Civil United Kingdom

Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) PTE Ltd v Francesco Mazzagatti & Anor

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1403

Case No: CA-2026-002478 AND CA-2026-002485

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

Mr Lionel Persey KC (sitting as a judge of the High Court)

[2026] EWHC 2178 (Comm)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: November 3, 2026

Before:

LORD JUSTICE ZACAROLI

LORD JUSTICE BUTCHER
and

SIR LAUNCELOT HENDERSON

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between:

ALLIANCE PETROCHEMICAL INVESTMENT (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD Claimant/ Appellant/ Cross-Respondent
– and –
(1) FRANCESCO MAZZAGATTI
(2) FRANCESCO DIXIT DOMINUS
-and-
ARSHIYA JAHANPOUR
-and-
VIARO ENERGY LIMITED
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants
Third Party
Cross-Appellant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Hodge Malek KC, James Potts and Diana Stoean (instructed by Devonshires Solicitors LLP) for the Claimant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent

Jonathan Nash KC, Daniel Hubbard and Samuel Cathro (instructed by Grosvenor Law Ltd) for the Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants

Hearing dates: 13-14 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Judgment Approved by the court

Lord Justice Butcher:

1. The Court has to decide an appeal and a cross-appeal in relation to interlocutory decisions of Mr Lionel Persey KC (‘the judge’). The judge gave his judgment on 14 August 2026 (‘the Judgment’), and the relevant order is dated 24 August 2026.

2. The judge determined five applications:

(1) An application by the Claimant, Alliance Petrochemical Investment (Singapore) Pte Ltd (‘API’) for non-party disclosure from H&P Advisory Ltd (‘H&P’) pursuant to s. 34(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR r. 31.17 (the ‘H&P Application’).

(2) An application by Viaro Energy Ltd (‘VEL’) to be joined to the H&P Application for the purposes of opposing it. This application was unopposed.

(3) An application by the Defendants, Mr Mazzagatti and Mr Dixit Dominus, to strike out certain parts of API’s statements of case pursuant to CPR r. 3.4(2)(a) and (b) (the ‘Strike Out Application’).

(4) An application by API for a worldwide freezing and proprietary injunction against the Defendants’ assets up to a value of €160 million (the ‘WFO Application’).

(5) An application by the Defendants and VEL dated 12 August 2026 for a stay of any disclosure pursuant to the H&P Application pending the outcome of their appeal (the ‘Stay Application’).

3. The judge refused the Strike Out Application, granted the H&P Application in relation to 8 of 9 categories of documents, refused the WFO Application, and refused the Stay Application. With permission granted by Lord Justice Newey on 25 September 2026, there is an appeal in respect of the judge’s determination of each of those applications.

The Nature of the Present Litigation

4. The present is a very hard-fought piece of commercial litigation. As the judge said at the outset of the judgment, there have apparently been some 22 applications already made in these proceedings, and they have not yet reached the disclosure stage.

5. A neutral description of the case can be found in the Case Memorandum, which is a case management document prepared by the parties and which contains a short and uncontroversial description of what the case is about (Commercial Court Guide, D4.1). I have adopted much of that in the following short summary.

6. API is a Singapore company. At all material times, it has been a shareholder of Mehr Petrochemical Company (‘MHPC’), an Iranian company which owns a petrochemical plant in Iran. Under its arrangements with MHPC, API was entitled to offtake petrochemical product manufactured by MHPC through an Assigned Distributor, and to re-sell the product in the marketplace, receiving revenue from customers.

7. On 31 July 2018, 100% of API’s shares were acquired by Petrochemical Industries Ltd (‘PIL’), a Hong Kong company which at that time was wholly owned and controlled by Mr Mazzagatti. Initially, the Assigned Distributor was Napag IT Limited (‘Napag IT’), a company incorporated in Ras Al Khaimah, UAE, which at that time was also wholly owned and controlled by Mr Mazzagatti.

8. Later, a Sharjah company, Alliance Petrochemicals Trading LLC (‘APT’), which was incorporated in December 2018 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of API, became the Assigned Distributor in place of Napag IT. APT was dissolved in 2021/22.

9. Mr Mazzagatti was an appointed director of API from 31 July 2018 to 14 September 2020. API claims that, despite his resignation as a director on 14 September 2020, Mr Mazzagatti acted as a shadow director of API, until at least mid – to – late 2022 (which is denied by the Defendants). API claims that Mr Mazzagatti acted as API’s CEO and Mr Dixit Dominus acted as API’s CFO.

10. API claims that Mr Mazzagatti was responsible for the incorporation of APT in Sharjah, UAE, in 2018, and claims that Mr Mazzagatti set up bank accounts for both API (at United Overseas Bank, Singapore) and APT (at Al Masraf Bank, UAE). API claims that at all material times Mr Mazzagatti, assisted by Mr Dixit Dominus, had full control over API’s and APT’s day-to-day operations, the proceeds of the offtake received by the Assigned Distributors, and API’s and APT’s bank accounts. API claims that Mr Mazzagatti and Mr Dixit Dominus used their control over API, APT and their bank accounts to misappropriate at least €143,808,798.66 from API and APT, both by making unauthorised transfers from their bank accounts for the benefit of themselves, their associates and entities controlled by them, and by diverting funds received by Napag IT, as Assigned Distributor, from API’s customers. API claims that large parts of these funds were diverted to PIL, then to Mr Mazzagatti personally, and were used by him and his majority-owned companies, Viaro Investment Ltd (‘VIL’) and VEL to acquire a North Sea oil and gas company, RockRose Energy Ltd (then known as RockRose Energy PLC (‘RockRose’)) on 2 September 2020. API brings claims for breach of trust/fiduciary duty, dishonest assistance, knowing receipt, unjust enrichment, conversion, and conspiracy, and a tracing claim into VIL, VEL and RockRose.

11. The Defendants deny API’s claims in their entirety. They allege that API and APT, and their bank accounts, were at all material times from 10 September 2018 onwards controlled not by the Defendants but solely by Mr Arshiya Jahanpour, whom they allege assumed ‘sole control’ of API from that date. Even in respect of the period between 31 July 2018 and 10 September 2018, the Defendants allege that API’s day-to-day operations were left in the hands of Mr Jahanpour and API’s previous management. The Defendants deny any involvement in API from 10 September 2018 onwards, other than (until September 2020) Mr Mazzagatti remaining an appointed director and Mr Dixit Dominus (acting for PIL) receiving monthly updates on API’s accounting to ensure that it could meet its alleged obligations to PIL. They deny that Mr Mazzagatti was API’s CEO or that Mr Dixit Dominus was API’s CFO.

12. The Defendants allege that Mr Jahanpour, not the Defendants, set up APT in December 2018. They deny that Mr Mazzagatti was responsible for making or overseeing any payments by API or APT. They allege that Mr Jahanpour had access to API’s and APT’s bank accounts at all times, and that the API directors had access to API’s bank statements. The Defendants allege that Mr Jahanpour continues to control API and is directing the present claim.

13. The Defendants allege that on 10 September 2018, Mr Jahanpour agreed that API would pay PIL for the upfront payment paid by PIL to the ‘Original Sellers’ of API (Itochu Corporation, PTT Global Chemical Public Company Ltd and SCG Chemicals Company) in July 2018, together with all deferred consideration due from PIL to the Original Sellers, and that Mr Jahanpour would additionally pay PIL a sum of US$23,220,000 plus SGD 15,000 to acquire 50% of API’s shares. The Defendants accept that PIL received certain sums from API’s and APT’s bank accounts but allege that these payments were all made by Mr Jahanpour pursuant to this agreement. The Defendants allege that RockRose was legitimately acquired by VEL with funds that did not originate from API or APT.

