Administrative United Kingdom
FM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: PA/68306/2024
PA/78550/2025
PA/67129/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham (Priory Court)
On 28th August and 23rd October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE cj williams
Between
Fm (1)
MM (2)
AH (3)
(anonymity direction Made)
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Islam of Counsel, instructed by Spring & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Qureshi, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants, citizens of Sri Lanka, appeal under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the respondent’s decisions dated 4th June 2024 (FM), 24th June 2025 (MM) and 4th June 2024 (AH) to refuse their protection claims made on 15th August 2022 (FM and MM) and 17th January 2025 (MM). As such ss30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’) apply.
Anonymity Direction
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS. For FM, there is a stitched bundle of 662 pages (SB1), for MM, there is a stitched bundle of 145 pages (SB2), and for AH, a stitched bundle (SB3) of 517 pages. Separate to the stitched bundles, I was also provided with an addendum bundle (AB) of 4 pages, and a bundle of supporting documents (AB2) of 17 pages.
4. The appellants assert that they would be at risk on return due to their religion and imputed political opinion, or alternatively that they are entitled to humanitarian protection.
HEARING
5. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.
Preliminary issues
6. At the hearing on 28th August 2026, the appellants were represented by Burton & Burton Solicitors. During the evidence of FM, she made repeated reference to an arrest warrant which she said she had provided to her solicitors. This document did not appear in the bundle. I gave Mr Islam (who represented the appellants at that hearing too) time to take instructions. Upon his return, he confirmed he had been told by Burton & Burton that the appellants had not provided an arrest warrant to them. This was contradicted however, by an email FM showed to Mr Islam which appeared to show the arrest warrant being sent to Burton & Burton in advance of the hearing.
7. Understandably, in the face of conflicting instructions from his lay and professional clients, Mr Islam felt he had no choice but to withdraw from the case. During the hearing, Burton & Burton stopped acting for the appellants. In the circumstances, I did not consider it would be fair to the appellants to continue with the hearing, and I adjourned the hearing part heard.
8. I made the following directions which were communicated to Burton & Burton by email on 31st August 2026 because they were no longer acting for the appellants.
(a) By 4th September 2026, the appellants must file and serve the arrest warrants referred to at the hearing. If they opt to waive privilege, copies of the emails containing the arrest warrants sent to Burton & Burton are also to be provided.
(b) By 11th September 2026, Jessica Frost of Burton & Burton must provide to the Tribunal a witness statement addressing the following matters:
(i) Whether any documents said to be arrest warrants from Sri Lanka were provided by the appellants, and if so, when.
(ii) If these documents were provided, why they were not filed with the Tribunal and respondent.
(iii) If it is accepted that these documents were provided by the appellants prior to the hearing, why Mr Islam was told otherwise.
9. There was non-compliance from both the appellants and Burton & Burton. The appellants did not provide the arrest warrant until 23rd September 2026, which appeared to be because of difficulties accessing MyHMCTS as appellants in person. A witness statement of sorts was received from Jessica Frost of Burton & Burton on 5th October 2026 which denied the appellants had provided any documents to the firm which were not sent to the Tribunal or respondent. Noting the appellants’ failure to provide to the Tribunal the email initially shown to Mr Islam, I say no more about the issue.
10. By the hearing on 23rd October 2026, the appellants had instructed new representatives and were represented again by Mr Islam.
Issues in dispute
11. The parties agree that the following issues are in dispute:
(i) Are the appellants at risk upon return to Sri Lanka?
12. I raised with Ms Qureshi the consistency of the respondent’s position as it pertained to the appellants’ affiliation with Sri Lanka Touheed Jaamaat (‘the SLTJ’). The refusals for FM and MM rejected this element of the claim, however the refusal for AH accepted that he was affiliated. In view of the familial link between the appellants, I asked Ms Qureshi whether the respondent intended me to determine separately each appellant’s connection to SLTJ or whether it was accepted all of the appellants should benefit from the concession made in AH’s case.
13. Ms Qureshi, with her usual pragmatism, accepted that it would be appropriate to extend the concession of affiliation to SLTJ to all of the appellants. In my view, that concession was properly made. Had the respondent not conceded this point, I would have found, on the basis of the consistent evidence before me on the issue, that all of the appellants were followers of the SLTJ.
Evidence and submissions
14. AH, FM and MM all gave evidence in Tamil with the assistance at the first hearing by Dr Natarajan and at the second hearing by Mr Amutharasan who appeared by Cloud Video Platform. I did not observe any difficulties in communication between the appellants and the interpreters, nor were any issues raised by the parties. All appellants adopted their witness statements and were cross-examined by Ms Qureshi. I heard submissions from both representatives, and at the end of the second hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give with reasons.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
15. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellants must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellants. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellants qualifiy as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the appellants have a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the appellants do in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.
16. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellants do have such a characteristic, and fears persecution as a result of that characteristic, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the appellants would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.
17. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellants must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellants.
FINDINGS
Are the appellants at risk upon return to Sri Lanka?
