Administrative United Kingdom
SM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/57307/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham
On 28 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Athwal
Between
SM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Spurling of Counsel, Thames Hill Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Tasnim, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 14 February 2025.
Anonymity
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant is a national of Kenya. He entered the United Kingdom on 3 December 2023 whilst in transit to Canada and claimed asylum on 6 December 2023. His protection claim was refused on 14 February 2025, and he lodged the present appeal on 23 February 2025.
4. The appellant's case is that he is a bisexual man who fears persecution on return to Kenya. He claims to be at risk from the Sungu Sungu vigilante group, from members of his family, in particular his brother, and from both state and non-state actors because of his sexual orientation. His account is that his sexuality became known in Kenya following two incidents involving hotel stays with a male partner in June and November 2023. He maintains that, as a consequence of those events and the resulting exposure of his sexual orientation, he left Kenya and sought international protection.
The Hearing
5. The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
6. Mr Spurling made an application to admit a 68 page supplementary bundle which was served 3 working days before the hearing. I have considered the principles set out in Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed; fraudulent applications; procedure) v SSHD [2026] UKUT 00378, Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC) and Dawrani (judicial discretion – late evidence – sanction) [2026] UKUT 00151 (IAC), and the requirements of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, and the Practice Direction of the FtTIAC, 1 November 2024.
7. I was satisfied that the late service of the supplementary bundle constituted a serious and significant breach of both the Tribunal's directions and the Practice Direction. I did not accept that difficulties arising from a disruption in funding arrangements provided a good reason for the delay in serving the evidence.
8. Having considered all the circumstances, however, I was satisfied that it was just to admit the late evidence. In reaching that conclusion, I took into account that Ms Tasnim did not oppose the application and confirmed that she had sufficient time to consider the additional documents and prepare for the hearing. I was satisfied that no material prejudice would be caused to the respondent. Accordingly, I exercised my discretion to admit the supplementary bundle notwithstanding the breach.
9. Mr Spurling confirmed that the appellant no longer sought to be treated as a vulnerable witness. He acknowledged that there was insufficient medical evidence before the Tribunal to support such an application. Accordingly, the appeal proceeded on the basis that no vulnerability adjustments were required.
Issues
10. The following matters were agreed between the parties:
(a) The appellant’s identity and nationality are not in dispute.
(b) The Refugee Convention is engaged on the basis of the appellant’s claimed particular social group, namely sexual orientation.
(c) The respondent accepts that, if the appellant's account is accepted, he would not have access to a sufficiency of protection in Kenya. That concession is made in light of the appellant's claim regarding the influence of his brother, whom the respondent accepts is a state agent, and the reach and influence of the Sungu Sungu vigilante group.
(d) The respondent further accepts that, if the appellant's account is accepted, internal relocation would not be a reasonable option.
11. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are
(a) Findings of Fact:
(i) Is the appellant bisexual or would he be perceived as bisexual?
(ii) If so, would he in fact live openly if returned to Kenya
(iii) If he concealed his sexuality, why would he do so?
(b) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution because of his actual or perceived sexuality?
(c) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
(d) Does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Kenya?
(e) Is the appellant at real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment?
12. Mr Spurling clarified that the appellant’s claims for asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights protection arose from the same factual matrix. He was not pursuing a separate Article 8 claim based on his private life in the United Kingdom.
Evidence
13. I heard evidence from the appellant in English, who adopted all three of his witness statements, as well as the representatives’ submissions. I considered the oral evidence and submissions together with the documentation contained on myHMCTS.
Legal Framework
14. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
15. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.
16. I have taken into consideration HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596.
17. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
18. For the appellant to succeed on Article 3 ECHR grounds, the appellant has the burden to prove to the lower standard a real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment ("the treatment"). Article 3 is a non-derogable right. The treatment complained of must reach a minimum level of severity, which is a relative threshold and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of execution, duration, physical or mental effects and the appellant's sex, age and state of health. Article 3 includes both positive and negative obligations on the state to refrain from the treatment and/or to take measures to effectively protect people from such treatment.
19. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
Facts
Is the appellant bisexual or would he be perceived as bisexual?
20. I have considered the evidence as whole and even to the lower evidential standard applicable to the humanitarian protection and human rights appeals, I am not satisfied that the appellant is bisexual or would be perceived as bisexual in Kenya. These are my reasons.
21. There are two principal factual issues for determination. The first is whether the appellant is bisexual, as he claims. The second is whether the events said to have occurred in Kenya, and which the appellant claims caused him to leave the country, occurred as alleged. I address each issue in turn.
