Administrative United Kingdom
Raja Aslam v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors
NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01521 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/D/2026/0607
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Transport
Heard by Cloud Video Platform
Heard on: 29 October 2026
Decision given on 05 November 2026
Before
JUDGE PERI MORNINGTON
TRIBUNAL MEMBER ROANTREE
TRIBUNAL MEMBER FRY
Between
RAJA ASLAM
Appellant
and
REGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORS
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J. O'Leary, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A. Raja, Deputy Registrar
Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The Registrar’s decision of 5 May 2026 is upheld.
REASONS
1. This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors (“the Registrar”) made on 5 May 2026 to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors (the “Register”) on the grounds that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to be an Approved Driving Instructor (“ADI”).
2. The proceedings were held by video (CVP). All parties joined remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this way.
Background to Appeal
3. The Appellant, Raja Aslam, became a registered Approved Driving Instructor ("ADI") in January 2022. Prior to the matters giving rise to this appeal, he had worked as a driving instructor without any adverse regulatory findings, criminal convictions, or cautions resulting in regulatory action. Throughout the proceedings the Appellant relied upon his previous good character and professional record, contending that he had always sought to provide a supportive learning environment for his pupils and that the allegations made against him were inconsistent with his character and conduct as an instructor.
4. The events which gave rise to the Registrar’s decision concerned a 17-year-old pupil who booked a course of seven driving lessons with the Appellant during 2025. The complaint therefore arose while she was part-way through the course of tuition, rather than after she had completed all of the lessons booked. Following her third lesson with the Appellant, the pupil made a complaint to Nottinghamshire Police, which was subsequently referred to the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (“DVSA”). In summary, she alleged that during the course of her tuition the Appellant had engaged in behaviour which crossed appropriate professional boundaries between instructor and pupil. The complaint included allegations that the Appellant had asked questions about her sexuality and personal relationships, made inappropriate comments regarding her appearance and body, and, during one lesson, kissed her hand. The complainant stated that these incidents made her feel uncomfortable and caused her to cancel her remaining lessons.
5. Following her third lesson with the Appellant, the pupil sent him a contemporaneous WhatsApp message in which she explained why she wished to cancel the remaining lessons in the course she had booked. In that message she directly challenged the Appellant about aspects of his behaviour and raised concerns regarding his conduct during lessons. The Appellant responded to that message at the time. During the appeal proceedings considerable attention was focused upon this exchange, both parties recognising it as an important piece of contemporaneous evidence. The Registrar contended that the messages provided significant support for the complainant's account, whereas the Appellant argued that too much weight had been attached to his response and maintained that he had not fully appreciated the content of the complaint when he replied.
6. Upon receipt of the complaint, the DVSA commenced an investigation. That investigation involved obtaining a detailed account from the complainant, reviewing the contemporaneous documentary material and interviewing the Appellant. Further information was subsequently obtained from former pupils through the DVSA enquiry process. That material did not form part of the Registrar’s stated reasons for the decision under appeal, but was placed before the Tribunal and relied upon by the Respondent as relevant to the wider question whether the Appellant remained a fit and proper person to continue to hold registration as an Approved Driving Instructor.
7. The Registrar informed the Appellant of the matters under consideration and invited him to provide written representations, which he did. Following completion of the investigation, the Registrar concluded that there was sufficient evidence to establish serious concerns regarding the Appellant's professional conduct and his maintenance of appropriate boundaries with pupils. The Registrar determined that the proven conduct was incompatible with the standards expected of members of the profession and demonstrated that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register of Approved Driving Instructors. Accordingly, the Registrar exercised the power conferred by section 128(2)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and directed that the Appellant’s name be removed from the Register.
8. The Appellant disputed the allegations and challenged the Registrar's conclusions. He maintained that he had behaved appropriately towards the complainant, denied that his conduct justified regulatory action and contended that the Registrar had attached excessive weight to the allegations made against him. He further relied upon his previous good character, the absence of any criminal or disciplinary history, and the serious personal and financial consequences that would follow from removal from the Register. It was in those circumstances that the present appeal came before the Tribunal by way of a full rehearing of the issues.
The Appeal
9. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the Registrar to remove his name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors on the basis that he had ceased to be a fit and proper person to remain registered. The Appellant contends that the Registrar reached the wrong conclusion on the evidence and that removal from the Register was neither justified nor proportionate in all the circumstances of the case.