18. FM is the mother of the other two appellants. They all claim to be at risk upon return to Sri Lanka following an event in October 2021. The appellants claim they were hosting a religious service at their home, an event at which AH was delivering a talk, promoting the teachings of the SLTJ. Following this event, the appellants claim their home was raided, they were suspected of supporting organisations affiliated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (‘LTTE’) and were detained and mistreated whilst in custody. The appellants claim a bribe was paid for their release; they were placed on reporting conditions but went into hiding until they left Sri Lanka for the UK.
19. The respondent accepts the appellants’ identity, their Sri Lankan nationality and that they are followers of the SLTJ. It is not accepted however, that the appellants are of adverse interest to the Sri Lankan government, nor would they be upon return to Sri Lanka.
20. I start by noting that the claim advanced by the appellants is generally consistent with the background evidence. Mr Islam in his submissions directed me to the respondent’s CPIN, Sri Lanka: Minority religious groups, Version 3.0, February 2025. I was referred specifically to 3.3.2 of the CPIN, which states:
Muslims reported that they faced official discrimination, harassment and were unfairly targeted by the police after the 2019 Easter Sunday terrorist attacks (perpetrated by a Muslim extremist group). However, the sources indicate the state pressure experienced by the Muslim community has since subsided and in general Muslims are able to practise their faith freely. Some Muslims, particularly those previously detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), families of those detained under PTA and their legal reps, community activists and those who engage with representatives of the international community, do continue to be monitored by the state.
21. It is entirely plausible, when considered against the background evidence, that a Muslim family would have been the subject of threats and pressure from the authorities in the way the appellants claim. I also accept that in April 2021, the Government of Sri Lanka, proscribed the SLTJ. The appellants have provided a copy (pp.479-481, SB) of Regulations made by the Government of Sri Lanka, proscribing a number of groups including the SLTJ. It is therefore also plausible that if the appellant’s affiliation were known to the authorities, they would be of adverse interest to them.
22. Having said that however, there were a number of issues with the evidence which, when taken together, mean I do not find they are at risk upon return. First, the evidence given by the appellants in respect of the raid on their home differed in a number of aspects.
23. When asked about the raid on 26th October 2021, FM said in oral evidence that there were around ten people who came to raid the property, which was what she said in her substantive interview (AIR 80). MM however gave a different account, saying there were six people who came to the house in his substantive interview (AIR 76). AH was also asked how many people had attended, and in oral evidence he said there had been four men and two women. When asked whether there were ten or six, he said ‘I can’t say but ten people came’. The appellants were also inconsistent about the gender make up of the group, with FH saying there was one woman and the others were men (AIR 94) and MM saying there were ‘4 men and two females’ in oral evidence. As to what those who raided the home were wearing, MM in his witness statement (p.22, SB) said that two of the officers were in uniform and the others were wearing ‘normal clothes’, whereas FM said they officers were not wearing uniforms (AIR 80).
24. I acknowledge that in circumstances where the appellants were surprised by this event, and it took place relatively early in the morning, there is room for misremembering. Having said that however, this was an event which is said to have led to the appellants being detained for nearly two weeks. I do not consider the appellants’ differencing evidence on the number of people who came to raid the house, or what they looked like, can be explained by the timing of the event, I find instead it is an inconsistency which tells against the credibility of the account.
25. Further, the evidence given by MM on the issue of the raid was also difficult to follow and was inconsistent. In his witness statement (p.21, SB), MM says those who attended the property ‘showed their ID cards’. When asked in cross-examination, he confirmed he did see the ID cards. In his substantive interview however (AIR 77), when asked how he knew they were CID, MM said ‘they didn’t tell us’, and that they knew because they had guns. Ms Qureshi asked the appellant why he had said he had seen the ID cards. He then said, ‘I saw they were showing ID but I didn’t know what they were’. I find this inconsistency again undermines the credibility of the narrative advanced, especially when the appellant had said in his interview (AIR 87) that they had identified themselves to his father and his father had told him.
26. Secondly, I turn to the appellants’ actions following their claimed release from detention. All of the appellants are consistent in their claim to have been released from detention on 7th November 2021 when FH’s brother paid a bribe with the assistance of an agent. MM said he was released on condition of reporting every two weeks (AIR 92). Looking at MM, he did not leave Sri Lanka until August 2022. He did not have any problems with the authorities (despite his failure to adhere to reporting conditions) between his release in November 2021 and his departure from Sri Lanka in August 2022.
27. When asked how this was possible, MM said that the agent was keeping him in hiding in various places in Sri Lanka. Whilst there was limited evidence about the specifics as to how the agent was doing this, I place little weight on the absence of contact with the authorities during this time as I acknowledge it would be possible to avoid contact with the authorities by moving around and hiding in different locations.
28. What I do find undermines the credibility of MM’s evidence, however, is his extensive travel in and out of Sri Lanka on his own passport (AIR 102). His own evidence is that in August 2022, he flew to Japan where he stayed for three months. He returned to Sri Lanka in November 2022 (AIR 100). In August 2023, he went to Malaysia until February 2024, when he returned to Sri Lanka until October 2024 when he left for the UK (AIR 101).
