Administrative United Kingdom

Igli Hazizaj v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/108341/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

On 28 October 2026

Before

JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL C R COLE

Between

IGLI HAZIZAJ

(anonymity direction NOT made)

Appellant

and

the secretary of state for the home department

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: None

For the Respondent: Mr C Scholes, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Background

1. The appellant was born on 27 December 1997. He is a national of Albania.

2. It is not clear when the appellant arrived in the UK. The appellant was served with a Notice of Liability to removal from the UK on 20 January 2024. He made representations in response to this notice which amounted to a claim for protection.

3. On 16 January 2025 the appellant was convicted at Carlisle Crown Court of conspiracy to produce cannabis for which he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on 27 February 2025.

4. A deportation order was made on 5 December 2025.

5. On 9 December 2025 the respondent refused the appellant’s Protection Claim and Human Rights Claim.

6. The appellant appeals against the respondent’s decision pursuant to section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002.

Issues

7. At the outset of the hearing, I clarified the issues to be resolved in this appeal.

8. The appellant is excluded from the Refugee Convention and Humanitarian Protection unless he can rebut the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the UK. This is the first issue for resolution.

9. The appellant claims that he is at real risk of serious harm in Albania. The respondent does not accept any of the appellant’s account. Thus, the credibility of the appellant’s account must be determined.

10. The respondent submits that, even if the account is accepted, then the appellant can access effective protection and/or reasonably relocate to Elbasan, Vlore of Durres. These are the next issues for resolution, if the appellant’s account is accepted.

11. Finally, the appellant claims to meet Exception 1 and Exception 2 of section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002.

12. The appellant claims in the alternative that there are very compelling circumstances in his case over and above Exceptions 1 and 2.

13. The respondent does not accept that Exceptions 1 or 2 are met or that there are very compelling circumstances. These will be the final issues for resolution.

Documents

14. The respondent provided a bundle of 154 pages containing annexes A to K including the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks, Screening Interview (SI), Asylum Interview Records (AIR1, AIR2 and AIR3), the appellant’s representations and statements, and the decision letter dated 9 December 2025.

15. Mr Scholes was able to provide documents relating the appellant’s extradition case.

16. The appellant did not provide any supporting documents (the appellant’s bundle in the hearing bundle was merely a copy of the respondent’s bundle).

The Hearing

17. The appellant was not represented and did not attend the hearing.

18. There was an unusual history to the appellant’s representation in this case. Mass Law lodged the appellant’s appeal and, even at the date of the hearing, they remained on the record in MyHMCTS.

19. At a hearing on 28 July 2026 Mass Law were contacted and confirmed that they were no longer representing the appellant. This was confirmed by them in a letter dated 6 August 2026. However, they remained on record on MyHMCTS.

20. On Monday 26 October 2026 when preparing, I was concerned about this case and so at my behest a Legal Officer called Mass Law who confirmed that they were once again acting in this case. They confirmed that they were aware of the hearing listed for 28 October and that they and the appellant would be attending.

21. Late in the afternoon before the hearing Mass Law emailed the Tribunal stating that they had to withdraw from representing at the hearing. My clerk called them on the morning of the hearing for clarification and they offered little assistance. There was a vague reference to financial issues. Their view was that the appellant would not be attending the hearing.

22. The only contact details on MyHMCTS were for the appellant’s partner. My clerk called her and she stated that she and the appellant had broken up some time ago. She did not know the appellant’s location.

23. The appellant failed to attend the hearing centre and failed to make any contact with the Tribunal.

24. I was satisfied that, pursuant to Rule 26 of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Procedure Rules 2014, a notice of this hearing was properly served on the appellant and his representatives. In accordance with Rule 28(a) I am satisfied that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the appellant of the hearing.

25. Pursuant to Rule 28(b), I considered whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing and for these reasons I was satisfied that it was:

(a) I was satisfied Rule 26 was met and that the appellant was provided with an opportunity to participate fully in the proceedings but chose not to attend and has not provided a reasonable explanation for his absence.

(b) I noted from the history of the case that the appellant has failed to attend previous hearings. The appellant had failed to engage in the process and had not complied with any directions and had not provided any supporting evidence.

(c) I have considered the need to avoid delay, so far as it is compatible with the proper consideration of the issues. The appellant did not apply for an adjournment. The respondent was present and ready to proceed.

26. Therefore, I decided to proceed in the absence of the appellant.

27. The full details of the submissions are contained in the Record of Proceedings which is within the court file. I have taken them into consideration in determining this matter. Consequently, I will not rehearse the evidence and submissions except where it is relevant to my findings.

28. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.

Findings and Reasons

29. I have considered all the evidence, paying regard to the matters to which I was specifically referred, but only summarised those matters that have been of most assistance to me and which relate to the issues for me to determine.