11. The Appellant's grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows:
a) The Registrar placed undue weight upon the allegations made by the complainant and failed properly to assess the reliability and credibility of her account;
b) The Registrar erred in concluding that the alleged incidents had occurred and failed to give sufficient consideration to the Appellant's explanations and denials;
c) The Registrar attached excessive significance to the contemporaneous WhatsApp message exchange between the complainant and the Appellant. It is said that the Appellant's responses have been misinterpreted and do not amount to an admission of any inappropriate conduct;
d) The Registrar failed properly to consider innocent explanations for the matters relied upon by the complainant and drew adverse inferences which were not justified by the evidence;
e) Insufficient weight was given to the Appellant's previous good character, his unblemished professional record, the absence of any criminal convictions or previous regulatory findings, and the positive reputation he had established as an Approved Driving Instructor;
f) The Registrar attached inappropriate weight to evidence obtained from former pupils during the course of the investigation. The Appellant contends that such evidence was either unreliable, incapable of proper testing, or insufficiently connected to the allegations made by the complainant;
g) The Registrar failed adequately to consider the Appellant’s case that the complaint may have been influenced by racial or religious prejudice. In support of that contention, the Appellant relied upon the complainant having asked whether he was Muslim and upon what he perceived to be hostility towards him from an early stage in the tuition. He maintained that those matters provided a possible explanation for her making allegations which he denied.
h) The Registrar failed to take proper account of the serious personal, professional and financial consequences that would result from the Appellant's removal from the Register;
i) In all the circumstances, the Registrar was wrong to conclude that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register and the decision to remove his name was disproportionate;
10. The Registrar's Statement of Case resists the appeal. The Registrar maintains that the evidence establishes that the Appellant engaged in inappropriate conduct towards a pupil, including making comments of a personal nature and crossing accepted professional boundaries within the instructor-pupil relationship. The Registrar submits that the Appellant's conduct fell materially below the standards expected of an Approved Driving Instructor, demonstrates a lack of professional judgment, and supports the conclusion that he has ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register. Accordingly, the Registrar contends that the decision to remove the Appellant's name from the Register was both justified and proportionate and should be upheld.
The relevant law
11. Conditions for entry and retention on the Register require the applicant to be and continue to be a “fit and proper person” to have his name on the Register – see sections 125(3) and 127(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (the “Act”).
12. The Registrar can remove a person’s name from the Register if they have ceased to be a fit and proper person to have their name on the Register (section 128(2)(e) of the Act). The Registrar may take the view that a person no longer meets this requirement where there has been a change in circumstances. The Registrar has the burden of showing that a person does not meet the statutory requirement to be a fit and proper person, and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
13. The powers of the Tribunal in determining this appeal are set out in section 131 of the Act. The Tribunal may make such order as it thinks fit pursuant to section 131(3). The Tribunal exercises a full merits jurisdiction and must reach its own conclusion on the evidence before it. In doing so, it should give appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision and to the Registrar’s experience as the person entrusted by Parliament with responsibility for maintaining the Register: see R (Hope and Glory Public House Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWCA Civ 31.
14. In Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808, the Court of Appeal described the “fit and proper person” condition as follows: “..the condition is not simply that the applicant is a fit and proper person to be a driving instructor, it is that he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the register. Registration carries with it an official seal of approval…It seems to me that the maintenance of public confidence in the register is important. For that purpose, the Registrar must be in a position to carry out his function of scrutiny effectively, including consideration of the implications of any convictions of an applicant or a registered ADI. This is why there are stringent disclosure requirements.” (paragraph 30).
15. The expression “fit and proper person” is not exhaustively defined in the Act. It calls for a broad assessment of the person’s character, conduct, integrity and judgment in the context of the responsibilities of an Approved Driving Instructor and the position of trust which registration entails. The assessment is concerned with present suitability, the protection of pupils and the maintenance of public confidence in the Register. It does not require proof of criminal conduct or an improper motive.
16. In making that assessment, the Tribunal may have regard to the standards contained in the ADI Register Guide and the ADI Code of Practice. Those documents do not create independent statutory grounds for removal, but they provide relevant evidence of the professional standards reasonably expected of a registered instructor. Those standards include maintaining appropriate professional boundaries, avoiding inappropriate physical contact, refraining from becoming improperly involved in a pupil’s personal affairs and avoiding circumstances which might reasonably be perceived as inappropriate.
