Administrative United Kingdom
MA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/50096/24
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
on 28th October, 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE jepson
Between
MA
(anonymity direction Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Not present.
For the Respondent: Ms.Elmas, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 18th December, 2023 to refuse their protection claim made on 14thMay, 2022.
2. Given the date of claim, this is one of an increasingly rare number of appeals to which the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 does not apply.
Anonymity Direction
3. An anonymity direction was made on a previous occasion. It remains in force until further order.
BACKGROUND
4. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.
5. The Appellant asserts they are at risk on two fronts. It is claimed the Appellant is gay. His family, who are religious, learnt of that after someone sent photographs of the Appellant at a club in the UK. The Appellant’s father disowned him as a result, threatened to kill the Appellant if he returned. He had arrived to this country on a student visa around January 2022.
6. Separately from that, the Appellant describes having been imprisoned in late 2019. Allegations were made of a sexual nature involving a child. The case was withdrawn three months later, after which the Appellant and his family moved to another area. Threats continued from the family of the complainant. That led to the student visa being sought and travel to the UK. It is claimed the same threats persisted thereafter, albeit towards the Appellant’s family rather than him directly.
7. The Respondent accepts nationality and that the Refugee Convention is engaged. Also conceded is an absence of state protection or relocation on return. That applies to both elements of the claim. Dispute arises as to whether either can be believed. The Respondent argues none of the account is true, be it relating to sexuality or threats made as a result of the criminal allegations. As to objective risk, the only argument raised around claimed sexuality is that the account cannot be believed. In regard to threats arising from the criminal case, the refusal notes the Appellant was able to remain in Pakistan for several years without anything untoward befalling him.
8. The refusal suggests no behaviour triggering S.8 Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 has been shown.
HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE
Preliminary issues
9. Neither the Appellant not a representative attended court. A note within the directions tab of MyHMCTS dated 9th December, 2024 (responding to a request for an interpreter) observed the skeleton argument and bundle served by the Appellant was not compliant with the applicable Practice Direction. Nor had a country information schedule served, the Appellant’s bundle doing no more than attaching various external information and authorities. No formal direction was made but equally there was no response to the note left.
10. A previous application (8th July, 2024) for an extension of time to serve the Appellant’s case had been refused. On 28th August of the same year, the Tribunal directed the appeal would be listed. Nothing further had been heard from the Appellant’s solicitor. That remains the position to date.
11. A delay seems to have then occurred, the Respondent applying in March 2025 that the appeal be listed. Due to the current length of backlog, it was assigned to me a floating case on 28th October, 2026. A notice of hearing was placed on MyHMCTS on 7th August, 2026. It was emailed to an address provided by the Appellant’s solicitor on the same date. At no point had the solicitor sought to withdraw from the case.
12. Despite that, no-one appeared at court. No message was received to indicate there was a difficulty. As set out above, prior to that there had been a history of non-compliance.
13. For those reasons, I opted to hear the appeal in absence. Nothing was recorded, Ms.Elmas (the presenting officer assigned to my court) indicating without the Appellant or their representative attending the Respondent would rely on what had been argued within the papers. Judgment was reserved on that basis.
Issues in dispute
14. The Respondent concedes the following matters:
(a) The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan.
(b) His account engages the Refugee Convention. That appears to be the case in relation to both limbs the criminal allegation made and claims to be gay.
(c) Neither state protection or internal relocation would be available on return.
15. The parties agree the following issues remain in dispute:
(a) If any element of the Appellant’s account is true.
(b) Whether, even if so, a well-founded risk arises via threats made after the criminal proceedings were withdrawn.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
16. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
17. This is not disputed in relation to any aspect of the claim.
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, the Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
18. The factual account, beyond that the Appellant entered the UK via a student visa, is disputed entirely. A number of concerns are raised in the refusal. Though I will consider each individually, a global view has ultimately been taken. I have when doing so borne in mind that even if one part of a narrative is accepted or rejected does not mean an identical view must be taken of the remainder.
19. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the Appellant’s screening interview as SCR, the substantive interview as AIR.