Exclusion from entitlement to benefit of Refugee Status

30. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention states that:

“1. No contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”

31. This Article has been incorporated into national law through section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002, which stated at the date of decision that:

(2) A person shall be presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if he is –

(a) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and

(b) sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months.

…

(5A) A person convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime (whether within or outside the United Kingdom) is to be presumed to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.

(6) A presumption under subsection (5A) that a person constitutes a danger to the community is rebuttable by that person.

32. The appellant was sentenced to three years imprisonment for conspiracy to produce cannabis.

33. The Judge’s Sentencing Remarks detail that the appellant performed a significant role in managing three properties which had been converted into cannabis production operations.

34. The appellant has failed to make any representations to rebut the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the UK.

35. It is of note that the appellant is subject to a signed Extradition Order as he has been sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment in Albania for forged identity document offences. Mr Scholes also had an updated PNC which indicated that the appellant was currently on bail for further offending and he is due to appear before Central London Magistrates Court on 14 November 2026.

36. Considering all relevant factors in the round, I find that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that he does “constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom”.

37. Thus, I find that the appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention.

Exclusion from Humanitarian Protection

38. The relevant Immigration Rules state the following:

339D. An asylum applicant is excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection for the purposes of paragraph 339C(iv) where the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are serious reasons for considering that the asylum applicant:

…

(iv) having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime (as defined in Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), constitutes a danger to the community of the UK

39. For the reasons detailed above, I find that the appellant does constitute a danger to the community of the UK and therefore he is excluded from Humanitarian Protection.

Article 3

40. Even though the appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention, and he is excluded from a grant of Humanitarian Protection, it is still essential for me to assess whether there is a real risk of the removal of the appellant to Albania resulting in a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

41. The appellant’s account is that his father borrowed money from a criminal gang and that, when his father could not repay the debt, the appellant was trafficked to the UK by this gang who then forced him to work in a cannabis factory. The appellant fears that the gang will seriously harm him on return to Albania.

42. The appellant’s account contains numerous inconsistencies. For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that his account is reasonably likely to be true.

43. The appellant did not attend to give evidence and had not provided a statement in support of his appeal. His account was detailed in his statement dated 27 January 2024 and then the SI and AIRs.

44. In his statement the appellant provides a history of unwittingly becoming involved in criminal gangs. He then states that he went to Greece where he was found by the gang and was forced to sell drugs. A similar fate awaited him when he went to Italy.

45. In this statement the appellant recounts being sent from Albania to France and then on to the UK. He was again forced to sell drugs. The appellant then states that he was caught and brought back to Albania on 5 October 2022.

46. In AIR2 the appellant was asked about flying from Luton to Albania on 5 October 2022 and he stated that he had been in the UK before. The Albanian authorities’ documents confirm the appellant entered Albania on 5 October 2022 on a Wizz Air flight from Luton. Mr Scholes stated that there was no information on the respondent’s systems regarding the appellant’s time in the UK prior to his return to Albania on 5 October 2022.

47. In the 27 January 2024 statement the appellant claims that within weeks of returning to Albania he was kidnapped by the gang and forced to work from them again. He does not detail when he claims to have re-entered the UK.

48. In the SI the appellant stated that he left Albania in September 2023 and then came to the UK on an unknown date in 2023 “to open his own garage.” He then claimed that he owed money to a criminal gang for his journey to the UK and that the gang had got him working in a cannabis farm to pay off his debt.

49. In AIR1 the appellant claimed to have entered the UK in December 2023. AIR1 was cut short due to connection issues.

50. In AIR2 the appellant claimed that his father borrowed money in October 2023 and this was the reason that the appellant was trafficked to the UK. He stated that, within a few days, he boarded a flight from Tirana to France. He was then put in the back of a lorry which brought him to the UK.

51. The appellant claimed that he was forced to work in a cannabis house, but he managed to escape after a few weeks.

52. Around a week later the gang found the appellant and then forced him to work in a cannabis house in Scotland where they made sure he was locked in. However, later in AIR2 the appellant stated that he was free for few a months after escaping the gang.

53. The appellant stated that he was held locked in the cannabis house in Scotland “Till I was arrested.” The appellant was arrested on 18 September 2024.

54. In AIR2 the appellant rejected the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks about him being responsible for three cannabis houses as “not correct.”

55. In AIR3 the appellant stated that he had “certainly” not said that his father borrowed money in 2023. When asked to explain this inconsistency, the appellant stated that he may have confused the years 2023 and 2022 and he then stated that it was September and not October that his father borrowed the money.

56. In AIR3 the appellant stated that, on his second occasion in the UK, the first cannabis house he was forced to work in was in Scotland and that the second cannabis house was in Coventry or Stoke.

57. The appellant’s representatives made representations to the respondent. These were made at some point after the appellant’s arrest.

