Administrative United Kingdom
NA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/86568/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Columbus House
On 23 October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE Webb
Between
NA
(Anonymity ORDER made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rana (Legal Representative)
For the Respondent: Ms Kavanaugh (Presenting Officer)
DECISION AND REASONS
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.
2. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
3. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds (Article 3).
REASONS
4. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, has appealed on protection and human rights grounds against the respondent’s decision dated 11 August 2025 refusing their application for leave to remain dated 09 April 2025.
ANONYMITY ORDER
5. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee and human rights conventions outweighs the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellant’s potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that the appellant’s identity be protected until the final outcome of this appeal.
BACKGROUND
6. The background to this appeal is set out in the information contained on MyHMCTS.
7. The appellant asserts a right to remain on protection grounds. He claims to fear harm from the Government of Bangladesh and third-party actors because of his position in the Chhatra League, the student wing of the Awami League, the previous ruling party in Bangladesh.
HEARING
Format
8. The hearing was held by video. There were no issues with any of the participants being able to see or hear each other and I was satisfied that the format enabled a fair hearing.
Issues in dispute
9. This is a case to which the provisions of the Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 apply and as a result the dual standard of proof applies to the issues I am required to decide under the Refugee Convention.
10. The parties agreed that the issues for me to decide are as follows:
Matters to be decided on the balance of probabilities
(a) Does the appellant fear persecution for a Convention reason?
Matters to be decided on the lower standard
(b) Would the appellant be persecuted for that convention reason?
(c) In the alternative would the appellant qualify for humanitarian protection?
(d) Does the decision breach the appellant’s rights under Article 3 ECHR.
11. The respondent does not rely on section 8 of the 2004 Act.
12. The respondent has conceded that there is no protection or internal relocation option if his account is accepted.
13. Mr Rana confirmed the appellant was not pursuing any Article 3 medical grounds or Article 8 private and family life grounds.
Evidence and submissions
14. The appellant gave evidence and followed the proceedings with the assistance of a Sylheti interpreter. Neither he nor the interpreter indicated any difficulty in understanding each other.
15. The appellant gave evidence; he confirmed his witness statement and was cross-examined by Ms Kavanaugh.
16. After I heard evidence, Ms Kavanaugh and Mr Rana both made submissions.
17. I recorded the oral evidence and submissions in my record of proceedings and have taken it all into account, along with the documentary evidence downloaded from MyHMCTS.
Post hearing directions
18. After the hearing but before promulgation of this decision the Upper Tribunal promulgated DS (NBAB s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC). The guidance provided by the Upper Tribunal in that case was directly relevant to the issues in this case. I invited the parties to provide any submissions they may wish by 02 November 2026.
19. Neither party provided a response.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
20. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion).
21. The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022, following s32 of the 2022 Act, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, as amended by DS, I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Whether the appellant has a characteristic that could cause them to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention.
(b) Whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
22. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason,
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available, and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.
23. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
24. In relation to Article 3 the appellant must establish that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of them being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
25. Where an appellant has provided documents, it will be for them to show they can be relied upon and they will be considered along with all the other evidence, Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439.
FINDINGS
Facts in dispute
26. I have not set out every point or piece of evidence, only those that are most important to my decision. In making my findings I have considered all the evidence that I was given.
27. In undertaking my assessment of all the evidence, I have in mind the structured approach set out in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC).
28. In assessing credibility, I remind myself that an individual may tell lies about some aspects of their case but may be telling the truth about others.
29. The respondent has not sought to rely on any behaviour that would engage section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
Whether the appellant has a characteristic that engages the Refugee Convention?
30. This is assessed on the balance of probabilities.
31. The respondent does not accept that the appellant has any political profile at all.
32. The respondent argues that the appellant has given a vague answer as to why he did not join the Chhatra League as soon as he turned 18.
33. I disagree with that assessment. The appellant explained that he could not join until he was 18 in any event, and that following him reaching the age of majority, he was hampered first by examinations and secondly because the period was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. That has been the appellant's consistent evidence, and I find the appellant's account is not vague, and his credibility is not undermined, as the respondent argues.
34. The respondent also argues that the appellant has given an inconsistent account about the date that he joined the Chhatra League and the date he was given the role of Joint General Secretary of his local area.