Appellant’s sexuality
22. The respondent challenges the appellant's credibility in two respects. First, his account of when he came to understand his sexual orientation. Secondly, his account of his relationship with his wife and his attraction to women.
23. As to the first issue, the appellant's evidence has not been consistent. In his first witness statement, he stated that he realised he was bisexual when he entered into a relationship with B (statement 1, [4]). In contrast, during his asylum interviews he stated that he initially understood himself to be gay and only later regarded himself as bisexual following his marriage (AIR1 Q36; AIR2 Q9).
24. The appellant sought to explain this inconsistency in his second witness statement and oral evidence. He stated that he was approximately 15 years old when he first realised he was attracted to men but did not then understand the relevant terminology (statement 2, [1]). He used the term “bisexual” incorrectly in his first statement, and it was an error on his part. He further stated that he had not always used the terms accurately because English is his second language and because he was under stress during his interviews (statement 2, [4]).
25. I have considered Mr Spurling's submission that little weight should be attached to variations in the appellant's terminology. I accept that individuals may describe and understand their sexuality differently and that a person raised in a society where same-sex relationships are stigmatised may have limited opportunity to explore or articulate their identity.
26. However, I do not find that explanation satisfactory. In his second witness statement, the appellant states that by 2008 he had researched and understood the distinction between being gay and bisexual (statement 2, [2]). If that account is correct, it undermines his explanation that he later used those terms inaccurately because he did not understand their meaning. Further, [3] of the same statement is difficult to reconcile with [2]. At [2] he states that in 2008 he researched and understood the distinction between the two; at [3] he states that he learned the term "bisexual" only later. I also do not accept that language difficulties provide a satisfactory explanation. The appellant elected to give evidence in English and answered questions without the assistance of an interpreter.
27. Drawing those matters together, I find that the appellant has provided inconsistent accounts of when and how he came to understand his own sexuality. I regard that inconsistency as damaging to the reliability of his evidence.
28. The second issue concerns the appellant's account of his relationship with his wife. In his first witness statement, the appellant described the marriage as "devoid of intimacy and emotional connection" (statement 1, [18]). He stated that he maintained a façade of being a devoted husband and father (statement 1, [19] and [21]) and that he had children in order to fulfil family and societal expectations and avoid suspicion (statement 1, [20]). At no stage in that statement did he suggest that he had developed emotional or romantic feelings for his wife. Whilst the evidence plainly establishes that the marriage involved a sexual relationship and resulted in the birth of four children, the appellant's earlier account was that this occurred within the context of a marriage entered into and maintained because of familial and societal pressures.
29. The same theme emerged in his interviews. During his second asylum interview he stated that, from an early age, he was attracted to men (AIR2 Q7 and Q9), that he had no interest in women before his marriage (AIR2 Q14), that he currently had no interest in women (AIR2 Q15), and that he had never sought an intimate relationship with a woman (AIR2 Q15-Q16). When asked why he described himself as bisexual, he stated that it was because he had a wife (AIR2 Q17).
30. The appellant nevertheless relies upon one answer in his second asylum interview in which he stated that he was attracted to his wife (AIR2 Q11). He developed that account significantly in his third witness statement. There, for the first time, he stated that although the marriage began because of family pressure, he developed feelings for his wife over time and experienced emotional and romantic attraction towards her, particularly after they had children together (statement 3, [8]).
31. I accept that the appellant stated in his second asylum interview that he was attracted to his wife. However, that answer must be considered in the context of his evidence as a whole. It sits uneasily with his repeated assertions that he had no real interest in women (AIR2 Q14-Q16), and with his earlier description of the marriage as lacking intimacy and emotional connection (statement 1, [18]). More significantly, neither his interviews nor his first witness statement contain any suggestion that he developed a genuine emotional or romantic attachment to his wife. Given the significance of such a matter, I would reasonably have expected it to feature in those earlier accounts if it were true. His account in interview, that he was attracted to his wife, when read in context suggests a physical attraction, not an emotional or romantic one.
32. In my judgment, the appellant's later claim that he developed emotional and romantic feelings for his wife represents a material departure from his earlier evidence. The fact that this account emerged only after the respondent had identified credibility concerns in the refusal decision further reduces the weight I attach to it. I therefore find that the appellant's evidence concerning the nature of his relationship with his wife has evolved over time and is not reliable in this respect. I do not accept Mr Spurling's submission that this change can be explained by the appellant's greater freedom in the United Kingdom to explore his sexuality, or by the fluid nature of sexuality. Those matters may be relevant to how an individual comes to understand or describe their sexuality, but they do not adequately explain the appellant's failure in his earlier accounts to mention what he now describes as an emotional and romantic attachment to his wife during the period they lived together in Kenya.
