Family United Kingdom

A Council v The Mother & Ors

Official source
Pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction and/or rule 12.73 FPR 2010, the child, parents, siblings and wider family members shall not be identified. The names of the child, parents, siblings and any person likely to identify them have been anonymised. Any person publishing this judgment must preserve that anonymity.

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT CHESTER & CREWE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

AND IN THE MATTER OF J and T

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWFC 319 (B)

BEFORE HER HONOUR JUDGE HESFORD

BETWEEN:

A COUNCIL

Applicant

-and-

THE MOTHER

1st Respondent

-and-

THE FATHER (1)

2nd Respondent

-and-

THE FATHER (2)

3rd Respondent

-and-

J

4th Respondent

-and-

T

(BY HIS CHILDREN’S GUARDIAN)

5th Respondent

______________________________

JUDGMENT

2 November 2026

______________________________

Representation

Mr Hurley For the Applicant Local Authority

Ms Gordon For the Mother

Ms Armitage For the Father (1)

Ms Rawlings For the Father (2)

Ms Soutar For J

Ms Wingfield For T via his Guardian

HHJ Hesford:

Introduction

1. This matter concerns two children, J , aged 13, and T , aged 4. I have read and considered all of the written evidence filed within these proceedings. I have also heard and considered the oral evidence of the witnesses called before me, being the social worker and the Guardian, together with the oral submissions of all advocates. In reaching my decision I have taken account of the totality of the evidence, both written and oral, even where specific reference is not made to every aspect of it within this judgment.

2. Threshold is agreed as follows:

Physical harm

1. The mother presents a risk of significant physical and emotional harm to N.

a. On [a date] 2025 the mother, whilst intoxicated, climbed onto the steps of N’s top bunk bed and assaulted N by repeatedly slapping her to the body and head which resulted in injuries, including scratches and bruises to the face.

b. N’s younger sibling J witnessed the assault by hearing it take place.

Emotional Harm

2. N is at risk of significant emotional harm from her mother and stepfather. Mother accepts her relationship with N has been difficult during her teenage years and the mother has not always handled it appropriately, apportioning responsibility to N. The mother accepting this undermines N feelings of self-worth and could create emotional harm

[mother suggested N had caused the injuries to herself.]

[Mother then turned to father (2) and made a comment "All of this because I cracked my daughter because she was a brat".]

3. On [a date] 2025 N collected T and looked after him at home. T became upset and the mother accepts N and J were not able to manage the situation on that occasion. This could have caused them emotional harm. The mother accepts that on two occasions N has been asked to babysit T when he was awake.

4. There has been domestic abuse between the parents including an incident where father (2) headbutted the mother. J was present when he was arrested. There was also previous domestic abuse in the mother and father (1)’’s relationship. The mother and father (2) have failed to adhere to bail conditions preventing contact with one another historically, evidencing that they are unable to prioritise the safety and welfare of the children, instead resuming their relationship.

Reference: incident between mother and father (2), mother sustained a head injury.

5. By virtue of the above, T and J are similarly exposed to the same risks in the parents’ care.

Neglect

6. The children have suffered harm due to neglect and is at risk of further significant harm due to neglect from the mother and father.

a. The mother accepts she has drunk alcohol to excess and used cocaine which could impact on the quality of parenting at times.

b. The father (1) drinks alcohol to excess and uses cannabis and cocaine and is therefore unable to provide appropriate care for N when under the influence of alcohol and substances.

c. The father (2) drinks to excess 3-4 times per week. He is unable to care for T when intoxicated meaning his basic needs are neglected. His HST results dated August 2025 were positive for misuse of cocaine and alcohol from May to June 2025. His HST results were positive for misuse of cocaine and alcohol from late July to November 2025. His HST results were positive for misuse of cocaine, codeine and alcohol from March to May 2026.

I am satisfied that the threshold criteria under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 are met.

3. The issue for determination is therefore the welfare outcome for J & T.

4. I remind myself that J's welfare falls to be determined by reference to the Children Act 1989 welfare checklist. In relation to T, I have regard both to the Children Act welfare checklist and to the welfare provisions within the Adoption and Children Act 2002. I remind myself also of the principles set out in Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33, Re B-S (Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, Re D-S (A Child: Adoption or Fostering) [2024] EWCA Civ 948 and Re S (Foster Care or Placement for Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 47. Adoption is the most interventionist order available to the court. It demands a rigorous evaluation of all realistic alternatives and can only be sanctioned where the child's welfare requires it. In Re D-S the Court of Appeal emphasised that a stable and successful foster placement must be afforded full weight in the welfare evaluation and cannot be discounted merely because it does not provide the same legal permanence as adoption.