20. Doubt is expressed about when the Appellant’s family became aware he is gay. Question 4.1 of the SCR is cited, in which the Appellant claimed he was accused of being gay in 2019. That, the Respondent argues, does not fit with the family being unaware until 14th April, 2022 (question 12 of the AIR.) That marked the date someone took photographs of the Appellant in a gay club then sent them to his father. The father in turn called and threatened to kill the Appellant if he returned. He was also disowned.
21. There may be more nuance to the account than the refusal suggests. I accept per 4.1 of the SCR the Appellant said he was accused of being gay and imprisoned for three months. Care must be taken around screening interviews. As question 4.1 itself makes clear, interviewees are directed to briefly (the word being underlined) set out the basis of their claim. A significant level of detail cannot reasonably be expected. On the other hand, nor is that a blanket defence against inconsistency. I equally bear in mind the AIR was comparatively short (thirty questions) though again that is not a tool by which issues within the account might simply be overlooked.
22. From his witness statement (6th December, 2024) the Appellant claimed he was accused in Pakistan of sodomy of a child (paragraph 4.) That led to the three-month period of remand referred to in the SCR. Bail followed in February 2020, the case being withdrawn in March. An agreement was signed, by which the Appellant left the local area. I will address those aspects of the account later in this section.
23. Very little of that was set out in the AIR. The Appellant did, I accept, talk at question 8 of what is called an “FIL” in the transcript being lodged (more likely a first information report per documentary evidence to which I will turn.) There was reference to powerful enemies and threats from family members once they realised the Appellant is gay (question 10.) When asked at question 11 why he was claiming asylum, the Appellant spoke only of his sexuality being discovered whilst in the UK and threats arising thereof. He described being shot at by enemies whilst in Pakistan at question 15, though that was not repeated in the later witness statement.
24. Approaching things with hopefully the required level of sensitivity, I have considered whether reference to being accused of homosexuality was intended to encompass the sodomy charges the Appellant says were brought against. Given the claimed victim of the latter is said to have been male, it could be said a degree of overlap exists between the two. I do not ignore that. However, whilst as set out above the Appellant referred to arrest and imprisonment during the AIR at no point did he provide detail other than that there were accusations of being gay. The two are not necessarily the same.
25. It may be the point made in the refusal – that the timeline as to when the family learned the Appellant is gay changed between interviews – carries less weight. Without speculating unduly, if one were to accept the criminal case was dropped or even existed at all that does not have to mean the family would believe he was gay at that point. He recounts no other incidents in Pakistan whereby that might have been discovered or even suspected. The argument might be made acquittal meant the incident of sodomy did not happen.
26. The more significant aspect in my view relates to the nature of the allegations faced. I can fairly consider that aspect, the refusal raising lack of detail (citing question 8 of the AIR) as a source of doubt. Even if some commonality exists between accusations of sodomy and being gay, it is equally arguable a distinction can be drawn between the two. If one were to read the AIR without reference to the later witness statement, the strong impression given is the Appellant was accused and imprisoned due to homosexuality itself. Nowhere in the interview is there any mention of a child or the accusations later described. Whilst bearing in mind my earlier observations about the level of detail expected at a first interview, that concern fits with what was said in the SCR. Much as with the later substantive interview, the Appellant claimed therein he was imprisoned for being gay (question 4.1.) On what is now said via the statement, that was not entirely right. Even allowing as I do for the relative brevity of the AIR, open questions (such as 11) were asked around the basis of claim. An opportunity existed to talk about the allegations made. The fact there was no clear mention of them marks in my view a notable inconsistency.
27. At paragraph 17 of his statement, the Appellant says any discrepancy around dates must be due to interpreter error. I note no interview corrections were submitted pre-refusal. That is despite, as will be discussed later in the determination, the Appellant having a solicitor at the time. He confirmed understanding of the translator in both interviews. From the transcripts provided, there is no sign of problems encountered during the process. That does not mean the claim is ignored but equally it is something raised only after concerns were expressed in the refusal.