17. The evidence must be assessed cumulatively and in its proper context. Individual incidents which might be capable of an innocent explanation when considered separately may nevertheless demonstrate poor professional judgment or a failure to maintain appropriate boundaries when considered as part of a pattern of conduct. The absence of an improper motive and the presence of good intentions are relevant to that assessment, but they are not determinative.
18. As this is an appeal by way of a full rehearing, the Tribunal is entitled to consider all of the evidence placed before it, whether or not that evidence was before the Registrar when the original decision was taken. The Tribunal's task is to reach its own conclusion on the question whether the Appellant is currently a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register.
19. Evidence of previous good character, the absence of criminal convictions and the absence of previous regulatory findings are relevant considerations and may bear upon the assessment of both credibility and current fitness. However, such matters are not determinative. A person of previous good character may nevertheless cease to satisfy the fit and proper person requirement if the Tribunal concludes that their conduct demonstrates a lack of judgment, integrity or professional standards inconsistent with continued registration.
20. Where the Tribunal is required to determine disputed facts, it must consider all of the evidence in the round, including contemporaneous documents, the consistency of accounts given by witnesses, the inherent probability of events having occurred as alleged and the reliability and credibility of the explanations advanced. Contemporaneous communications may in an appropriate case provide particularly persuasive evidence of what occurred and how those events were understood by the individuals concerned at the time.
The evidence
21. The Tribunal considered the agreed hearing bundle, including the Registrar’s decision, the parties’ statements of case, the complainant’s written statement, the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange, the DVSA investigation material and the written accounts obtained from former pupils. The Tribunal also admitted and considered the Appellant’s witness statement, which had been provided after the date originally directed, together with its exhibits, and the written skeleton argument prepared on his behalf by Mr O’Leary. No objection was taken to the Tribunal considering that material and the Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to admit it. The Appellant attended and gave oral evidence. The complainant and the former pupils did not attend the hearing and their written evidence was not tested in cross-examination. We took that into account when assessing the weight to be attached to their evidence.
The Appellant's Evidence and Submissions
The Appellant's Evidence
22. The Appellant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal and adopted his witness statement. He denied that he had behaved inappropriately towards the complainant and maintained throughout the hearing that he had always sought to conduct himself professionally in his role as an Approved Driving Instructor.
23. The Appellant described his background, his experience as a driving instructor and the circumstances in which he had entered the profession. He emphasised that he had no criminal convictions, cautions or previous regulatory findings and relied upon what he described as an otherwise unblemished professional record.
24. He told the Tribunal that he had taught hundreds of pupils since becoming registered in January 2022. When questioned about that figure, he maintained that it was an accurate reflection of the number of pupils to whom he had provided tuition. He emphasised that there had been no previous substantiated complaint or adverse regulatory finding concerning his conduct.
25. The Appellant accepted that he had provided driving instruction to the complainant but disputed significant aspects of her account. His evidence was that he had provided two lessons to her, whereas the complainant’s account referred to three lessons. He maintained that many of the allegations had either been misunderstood, taken out of context or had not occurred in the manner alleged.
26. In relation to comments concerning the complainant’s appearance, the Appellant accepted that there had been conversations of a personal nature during the lessons. He denied, however, that any comments were intended to cause offence or discomfort. He maintained that he had no inappropriate interest in the complainant and that his remarks had been misconstrued.
27. The Appellant accepted that he had told the complainant that he had initially thought she was a boy. He first said that this occurred at the beginning of the first lesson, when he arrived expecting to meet a female pupil but believed that the person waving at him was male. Later in his evidence, however, he said that the comment might have been made during the second lesson. He maintained that the remark was an innocent observation and disputed the significance attached to it by the complainant and the Registrar. He denied making any comment concerning the complainant’s figure or body.
28. The Appellant also denied that he had acted in any way which blurred or crossed professional boundaries. He maintained that he had always regarded the relationship between himself and the complainant as a professional instructor-pupil relationship and denied any intention to create a personal or inappropriate relationship.
29. Particular attention was given during the hearing to the allegation that the Appellant had kissed the complainant's hand. The Appellant denied that he had behaved in the manner alleged. He said that the incident simply did not happen. He submitted that the complainant's account was inaccurate and that the allegation was either mistaken or fabricated.