5. I remind myself that the issue is not whether long-term foster care is capable of meeting T's welfare needs, but whether his welfare requires adoption. The burden lies upon the local authority to establish that the making of a placement order is proportionate and necessary.

Background and Summary

6. The history leading to these proceedings is lengthy. The case has exceeded the 26-week statutory timetable and is now at week 71, principally because of the exploration of realistic family options for T and the need for further evidence concerning his permanence options. Whilst regrettable, I am satisfied that the delay was necessary to ensure that all realistic options were properly evaluated before final decisions were made for the children.

7. The children have grown up within a family environment characterised by longstanding concerns regarding domestic abuse, alcohol misuse, substance misuse, emotional harm and instability. Those concerns resulted in repeated social care involvement over a number of years. The proceedings themselves arose following the serious assault upon their older sister N in mid 2025, an incident which occurred in the context of alcohol misuse and which left N with significant injuries confirmed by medical evidence. J witnessed aspects of that incident.

8. The court has had the benefit of extensive assessment throughout these proceedings. Although both parents have engaged with some support, the consistent conclusion of the professional evidence is that neither parent has demonstrated sufficient insight into the concerns, nor sufficient sustained change, to enable either child safely to return to their care. Of particular concern are continuing findings relating to alcohol misuse, cocaine use, minimisation of harm and emotional dysregulation. This case has now been before the court for a considerable period an the parents have had every realistic opportunity to demonstrate change. Regrettably, the evidence does not establish change within a timescale compatible with either child's welfare needs.

9. The local authority seek orders for J to remain in foster care and for T to be adopted; they have applied for a placement order for T.

10. The parents were, until very recently, opposed to those plans in their entirety but they have latterly conceded that they are not in a position to challenge the evidence and they accept that presently they are not in a position to care for either child. This was a brave concession by them and one which will have taken much thought and consideration. Accordingly both parents are no longer actively opposed to the making of final care orders, with plans for long term foster care although they did not formally consent to the same. They remain opposed to the plan for T to be adopted and oppose the making of the placement order. They seek additional contact with both children.

11. The Guardian's final position is that final care orders should be made in respect of both children and that both children should be cared for under plans of long-term foster care. The Guardian opposes the Local Authority's application for a placement order and adoption plan for T. She considers that T already enjoys the emotional permanence, stability and secure attachment that adoption seeks to achieve and that his welfare is better served by preserving those existing relationships through long-term foster care than by disrupting them in pursuit of an adoptive placement.

12. J is separately represented. She would prefer to go home but again has latterly accepted that this cannot happen at present and she is aware that she will remain in foster care.

13. I am entirely satisfied that rehabilitation is not a realistic outcome for either child; this is now unopposed. Equally, all realistic family options have been explored. No family member has emerged as a viable long-term carer for either child.

14. J is now thirteen years old. She is an intelligent, thoughtful and resilient young person. I had the pleasure of meeting her recently.

15. She has experienced significant instability during her childhood. She has been exposed to domestic abuse, substance misuse and conflict. She has witnessed events no child should witness and has experienced uncertainty for much of her life. More recently she has also experienced instability within care through placement changes and uncertainty regarding her future. In particular, I have considered J's wishes and feelings, which carry considerable weight given her age and understanding; her emotional and educational needs; the harm she has suffered and remains at risk of suffering; her age, background and personal characteristics; and the capabilities of those available to meet her needs. Taken together, those matters point clearly towards long-term foster care.

16. J's wishes and feelings are clear. Her first wish remains to return home to her mother and father (2). If that is not possible, she wishes to remain close to her school, friends and community. She has also expressed strong views regarding T, opposing adoption for him and supporting his remaining with his current foster carer if he cannot return home. Those wishes and feelings are important and I have given them significant weight. J is old enough for her views to matter. However, they cannot be determinative.

17. The professional evidence paints a consistent picture. J requires stability, permanence, emotional containment and therapeutic support. She requires adults who can provide predictable care, emotional warmth and boundaries throughout her adolescence. The evidence strongly suggests that, despite her loyalty to her mother, J understands at some level why she cannot safely return home and that the uncertainty surrounding her future has itself been an important source of emotional difficulty for her. This was also reflected in my own meeting with her.