28. Reliance is placed by the Repsondent on apparent disparity around family contact. Contrast is draw between threats (AIR 8 being cited) and recent contact with the Appellant’s mother (question 5.) The translated reply as question 8 reads as follows –
“We have enemies there and an FIL was lodged and I was sent to jail for 3 months and we had reconciliation. I am gay and, because of that, I fear my father, family, and my enemies as well. I receive threats because of this.”
Whilst bearing in mind meaning can be lost via translation, it nevertheless seems fairly clear in my view the Appellant was suggesting at least some threats came from family members. One might ask if so how there could be ongoing contact with them.
29. The difficulty with that argument is it assumes the family all took an identical view of events. I caution myself against guesswork but as a broad principle just because some relatives (the Appellant speaks in the plural during interview) made threats does not have to mean that involved every one of them. The Appellant did, in fairness, say at question 9 of the AIR he feared his father along with uncles. There was no specific mention of his mother. The point therefore carries less weight.
1. A related concern nonetheless arises. In response to the above point, the Appellant in his statement gave what I find to be an inconsistent account. In doing so, he did not directly address the issue. The statement describes how a friend had called from a hospital. They reported the Appellant’s mother was ill, handed the phone to her (paragraph 15.) In fairness, mention had been made during the AIR of the mother being unwell (5.) Some commonality thus exists between interview and statement.
2. Nonetheless, contact is characterised in the statement as an isolated event resulting from a friend’s intervention. At no point in the AIR did the Appellant suggest that was the case. The question at AIR appears fairly clear – “are you in contact with any of your family in Pakistan, if yes, when and who did you contact?”One could characterise the answer given as implying ongoing communication.
3. On what is now said, there was but a single call. Added to that is a claim made in the statement (again paragraph 15) that the mother refused to speak. It could I find have been reasonably expected the Appellant say at much in interview. Rather, he suggested there had been a conversation – “A week ago, I spoke to my mother, because she wasn't feeling well” (AIR 5.) At the very least, that now said adds context which could have been given at the time. I make plain the point is far from determinative of the claim. There was, that said, an opportunity to give more detail at that point. Such arose only as a result of challenge made via the refusal.
4. Part of the account involves someone sending photographs of the Appellant in a club to his father. That prompted disownment and the threats made. The refusal argues conflict exists with the narrative as to who sent the pictures. Questions 11 and 14 of the AIR are quoted. Respectively, it is said the Appellant claimed a friend of his father was involved (question 11) as against ‘my friends’ (question 14) having done so (the translated words recorded.) In his statement, the Appellant asserted he did not know who was responsible for sending the images. He had asked his father, who declined to answer. That led to the assumption it must be a friend to the father.
5. The point has some significance, given the transmission of photographs is said to be the reason the Appellant’s family discovered he is gay. If one were to accept reference to the father’s friend resulted from deduction on the Appellant’s part, that could have been said in interview. There is I find a difference between knowing who sent the images and simply guessing based on the father refusing to say. Even if one were to put that aside, there remains the fact an entirely contradictory version was given within a few questions of the same interview. The Appellant has not addressed that at all. Although a less central aspect, within paragraph 7 of his statement the Appellant shifts from a single photograph being taken to talking of things in the plural.
6. Although also argued in relation to objective risk, the refusal notes nothing seems to have happened to the Appellant between 2019 and 2022. He remained in Pakistan throughout. That is said to cast doubt on claims of ongoing threats. I do not ignore the point but relatively little weight has been given to it. Whilst recognising three years is a comparatively long time to remain unscathed, care must be taken not to make assumptions about how people might behave.
7. Other than extremely brief mention of being shot at (AIR 15,) the Appellant says nothing on the subject. He referred therein to the incident occurring before he was ‘displaced’ (the translated word used.) That implies the shooting was before the Appellant agreed to move to another area. Paragraph 5 of the Appellant’s statement says nothing about the subject. There is mention of what is termed harassment. That included those feared via the criminal case attending a family home. Much the same was said at paragraph 18. The Appellant ‘had to keep looking over my shoulder.’ He did not speak of a shooting. It might be a distinctive event to omit.