14. As regards payments to Napag IT, the Defendants allege that these were in the ordinary course of business but that they were not involved in them. They allege that all payments from API to Mr Dixit Dominus were legitimate payments for services which Mr Dixit Dominus provided to API.

15. The Defendants allege that Mr Jahanpour used his control of API improperly to direct payments to the accounts of MAM Refined Oil Products Trading LLC (‘MAM’), APT and Black Diamond FZC (a company incorporated in the Fujairah Free Zone, UAE), and from there to accounts of entities said to be controlled entirely by him (namely Black Gold FZC, Petropolymer International Trading LLC, Starex International FZE and Starex Dis Tikaret Kimya Anonim Sirketi) for his personal benefit.

16. These allegations by the Defendants are all denied by the Claimant.

The Judgment

17. In the Judgment, the judge commenced with a description of the ‘Background’, prefacing this with the comment that while virtually every matter of substance was in issue between the parties, ‘it is significant that it is accepted by the Defendants that there is a good arguable case and/or serious issue to be tried in relation to each of API’s pleaded allegations’. He then set out what he described as a brief summary of the allegations made by each party, saying that he had taken this summary from API’s skeleton argument. He said that:

“I make no judgment as to the correctness of these matters. Although many of them are disputed by the Defendants I consider that API has a good arguable case and/or have shown that there is a serious issue to be tried in relation to those matters that have not been specifically pleaded.”

18. The judge’s summary then runs from paragraph 4 to paragraph 29 of the Judgment. It is a detailed précis of allegations made, but one which is, by reason of its provenance, slanted, as the Defendants fairly say, in favour of API. In addition to the allegations which I have already summarised by reference to the Case Memorandum, it is helpful to identify here the following further or more detailed areas of allegations which are referred to in the judge’s summary.

(1) API contends that its case that Mr Mazzagatti set up APT is supported by: documents obtained from Sharjah Media City, indicating that he was responsible for its establishment, the renewal of its licence and shutting it down; and a ‘purported’ Board Resolution of API referring to a meeting on 6 December 2018 apparently conferring on Mr Mazzagatti powers to open APT and set up bank accounts as its sole signatory, which cannot be a genuine document as all the apparent signatories deny having signed it and there was no Board meeting on that date.

(2) In relation to its allegation that the Defendants directly took funds out of API and APT’s bank accounts, API relies on APT banking records obtained in 2024 and 2025 from Al Masraf Bank, showing that Mr Mazzagatti had personally signed cheque requests and cash withdrawal request forms. Two examples are relied on. The first is two cash withdrawals of AED 1 million each on 5 July 2020. API infers these were in connexion with the acquisition of RockRose and what it contends was the forged documentation produced in relation to that. While Mr Mazzagatti has said that Mr Jahanpour requested one of the withdrawals, and attended the bank with him on 5 July 2020, Mr Jahanpour had been in London at the time. The other is Mr Mazzagatti’s signature of a cheque request form dated 15 December 2020 for a manager’s cheque for AED 6.6 million issued to Mr Saeed Mohamed Saif Alowaid Almheiri, then a senior advisor to the Fujairah Government. This money was paid on the same date as RockRose entered into an agreement to sell one of its subsidiaries (UKCS8 LLC) to Fujairah International Oil and Gas Corporation for US$ 1, in circumstances where UKCS8 LLC is said to have had decommissioning liabilities to joint venture partners. API infers that the AED 6.6 million was a corrupt payment made in connexion with the RockRose-Fujairah transaction.

(3) API relies on transactions shown by Mr Mazzagatti’s bank statements at the Commercial Bank of Dubai which are said to show that he benefitted from substantial payments made to PIL from API’s and APT’s bank accounts.

(4) API makes the case that the Defendants took steps to conceal their misappropriations, including by misrepresentations and forgeries. These include: representations that API held substantial funds in a ‘dedicated account’ for MHPC; the production of a ‘doctored’ bank statement for APT’s Al Masraf AED account showing the balance on 28 February 2021; Mr Mazzagatti’s dissolving APT using a false board resolution; Mr Mazzagatti’s handing to two other directors of API in November 2022 a draft API Board Resolution backdated to 30 September 2020, including a dividend declared in favour of PIL, to be offset against debts of PIL, when no such board meeting had taken place and no dividend had been declared; Mr Mazzagatti’s attempt, on 25 November 2022, to transfer 100% of PIL’s shares in API to Sonic Investment Ltd (‘Sonic’), which was owned by Ms Nejla Baccouche (a friend of Mr Mazzagatti), for nominal consideration; and Mr Mazzagatti’s actual transfer of his shares in PIL to Sonic for no payment in return.

(5) API makes the case that Mr Mazzagatti has relied on a forged SPA with Ms Baccouche dated 10 September 2018, a forged Novation Agreement with Ms Baccouche and Sonic dated 24 September 2022 and a forged Termination and SPA with Sonic dated 3 January 2023 as well as similar documents relating to Mr Jahanpour and his mother.

(6) In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, the judge refers to API’s case that a substantial portion of the funds alleged to have been misappropriated by the Defendants was used to fund the acquisition of RockRose. The Judgment says that ‘[c]entral to this is API’s allegation that the Defendants used forged documents to claim VEL had financing for the acquisition via two loan facilities of £250 million each from two Abu Dhabi Sheikhs, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Thiab’. The Judgment sets out, in detail, API’s case that these facilities, which are referred to as ‘the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities’, were forgeries and that the RockRose acquisition involved fraudulent misrepresentations made by VEL, acting by the Defendants. These allegations, and their relationship to the pleadings, will be considered below.

(7) API relies on the fact that Mr Mazzagatti and Mr Dixit Dominus received salaries of £68.4 million and £20.1 million, respectively, between 2022 and 2024, notwithstanding that there are, API contends, doubts as to VIL, VEL and RockRose’s financial positions.

(8) API claims that it has suffered losses of at least €143 million, which was the amount of API’s outstanding liability to MHPC. The judgment records that API’s case is that it entered into a settlement agreement with MHPC on 17 August 2023 to repay the debt; that it was unable to repay that debt, and financed the payments under the settlement agreement through a loan from a Hong Kong company called Selenium Resources Ltd (‘Selenium’); that Selenium ultimately enforced against 49,310 of API’s shares in MHPC through a judgment of the Iranian courts of 4 August 2024. It records also that it is the Defendants’ case that Selenium is controlled by Mr Jahanpour and that the Selenium transactions and the Iranian judgment were a sham/fraud.