18. Having had regard to the welfare checklist, I am satisfied that J's need for stability, permanence and emotional security outweighs her understandable wish to return home. Long-term foster care offers the best prospect of meeting those needs throughout the remainder of her childhood. I am thus satisfied that J's welfare requires a final care order and a plan of long-term foster care. That plan is necessary, proportionate and plainly in her best interests. It is also one which she accepts, albeit reluctantly.

19. I have considered the likely effect upon J of a final decision. Although she may be disappointed by the outcome, permanence itself is likely to be beneficial. She needs certainty and the opportunity to invest emotionally in a placement without continuing to hope for a return home that the evidence does not support.

20. I turn to T. The Local Authority seeks a placement order and a plan of adoption. The Guardian, supported by the parents, opposes that plan and supports long-term foster care. Given the lifelong consequences of adoption, the application requires particularly careful scrutiny. The issue is whether T's welfare requires adoption.

21. When he entered care, T was a vulnerable child who had experienced instability and adversity. The evidence now presents a markedly different picture. T is settled within his foster placement, where he has lived for 14 months, he has formed a secure attachment to his foster carer and is thriving emotionally, socially and educationally. The evidence is strikingly consistent that the placement is meeting his needs exceptionally well. An important feature of this case is that T is already living in a placement which provides him with stability, security, attachment and belonging. Adoption would undoubtedly provide a greater degree of legal permanence. The question is whether the additional benefits of adoption justify disrupting what T already has.

22. The Local Authority now accepts that long-term foster care is a realistic permanence option. Its further analysis recognises that T's current placement is meeting his needs very well, that his foster carer remains committed to caring for him throughout his childhood, and that the placement is capable of providing him with long-term stability. Those are important considerations in the welfare evaluation. As recognised in Re S, where the court is considering whether to disrupt a successful foster placement in pursuit of adoption, the consequences of interfering with established attachments require careful scrutiny. Adoption, by contrast, carries an element of uncertainty. I have considered the evidence of the family-finding social worker concerning family finding. I do not determine welfare by reference to statistics or placement availability. However, I accept that finding adopters for a child with T's profile may present challenges and take time. Whilst adoption remains achievable, those practical realities form part of the consequences of the plan which I must evaluate. The Local Authority's plan remains contingent upon a successful family-finding exercise. Whilst I accept that adoption may ultimately be achievable, the outcome, timing and identity of any prospective adopters are presently unknown. I take account of that uncertainty not as a reason to reject adoption, but as part of the practical welfare consequences of the plan under consideration.

23. I also note that the foster carer's understandable reluctance to pursue a Special Guardianship Order at this time arises from concerns about assuming parental responsibility and managing future relationships with mother. The evidence does not suggest any lack of commitment to T's care. On the contrary, her position has consistently been that she wishes to continue caring for him throughout his childhood. If there is improvement in the behaviour of the mother and their relationship, an SGO could be possible at a later stage.

24. Adoption would provide T with lifelong legal permanence, full legal membership of a substitute family, exclusive parental responsibility vested in adoptive parents and freedom from continuing state intervention. Those are significant advantages and I have afforded them substantial weight. T remains a young child and there are many years of childhood ahead of him during which those benefits could be realised. I have also considered the Local Authority's submission that T's ability to form secure attachments and to thrive in stable care are factors which may support a successful transition to an adoptive placement. Against that, adoption would require T to leave the placement in which he is presently settled and secure. He would lose his day-to-day relationship with the foster carer to whom he is securely attached and there would inevitably be disruption and uncertainty associated with that transition. Adoption would also have implications for the preservation of T's existing sibling and wider family relationships notwithstanding the careful contact proposals advanced by the Local Authority and Guardian.

25. The advantages of long-term foster care are equally clear. T is already settled, thriving and securely attached within his current placement. Remaining there would preserve continuity of care, emotional security and established relationships. It would avoid the risks associated with disrupting a placement that is presently meeting his needs exceptionally well. This is not a theoretical option. It is an arrangement that is currently succeeding and which his foster carer is willing to continue throughout his childhood. The disadvantages of long-term foster care must also be recognised. It cannot provide the same degree of legal permanence as adoption. T would remain a looked-after child and subject to ongoing Local Authority involvement and review. Foster care cannot provide the same lifelong legal family relationship, certainty of status or freedom from state intervention as adoption.