8. I take into account the point is not raised in the refusal. That means much less weight has been given to it. I can nevertheless consider what seems to me a fairly clear discrepancy within the narrative. It is also right to say even those events which were described at paragraph 5 of the statement are not mentioned in interview. I appreciate more information is given in the Appellant’s statement. That is not simply swept aside, though easier in my view to give detail once the Respondent’s reasons for refusal had been provided. In any event, after raising claims of being shot at, the Appellant then failed to talk of the incident every again. That does not determine the appeal but strikes me as potentially strange.
9. A number of documents are submitted. In his statement, the Appellant claims they were provided pre-refusal (paragraph 14.) Nothing demonstrates material was supplied to the Home Office at the time, though I bear in mind that point is not taken in the decision letter. As with other points discussed, that means much less weight is applied. I can. However, take the issue into account. It is something the Appellant has himself raised.
10. What may be of greater note is discussion on the topic at question 5.3 of the SCR. The Appellant said therein his mother had documents supportive of his case. She could send them. Quite how that fits with the account now given of the mother refusing to speak to the Appellant during what is portrayed as a chance call is unclear. It is difficult to reconcile each scenario.
11. That in turns raises the question how any documents now presented reached the Appellant. Contrary to what is said in the witness statement (paragraph 14,) he did not provide such material at the time of substantive interview. The end of the AIR notes an agreement to do so within a specified period thereafter. Though corroboration is not required, no evidence is supplied showing the documents were submitted within that time frame (or before refusal.) In saying that, I remind myself such feature does not have to mean the material is necessarily unreliable.
12. Without purporting to set out every word, I will address each of the documents in turn. Where the identity of an interpreter is given, they appear to be a lawyer based in Pakistan. No information is given as to their ability to accurately translate. That has some relevance, given the quality of English in several items is not particularly high. Again unless a contrary indication is given, each document is presented in both English and what appears to be original form.
13. Notwithstanding what is said about service of evidence prior to the point of refusal nothing in the Respondent’s bundle shows that to be the case. If so, that means less opportunity to comment on such evidence existed. Some balance must be struck on that topic. There is no Respondent’s review in these proceedings. The Appellant’s bundle was uploaded on 9th December, 2024. Per that said discussed under the ‘preliminary issues’ section above, the deadline to do so had long since passed by then. Equally, the Respondent had at least some time to submit a review and did not do so. The lack of review does not, however, mean the documents produced are in any way conceded. Nor does it require that I must necessarily accept such material to be reliable.
14. At page 15 of the Appellant’s bundle is something titled ‘dis-inheritance deed.’ The translated version does not bear a date, though the original seems to say 14th April, 2022. That was the date the Appellant says he was called and threatened by his father. I do not apply too much weight but that would mean the father moved very quickly from a call to obtaining what is implied to be a formal document.
15. The deed does not explicitly say the Appellant is gay. Instead, ‘..he is not obeying my order/commond {sic} nowadays he is residing in UK {sic} but do not {sic} contact me similarly now he is extra ordinary liberal and not following our tradition culture due to {sic} above said reason the entire family is in {sic} embarrassing situation.’ That might be considered broadly consistent with the Appellant’s account, though equally the wording suggests the Appellant had stopped contacting his father. At no point has the Appellant spoken of that. I quote part of the document to show the fairly poor English used.
16. The document at page 18 is titled ‘publication in respect dis-inheritance.’ It contains much the same wording as the latter half of the above deed, whereby the author absolves themselves of responsibility for the Appellant’s actions. As with the deed, the translated version is not dated. The original (page 19) may be something contained within a page of a newspaper. The implication, though the Appellant says nothing about this in his statement, is the father posted a public notice of his son being disowned. That could be considered an odd omission. Perhaps particularly so if as is claimed the Appellant had the documents at the time of his substantive interview. I acknowledge there was mention of disownment at that point. However, nothing was said about that being publicly advertised.