19. The judge dealt first with the Strike Out Application. At paragraph 30 he identified the paragraphs of API’s Amended Particulars of Claim (‘APOC’) and Amended Reply (‘AR’) which the Defendants were seeking to strike out. He then said that these passages fell into two categories: first, the acquisition of the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities; and secondly, the Foreign Proceedings Allegations. He set out the parties’ respective cases in relation to the application to strike out the passages relating to the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities and then proceeded to conclude that the application to strike them out failed, for four reasons. These were, in summary: (i) that they were closely related to API’s case that RockRose was purchased through the use of funds that were misappropriated from API; (ii) that if relevant allegations of fraud/dishonesty were to be made it was right that they should be pleaded; (iii) that he did not consider that the allegations were no more than an attempt to prejudice the Court against Mr Mazzagatti and exert illegitimate pressure upon the Defendants; and (iv) that the allegations which API makes are close in time to each other and, if made good, suggest a pattern of forgery and other dishonesty that is, or may be, relevant to API’s claims against the Defendants. In relation to (iv), he said that the allegations did not, in his view, amount to similar fact evidence, but, if he was wrong about that, then they were admissible similar fact evidence (Judgment para. 46). The judge then dealt with the Foreign Proceedings Allegations, and at paragraph 51 said that he would dismiss the strike out application in relation to them as well because ‘I consider that API has shown that the foreign proceedings are arguably relevant to their claim in fraud against the Defendants’.

20. The judge then turned to consider the H&P Application. After summarising the parties’ positions relating to it, he said that he disagreed with the Defendants in relation to it. He said (at paragraph 59):

“[The Defendants’] strike out application has failed. No costs will be incurred by them at this stage because H&P’s costs will, at least in the first instance, be paid for by API. I am satisfied that the first eight of the categories of documents sought in the H&P Application are necessary and potentially relevant for the reasons which they have given. API has satisfied me that it has legitimate concerns about the authenticity of the documents produced to date by the Defendants and I consider that the disclosure of documents in the possession of H&P may well show whether those concerns are, or are not, justified. I do not, however, regard the ninth category as being confined to the issues in this case and do not order disclosure of the documents sought under this category.”

21. At paragraphs 60-78 the judge then dealt with the WFO Application. He set out the applicable principles as he understood them to be, and gave a summary of the parties’ submissions. At paragraph 69 he referred to the judgment of Flaux J in Madoff Securities v Raven [2011] EWHC 3102 (Comm) in relation to the effect of delay on the making of an application for a freezing injunction, and at paragraph 70 said that, while delay will not, by itself, be dispositive in an application for a WFO it can be a powerful consideration. At paragraph 71 he said that API’s case ‘has not materially changed over the years’ and that the ‘principal allegations of fraud and forgery have been the same all along’. He said: ‘I consider that API needs to point to new evidence showing a risk of dissipation if it is to have any prospect of success on its WFO application.’ He then turned to consider ‘three more recent matters’ relied on by API: (i) the recent restatement of VIL’s 2023 accounts, to show a considerable loss; (ii) the effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal in TAQA Bratani Ltd v Fujairah Oil and Gas UK LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1669; and (iii) evidence of what API called the exorbitant salaries and bonuses of the Defendants.

22. The judge considered these three ‘more recent’ matters in turn. He said, at paragraph 73, that he found API’s reliance on the financial position of VIL, VEL and RockRose to be misplaced because there was little or no support for API’s expert’s conclusion that they are financially vulnerable. At paragraph 74, he said that he could find nothing in the Court of Appeal decision in the TAQA case which showed that the Defendants had a propensity to strip assets. At paragraph 75 he addressed API’s reliance on the remuneration of the Defendants. He said that, ‘whilst undoubtedly extremely generous’, Mr Mazzagatti’s remuneration was contractually linked to a fixed percentage of EBITDA, had been disclosed in company accounts, and was made in accordance with the ordinary course of business of the Viaro group and RockRose.

23. At paragraph 76, the judge said:

“It follows from the above that I find that API has not established any new evidence in support of its allegations regarding the dissipation of assets. I consider that the delay in making this application is fatal to the WFO Application.”

He then stated, in paragraph 77, that it was not necessary to consider the Defendants’ further arguments as to why it would not be just and convenient for the Court to grant a WFO. He said, however, that he considered that they had made good the first reason for which they had contended, namely that any injunction would have ‘a catastrophic impact on Mr Mazzagatti’s business.’

24. At paragraph 78 the judge dealt with the application which had been made to him by API for a proprietary injunction, and said that API had not demonstrated that there was a serious issue that they can establish that the funds which they seek to injunct are traceable so as to give rise to an entitlement to a proprietary claim.

The Issues on the Appeals

25. Whilst, because of issues as to availability of counsel, it was not the order in which they were addressed before this Court, I intend to consider the issues arising on the appeal and cross-appeal in the order in which they were addressed by the judge.

The Appeal in relation to the Strike Out Application

26. The Defendants characterise the allegations they seek to strike out as ‘Collateral Allegations’, falling into five categories, as follows: (i) allegations that the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities were fictitious (these have been called the ‘Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations’); (ii) allegations that when VEL acquired RockRose, it made misrepresentations to various third parties as to the genuineness of the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities, and especially to Snowden J who, on 27 August 2020, sanctioned the Scheme of Arrangement (these have been called ‘the Snowden Allegations’); (iii) allegations that Dias J dismissed the claim brought by TAQA Bratani Ltd and others against the Defendants and others, see [2024] EWHC 3146 (Comm), ‘at least partly’ on the basis that the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities were genuine (these have been called ‘the Dias Allegations’); (iv) allegations that Mr Mazzagatti sent H&P a fake balance confirmation letter for the purpose of evidencing that Sheikh Zayed had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the loan (these have been called ‘the Balance Confirmation Allegations’); and (v) allegations as to accusations made in two sets of foreign proceedings, namely certain proceedings by the Italian tax authorities in relation to Mr Mazzagatti, and a criminal case pending against him before the Court of Milan (these have been called ‘the Foreign Proceedings Allegations’).

The Parties’ contentions

27. The Defendants contend that the judge’s decision in relation to the Strike Out Application (and the H&P Disclosure Application) was vitiated by a serious procedural irregularity, namely his wholesale adoption, in the Judgment, of API’s account of the background and of the pleaded issues, notwithstanding that it was partisan, and his failure adequately to record the Defendants’ case in response.

28. As to the merits of the Strike Out Application the Defendants contend that the ‘Collateral Allegations’ plead matters which API does not need to prove in order to succeed on its claim, but which raise serious issues, based on allegations of dishonesty, which the Defendants cannot ignore; and that as such they are likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings within the meaning of CPR 3.4(2)(b) by clogging up those proceedings with irrelevant collateral matters and thereby wasting the parties’ (and the Court’s) time.

29. Further, the Defendants point to the way in which the ‘Collateral Allegations’ are introduced into API’s statements of case. Other than two, which appear in the AR, they are all contained in paragraph 78 of APOC. This paragraph appears under a heading claiming Norwich Pharmacal/Bankers’ Trust relief. It has since been stated by API that it is not claiming such relief against the Defendants. The various matters pleaded in paragraph 78 are however said, in paragraph 81 of APOC, to be particularisation of API’s claim to trace misappropriated funds into the shares in and assets of VIL, VEL and/or RockRose. The Defendants point out, however, that it is common ground that the Abu Dhabi Loan Facilities were not drawn down, and not used in the purchase of RockRose, and cannot found or support a tracing claim. The Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations are therefore irrelevant to API’s pleaded causes of action. Nor can they be similar fact evidence, and the judge expressly found (in Judgment para. 46) that they were not.

30. As to the Snowden, Dias and Balance Confirmation Allegations the judge had failed to consider these separately at all. He had, the Defendants contend, failed to identify and apply his mind to each of these different categories. This amounted to another serious procedural irregularity. And if and to the extent that the judge’s reasons for dismissing the application to strike out the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations were intended to apply to these three further categories, his decision not to strike them out was, a fortiori, wrong.

