Administrative United Kingdom
EO v THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/55564/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Columbus House
On 21 October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE Webb
Between
EO
(Anonymity ORDER made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Jaisri (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms A Bowden (Counsel)
DECISION AND REASONS
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.
2. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
3. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds (Article 3).
REASONS
4. The appellant, a citizen of Nigeria, has appealed on protection and human rights grounds against the respondent’s decision dated 02 February 2025 refusing their application for leave to remain dated 16 June 2021.
ANONYMITY ORDER
5. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee and human rights conventions outweighs the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellant’s potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that the appellant’s identity be protected until the final outcome of this appeal.
BACKGROUND
6. The background to this appeal is set out in the information contained on MyHMCTS.
7. The appellant asserts a right to remain on protection grounds. He claims to fear harm based on his membership of the IPOB and on the basis of his identity as a bisexual man.
HEARING
Format
8. The hearing was held by video. There were no issues with any of the participants being able to see or hear each other and I was satisfied that the format enabled a fair hearing.
Issues in dispute
9. The appellant made his application for leave to remain on 16 June 2021, so this is not a case to which the provisions of the Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 apply. As a result, the lower standard of proof applies to the issues I need to decide under the Refugee Convention.
10. The parties agreed that the issues for me to decide are as follows:
(a) Does the appellant fear persecution for a Convention reason?
(b) If the appellant is a bisexual man, would he live openly on return to Nigeria?
(c) In the alternative would the appellant qualify for humanitarian protection?
(d) Does the decision breach the appellant’s rights under Article 3 ECHR.
11. The respondent does not rely on section 8 of the 2004 Act.
12. Ms Bowden confirmed that the respondent conceded that if the appellant’s account of his political involvement is accepted, he would be at risk. Ms Bowden also confirmed that if the appellant is found to be a bisexual man who would live openly on return, he would be at risk.
13. The respondent has conceded that there is no protection or internal relocation option if his account is accepted.
14. Mr Jaisri confirmed the appellant was not pursuing any Article 3 medical grounds or Article 8 private and family life grounds.
Evidence and submissions
15. The appellant and his witness gave evidence and followed the proceedings in English. They both gave evidence. They confirmed their witness statements and were cross-examined by Ms Bowden.
16. After I heard evidence, Ms Bowden and Mr Jaisri both made submissions.
17. I recorded the oral evidence and submissions in my record of proceedings and have taken it all into account, along with the documentary evidence downloaded from MyHMCTS.
Post hearing directions
18. After the hearing but before promulgation of this decision the Upper Tribunal promulgated DS (NBAB s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC). I invited the parties to provide any submissions they may wish by 02 November 2026.
19. The respondent did not provide any submissions. The appellant did provide submissions arguing that DS was not relevant because the asylum claim under consideration was made before the relevant provisions of NABA came into effect. I agree with that submission.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
20. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion).
21. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
22. In relation to Article 3 the appellant must establish that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of them being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
23. Where an appellant has provided documents, it will be for them to show they can be relied upon and they will be considered along with all the other evidence, Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439.
FINDINGS
Facts in dispute
24. I have not set out every point or piece of evidence, only those that are most important to my decision. In making my findings I have considered all the evidence that I was given.
25. In undertaking my assessment of all the evidence, I have in mind the structured approach set out in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC).
26. In assessing credibility, I remind myself that an individual may tell lies about some aspects of their case but may be telling the truth about others.
27. The respondent has not sought to rely on any behaviour that would engage section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
28. The respondent does not accept that the appellant has a political opinion or that he is a bisexual man.
29. The appellant did not disclose his sexuality until shortly before a previous appeal hearing. The appellant explains that he did not disclose his sexuality in his initial screening interview or in his first substantive interview because he was not aware of how the authorities in the UK would treat a bisexual man and because of the cultural stigma that attaches to bisexual men in Nigeria.
30. I accept that those who come from countries where the authorities are actively hostile to the LGBT community may be reluctant to disclose their sexuality to the authorities in the UK, and I find the late disclosure in this case does not adversely affect the appellant's credibility in relation to this aspect of his account.
31. In assessing this part of the appellant's account, I have considered that his sister gave evidence to say that he disclosed his sexuality to her when they first met in the UK. However, her evidence was that she did not know of any relationships with men that the appellant had been in in the UK. I find, therefore, that her evidence that the appellant is bisexual is only a repetition of what she has been told by the appellant, and therefore it has very little weight in my overall assessment of his account.
32. Having considered the appellant's evidence about his sexuality and his relationships in Nigeria, I find that it is lacking in sufficient detail and inconsistent. In particular about the person with whom he was found by his ex-partner in Nigeria, the length of their relationship, and the number of relationships he had in Nigeria. These are matters that adversely affect the credibility of the appellant’s account of his sexuality.
33. I remind myself that I should not reject the plausibility of an account lightly, and certainly not on the basis that it would not seem reasonable if it happened in the UK, Y [2006] EWCA 1223.
34. However, I find it is implausible that the appellant’s ex-partner was able to enter his house and bedroom unhindered by locks to discover the appellant in bed with a man. This is another factor that adversely affects the credibility of this aspect of the appellant’s account.