17. Page 20 consists of an ‘affidavit of facts and service.’ It is written in English. Therein, a lawyer (not the same person as seems to have translated the other documents) seeks to certify that an accompanying bail petition is accurate. One of several stamps indicates a date of 29th February, 2020. The document which follows, dated the day before, looks to be a bail application. It describes the allegation faced, whereby the Appellant was arrested in December 2019 for alleged sodomy of a child. Reference is made at paragraph 4 of the document to a compromise having been reached with the complaining party. Bail was thereby agreed.
18. A first information report (FIR hereinafter) is at page 24. It also sets out the allegation made. In contrast to the above court document – which says the allegation was reported on 12th December, 2019 at a police station – the FIR indicates that was on 8th December. Not the largest of differences but nevertheless a discrepancy. I bear in mind when making such comment the material is presented as official police/court documents. It might be a greater expectation of accuracy could arise as a result, though I take care not to over-emphasise that aspect. The English is as with other documents rather poor, for example ‘…I remain silent due to dear that’s way report is lodge delay.’
19. Found at page 26 is a document, written in English, from the same lawyer who appears to have translated the other material. Mention is made of translation from Urdu to English, though no original appears to have been submitted. Although the contents are not entirely clear, there is reference to attaching a court document by which the Appellant was acquitted on 3rd March, 2021. That is said to contain a ‘clerical mistake,’ by which the Appellant’s family name was misspelt. No reason is given for such error, though I recognise it was at least highlighted.
20. The applicable court documents follow at page 27. They are in English, without an original being clearly included in the bundle. As was noted in the lawyer’s document at page 26, the name of the defendant is spelt differently to that of the Appellant. The difference is only one letter. As with other aspects relating to documentation, I am careful not to engage in undue speculation. Nevertheless, given the court papers are presented as evidence the Appellant faced criminal proceedings it could be considered strange his name – a fundamental part of an official record – is wrong.
21. I again take care not to draw too much from the point but the document is stamped as attested on 23rd October, 2023. That was the date of the AIR. Without engaging in undue guesswork, it may be difficult to see how it reached the Appellant in time for his substantive interview. The rest of the stamp (page 29) suggests a request for attestation was also made on the same date. That would mean not only did the document reach the Appellant around the same time it was requested, someone had to make and process such request within the same twenty-four hour period. It is not clear whether there should be a version of the document other than in English. No assumptions are made about that but I note most of the other material presented is presented in translated and original form.
22. At page 30 is a document titled ‘release warrant.’ It directs release of the Appellant, appears to be dated 28th February, 2020 per the above court documents. What may be an original is attached, though nothing explains who performed translation of it.
23. What might be a police report is at page 32. It has been translated by the same lawyer as before, is in equally broken English – ‘..my son {Appellant’s name} who gone {sic} for study abroad, who is received {sic} threats for life from {two names given} due to previous enmity with them, as they has {six} charged my son in a false and fabricated case PI lodge {sic} the report as the life of my son is in dangerous {sic.}’ The document, which is dated 22nd February, 2022, seems to refer to a false allegation made against the Appellant and threats made as a result.
24. An almost identically worded document, with original, is at page 34. It is dated 13th March, 2022. Whilst that may support a suggestion of multiple threats made after the Appellant left, why the report bears exactly the same words as the first is unclear. Taking things back a step, it is similarly not clear why such threats were only seemingly reported – at least in a form which was documented – after the Appellant left the UK. He describes in his statement being threatened and harassed prior to departing Pakistan. If, as seems said, the police were willing to take a report, I struggle to understand why efforts to seek their help were not made sooner.
25. An undertaking is provided at page 36. The lawyer as before translated it, an original being attached. The original is dated 21st April, 2021 whereas the translation is undated. Therein, the Appellant’s father appears to undertake that the Appellant will leave the local village. Some broken English is exhibited as with other documents. The skeleton argument suggests the entire family had to move. His statement (paragraph 5) makes the same claim. That does not necessarily fit with the undertaking, which seems to indicate only he would be departing the area.