31. The Foreign Proceedings Allegations, the Defendants say, do not even contain allegations of any underlying matters, but just consist of a summary of allegations said to have been made in two sets of foreign proceedings, the first of which – i.e. the tax investigation, has now been dismissed, and the second – the Milan Court proceedings – has been narrowed and is contested, and both of which concern matters said to have occurred in 2017 and 2018, well before the RockRose acquisition. These amount to no more than prejudice; and the judge gave no adequate reasons for not striking them out.

32. API, for its part, contends that the judge’s decision on the Strike Out Application was correct, essentially for the reasons he gave, and certainly did not exceed the ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. It points out that the Defendants have not appealed against the judge’s finding (in paragraph 3 of the Judgment) that there was a good arguable case and/or a serious issue to be tried as to the facts alleged in the impugned paragraphs, amongst others. There was no procedural irregularity in the judge’s account of the background: he made it clear that he had derived it from API’s skeleton argument, he had summarised the Defendants’ defences, and did not ignore their case. He had made no final factual findings but had rather concluded that API had demonstrated serious issues to be tried, which was a holding which the Defendants had not sought to appeal.

33. In relation to the merits of the Strike Out Application, API contends that the judge had adopted a correct approach. The Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations (as well as the Snowden Allegations, the Dias Allegations and the Balance Confirmation Allegations, which can be taken together with the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations) are not collateral issues. They are instead fully particularised, factual allegations which are part of the events in question on which API relies in inviting the Court to infer fraud and asset-stripping by the Defendants. They are, in essence, particulars of the fraud. They are also relevant to whether specific pleaded payments (namely the large cash withdrawals and the cheque payment referred to above) were in connexion with the production of fake documents supporting the existence of the Abu Dhabi loans, giving rise to the inference that the Defendants controlled the relevant bank accounts. No question of similar fact evidence arose: the judge correctly found that these allegations were directly relevant. But if they were properly regarded as pleading similar fact evidence, the judge was correct in permitting it to be pleaded.

34. In relation to the Foreign Proceedings Allegations, API does aver that the allegations against Mr Mazzagatti in the pending Milan criminal trial are true, and says that this supports the inference that his companies did not have sufficient resources to acquire RockRose without resorting to funds misappropriated from API and APT.

Discussion

35. Under CPR r. 3.4(2) the court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court, amongst other things:

“(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;

(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings…”

36. CPR r. 16.4 states, in part:

“(1) Particulars of claim must include –”

(a) a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies …”

37. As is set out in the Commercial Court Guide, C.1.3:

“(c) (i) Full and specific details should be given of any allegation of fraud, dishonesty, malice or illegality; and

(ii) where an inference of fraud or dishonesty is alleged, the facts on the basis of which the inference is alleged must be fully set out.”

38. The Defendants referred to the statement of Stuart-Smith J in Portland Stone v Barclays [2018] EWHC 2341 (QB), [30], where he said:

“It should not need repeating that Particulars of Claim must include a concise statement of the facts on which the Claimant relies: CPR 16.4(1)(a). The “facts on which the Claimant relies” should be no less and no more than the facts which the Claimant must prove in order to succeed in her or his claim.”

In saying this, Stuart-Smith J was not saying that no matter should be pleaded unless, without that fact being established at trial, the claimant’s case will fail. By way of example, a party may, and often should, plead different particulars of an allegation of fraud or dishonesty, some of which may be established and some of which may not, but the fraud or dishonesty is, overall, made out. This statement is not to be taken as any departure from the well-established approach that allegations of fraud and dishonesty, and the basis of any inferences of fraud or dishonesty, are to be fully and properly pleaded, so that the defendant can fairly and properly understand the case made against him or her.

39. I do not consider that the Defendants’ complaint of serious procedural irregularity, by reason of the terms in which the judge set out the background to the Applications before him, has any merit. In his summary, the judge was not finding facts. He made it clear that he had drawn the summary from API’s skeleton argument, and it is plain that he was aware of the Defendants’ defences. Insofar as he thought that what the Defendants describe as ‘the Collateral Allegations’ were properly pleaded, that was as a result of his assessment that they were of relevance to what are actually the issues in the case, not because he had been misled as to what those issues are by API’s summary or his adoption of it in the Judgment.

40. I also consider that the judge was right in rejecting the Strike Out Application insofar as it related to the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations (as well as the Snowden, Dias and Balance Confirmation Allegations). It is fair to say that these allegations are pleaded in a confusing manner and at a confusing place in APOC (or in the case of the Balance Confirmation Allegations, the AR). They are not directly relevant to, or supportive of, the claim to trace. However, it was obviously made clear to the judge, as it has been to this Court, that these allegations are relied on as particulars of the alleged fraudulent misappropriations of API’s funds, and as matters from which those alleged frauds, and dishonesty on the part of the Defendants, can be inferred.

41. It is a part of API’s case, in pleadings which the Defendants do not seek to strike out, for example paragraph 16C of APOC, that substantial sums misappropriated from API were used by Mr Mazzagatti to fund his acquisition of RockRose. API’s case is that the Defendants masked the source of these funds. If the Defendants lied about £500 million of alleged financing for the RockRose acquisition, in the ways pleaded in the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations, that can support the inference that they misrepresented VEL’s source of funds and disguised the use of misappropriated funds. It is appropriate that this should be pleaded so as to give fair notice to the Defendants that these matters will be relied on.

42. Like the judge, I do not consider that this raises a question of similar fact evidence. The domain of similar fact evidence is matters which are not part of the transaction(s), event(s), or incident(s) which are the subject of the charge or claim, but which may have probative value nevertheless. What is at issue here are (alleged) facts relating to a transaction, the RockRose acquisition, which is said to have been facilitated by the alleged frauds which are central to the claim, and which will in any event be the subject of investigation by reason of pleas which are not the subject of the Strike Out Application. Those alleged facts are, furthermore, close in time to API’s allegations of misappropriation. Evidence in relation to them, in my view, has ‘a direct relation to the principal question in dispute’, to use the language of Lord Watson in Metropolitan Asylum District Managers v Hill (No. 1) (1882) 47 L.R 29, at p. 35.

43. Furthermore, there is an additional direct relation of the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations to API’s case on misappropriations in that, assuming that they are true, they may indicate that certain payments were made in connexion with the production of what, on API’s case, are fake documents, and thus be relevant to whether the Defendants controlled the relevant bank accounts, which is clearly an issue in the proceedings.

44. If I am wrong that the relevant averments do not relate to similar fact evidence, and they must be regarded as potentially admissible only as similar fact evidence, the test for admissibility still turns, and turns only, on whether that evidence is probative, in the sense of making the matter which requires proof more or less probable: O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534, at 541, [4] per Lord Bingham of Cornhill. Like the judge, I consider that such evidence would be potentially probative, in that, if proved, it might be capable of affording ‘a “reasonable presumption or inference” in relation to the matter in dispute to which they [are] said to be relevant’, again to use the language of Lord Watson, as considered by Lord Phillips in O’Brien v Chief Constable at 552, [45]-[46]. The judge was entitled to conclude that, on that alternative basis, the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations should be permitted to remain on the pleadings and not be struck out.