33. I also take into account that the appellant sought to rely upon a relationship with a woman in the United Kingdom as further evidence of his attraction to women. No statement was provided from that individual and she did not attend the hearing to give evidence. When asked about her absence, the appellant was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation. I therefore attach little weight to that evidence.
34. Finally, I have considered the appellant's contention that he did not state during his second asylum interview that he "hated ladies mostly" (AIR2 Q7). No contemporaneous correction was made to the interview record. In those circumstances, I place weight upon the interview record as recorded.
35. Drawing these matters together, I find that the appellant's account of when he came to understand his sexuality, his attraction to women, and the nature of his relationship with his wife has changed materially over time. Those inconsistencies undermine the reliability of his evidence and weigh adversely in my overall assessment of credibility.
Events leading to appellant’s departure
36. I do not accept the appellant's account of the events said to have led to his departure from Kenya. There are a number of material inconsistencies concerning when his sexuality became known, when he first came to the attention of the Sungu Sungu, and the circumstances in which he claims to have gone into hiding.
37. In his screening interview, the appellant stated that he had been "caught" six months before leaving Kenya and had been hiding since.Whilst I accept the screening interview was intended as a brief initial account rather than a verbatim record, I am satisfied that the inconsistency identified concerns the substance of the appellant's claim rather than mere differences in wording. The appellant is a fluent English speaker, gave evidence before me in English, and there is no suggestion that he misunderstood the questions asked. Furthermore, he has described how he was hiding in his second statement, thereby adopting the veracity of that account. I am satisfied that the screening interview accurately records the substance of what he said.
38. The appellant later sought to explain that the reference to six months in hiding was to the period following the June 2023 incident involving M. However, that explanation is inconsistent with his evidence in his second asylum interview, where he stated that he went into hiding only after learning of his brother's involvement and whilst making arrangements to leave Kenya following the events of November 2023 (AIR2 Q67). These accounts are not readily reconcilable. The inconsistency concerns a central aspect of his claim and undermines the reliability of his account.
39. I also find the appellant's evidence concerning the extent of the Sungu Sungu's interest in him prior to June 2023 to be inconsistent. In his first witness statement, he states that by June 2022 the Sungu Sungu were questioning his association with S, that he was terrified, believed his life would be at risk if discovered, and thereafter took active steps to avoid them ([37]-[40]). In contrast, in his second asylum interview he described rumours and questions from members of the community about his friendship with S, but did not suggest that the Sungu Sungu were investigating S (AIR2 Q51-Q56).
40. That inconsistency is significant because it affects the plausibility of the appellant's subsequent conduct. If his first witness statement is correct, then by June 2022 he believed that the Sungu Sungu suspected him, that discovery would place his life at risk, and that he was taking steps to avoid attracting attention. Yet, on his own account, he entered into a new relationship with M in January 2023 and agreed to meet him at a hotel in his home town in June 2023. At paragraph 46 of his first witness statement, he records that M expressed concern about whether it was safe to do so, and that he reassured him that everything would be fine. That conduct is difficult to reconcile with the appellant's claim that he was terrified of the Sungu Sungu and, as he later put it, effectively living in hiding.
41. I also find the appellant's explanation for returning to the same hotel in November 2023 to be unsatisfactory. On his account, the receptionist had reported him to the Sungu Sungu in June 2023. However, when asked why he returned, the appellant stated that the receptionist had been friendly, that he did not expect to encounter him again, and that he believed the issue had been resolved (AIR2 Q63-Q64). In his second witness statement, he advanced further reasons, namely that alternative hotels would have involved greater scrutiny and questioning and that he considered this hotel to be the safest and most practical option available ([21]-[22]). The difficulty is that those explanations were not provided when he was specifically asked about the issue in interview. I therefore find that his account has developed over time in response to the credibility concerns raised by the respondent.
42. Drawing these matters together, I find that the appellant's account has evolved over time. The inconsistencies identified are not peripheral matters but concern the core chronology of events, the extent of the alleged adverse interest in him, the period during which he claims to have been in hiding, and the decisions he says he made in response to the risks he faced. I have considered the explanations offered by the appellant and on his behalf, but I do not find them persuasive. Taking the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the events said to have occurred in Kenya took place substantially as claimed. Accordingly, I do not accept that the appellant has established that he came to the adverse attention of the Sungu Sungu, was pursued by them, or was forced to leave Kenya for the reasons he advances.