35. I agree with that assessment. The appellant gave two different dates for joining the organisation in his two interviews. Before me, his evidence was that he became Joint General Secretary in October 2023 and joined the organisation in January 2023.
36. In support of this, he relied on a list of members from the Chhatra League. However, that document records that he was a Joint General Secretary in January. That document is inconsistent with the appellant's own evidence, which itself is internally inconsistent. I find this is a significant factor that undermines the appellant's account of him holding the role of Joint General Secretary in the organisation and of his political involvement more generally. I also find this document is not one that the appellant has shown is reliable and so I place no weight on it in my overall assessment.
37. The respondent argues in the refusal letter that the appellant's account of the aims and objectives of the Awami League, and what attracted him to support the organisation, is vague and lacking in detail.
38. I disagree with that assessment. The appellant, in his interview, was able to identify the MP who attended his school whose speeches initially piqued his interest and the Awami League's commitment to women's education, which the appellant said was a matter of importance to him because it would improve his sister's access to education. The appellant was also able to identify specific infrastructure projects that he attributed to the Awami League's actions. I find the appellant's credibility is not undermined in the way suggested by the respondent.
39. I also find, contrary to the submission of the respondent, that the appellant has been consistent about senior party leaders that he remains in contact with. There is a difference between knowing where somebody is and being able to contact them via telephone or other means. I find the appellant's credibility is not undermined, as argued by the respondent.
40. Having considered the appellant's interview records, I also disagree with the respondent's submission that the appellant's account of activities for the Chhatra League lacks sufficient detail. The appellant has given sufficient detail about the activities he undertook, the number of meetings he attended, and what speeches he gave at those meetings.
41. Similarly, I find there is no inconsistency in the appellant's account of attending such meetings as a supporter from 2022 before joining the party at a later date. I also find that the appellant was able to recall when the last demonstration in the UK took place, even if he was not able to recall the exact date. I find this is sufficient detail and does not undermine the appellant's account. I find the appellant's credibility is not undermined by these factors.
42. In her submissions, Ms Kavanuagh sought to argue that the lack of witness statements from the appellant's political friends in Bangladesh, or from his family, given that the appellant says he remains in contact with his father, undermines the credibility of the appellant's account.
43. I remind myself that corroboration is not required, but that where evidence can be reasonably expected but not provided it may be damaging to the credibility of a witness: ST [2004] UKIAT 00119, TK (Burundi) [2009] EWCA Civ 40.
44. The weight I would be able to give to witness statements where there is no oral evidence would be limited. In order to call witnesses from Bangladesh, the appellant would be required to ask permission from the Bangladeshi authorities. Given the appellant's claim is that he is scared of the Bangladeshi authorities because of his membership of the previous ruling party, I find it is not reasonable to expect those witnesses to give evidence. I further find that the limited weight I could give to such unsupported statements means that it is not reasonable to expect the appellant to produce such evidence. I find the appellant's credibility is not undermined by the lack of this specific evidence.
45. In support of his account the appellant has provided an FIR, arrest warrant and letter from a Bangladeshi Lawyer. The appellant's account is that these criminal proceedings have been brought as politically motivated false charges.
46. I find that country information shows that politically motivated false criminal charges have been a feature of Bangladeshi politics and the appellant's account is consistent with the country information.
47. The appellant is identified in the FIR as accused15, the details of father and address provided in the document and in the arrest warrant are consistent with the appellant’s details he provided in his visa application. Those are factors that support the reliability of the documents.
48. The appellant’s account is that he obtained these documents from his lawyer in Bangladesh who has also provided the letter in support of the appellant’s account.
49. However, I have concerns about the contents of this letter. The charges raised in the FIR are clearly false as the appellant was in the UK at the time of the events. The lawyer’s letter is silent on this factor and what if anything could be done to discharge the criminal proceedings before the appellant arrives in Bangladesh or shortly after arrival. I also consider it strange that the lawyer specifically mentions threats to the appellant’s life which would seem to be outside of a lawyer’s expertise and are unsupported.
50. I remind myself that I should not reject the plausibility of an account or evidence lightly, and certainly not on the basis that it would not seem reasonable if it happened in the UK, Y [2006] EWCA 1223. However, the complete silence on any action that may be taken to challenge the demonstrable false charges I find is simply not plausible. I find this is a significant factor that undermines the reliability of the letter.