45. The Snowden, Dias and Balance Confirmation Allegations were not considered separately by the judge. He clearly considered that they stood or fell together with the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations. In my judgment he was entitled to do so. What is alleged in these sets of Allegations is, in effect, a ‘doubling down’ by the Defendants on what, if the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations are made out, was a dishonest fabrication of £500 million of loan facilities. They, again, can be regarded as properly pleaded particulars of the fraudulent misappropriations, which are the main subject of API’s claim.

46. The Foreign Proceedings Allegations, by contrast, occupy, in my view, a significantly different position. What is currently pleaded, namely that Mr Mazzagatti had been ‘accused’ in proceedings before the Agenzia delle Entrate of using false invoices to inflate the 2017 accounts of Napag Italia, and that allegations were being made in criminal proceedings before the Court of Milan in relation to a payment by Eni Trading & Shipping SpA to Napag Italia, is neither here nor there. The fact that allegations have been made, if it is not said that they are true, has no relevance in this case. However, even if what is pleaded is taken as averring the truth of the allegations made in the criminal proceedings in the Court of Milan (and, as I have said, API has stated that it does intend to aver those matters), I still consider that these pleas are ones which are likely to disrupt the fair disposal of the proceedings.

47. These allegations concern matters which occurred before API’s shares were acquired by PIL and Mr Mazzagatti became a director of API at the end of July 2018, and significantly before the alleged misappropriations from API. They cannot be regarded as particulars of the main fraud, nor, in my view, do they have a ‘direct relation’ to the principal issues in dispute. I am not presently persuaded that, if established, they would have any probative value in relation to the matters in issue on API’s claims. What does appear clear to me, however, is that this is a case in which this Court can see, even at this stage, that on any reasonable approach to the management of this litigation, evidence of these matters should not be adduced. If they have any probative value, it will be minor, while adding these allegations will increase disproportionately the length and complexity of the trial, and risk distracting attention from the central issues. The matters pleaded in paragraph 78(3)-(4) are complex and doubtless likely to be the subject of considerable dispute and debate. In the circumstances, applying the weighing exercise described in O’Brien v Chief Constable, evidence of these matters should not be adduced. Accordingly, pleas aimed at allowing the adduction of such evidence should not be permitted, as that would not be conducive to the fair disposal of the proceedings.

48. The judge’s reasoning in relation to the Foreign Proceedings Allegations was very limited. It did not grapple with the issues addressed above. Insofar as it constituted a case management decision, I consider that it was one outside the bounds of what constituted a reasonable approach to the management of this litigation, and that this Court is entitled to intervene.

49. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the Strike Out Application insofar as it concerns the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations, the Snowden Allegations, the Dias Allegations and the Balance Confirmation Allegations. I would, however, direct that API should serve amended statements of case which make clearer the basis on which these Allegations are said to relate and be relevant to API’s causes of action. I would hope that a draft of such amendments might be available for consideration at the forthcoming CMC. I would allow the appeal in relation to the Strike Out Application insofar as it concerns the Foreign Proceedings Allegations.

The Appeal in relation to the H&P Application

The parties’ contentions

50. The Defendants contend that the judge was wrong to allow the H&P Application in respect of 8 of the 9 categories of documents sought. All those categories go to the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations or the Balance Confirmation Allegations, and if the appeal in relation to the Strike Out Application had succeeded, then the H&P Application should fail. But, even if the judge’s decision to refuse the Strike Out Application in relation to the Abu Dhabi Loan Allegations and the Balance Confirmation Allegations was not wrong, his decision in relation to the H&P Application, say the Defendants, was. Disclosure from H&P could only properly be ordered when it was ‘necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs’ (CPR r. 31.17(3)(b)), and that was not the case here, where the List of Issues for trial did not include any issues in respect of those two sets of Allegations, and where some documents sought will also be in the possession of the Defendants and can be obtained through the normal processes of disclosure. Furthermore, in relation to two categories of documents it was not established that the documents sought existed and, indeed, in relation to category (6), H&P’s evidence was that they did not.

51. API, for its part, contended that, insofar as the Defendants’ appeal against the judge’s order on the H&P Application was not dependent on the success of their appeal against his order on the Strike Out Application, it was a challenge to the judge’s exercise of a case management discretion. Many of the documents will only be in the possession of H&P. Insofar as certain categories of documents may also be within the possession/control of the Defendants (namely category (7) and possibly categories (5) and (6)) there were nevertheless good reasons for obtaining copies from a third party, because API had at least real prospects of showing that the Defendants had previously produced forgeries of some of these documents.

Discussion

52. The relevant principles applicable to an application for third party disclosure were summarised by Henshaw J in Bugsby Property LLC v LGIM Commercial Lending Ltd [2021] EWHC 1054 (Comm) at [15] to [26]. It is helpful to set out the following aspects of that summary:

“[15] Section 34(2) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 provides:”

“On the application, in accordance with rules of court, of a party to any proceedings, the High Court shall, in such circumstances as may be specified in the rules, have power to order a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who appears to the court to be likely to have in his possession, custody or power any documents which are relevant to an issue arising out of the said claim — (a) to disclose whether those documents are in his possession, custody or power; and (b) to produce such of those documents as are in his possession, custody or power to the applicant or, on such conditions as may be specified in the order —

(i) to the applicant's legal advisers; or

(ii) to the applicant’s legal advisers and any medical or other professional adviser of the applicant; …”

[16] Pursuant to that provision, CPR 31.17 provides:

“Orders for disclosure against a person not a party

(1) This rule applies where an application is made to the court under any Act for disclosure by a person who is not a party to the proceedings.

(2) The application must be supported by evidence.

(3) The court may make an order under this rule only where –

(a) the documents of which disclosure is sought are likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings; and

(b) disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs.

(4) An order under this rule must –

(a) specify the documents or the classes of documents which the respondent must disclose; and

(b) require the respondent, when making disclosure, to specify any of those documents –

(i) which are no longer in his control; or

(ii) in respect of which he claims a right or duty to withhold inspection.

(5) Such an order may –

(a) require the respondent to indicate what has happened to any documents which are no longer in his control; and

(b) specify the time and place for disclosure and inspection.”

[17] The requirements flowing from CPR 31.17 were conveniently summarised by Vos J in Constantin Medien AG v Ecclestone [2013] EWHC 2674 (Ch) as comprising:

i) the threshold test of whether it has been shown that each of the documents in the category or the class of documents sought may well help the claimant's case or damage the defendant's case;

ii) whether disclosure of the documents is necessary to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs;

iii) whether the definition of the documents is sufficiently clear and specific, so that no judgments about the issues in the case are required by the respondents; and

iv) whether, as a matter of overall discretion, disclosure of that class of documents should be ordered.

[18] The first requirement, that the documents must be “likely to support the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of one of the other parties to the proceedings” (CPR 31.17(3)(a)), does not require the applicant to satisfy the test on a balance of probabilities. It is sufficient that the documents “may well” support the applicant’s case or adversely affect another party’s case: see Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.4) [2003] 1 WLR 210 (CA) §§ 29, 32 and 33.

[19] Where the applicant seeks classes of documents, every document which falls within the class must satisfy the test: Three Rivers at §§ 36 and 38. Some documents in the class can be considered to satisfy the test if they provide context for other more obviously relevant documents, even if the former documents might not satisfy the test if viewed in isolation: American Home Products Corp v Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd (No.2) [2001] FSR 41 (CA) § 34; Three Rivers §§ 37-38).