Other supporting evidence
43. I have considered the supporting evidence relied upon by the appellant, including the statements from his wife, sister, friend in Kenya and friend in the United Kingdom, together with the evidence of his attendance at Pride events and participation in LGBTQ+ WhatsApp groups. I have considered that evidence in the round and in the context of the appellant's claim as a whole. Whilst I accept that these matters are capable of providing some support for his account, I do not consider them sufficient to overcome the significant credibility concerns identified above. The statements largely repeat the appellant's own account and provide limited independent evidence of his claimed sexuality. Attendance at Pride events and participation in social media or messaging groups are not, without more, determinative of a person's sexual orientation. I also note that, despite claiming to have formed relationships with both men and women in the United Kingdom, the appellant has not produced evidence from any former or current partner. In the circumstances, I attach limited weight to this evidence. Considered cumulatively and against the background of the inconsistencies I have identified, I am not satisfied that it establishes, even to the lower standard of proof, that the appellant is gay or bisexual. Whilst I accept that the appellant has attended Pride events and engaged with LGBTQ+ groups in the United Kingdom, I do not find that evidence sufficient, whether individually or cumulatively, to overcome the credibility concerns arising from his own account or to establish his claimed sexual orientation.
Conclusion
44. Drawing all of the evidence together, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the appellant has established that he is bisexual or would be perceived as such in Kenya. I have considered the evidence in the round, including the appellant's interviews, witness statements, oral evidence, the supporting statements from family members and friends, and the evidence of his participation in Pride events and LGBTQ+ WhatsApp groups. However, I have identified a number of material inconsistencies concerning when and how he came to understand his sexuality, the nature of his attraction to women, the nature of his relationship with his wife, and the events which he claims brought him to the adverse attention of the Sungu Sungu. These inconsistencies go to the core of the claim and are not satisfactorily explained by differences in terminology, language difficulties, the fluidity of sexuality, or the appellant's greater freedom to explore his sexuality in the United Kingdom. I am also satisfied that the appellant's account has evolved over time, with significant explanations and evidence emerging only after credibility concerns had been raised by the respondent. Whilst I have considered the supporting evidence carefully, I do not find that it materially corroborates the appellant's claim or overcomes the concerns arising from his own evidence. Taken cumulatively, I do not regard the appellant's account as reliable. Accordingly, I find that the appellant has failed to establish that he is bisexual, gay, or otherwise a member of the LGBTQ+ community, and I am not satisfied that he would be perceived as such on return to Kenya. I further find that he has not established that the events which he claims caused him to leave Kenya occurred as alleged.
Would he in fact live openly if returned to Kenya and why would he conceal his sexuality.
45. Given my finding that the appellant has not established that he is gay or bisexual, and has not established that he would be perceived as such on return to Kenya, the remaining questions identified in HJ (Iran) do not arise. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether he would live openly if returned to Kenya or whether any concealment of his sexuality would be motivated by a fear of persecution. No further findings are required on those issues.
Determination of the Issues
On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution because of his actual or perceived sexuality?
46. For the reasons set out above, I do not accept the factual basis of that claim. I have found that the appellant has not established that he is bisexual, gay, or otherwise a member of the LGBTQ+ community. Nor have I accepted his account that his sexuality became known in Kenya or that he came to the adverse attention of the Sungu Sungu, his family, or his brother for that reason. Accordingly, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant has established a fear of persecution based upon an actual or perceived sexual orientation.
Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
47. Given my findings that the appellant has not established that he is bisexual or gay, and has not established that he would be perceived as such on return to Kenya, he has failed to demonstrate a Convention reason. It follows that there is no real or reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted on account of his actual or perceived sexuality.
Does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm ot torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment?
48. For the same reasons, I am not satisfied that the appellant faces a real risk of suffering serious harm on return to Kenya. I have rejected his account that he came to the adverse attention of the Sungu Sungu, that he was threatened because of his sexuality, or that his brother has sought to harm him. The factual foundation of his protection claim has not been established. Accordingly, the appellant has not shown that he faces a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules or torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return to Kenya in breach of Article 3 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
PROTECTION: The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds, on humanitarian protection grounds, and on human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 30 October 2026
H.Athwal
First-tier Tribunal Judge Athwal
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