58. These representations state that the appellant arrived in the UK in January 2024. They state that the appellant found himself in a challenging situation in Albania in October 2023 and so had to relocate to the UK. He was forced to work in a cannabis house and was subsequently arrested in September 2024.

59. It is reiterated that he was forced to work in a cannabis house in Scotland. It is stated that the appellant was forced to stay in the house and not given access to leave the house.

60. However, in the next paragraph it is stated that the appellant started a relationship with his partner in March 2024. It is not explained how the relationship began and progressed when, in the immediately preceding paragraph, the appellant is said to have been locked inside a cannabis house in Scotland.

61. Without any significant detail the following paragraph then states that the couple had time together but then “unfortunately” the appellant was forced to work on a cannabis farm due to an unpaid debt.

62. As can be seen from the above, the appellant has provided an inconsistent account of the core issues in his claim. This is demonstrated clearly when the independently verifiable evidence is assessed.

63. The appellant was in the UK prior to 5 October 2022 when he flew from Luton to Albania. This flight is accepted by the appellant. The respondent must have evidence of this flight as the appellant was questioned about it in AIR2. Furthermore, the evidence from the Albanian authorities details the appellant entering Albania on a flight from Luton on 5 October 2022.

64. The extradition request from the Albanian authorities details that the appellant was stopped at Tirana airport on 9 December 2022 whilst trying to board a flight to Barcelona. He was stopped and searched. A forged Greek passport and identity card with his photograph on were discovered in the appellant’s bag. It was the possession of these documents that led to the appellant being convicted and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment in Albania.

65. At the extradition hearing in May 2026 the appellant claimed that he was allowed to board the flight to Barcelona after his arrest. This seems wholly implausible when the extradition request details how the appellant was interviewed in the presence of his lawyer following his arrest.

66. Furthermore, the Albanian authorities have provided evidence of the appellant’s lawful entries and exits from Albania. Following the entry to Albania from Luton on 5 October 2022, the next exit date recorded is 11 February 2023 when the appellant flew to Hamburg in Germany.

67. There is no record of the appellant exiting to Barcelona on 9 December 2022 and not record of an entry to Albania after 9 December 2022. Thus, I reject the appellant’s claim that he was able to board the flight to Barcelona.

68. I find that the appellant returned to Albania from Luton on 5 October 2022 and then left Albania to fly to Hamburg on 11 February 2023. The appellant was thwarted in his attempt to fly to Barcelona on 9 December 2022.

69. There is no firm evidence of when the appellant entered the UK. However, I find that the appellant did not return to Albania after he left on 11 February 2023 and so I reject any claim that he was trafficked to the UK from Albania in September/October 2023.

70. The appellant’s account of being held captive in cannabis houses is similarly undermined by the verifiable evidence.

71. The appellant’s partner provided a statement dated 3 June 2025. She stated that she and the appellant first connected on TikTok on 18 September 2024. This year must be an error as this was the date the appellant was arrested and, it is inconsistent with the remainder of that paragraph. I take it that she meant September 2023.

72. She stated that the appellant visited her in April (presumably 2024) and then she spent multiple times with him in Manchester before moving there on 30 August 2024.

73. The appellant’s partner has provided various social media screenshots detailing their relationship. There are photographs of the couple together on 23 April 2024. On 16 July 2024 she was with the appellant and travelling to Wales for a “Bachelor party.” There are photographs of the couple together in Swansea for the appellant’s partner’s graduation and these are also dated 16 July 2024. The couple were together on 7 August 2024 as evidenced by the photographs. There is evidence of the couple getting engaged in Manchester on 30 August 2024.

74. The social media evidence presented by the appellant’s partner does not support his claim to have been locked in cannabis farm and living in fear for his life.

75. As detailed in the Judge’s Sentencing Remarks, the appellant had the role of managing the three properties in Carlisle which had been converted to cannabis production.

76. Drawing all the threads together and considering all the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant has failed to prove that his account of events is reasonably likely to be true. I find that the appellant has fabricated his whole account of being in debt and being trafficked to the UK in order to repay that debt.

77. I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that the appellant was trafficked to the UK and forced to work in cannabis farms. The appellant’s history of travel, his access to forged identity documents, and his lifestyle in the UK indicate that he was not a victim of trafficking. The appellant’s conviction details the appellant’s significant role in cannabis production that was part of a wider organised crime group.

78. I find that the appellant knowingly participated in organised criminal activity and performed a significant managerial role within a conspiracy that formed part of a wider organised crime group. I find that he came to the UK of his own free will to participate in criminal activities for his own financial gain. It is clear from the evidence that the appellant had a more significant role in the conspiracy than his co-defendants (one of whom was a relative) as they were the cannabis gardeners and the appellant was the manager.