26. Dealing with documentary evidence relating to claimed sexuality, two statements are presented. They come from a witness I shall call MK (page 6 Appellant’s bundle – 5th December, 2024) and MH (page 9 – dated similarly to MK.) Neither is supported by ID. Given the lack of attendance at court, nor has either been tested by way of cross-examination. That does not mean the evidence has simply been put aside, however.
27. MK describes themselves as the chairperson of an LGBT organisation in the UK. They met the Appellant via the witness MH in February 2024. Attendance at the group has taken place since on a monthly basis. A one-to-one session took place before a membership card was supplied. That was issued September 2024. I cannot see it within the evidence provided. New members are observed, though MK accepts anyone is welcome to join. They describe having seen the Appellant being in an ‘intimate situation’ with two men. MH had told MK he and the Appellant were in a relationship.
28. MH says he met the Appellant at a named club in January 2024. He invited the Appellant to join the LGBT group run by MK. There had been regular attendance since. The two had been intimate twice but never in a relationship. That conflicts to an extent with what MH says. The Appellant had been to Liverpool Pride. MH had also seen him behaving intimately with men in clubs.
29. The statements lend some credence to the Appellant’s account. It is nevertheless comparatively limited. Concern arises as to lack of supporting ID documents. That means whilst not necessarily the case, each statement could have been written by anyone. No literature is produced to show the LGBT group described exists. The lack of membership card raises doubt. It could have been easily produced. Whilst a much less central point, any involvement with either witness seems to have begun long after the Appellant arrived to the UK. I take care with that, appreciating as a broad point assumptions should not be made about how long on arrival to another country someone might begin to express their sexuality openly.
30. However, that is not the only potential concern. In the AIR, the Appellant suggested he had been going to gay clubs before his father made the threatening call in April 2022. He stopped doing so as a result (question 16.) Thereafter, the Appellant began using what he called a ‘gender app.’ It allowed people to arrange meetings at each other’s houses. Whilst reminding myself corroboration is not required, no evidence showing either aspect has been produced. Moreover, whilst again something approached with caution it does not appear despite apparently open expressions of sexuality the Appellant engaged with LGBT groups until just after his asylum claim was refused. I again caution myself not to simply make assumptions about how someone would act. The timing is nevertheless something that can be taken into account.
31. The Appellant’s skeleton argument cites various external material. It is suggested what the argument calls ‘carnal intercourse’ is illegal in Pakistan, that humiliation and death await those who are gay. There is no need to rehearse that quoted at length therein. I have taken all of it into account, particularly given it is referenced several times, applicable country policy[1]. Referring to an updated version now available, it seems simply being gay does not create sufficient risk from the state whereby a protection claim might succeed[2]. Any laws which prohibit same-sex activity are described as rarely leading to prosecution or conviction[3]. It is, however, equally asserted from the same source such risk would arise from non-state actors[4]. That forms the centre of the Appellant’s case. Some support is afforded to the account as a result. Objective material exists to show the reaction of the Appellant’s father to his sexuality is not necessarily atypical. That might also be said of those claimed to have made threats.
32. Even taking that into account, I do not believe either element of the account. Both have in my view been concocted as a mean to remain in this country. Whilst some parts of the evidence are supportive, they are entirely outweighed by the various concerns discussed above. The documents produced do more harm to credibility than they assist. I do not consider any of them to be reliable. Even to the standard of reasonable likelihood, the account in my view is entirely incredible. To be clear, I reject any claim the Appellant is gay. Nor do I believe it reasonably likely he faced criminal proceedings in Pakistan, was threatened and continues to be at risk as a result. That said about the latter in particular is extremely vague.
33. The asylum claim is thereby dismissed. I will nevertheless consider the remaining elements thereof, in the interests of completeness.
(a) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(b) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
34. In relation to claimed sexuality, the only point made in the refusal is that the Appellant’s account is untrue. I need not rehearse my findings on that point.
35. The same is said as regards threats said to have been made following the criminal proceedings. Again, there is no need for me to repeat that already discussed.