[20] As to the second requirement, that “disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs” (CPR 31.17(3)(b)), Vos J said in Andrew v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 734 (Ch):

“This requirement seems to me to be largely, but not wholly, to follow relevance. I need to have regard here to the availability to the claimant of similar documentation or information from other sources.” (§ 71)

However, I agree with the Respondents that Vos J should not be taken to have intended to state, as a general proposition, that the necessity test has little or no independent role once documents are regarded as relevant. For example, the documents already in the possession of the parties to an action may be sufficiently complete in relation to an issue for there to be no necessity to trouble a third party to provide documents on the same issue. Indeed, Vos J’s second sentence quoted above alludes to that as an example of a case where the necessity test may not be passed.

…

[22] As to the third requirement, the court must be satisfied that the documents actually exist and that it will be clear from the face of the order whether documents do or do not fall within its scope (Re Howglen [2001] 1 All ER 376, 382-383; Three Rivers § 36). A non-party should not be required to familiarise itself with the issues in the litigation, in order to decide which documents are covered by the order. However, there is not necessarily a problem with the disclosing party having to exercise some judgment in complying with an order – see Constantin Medien AG v Ecclestone [2013] EWHC 2674 (Ch) per Vos J …

[23] As to the fourth question, the language of CPR 31.17(3) (“the court may make an order”) indicates that even if the requirements in CPR 31.17(3)(a) and (b) are met, the court maintains a discretion. As Capco submits:

i) The limits on non-party disclosure set out above are appropriate, given the “intrusive” nature of the jurisdiction (Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 411 (QB) § 29), and it has been said that disclosure remains the

“exception rather than the rule”: see White Book note 31.17.2.1 citing Frankson v Home Office [2003] 1 WLR 1952 § 10 and Ang v Reliantco Investments Ltd [2020] EWHC 2529 (Comm) §§ 6-7. …

ii) Accordingly, the courts have been encouraged to exercise the powers under 31.17 with caution (Re Howglen at p.382h). …

[24] As illustrated by Frankson, one factor of potential relevance to the discretion is any alleged confidentiality in the documents. …”

53. The judge at paragraphs [54] – [55] of the Judgment also sought to summarise the relevant principles. This misstates what was said in Bugsby at [20], and generally I prefer Henshaw J’s summary. I do not, however, consider that any error in the judge’s summary is material to the resolution of this appeal.

54. In my judgment, having rejected the Strike Out Application, the judge was entitled to conclude that the first eight categories of documents sought from H&P were relevant, and their production by H&P necessary. In coming to the conclusion that they were relevant and necessary, the judge must have concluded that they are likely to support API’s case or adversely affect the Defendants’ case. That did not involve taking the view that they are more likely than not to do so, but only that they may well do so. I consider that to be right. I also agree with API’s submission that the issue of relevance was not determined by whether the issues in question were included in the draft List of Issues for trial. The draft stated that it was without prejudice to the parties’ pleaded cases, and in any event the List of Issues remains unfinalised.

55. As to the question of whether third party disclosure is necessary: certain of the categories are documents which will not be in the hands of the Defendants. In relation to those categories of documents, I consider that it is fair to say that the requirement of necessity adds little to relevance. Insofar as certain of the categories are likely to be in the hands of the Defendants as well as H&P, the judge was justified in coming to the view that disclosure by H&P was necessary because of legitimate concerns about the authenticity of documents produced to date by the Defendants. That does not prejudge the question of whether any documents which have been produced to date are inauthentic: it merely recognises that there are serious issues in relation to that question, and that disclosure of documents in the possession of H&P may help to demonstrate whether the concerns are or are not justified. To the extent that the Defendants’ complaint in relation to these categories of documents is that there should have been no order for third party disclosure until after it has been seen whether the Defendants will produce the documents (and metadata), that resolves itself into a question of the sequencing of steps in preparation for the trial. That is a paradigm instance of a case management decision by the judge. It was one which was well within the range of the reasonable, and this Court will not interfere with it.

56. In relation to category (4) of the documents ordered to be disclosed, and the Defendants’ contention that it has not been shown that this category of documents exists, API points out that H&P have stated that they are ready to disclose documents in categories (1) to (4). That appears to me to be sufficient evidence of the existence of documents in category (4) to justify an order. As to category (6), H&P has said that they have no documents in this category. The judge considered that the way to deal with this was that H&P could deal with this category in their disclosure list, by saying that they had no documents falling within it. That appears to me to be a sensible order in circumstances where H&P will be producing a list relating to documents in other categories; and is an order of a type which, while perhaps unusual, is permissible as an adjunct to the wider non-party disclosure order in this case.

The Appeal in relation to the WFO

The parties’ contentions

57. API submitted that the judge was plainly wrong in relation to whether it had been shown that there was a risk of dissipation. It contends that the judge did not take into account the impact of API’s good arguable case of dishonesty, and all the evidence of the Defendants’ propensity to dissipate assets as part of a cumulative assessment of whether there was a risk of dissipation.

58. In that context Mr Malek KC, in written and oral submissions, placed particular emphasis on the good arguable case that the Defendants had misappropriated and laundered funds. He also emphasised that the Defendants had, in API’s submission, pursued abusive litigation in foreign proceedings. Reference was made to a criminal complaint against two of API’s current directors in Rome; to proceedings brought by PIL in Singapore; to a claim brought in Iran by Mr Ali Hosseini, former managing director of MHPC; and proceedings commenced by Mr Mazzagatti in Dubai and Sharjah. He stressed that API had a good arguable case that the Defendants have produced and relied on false and forged documents, and that Mr Mazzagatti retains ownership of PIL, Napag IT and Napag Italia, despite the apparent transfer of ownership to Ms Baccouche. He referred to the fact that the Defendants had received over £84 million in remuneration from the RockRose group since 2022 but had refused to disclose what they had done with such large sums. And he argued that the Defendants are financially sophisticated, internationally mobile and have used a ‘web’ of bank accounts in different currencies at different banks.

59. API contended that the judge’s approach was flawed because he had directed himself that he should only have regard to new evidence, that is to say evidence since API issued the present claim. In any event, there were numerous other matters which either postdate the issue of the claim, or of which API has obtained evidence since the issue of the claim, strengthening the inference that there is a real risk of dissipation. Mr Malek KC relied principally on the following: that in 2024 and 2025 API obtained banking records of API and APT and Mr Mazzagatti’s own bank statements; that in 2025 came the public statements from Sheikh Zayed denying that he had had dealings with Mr Mazzagatti; that by early 2026 API had been provided with documents indicating that the Termination Agreement for Sheikh Zayed’s loan facility and the balance confirmation letter were forgeries; and that in 2025 and 2026 there had been what he described as ‘a rapid escalation in attempts by [the Defendants] (including through Mr Mazzagatti’s proxies) to use abusive proceedings to block API from pursuing recovery through the English proceedings’.

60. API further contended that the judge erred in law and/or was plainly wrong in failing to conclude that it was just and convenient to grant a WFO. Even if, which API did not admit, the judge was right to say that the injunction he was considering would have a catastrophic impact on Mr Mazzagatti’s business, it was nevertheless plainly just and convenient to grant the WFO in light of the risk of dissipation. In fact, moreover, as API was now seeking only a WFO and not a proprietary injunction, any impact would be less. API accordingly submitted that the judge’s exercise of discretion was vitiated, and invited this Court to re-take the exercise and grant a WFO.