51. In her submission Ms Kavanaugh referred me to the Country Information Note: Bangladesh: Documentation, version 4, dated November 2024. This shows that genuine documents may be fraudulently obtained easily in Bangladesh. When taking this into account, however, I remind myself that because some documents from Bangladesh may be fraudulent, that does not mean that all documents from Bangladesh are fraudulent. It is however a factor that I take into account in my assessment.
52. Taking my findings above and considering all the evidence holistically I am not satisfied that the documents provided by the appellant are reliable. I therefore put no weight on them in my assessment of the appellant’s account.
53. The appellant maintains that he has continued his political activity while in the UK by attending demonstrations and posting pro-Awami League literature on Facebook. However, the appellant has provided no evidence of his social media account or of his attendance at any demonstrations. There is no rational or reasonable explanation as to why such evidence could not be provided, and I find that its absence is a factor that undermines the appellant's credibility in relation to his claimed continued political activity.
54. Taking my findings above, I find that the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he was a Joint General Secretary of the Chhatra League as he has claim, his evidence about this aspect of his account has been inconsistent.
55. However, I find the appellant was a supporter of the Chhatra League in Bangladesh, that is because his evidence about his reasons for supporting the group and the activities he undertook for them has been consistent and sufficiently detailed. However, I find the appellant has not shown he was a high-profile supporter of the organisation.
56. I find the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he is subject to a politically motivated criminal charge. I have found the documents he provided in respect of this particular part of his claim are not reliable and do not support his account.
57. I find the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he has continued to actively support the Chhatra League while he has been in the UK.
58. Taking my findings above, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that as a low-level member of the Chhatra League the appellant has a characteristic that engages the Refugee Convention.
Whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution
59. This is assessed on the balance of probabilities.
60. Political violence has been prevalent in Bangladesh, the previous Awami League Government and its supporters used violence and false charges to target those with political opinions that did not align with the Government.
61. The country information that I was referred to in the Report of a fact-finding mission Bangladesh: Political situation, dated October 2026, shows that political violence still occurs on a local level, but that this has reduced since the 2026 elections.
62. Given the appellant’s low-level support and previous activities for the Chhatra League and the history of political violence, I find the appellant has shown on the balance of probabilities that he has a subjective fear of persecution on return to Bangladesh.
Risk on return
63. This is assessed on the lower standard of proof.
64. I have accepted that the appellant was a low-level member of the Chhatra League and that he has a subjective fear of persecution but that does not mean the fear is well-founded. I must assess the risk of that harm actually occurring.
65. The report of the fact-finding mission records that supporters of the Awami League not associated with corruption, violence or repression are generally able to remain in their communities without facing any harm. The appellant has not claimed to have been involved in any such activities, and I find that his past activities for the Chhatra League and support for the Awami League would not give rise to a real risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh.
66. The report does show that those who openly express support for the previous regime may face violence. I have found above that the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he has undertaken any political activity since he arrived in the UK. I find that the lack of previous activity in the UK is a significant factor that undermines the appellant’s claim that he would become politically active in Bangladesh on return. I find the appellant has not shown to the lower standard of proof that he would openly support the Awami League now.
67. I find the appellant would be free to show his support for the Awami League in the UK without fear of persecution. I find the appellant has not shown to the lower standard that it is that fear of persecution that would stop him from supporting the Chhatra League or the Awami League on return to Bangladesh.
68. I find the appellant has not shown to the lower standard that he would be persecuted on return to Bangladesh.
Internal relocation and sufficiency of protection
69. In light of my findings above, these points no longer need to be determined.
Humanitarian protection and Article 3
70. I remind myself that the lower standard of proof applies to my findings under these grounds. However, for the reason set out above, the appellant does not face harm on return to Bangladesh.
71. Taking the findings above, I conclude the appellant has not shown to the lower standard of proof that there is a real risk he would be subjected to serious harm on return to Bangladesh.
72. For those same reasons I also find that there is no real risk of him being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
Application of the law to the facts
73. For the reasons set out above I find the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
74. For the reason set out above, I find that the appellant does not qualify for humanitarian protection.
75. For the reasons stated above I also find there is no risk the appellant would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, until this appeal is finally determined or the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
If there is an onward appeal or challenge, an application to amend or vary the anonymity order must be made to the Upper Tribunal or court concerned.
TO THE RESPONDENT – FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
N Webb
First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb
05 November 2026
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