79. I have considered whether the appellant's account might nevertheless be accepted in part. I do not find that possible. The inconsistencies identified above do not concern peripheral matters. They relate to the core elements of the protection claim, including when he left Albania, whether he had previously been in the UK, why he came to the UK, the existence and ownership of the alleged debt, his claimed captivity in cannabis premises, and the circumstances in which he says he returned to Albania. These matters materially undermine the reliability of his account as a whole.

80. Overall, considering all the evidence and the issues, I find that, on return to Albania, the appellant is not at real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.

Article 8

81. The appellant also claims that his deportation would be an unjustified and disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private and family life as protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.

82. In this regard it is necessary for me to take account of section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002 (as amended by the Immigration Act 2014) which states:

Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.

83. The appellant has been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and thus he can rely on Exception 1 and/or Exception 2.

84. If he is unable to meet Exceptions 1 or 2, then the appellant must demonstrate that, on the balance of probabilities, “there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”

85. In relation to Exception 1, the appellant has not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life. The appellant has only been in the UK for a relatively short period.

86. I find that the appellant is not socially and culturally integrated in the UK. The appellant has not been in the UK for long and he has spent much of that time involved in organised criminal activity.

87. Finally, I find that there is not sufficient evidence produced to conclude that, on balance, there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania.

88. The concept of “integration” was explained by the Court of Appeal in Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 where it was stated by Sales LJ:

“The idea of 'integration' calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life."

89. The Upper Tribunal in Treebhawon and Others (NIAA 2002 Part 5A – compelling circumstances test) [2017] UKUT 00013 described the “very significant obstacles” test in the following terms:

“The other limb of the test, 'very significant obstacles', erects a self-evidently elevated threshold, such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient in this context.”

90. The Court of Appeal in Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 clarified the Treebhawon summary of the threshold when Underhill LJ stated:

“I have to say that I do not find that a very useful gloss on the words of the rule. It is fair enough to observe that the words "very significant" connote an "elevated" threshold, and I have no difficulty with the observation that the test will not be met by "mere inconvenience or upheaval". But I am not sure that saying that "mere" hardship or difficulty or hurdles, even if multiplied, will not "generally" suffice adds anything of substance. The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal, in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as "very significant".”

91. The appellant is a healthy male who was born and raised in Albania and lived there until 2023. He speaks the language and has family in Albania. There are no real barriers to the appellant’s return to Albania. I find that he could easily integrate back into Albania.

92. I find that the evidence does not demonstrate that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania.

93. Therefore, drawing all these threads together and considering all the evidence holistically and cumulatively, I find that, on balance, the appellant has not demonstrated that there are very significant obstacles to his integration into Albania.

94. Thus, I find that the appellant does not satisfy Exception 1.

95. In relation to Exception 2, the appellant claims that he has a qualifying partner. The respondent in the decision accepted that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner.

96. However, there has been no updated evidence from the appellant’s partner and when she was called to see whether she and the appellant would be attending the hearing, she stated that she had split up from the appellant a while ago. Thus, the evidence produced by the appellant fails to establish that, on balance, he currently has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner.

97. Considering all the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant has been unable to prove to the civil standard of proof that he has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his former partner.

98. Thus, I find that the Appellant does not satisfy Exception 2.

99. The fact that the appellant does not satisfy Exception 1 or 2 does not mean that there cannot be “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”, but his failure to satisfy them is certainly relevant to the overall assessment of whether there are in fact “very compelling circumstances”.

100. The appellant’s claim fails to disclose any compelling circumstances. The appellant has been in the UK for around three years. Whilst in the UK he has been involved in organised criminal activity. He has spent time in prison. He is subject to a signed Extradition Order. He is currently on bail for further criminal offending.

101. The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. The more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in the deportation of the criminal. Furthermore, the appellant is subject to a signed Extradition Order.

102. I have considered all the factors put forward on the appellant’s behalf and I find that, on balance, those matters do not outweigh the public interest in deporting the appellant.

103. I find that all the factors supportive of the appellant’s private life in the UK when combined do not amount to “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. I find that there is nothing very compelling about the appellant’s case.

104. The appellant’s deportation is proportionate as there is little of significant weight in the appellant’s favour, whereas the public interest in deportations carries very substantial weight due to the serious nature of the appellant’s offending culminating in the three-year sentence of imprisonment.

105. In conclusion I find, on balance, that the deportation of the appellant would not amount to an unjustified and disproportionate interference with the appellant’s right to respect for private and family life as protected by Article 8 of the ECHR.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

No anonymity direction is made. No party applied for an anonymity order. There is no reason to make such an order.

Signed C R Cole Date 2 November 2026

Judge C R Cole

Judge of the First-tier Tribunal

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

The appeal has been dismissed and so there can be no fee award.

Signed C R Cole Date 2 November 2026

Judge C R Cole

Judge of the First-tier Tribunal


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