30. The Appellant was questioned extensively about a contemporaneous WhatsApp message sent by the complainant following her final lesson. At 20:51, the complainant informed the Appellant that she wished to cancel her remaining lessons because she had felt uncomfortable as a result of his conduct. She referred expressly to the Appellant kissing her hand and making comments about her body. At 21:13, 22 minutes later, the Appellant replied: “Its ok [name] i m sorry i just praised at friendly atmosphere don’t worry i wont b friendly” [sic]. The Appellant maintained before the Tribunal that he had not fully read the complainant’s message and had therefore not appreciated its contents or the nature and seriousness of the allegations when he sent his response. He denied that his message amounted to an admission that he had behaved inappropriately and contended that it should not be interpreted as accepting the truth of the complainant’s allegations.
31. The Appellant was asked why, if the allegations were entirely false, his response did not contain a clear and unequivocal denial. He maintained that he was taken by surprise by the message and that his response should not be viewed as evidence of wrongdoing.
32. The Appellant further alleged that the complainant may have been motivated by racial or religious prejudice. He relied upon an exchange in which the complainant asked whether he was Muslim. The Appellant perceived an element of dislike or hostility towards him from an early stage in their instructor-pupil relationship and maintained that this exchange, considered together with her attitude towards him, caused him to believe that prejudice may have played a part in the complaint. He accepted that he could not identify any expressly racist or anti-Muslim comment made by the complainant.
33. The Appellant was also questioned regarding evidence obtained by the DVSA from former pupils during the course of its investigation. The Tribunal was referred to accounts from previous pupils raising concerns about aspects of the Appellant's professionalism during lessons. Those concerns included allegations that driving lessons were used for stops unrelated to tuition, including visits to retail premises, and allegations that significant parts of lesson time were spent on matters not connected with driving instruction. The Registrar also relied upon evidence concerning alleged detours, lateness and the involvement of matters associated with the Appellant's business interests during driving lessons. The Appellant disputed the reliability of this evidence. In particular, he maintained that one complainant was a former business partner with whom he had fallen out and whose evidence should therefore be approached with caution. He further explained that one alleged stop at the East Midlands Designer Outlet arose because a pupil with a medical condition required a toilet break during a motorway lesson and denied using lesson time for personal errands or permitting third parties to observe pupils during tuition. The Appellant submitted that these complaints were either mistaken, exaggerated or motivated by personal grievance and should attract little weight.
34. Throughout his evidence the Appellant repeatedly emphasised the serious impact that the Registrar's decision had upon him personally and professionally. He explained that driving instruction was his livelihood and that removal from the Register carried significant financial and reputational consequences.
35. The Appellant told the Tribunal that the regulatory proceedings had caused him to reflect upon his professional responsibilities and to revisit the guidance applicable to Approved Driving Instructors. He said that he had booked a professional-conduct course which was due to take place on 31 October 2026. He relied upon that course as evidence of his willingness to undertake further professional development and to address any concerns arising from the proceedings. When asked whether he considered that he required any particular refresher training in relation to equality and appropriate professional conduct, however, the Appellant maintained that he was already fully aware of the standards expected of him. His position was that he had not engaged in the conduct alleged and did not accept that the complaint demonstrated any deficiency in his understanding of those standards.
Submissions of Mr O'Leary
36. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr O’Leary relied upon the written skeleton argument and submitted that the Registrar had not discharged the burden of establishing, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register. He accepted that the Tribunal was exercising a full merits jurisdiction and was required to reach a fresh decision on the evidence before it, while giving appropriate weight to the Registrar’s decision as the person entrusted by Parliament with responsibility for maintaining the Register.
37. Mr O’Leary submitted that the Registrar’s decision letter was based upon the complaint made by the complainant and that the Tribunal was required to determine a direct factual dispute between her and the Appellant. The complainant did not give oral evidence and her written account was therefore not tested in cross-examination. By contrast, the Appellant attended, adopted his witness statement and answered questions from the Respondent’s representative and each member of the Tribunal. Although Mr O’Leary accepted that hearsay evidence was admissible under the Tribunal’s procedural rules, he submitted that the absence of an opportunity to question the complainant was highly relevant to the weight which could safely be attached to her evidence.
38. Mr O’Leary invited the Tribunal to exercise caution when assessing the complainant’s statement. He described it as a carefully prepared statement which appeared to have been taken by another person and submitted that it contained a number of assumptions and conclusions rather than merely an objective account of events. By way of example, he referred to passages in which the complainant described the Appellant as sounding surprised, attributed a particular meaning to his facial expression and characterised his WhatsApp response as threatening. Mr O’Leary submitted that insufficient detail was given to explain those conclusions and that the WhatsApp response, when read objectively, could not reasonably be described as threatening. He argued that these matters, considered cumulatively, reduced the weight which could properly be attached to the complainant’s account.