29. I have taken into account the expert evidence relied on by the appellants, of Dr Gilberto Algar-Faria. His evidence was not challenged by Ms Qureshi before me, and I accept, on the basis of his CV and his qualifications, that he is qualified to give the opinion he does within the report. The appellants say and are supported by the expert at 4.1.8 of his report, that the facial recognition software relied on by the respondent was not installed until January 2024. I accept that. What I find difficult to accept however, is that a person who claims to have been detained, tortured, and placed on reporting conditions would fail to comply with those conditions and be able to enter and exit Sri Lanka on six occasions without any difficulties on his own passport. Even taking into account the claim that the agent was able to arrange matters on MM’s departure, it does not account for how MM was able to enter Sri Lanka from other countries without coming to the attention of the authorities.
30. Irrespective of the presence of facial recognition, Ms Qureshi relied on the respondent’s ‘report of a Home Office fact-finding mission to Sri Lanka’ published on 20th January 2020. It was submitted that the details about immigration processes in Sri Lanka do not give scope for a person of interest to the authorities to enter and exit freely in the manner claimed by the appellants. Having considered the detail in the report, I agree with this position. I find that MM’s evidence undermines the credibility of his claim.
31. Third, the appellants have produced some documentary evidence in support of their claim. Specifically, they rely on documentation said to be from the Magistrates Court in Kandy in which all members of the family are identified as suspects, having arrest warrants issued for them, and following their exit from Sri Lanka, there are now notifications to arrest the appellants upon return to Sri Lanka. I have considered this evidence with Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan * [2002] UKIAT 00439 in mind, i.e. that it is for the appellants to establish the reliability of the evidence they rely on.
32. The appellants have provided a letter from a Sri Lankan attorney, accompanied by a copy of an ID card and certification of enrolment as an Attorney of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. There is however no evidence as to how these documents were received by the appellants. When asked in cross-examination, FM said her husband asked FM’s brother to obtain the documents in August 2026. There was no evidence from FM’s husband, despite attending both hearings, nor was there any evidence from FM’s brother. I did not have a copy of the email containing the documents from the lawyer, nor did I have any of the originals of the court documents, only the translations.
33. These factors in my judgment undermine the reliability of the evidence when taken in the round. This is especially so when the appellants were afforded an adjournment of nearly two months to file further evidence which they claimed had been sent to their previous solicitors and not filed with the Tribunal.
34. The respondent highlighted in her review of AH’s appeal, dated 4th September 2025, objective evidence which indicates the proscription of the SLTJ was set aside by the Sri Lankan Government in July 2023. FM and MM accepted in their evidence that this was so. In light of the withdrawal of the proscription, it is unclear why, in November 2024, a complaint would be made by the Terrorism Investigation Unit of the appellants’ involvement with the SLTJ.
35. Taking these factors together, along with the rest of the evidential landscape, I do not find these documents reliably establish the appellants are of adverse interest to the authorities because of their connection to the SLTJ.
36. The appellants also claim to be suspected of involvement with the LTTE on account of charity work they have undertaken. These allegations are not well particularised by the appellants, however they rely on the same court documents I have considered in making good this aspect of their claim. I note that FM, in her screening interview, made brief mention of the SLTJ, but did not mention any accusations of being affiliated with the LTTE, even when asked the standard questions about involvement (or perceived involvement) with armed or violent groups. When AH was asked the same questions in his screening interview, he mentioned his membership of the SLTJ, but there was no mention of the LTTE.
37. MM also only mentioned connection with the SLTJ in his screening interview, and denied any accusation of being involved with any other groups. I therefore do not consider the appellants’ claim to be accused of involvement with the LTTE is credible. I do not consider it is something all three who were interviewed would forget or omit if it were indeed something they were accused of by the Sri Lankan authorities.
38. Whilst the appellants have provided photographs of themselves making donations to what they say are groups supporting disabled people, I do not consider that donations in this manner, to a group supporting disabled people, are likely to be perceived as the ‘a "significant role" in Tamil separatism’ which, according to the country guidance of KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130, is likely to place the appellants at risk.
39. I have further taken into account, when assessing their credibility, the appellants’ failure to claim asylum upon arrival in the United Kingdom. I have taken into consideration the appellants’ claim that they were being advised of what to do by an agent. I do consider however, especially in the case of MM, that only making a protection claim after he was unable to enrol in university is a factor undermining the credibility of the claim.
40. Pulling the threads together, I do not find the appellants have established that they do in fact fear persecution for a Convention reason. I find their evidence at points is contradictory, and whilst plausible, the factors I have considered above mean that I do not accept the accounts as credible. I do not find the appellants came to the adverse interest of the authorities in Sri Lanka, nor do I find there are any legal proceedings facing them upon return. In view of the end of the proscription of the SLTJ, I do not find the appellants would face any difficulties in practicing their faith upon return. I therefore do not consider the appellants are reasonably likely to face persecution.
41. Even applying the lower standard of proof applicable in humanitarian protection claims, I do not find the appellants have shown there is a real risk of serious harm to them upon return to Sri Lanka.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeals are dismissed.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed CJ Williams 3rd November 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge CJ Williams
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