26. I fully acknowledge the Local Authority's submission that adoption offers a higher order of legal permanence than long-term foster care and the lifelong security, legal status and family membership that accompany it. I accept this. Those are weighty factors and I have given them substantial importance. The difficulty for the Local Authority's case is not that those advantages are absent, but that their attainment would require the court to sanction disruption to a placement that is already providing T with stability and a sense of belonging. On the particular facts of this case, I am not persuaded that the additional legal advantages of adoption outweigh those immediate and certain welfare consequences.

27. I accept that the Local Authority's plan is not speculative in the sense that adoption is plainly achievable for some children of T's age and profile. My conclusion is not based upon any prediction that family finding will fail. Rather, it is based upon the welfare consequences for T of pursuing adoption in the circumstances I have addressed. The feature that ultimately carries greatest weight is the success of T's current placement and the secure attachments he has formed there. I recognise the disadvantages of long-term foster care and I have weighed them carefully. However, in T's circumstances those risks are presently speculative. By contrast, the disruption that adoption would require is immediate and certain. The loss of his current home, his primary attachment figure and the stability he presently enjoys are not theoretical risks but inevitable consequences of the plan advanced by the Local Authority.

28. This conclusion is driven by the particular facts of T's case and not by any general preference for long-term foster care over adoption. In many cases adoption will properly be regarded as the welfare outcome that best secures a child's lifelong interests. What is unusual here is that T is already thriving within a stable and enduring placement, has formed secure attachments and has a foster carer willing to continue caring for him throughout his childhood.

29. In reaching that conclusion I have had regard to all the matters set out in section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. I have considered T's wishes and feelings insofar as they can be ascertained having regard to his age and understanding; his particular needs; the likely effect on him throughout his life of any decision made; his age, background and relevant characteristics; any harm he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; and the capability of those available to meet his needs.

30. I have also considered T's relationships with his parents, J, his foster carer and other significant adults. I regard it as significant that long-term foster care would enable him to maintain those relationships whilst remaining in the placement where he is settled and secure. Those relationships form an important part of his identity and welfare. This may not be possible to the same extent if adoption were pursued.

31. I do not treat the success of the current foster placement as determinative. I recognise the additional legal permanence and family membership that adoption could provide. However, T is already experiencing stability, secure attachment and a sense of belonging in a placement that is meeting his needs and is capable of enduring throughout his childhood. That reality carries considerable weight in the welfare evaluation.

32. I have carefully considered whether the realistic alternative of long-term foster care can meet T's welfare needs. I am satisfied that it can and that it is presently doing so. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that T's welfare requires adoption.

33. Drawing these matters together, I am not satisfied that the Local Authority has established that a placement order is necessary or proportionate. Having undertaken a holistic welfare evaluation and a full Article 8 balancing exercise, I conclude that long-term foster care is not merely a realistic alternative to adoption but, on the evidence before me, is the option that best promotes T's welfare throughout his childhood. Adoption is not required by his welfare and a placement order would be disproportionate. I therefore refuse the application for a placement order.

Sibling relationships and separate placements

34. I have considered carefully the evidence concerning the relationship between J and T. I have also considered the guardian's thoughtful submissions regarding a possible joint placement at some point.

35. The sibling assessments provide balanced and thoughtful analyses. They demonstrate that the relationship is loving, affectionate and important to both children. Their time together is plainly beneficial. They enjoy each other's company and should continue to have opportunities to develop that relationship. However, the assessments also highlight the significant differences in their ages, developmental stages and needs. Most importantly, J has repeatedly and consistently stated that, whilst she wishes to maintain her relationship with T, her preferred option is not to live with him (unless at the parental home).

36. I accept the conclusions of the latest sibling assessment. There is no realistic joint placement presently available and any attempt to pursue one would require disruption of T's settled placement. For the reasons already given, I am satisfied that the children's welfare is best served by separate placements accompanied by regular and meaningful sibling contact.

37. I am satisfied that the conclusion would be the same even absent J's stated wishes, given the children's markedly different developmental needs and the practical difficulties of identifying a placement capable of meeting both children's needs without disrupting T's settled placement.

Contact

38. I agree broadly with the guardian's proposals concerning contact, which should be supervised. Those proposals are that J should spend time with her mother monthly, T should spend time with his parents monthly, that sibling contact should continue monthly as at present, and that J's relationship with her father should continue in accordance with her wishes and feelings. The sibling relationship should continue to be actively promoted. Direct sibling contact should continue at least monthly, subject to review through the looked-after-child framework. N should also be included.