35. In support of his relationships in Nigeria, the appellant has provided a letter from a man with whom he says he had a relationship. This letter is typed and does not include a wet signature, nor is there any ID document that shows the writer is a real person. I note the content of that letter does not provide any details of their relationship but rather talks about the consequences of being a gay man in Nigeria. I find this letter has all the hallmarks of being written to order, and I place very little weight on it in my overall assessment.
36. The appellant says that he has been in two relationships with men in the UK, with one lasting 12 months and another six months. It was put to the appellant in cross-examination that he had not provided any evidence of those relationships. The appellant's explanation was that he had not been asked to provide any evidence.
37. I remind myself that corroboration is not required, but that where evidence can be reasonably expected but not provided it may be damaging to the credibility of a witness: ST [2004] UKIAT 00119, TK (Burundi) [2009] EWCA Civ 40.
38. I note that the appellant is represented, and I find that it would be reasonable to expect evidence of the relationships he has been in if that evidence existed. I find that the absence of such evidence adversely affects the credibility of the appellant's account to have been in relationships while in the UK.
39. The appellant also relies on letters provided by the Harbour Project and from the Swindon LGBT Social Group that record his attendance at meetings and participation. I agree with the submission of Ms Bowden, that attendance at these groups does not mean that the appellant is a bisexual man. Indeed, the letters themselves do not record that the appellant has claimed to be a bisexual man or shared his experiences in Nigeria with the authors. I find these letters have very little weight in my assessment of the appellant's sexuality.
40. In support of his membership of the IPOB organisation, the appellant has provided a number of cash receipts. The earliest of those is dated February 2016 and records that it was for fees due in January and February. The appellant's account is that he did not join until August 2016.
41. When the point was put to the appellant during cross-examination by Ms Bowden, his response was that he did not know why the cash receipt was dated in February. When asked by me about the stamped reference numbers all being the same on the documentation, the appellant again said that he did not know why the numbers were the same.
42. Having considered these documents and the appellant's explanation, I find that these are documents on which I am able to place no weight when assessing the appellant's membership of the IPOB, they are not consistent with his account and appear to have identical stamped reference numbers despite them being dated months apart.
43. The appellant also seeks to rely on a copy of his IPOB ID card. The appellant's evidence before me was that the original was a piece of cardboard that remained in Nigeria. However, the copy that has been provided by the appellant in the bundle, does not appear to be a photograph or scan of a cardboard ID card; it appears to be an electronic document. I find that this is not a document on which I am able to place weight when assessing the appellant's claim as it is not consistent with the appellant’s own evidence.
44. The appellant also seeks to rely on two letters, one from the UK branch of the IPOB and one from his local branch in Nigeria.
45. I accept Ms Bowden's point that the author of the UK letter does not say what activities the appellant undertook in Nigeria, and I place no weight on the author's statement that the appellant is at very high risk if he is returned to Nigeria. Nevertheless, I place some weight on this letter, as it is consistent with the appellant's photographs that show him undertaking IPOB protests in the UK.
46. In evidence before me, the appellant said that he was a chairman of volunteers. However, that is not recorded in the letters from the IPOB sent from Nigeria. The appellant's account is inconsistent with the letter provided from Nigeria, and I find that limits the weight that I am able to place on the letter and his oral evidence.
47. In support of his account, the appellant has provided an expert report. I have carefully considered the contents of that report and note that it deals with an assessment of the appellant's risk if I were to accept that he has a political opinion or is a bisexual man. I therefore find it is of limited evidential value in assessing whether the appellant has those characteristics.
48. I have carefully considered the appellant's own evidence about his involvement in the IPOB, his reasons for joining it, and the activities he has undertaken, but find that the account lacks appropriate detail. I find this is a factor that undermines the appellant's account of being an IPOB supporter.
49. Taking all my findings above, I find that the appellant's account of being a bisexual man and of being an IPOB supporter lacks detail and consistency. I find that the documents the appellant has provided are largely unreliable.
50. Although I accept the appellant has provided photographs of himself at IPOB events in the UK, I am of the view that the appellant has failed to show, to the lower standard, that he has a genuine political opinion in support of the IPOB. I further find that he has not shown, to the lower standard, that he is a bisexual man.
51. I find the appellant has not shown that the authorities in Nigeria would be aware of any activities that he has carried out in the UK for the IPOB and impute him with a political opinion.
52. I find the appellant has not shown on the lower standard that he has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
Humanitarian protection and Article 3
53. I remind myself that the lower standard of proof also applies to my findings under these grounds. However, for the reason set out above in relation to the appellant’s refugee grounds I find the appellant has not shown, to the lower standard of proof that he is a bisexual man or a genuine or imputed supporter of the IPOB.
54. Taking the findings above, I conclude the appellant has not shown to the lower standard of proof that there is a real risk he would be subjected to serious harm on return to Nigeria.
55. For those same reasons I also find that there is no real risk of him being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
Application of the law to the facts
56. For the reasons set out above I find the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
57. For the reason set out above, I find that the appellant does not qualify for humanitarian protection.
58. For the reasons stated above I also find there is no risk the appellant would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, until this appeal is finally determined or the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
If there is an onward appeal or challenge, an application to amend or vary the anonymity order must be made to the Upper Tribunal or court concerned.
TO THE RESPONDENT – FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
N Webb
First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb
05 November 2026
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).