61. For their part, the Defendants contended that API had not identified any error of fact or law on the part of the judge. The fraud allegations which API made did not, of themselves, establish that there was a risk of dissipation. Those fraud allegations are, moreover, vehemently denied. The Defendants have pleaded back to each of the allegations made against them. The merits have been the subject of numerous witness statements filed in support of or in opposition to the many applications already made in the present claim. The judge was entitled to take into account the delay. He did not treat it as dispositive, but weighed it when evaluating the risk of dissipation. This Court should not interfere with the judge’s conclusion. In any event, no real risk of dissipation had been shown.

62. Furthermore, even if the judge had been wrong to conclude that there was no real risk of dissipation, the judge’s decision should nevertheless be upheld on the basis that it was not just and convenient to grant a freezing injunction. This was the subject of a Respondent’s Notice. This case was put on five bases. First that an injunction would have a catastrophic effect on Mr Mazzagatti’s business, as explained in Mr Morrison’s affidavit. Secondly, that API does not come with clean hands, but has itself engaged in asset stripping, through the Selenium transaction. Thirdly, because the delay in the bringing of the application suggests that it has been brought to put the Defendants under commercial pressure, which was an abuse of process. Fourthly, that API had brought proceedings against the Defendants in multiple jurisdictions, often seeking related or overlapping relief. And fifthly that the cross-undertaking in damages offered by API is manifestly inadequate.

Discussion

63. The tests applicable on an application for a freezing injunction are well-established and familiar. The basic requirements were summarised by the judge at paragraph 62 of the judgment as follows:

“[62] … The applicant must show that: (1) there is a serious issue to be tried; (2) that there is a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of an unjustified dissipation of assets; and (3) that it would in all of the circumstances be just and convenient to grant the freezing order.”

That is an accurate statement, taking into account the decision in Isabel Dos Santos v Unitel S.A. [2024] EWCA Civ 1109, in which it was decided that there is not and should not be a distinction between a ‘good arguable case’ merits test for freezing orders and the test of ‘serious issue to be tried’ for other forms of injunction (see [106], [122]-[132]).

64. The judge summarised further applicable principles at paragraphs 63-65.

“[63] Applications for WFOs are usually made either immediately before or at the outset of proceedings. A freezing injunction is a “… drastic interference with a person’s right to do as they please with their own property … (quite apart from the reputational damage that it may cause)… ”. For that reason, the courts “must remain vigilant” in ensuring they are not inappropriately granted: FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2025] EWHC 1920 (Comm), [14]. It is “necessary to maintain the close regulation” of freezing injunctions, which “have the nuclear effect of prohibiting the affected party from dealing with his assets”: Holyoake v Candy [2018] Ch 297 (CA), [40] per Gloster LJ. Such regulation is “… beneficial and should not be weaken[ed]… in any way because it incorporates important safeguards for the defendant …” ibid, citing Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 WLR 320 (HL), [3].

[64] The purpose for which freezing orders are granted is also tightly circumscribed. They “are not there to give the claimant comfort or to provide a route to extra disclosure but to ensure that if there is a real risk that a judgment or award may go unsatisfied, something is done to prevent this”: Petroceltic Resources Ltd v Archer [2018] EWHC 671 (Comm), [55]. Importantly, the purpose of a WFO is not to provide a claimant with security: Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Morimoto [2019] EWCA Civ 2203, [34(6)]. Instead its purpose is

“… to restrain a defendant from evading justice by disposing of, or concealing, assets otherwise than in the normal course of business in a way which will have the effect of making it judgment proof. A WFO is not intended to stop a corporate defendant from dealing with its assets in the normal course of its business. Similarly, it is not intended to constrain an individual defendant from conducting his personal affairs in the way he has always conducted them, providing of course that such conduct is legitimate. If the defendant is not threatening to change the existing way of handling their assets, it will not be sufficient to show that such continued conduct would prejudice the claimant’s ability to enforce a judgment. That would be contrary to the purpose of the WFO jurisdiction because it would require defendants to change their legitimate behaviour in order to provide preferential security for the claim which the claimant would not otherwise enjoy …” Lakatamia (above) at [34(7)], per Haddon-Cave LJ adopting the reasoning of Popplewell J. (as he then was) in Fundo Soberano de Angola v dos Santos [2018] EWHC 2199 (Comm).

[65] Importantly, the risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence. Mere inference or generalised assertion is not enough. Each case is fact specific and relevant factors must be looked at cumulatively: see Lakatamia (above) at [34(2)] and [34(7)]. It has been held that

(1) Where there is a good arguable case that the defendant has been guilty of dishonesty, this may point to the conclusion that assets are likely to be dissipated or dealt with in such a way as to make enforcement more difficult. Depending on the type of dishonesty, it may be a reasonable inference that the defendants might readily resort to similar methods to render their major assets proof against enforcement: Fundo Soberano de Angola (above) at [86(4)]; PJSC National Bank Trust v Mints [2019] EWHC 2061 (Comm) at [23] to [24];

(2) The defendants’ nature and financial standing, for example whether they have the skills and experience to move assets and manage them abroad, are relevant: Caring Together Ltd v Bauso [2006] EWHC 2345 (Ch), at [64];

(3) A failure by the defendant to make a voluntary disclosure of assets prior to the application may be held against him in assessing the risk of dissipation: Madoff Securities International Ltd v Raven [2011] EWHC 3102 (Comm), at [170]-[172].”

Whilst plainly not exhaustive, that summary is also accurate.

65. I would add the following, as to challenges to decisions in relation to the grant or refusal of freezing orders. At paragraphs 78-79 of Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Morimoto (above), Haddon-Cave LJ said this:

“Appeals

[78] The Court will only interfere with a finding as to whether a good arguable case exists where it is plain that the judge below was wrong. As Longmore LJ said in Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su [2012] EWCA Civ 1195 at [27] (Lord Neuberger MR and Sullivan LJ concurring):

“[I]t must be remembered that applications for freezing injunctions made on the basis of a good arguable case come before the commercial judges all the time. Derived from their time in practice they have developed what is perhaps best described as an instinct as to what is well arguable and what is not. That instinct should be respected by those in this court without the everyday experience of granting and refusing freezing injunctions unless it is plain that the judge is wrong: see Stuart v Goldberg Linde (a firm) [2008] 1 WLR 823 paragraph 76 per Sedley LJ and paragraph 81, Sir Anthony Clarke, Master of the Rolls.” (emphasis added)

Conclusion

[79] This Court is always reluctant to interfere with a finding of an experienced Commercial Judge on findings as to whether there is a real risk of dissipation.”

While what is said in paragraph 78 refers to findings as to whether there is a good arguable case, I consider that it applies equally in relation to whether there is a real risk of dissipation, and such considerations underlie what Haddon-Cave LJ said in paragraph 79.

66. The thrust of API’s criticism of the judge’s conclusion as to risk of dissipation is that he failed to conduct a proper evaluation of that risk taking into account the nature and strength of the whole of API’s case on the merits and as to concomitant fraudulent or dishonest practices. Instead, on the basis that delay can be a powerful consideration against the grant of a WFO, he narrowed his consideration only to certain limited matters and examined whether they could be regarded as ‘new evidence’, enabling him to come to the conclusion that they were not and that delay was therefore fatal. He had thus taken no account of the other material suggesting a risk of dissipation, including the strength of API’s case as to fraud, misappropriation, and forgery.