39. Mr O’Leary also relied upon the complainant’s description of the tuition vehicle as black, whereas the Appellant had produced evidence that the vehicle he used at the relevant time was red. He accepted that a witness being mistaken about one matter did not necessarily mean that the remainder of their evidence was untrue. Nevertheless, he submitted that the discrepancy formed part of the Tribunal’s overall assessment of the reliability of a witness whom it had not seen or heard and whose account had not been tested.
40. It was further submitted that the complainant’s account had been considered by the police, who had taken no further action. The Appellant’s evidence was that he had not even been interviewed by the police. Mr O’Leary also referred to the absence of any intervention by the Local Authority Designated Officer, notwithstanding that the complainant was 17 years old at the relevant time. He did not suggest that the absence of police or safeguarding action was determinative of the regulatory proceedings, but relied upon those matters as part of the evidential context in which the Tribunal was required to decide what weight should be given to the allegations.
41. In relation to the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange, Mr O’Leary accepted that the Appellant had not expressly denied the allegations in his immediate response. He submitted, however, that the absence of such a denial should not be treated as an admission that the alleged conduct had occurred. The Appellant had explained that he received a large number of messages, had not read the complainant’s message fully and had replied on the understanding that she was objecting to his remark, made at the beginning of the first lesson, that he had initially thought she was a boy. Mr O’Leary submitted that an individual unexpectedly confronted by allegations after the final lesson might not respond in the precise or complete manner which, with hindsight, might have been expected.
42. Mr O’Leary submitted that the Appellant’s response had not in fact been inconsistent with his subsequent position. He emphasised that the Appellant had denied the material allegations during the DVSA interview on 24 March 2026, in his written representations dated 30 April 2026, in his notice of appeal and in his witness statement prepared for the hearing. He argued that those repeated denials demonstrated that the Appellant’s position had remained consistent once he became aware of the precise allegations being made against him. Any significance which might otherwise be attached to the absence of an express denial in the WhatsApp response was, he submitted, materially reduced by that consistent course of denial.
43. Mr O’Leary submitted that the Appellant had identified possible explanations for the complainant making allegations against him. The Appellant’s evidence was that there had been an element of dislike or tension from an early stage in the tuition. He had referred to the complainant asking whether he was Muslim and had suggested that there may have been an element of racism. He had also said that the complainant believed herself to be a competent driver and may have considered that he was seeking to prolong the tuition by recommending more lessons than she thought necessary. Mr O’Leary accepted that the Appellant had not put forward a single definitive motive, but submitted that the Tribunal should consider those matters when assessing the competing accounts.
44. Turning to the further information obtained from former pupils, Mr O’Leary submitted that this material had not formed part of the basis upon which the Registrar made the decision under appeal. The decision letter referred to the complaint made by the complainant and did not rely upon the two adverse responses obtained through the later enquiry exercise. He submitted that it was improper retrospectively to reinforce the Registrar’s decision by placing substantial reliance upon allegations which had not formed part of the original reasons for removal.
45. Mr O’Leary further submitted that the former-pupil material was of limited evidential quality. Five former pupils had been approached at random, but only two adverse responses were before the Tribunal. Mr O’Leary submitted that, had the remaining pupils experienced concerns, it might reasonably have been expected that they would have responded. The Respondent’s position was that no further responses had been received.
46. In any event, Mr O’Leary submitted that the matters raised by the former pupils were materially different from the complainant’s allegations. They concerned alleged lateness, detours, stops at retail premises and the use of lesson time for matters said to be unrelated to driving instruction. Mr O’Leary submitted specifically that an instructor stopping at a shop during a driving lesson was not, of itself, a matter requiring regulatory intervention. He argued that, even if the allegation were established, it was insufficiently serious to bear materially upon whether the Appellant remained a fit and proper person to be registered. More generally, he argued that such matters were unconnected with the allegations of inappropriate physical contact or personal questioning and, even if established, would not ordinarily justify removal from the Register. He therefore invited the Tribunal either to disregard that material or to attach very limited weight to it.
47. Mr O’Leary placed substantial reliance upon the Appellant’s previous good character. He described the Appellant’s character as exemplary and submitted that it was relevant in two distinct respects. First, a person of good character was more likely to give truthful evidence. Secondly, the Appellant’s absence of any established history of comparable misconduct reduced the likelihood that he had engaged in the conduct alleged. Mr O’Leary referred to the Appellant’s qualification and professional history, the absence of any criminal conviction and the fact that no complaint had been made against him since the Registrar’s decision while he had continued working pending the determination of the appeal.