39. In relation to J's father, I do not consider it necessary or desirable to prescribe a fixed pattern of contact. The evidence demonstrates that the relationship is positive, improving and free from safeguarding concerns. J enjoys a degree of flexibility in arranging time with her father and paternal grandfather and I consider it appropriate that those arrangements continue to be guided by her wishes and feelings, subject to her welfare.

40. I recognise that the arrangements should be reviewed regularly in accordance with the children’s welfare needs and, in J's case, her wishes and feelings. T’s contact must be reviewed regularly to ensure that it is positive and that the frequency remains in line with his best interests. The behaviour of the mother is known to be challenging at times and could potentially cause disruption. The stability and security of the foster placement is crucial and must be the primary concern. Destabilisation of his placement would certainly harm his welfare. I express the hope that the mother’s future behaviour is reflective of the finality of the plans and care order and that she becomes supportive and respectful of both T’s placement and his carers. With the parents, the emphasis for both children should be on the quality of contact rather than specific quantities.

41. I have considered whether it is necessary to make an order regulating contact between the children and their family members. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, I decline to do so. There is no evidential basis to conclude that the local authority would fail to facilitate the contact arrangements set out in this judgment. Both children will remain subject to final care orders. The local authority accepts the importance of maintaining their sibling relationships and the guardian strongly supports the continuation of direct contact. I will approve care plans that recognise the significance of those relationships and I am satisfied that the arrangements can appropriately be managed and reviewed through the statutory looked-after-child framework. I bear in mind that contact orders should not routinely be made where appropriate arrangements can be managed through public-law planning and statutory review mechanisms.

42. That should not be taken as diminishing the importance of contact. On the contrary, I regard the sibling relationship between J and T as an important protective feature in both children's lives. The local authority should ensure that direct sibling contact remains regular, meaningful and child-focused, and should consider opportunities for additional contact where this can appropriately be achieved.

43. For those reasons, I conclude that the making of a contact order is neither necessary nor proportionate.

Proportionality and Article 8

44. I have considered the rights of all family members under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The making of care orders is undoubtedly an interference with family life. However, I am satisfied that such interference is lawful, necessary and proportionate. Neither child can safely return home. No family placement is available. I have considered the realistic alternatives of rehabilitation, placement within the family, long-term foster care and adoption. I am satisfied that no less interventionist order than a care order is capable of meeting the children's welfare needs.

45. In relation to T, I have carried out a separate proportionality analysis regarding adoption. Adoption would represent a substantially greater interference with the Article 8 rights of T and his birth family. I have considered the application for a placement order with particular care, recognising both the gravity of the order sought and the lifelong consequences that would flow from it. In circumstances where there exists a realistic and welfare-positive alternative which I have concluded best promotes T's welfare in the form of long-term foster care, I conclude that a placement order would be a disproportionate response. I have therefore concluded that long-term foster care is the least interventionist option capable of meeting T's welfare needs. A placement order would go further than is necessary or proportionate.

Conclusion

46. The outcome I have reached reflects the recommendations ultimately advanced by the Children's Guardian, namely that both children should be the subject of final care orders with plans of long-term foster care and that the application for a placement order in respect of T should be refused.

For those reasons:

i. I make a final care order in respect of J.

ii. I approve the care plan for J of long-term foster care.

iii. I make a final care order in respect of T.

iv. I refuse the application for a placement order in respect of T.

v. I approve the care plan for T of long-term foster care, ideally in his current foster placement.

vi. I conclude that the children's welfare is best served by their remaining in separate placements at this time.

vii. I approve continuing sibling and parental contact broadly in accordance with the recommendations of the children's guardian, subject to ongoing review.

55. I recognise that this outcome will be profoundly disappointing for the parents. Nothing in this judgment should be taken as a failure to recognise their love for these children. The difficulty is that the welfare concerns identified throughout these proceedings have not been resolved. I am aware that they hope for a future rehabilitation of the children. It is important that they recognise that these orders today are not made as short-term holding measures for potential rehabilitation but as long-term orders securing the children’s placements in foster care. Any future application would require the parents to demonstrate substantial, evidenced and sustained change over a significant period before any consideration is given to a potential change in circumstances, in order to avoid disrupting the children unnecessarily. They should be guided by the professional social workers in this regard.

56. My task is to determine the outcome that best promotes the children's welfare. Having considered all realistic options, I am satisfied that the orders I have made are necessary, proportionate and in the best interests of both children.

HHJ Hesford

2 November 2026

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