67. If that had been the judge’s approach, I agree that it would not have been the correct one. The correct approach involved an assessment of all the evidence which might suggest a risk of dissipation, including its cumulative effect, but also of the points or evidence which counted against there being a risk of dissipation. The latter could include the implications of delay. If there has been delay, coupled with an absence of evidence that, during the period of that delay, there has been any dissipation of assets, that can be a factor, and sometimes a powerful factor, suggesting that there is no real risk of dissipation. Sometimes delay may indicate that the claimant does not itself consider that there is a risk of dissipation. If that were the case it would also be a matter, albeit only one matter, to be weighed in considering whether a risk of dissipation had been made out.

68. I am not persuaded that the approach that the judge actually adopted was an incorrect one. He was fully aware of the fact that the existence of a good arguable case that a defendant has been guilty of dishonesty may point to the conclusion that assets are likely to be dissipated, and that depending on the type of dishonesty it may be a reasonable inference that a defendant may resort to similar methods: see Judgment [65(1)], quoted above. He was aware that the defendants’ nature and financial standing, including their ability to move assets and manage them from abroad, could be relevant to the risk of dissipation: Judgment [65(2)]. He recognised that delay will not, by itself, be dispositive in an application for a WFO: Judgment [70], citing Madoff Securities v Raven [2011] EWHC 3102 (Comm). He was fully aware of the fact that API had a good arguable case in relation to its allegations of dishonesty, misappropriation and forgery. Indeed, as I have said, the summary of the case which he set out in his judgment was one slanted towards API (see paragraph 18 above).

69. Although the language of the Judgment might suggest an overly mechanical approach to the evaluation of the risk of dissipation and the impact of delay, what I understand the judge to have done was to take into account the nature of the allegations made by API, and that it had a good arguable case in relation to them, but also to take into account that most of those allegations had been made some time ago and had been part of the proceedings from the outset; that there was no cogent new evidence of a risk of dissipation; and that in the circumstances, the fact of API’s good arguable case as to dishonesty, misappropriation and forgeries did not amount to solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation. Such an approach is not wrong in principle, and I would not interfere with it.

70. If, however, I am wrong, and the judge’s decision was based on an error of law as to the right approach, and it accordingly falls to this Court to carry out its own evaluation as to whether a WFO should be granted, I would conclude that there is not solid evidence of a real risk of dissipation and refuse the grant of an injunction. I say this for the following reasons:

(1) While Mr Malek placed emphasis on various aspects of what he said were the underlying facts, these essentially constituted, in my view, an effort to persuade the court that API’s case amounted to more than serious issues to be tried, but was sufficiently powerful as to count as cogent evidence of a risk of dissipation. In the particular circumstances of this case, where API’s claim is being fully defended including on the basis of serious allegations made by the Defendants against a number of individuals including Mr Jahanpour, where the Defendants’ defences have not been struck out or the subject of summary judgment, and where there have been witness statements supporting various aspects of the Defendants’ defences, I do not consider that the Court can or should proceed on the basis that API has shown more (or less) than serious issues to be tried on the points which are disputed.

(2) Mr Malek also relied on various sets of proceedings abroad, brought by the Defendants, which he described as abusive and being efforts to block API’s claims against the Defendants and/or to prevent API from accessing or deploying evidence. Mr Nash KC for the Defendants contended that the boot was on the other foot. API, he said, had done little to progress the matter here, while pursuing a campaign against the Defendants in many different jurisdictions, making different but overlapping allegations. He referred to criticisms made of API in Singapore of its attempts to get the Singapore High Court to pronounce on issues here, to other proceedings begun in Singapore but withdrawn, and to a failed criminal complaint in Sharjah and criminal proceedings in Iran. In my judgment, in this case, and at this stage, this Court cannot draw a conclusion, even on a provisional basis, that any of the foreign proceedings are an abusive attempt by the Defendants to prevent the present proceedings reaching judgment or give rise to the inference that the Defendants will go to ‘similar lengths to conceal and/or dissipate assets’, any more than it can draw the conclusion that the foreign proceedings represent an improper campaign of harassment by API of the Defendants.

(3) In this case, delay is of significance in relation to the question of whether there has been shown to be a real risk of dissipation of assets. In particular, this is a case in which the fact that API is making very serious allegations against the Defendants, and the basic nature of those allegations, have been known to the Defendants for some years. Proceedings were commenced in Singapore by API against Mr Mazzagatti in July 2023. The present proceedings were commenced in August 2024. API has not produced any evidence that, in the period during which the Defendants have known about the allegations which API was making against them, or during which they have been the subject of claims in one or more jurisdictions, they have dissipated any assets.

(4) I do not regard the point in (3) as being adequately met by API’s complaint that the Defendants have not, despite requests, given disclosure of the nature and whereabouts of their assets. It is undoubtedly the case that, in some cases, a failure by a defendant to make voluntary disclosure of assets prior to the application may be held against him or her in relation to the risk of dissipation: this was recognised by the judge (Judgment [65(3)]), who referred to what Flaux J said in Madoff v Raven at [170]-[172]. Whether this is so must, however, depend on the circumstances of the case. In the present case, the parties have been engaged in hostile litigation in a number of jurisdictions, with a multitude of applications. The Defendants say that they are concerned that API is engaged in what is described by Mr Morrison in paragraph 145 of his Affidavit as ‘a systematic pattern of abuse, including the misuse of criminal process, forged or misleading evidence and media amplification, deployed to exert pressure rather than to secure the determination of properly pleaded and evidenced claims.’ On this appeal, this Court is entitled to proceed on the basis that that description of how the Defendants see API’s litigation strategy may be true and may be justified. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to ‘hold against’ the Defendants that they have not made voluntary disclosure of their assets, or to regard it as itself supporting an inference that they may have dissipated assets.

(5) I thus do not consider that a real risk of dissipation on the basis of solid evidence is made out in respect of either Defendant. I add, however, that even if I had been persuaded that there was solid evidence of a risk of dissipation in the case of Mr Mazzagatti, I would not have been so persuaded in relation to Mr Dixit Dominus.

(6) Given the above, it is not necessary to consider wider considerations of the justice and convenience of the grant of an injunction. Had it been necessary to do so, I would have had reservations as to whether it was just and convenient to order a WFO in circumstances where evidence has been put before the Court that an injunction will have a very adverse effect on Mr Mazzagatti’s business, and where the cross-undertaking in damages is distinctly unlikely to be worth the amount of any loss or damage which might be occasioned by a WFO.

71. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the WFO Application.

The Stay Application

72. It was agreed between the parties that H&P should not give disclosure of the categories of documents sought from them until this Court hands down its judgments. In the circumstances, the Stay Application does not need further consideration.

73. When the documents are provided to API by H&P, CPR r. 31.22(1) will apply (as is made express by paragraph 14 of the judge’s order). Given that, and notwithstanding the Defendants’ submissions otherwise, I do not see the need for the provision of further undertakings by API.

Conclusion

74. For the reasons I have given:

(1) I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the Strike Out Application, save that I would allow it insofar as it relates to the Foreign Proceedings Allegations;

(2) I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the H&P Application;

(3) I would dismiss the appeal in relation to the WFO Application.

Sir Launcelot Henderson

75. I agree.

Lord Justice Zacaroli

76. I also agree.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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