36. As a secondary argument, the refusal relies on what is deemed an absence of action taken against the Appellant over a considerable period of time. That is defined within by the Respondent as 2019-22. It may be more accurately characterised as starting in March 2020, that being the point at which the Appellant was released on bail. I have already set out my concerns on that subject. I reject any of the events involved – be it in Pakistan or the UK – ever took place. That logically means no risk can arise.
37. A well-founded risk has therefore not been established for any element of the narrative.
(a) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
38. Both of the above aspects are conceded, though depend entirely on whether the Appellant’s version of events is believed.
The Humanitarian Claim
39. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
40. Although a distinct element from the asylum limb of the appeal, the same competing factors apply. As do the conclusions reached.
Other Issues
41. The Appellant’s skeleton argument refers to Article 3. To the extent that is based on the same claimed facts as the protection elements, it is dismissed. The same concerns expressed apply.
42. At paragraph 43 of the skeleton, a suggestion is made the Appellant faces prison conditions which would breach Article 3. It is also submitted he might die in custody due to poor health. The question of health is not mentioned anywhere else in the papers that I can see. No medical evidence is provided. The Appellant said at question 1 of the AIR he has no health problems. He made no mention of the subject in his statement.
43. The basis of those claims, even that relating to poor health, seems based on the prospect of being imprisoned in Pakistan for being gay. Given I have rejected such claim, any such risk does not arise.
44. Article 5 – cited as the right against arbitrary arrest – is also raised. I am unclear from the skeleton how that applies to the Appellant’s case. If it is intended to refer to claimed sexuality, my dismissal of the account means no chance of such arrest exists. If based on another aspect of the account, I do not understand how a prosect of arrest arises. On the Appellant’s case, the criminal proceedings were withdrawn. No suggestion is made of a further case against him.
45. There is reference at paragraph 10 of the skeleton argument to private life issues. Article 8 is mentioned at paragraph 48. No context is provided. Although not at all clear, the implication seems to be that relates as with other aspects of the appeal to the Appellant claimed sexuality. Aside from that, no elements of a private life are cited. My rejection of that part of the account means it cannot be considered as part of an Article 8 assessment.
46. I recognise given the Appellant has been in the UK since 2022 he may have amassed sufficient such life (generally, rather in the context of claimed sexuality) whereby Article 8 might be engaged. However, for much of that he held no status in this country. Limited weight would therefore be applied. A clear public interest exists in immigration control. Given use of interpreters in interview, nothing shows the Appellant speaks English. There is no indication the Appellant is financially independent. He refers at question 3.1 to his father having cut funding for studies a short time before the SCR took place.
47. Other than claims around sexuality, no other information is given as to extent of private life. Having rejected that part of the narrative, I cannot find removal would be a disproportionate breach thereof.
48. Similarly (and to the extent it may be relied on,) very significant obstacles to re-integration do not arise. If one discounts, as I have, any suggestion of threat on return and that said about sexuality, what remains is a comparatively young man who was born and spent most of his life in Pakistan. The span of time spent in this country would not in my view have significantly reduced familiarity with language and culture. Per question 2.6 of the SCR, the Appellant has some education. Sufficiently so he was attending college in the UK. Rejection of the account means family remain in Pakistan. Beyond that asserted around sexuality, no other dispute with them has been raised. They had but for that aspect of the account been described as supportive. As the Appellant commented at question 11 of the AIR, all was well ‘..going on well..’prior to that point.
49. Even if one were to accept some contention existed, as someone in seemingly good health with an education the Appellant would be in no worse a position to re-establish himself than anyone else. Perhaps better than some. Sufficient obstacles to re-integration do not therefore arise.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal on asylum grounds is dismissed.
The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.
All other grounds are dismissed.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
The appeal has been dismissed. No fee award can be made.
Signed Date 2nd November, 2026
FTTJ Jepson
First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson
Notes
[1] CPIN Pakistan – Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression – February 2024 version quoted in the skeleton, the current edition being dated November 2025.
[2] Ibid., 3.2.1.
[3] Op.Cit., 3.2.5.
[4] Op,Cit. 3.3.2.
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