48. Mr O’Leary submitted that the Appellant had given his evidence openly and had attempted to answer fully the questions put to him. He accepted that some of the Appellant’s answers were lengthy, but argued that this demonstrated an attempt to explain his position and allay the concerns of the Registrar and the Tribunal, rather than any intention to avoid the questions. The Tribunal was invited to assess the Appellant’s account in light of both his good character and the consistency of his denials.
49. As to risk and proportionality, Mr O’Leary relied upon the fact that the Registrar had not required the Appellant’s removal to take immediate effect, but had permitted him to continue working while the appeal process remained outstanding. He submitted that this was a significant indication that the Registrar had not considered the Appellant to present an immediate or substantial risk to pupils. He argued that the Tribunal should take that assessment into account when deciding whether removal was necessary.
50. Finally, Mr O’Leary submitted that removal from the Register would deprive the Appellant of his livelihood. The Appellant had told the Tribunal that driving instruction was his only source of income and that he had no alternative employment available to him. Mr O’Leary submitted that the Tribunal was required to consider whether the legitimate regulatory objectives could be achieved by a less coercive measure. The proceedings themselves had caused the Appellant to reflect upon his professional responsibilities; he had reviewed relevant guidance and had booked a course concerning professional conduct, due to take place on 31 October 2026. It was submitted that the proceedings had already had a salutary effect and that continued registration, together with the Appellant’s further professional development, would provide a proportionate means of addressing any residual concern. For those reasons, Mr O’Leary invited the Tribunal to allow the appeal.
The Respondent's Submissions
51. On behalf of the Registrar, Mr Raja relied upon the Registrar’s Statement of Case and submitted that the evidence, when considered as a whole, established on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register. The Tribunal was therefore invited to dismiss the appeal and uphold the Registrar’s decision of 5 May 2026.
52. Mr Raja submitted that the central evidence was the complainant’s detailed account, as set out in her witness statement, which was materially supported by the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange. He accepted that the Appellant disputed the allegations and that the burden remained upon the Registrar throughout. Nevertheless, he submitted that the complainant’s account, the contemporaneous communications and the further evidence concerning the Appellant’s professional conduct were sufficient to discharge that burden.
53. Particular reliance was placed upon the complainant’s WhatsApp message. Mr Raja submitted that the complainant’s message made two clear and specific allegations and that the Appellant’s response did not deny either of them. Instead, the Appellant apologised and referred to having acted in a friendly manner.
54. Mr Raja invited the Tribunal to reject the Appellant’s evidence that he had not read the complainant’s message before replying. He submitted that the response was plainly a personal and considered response to the message he had received. It addressed the complainant by name, referred to the atmosphere between them and sought to explain the Appellant’s behaviour as friendliness. Mr Raja submitted that the response could not sensibly be characterised as a generic or unrelated reply and that significant weight should be attached to the Appellant’s failure at that time to deny either kissing the complainant’s hand or commenting upon her body.
55. It was submitted that the contemporaneous exchange materially undermined the credibility of the Appellant’s subsequent denials. Mr Raja recognised that the Appellant had later denied the allegations during the DVSA investigation and in the course of the appeal. However, those denials were made after the complaint had become the subject of investigation. By contrast, the WhatsApp exchange occurred before any regulatory proceedings had arisen and recorded the parties’ responses at the time. Mr Raja submitted that the contemporaneous nature of that evidence made it particularly significant.
56. Mr Raja further relied upon the complainant’s allegations that the Appellant had questioned her about her sexuality and sexual relationships, made comments concerning her body and kissed her hand during a driving lesson. He submitted that none of those matters served any legitimate instructional purpose. The Appellant had himself accepted in evidence that unwanted personal remarks and physical contact would cross appropriate professional boundaries and would be unprofessional. The Registrar’s case was that the conduct alleged by the complainant had occurred and amounted to a serious breach of the standards expected of an Approved Driving Instructor.
57. Mr Raja also relied upon the Appellant’s admitted comment that he had thought the complainant was a boy. He submitted that the remark served no instructional purpose and was capable of causing offence. The Appellant had continued during his oral evidence to defend the remark by reference to the complainant’s hairstyle, clothing and appearance. Mr Raja submitted that this demonstrated a failure properly to appreciate why personal observations of that nature were inappropriate within a professional instructor-pupil relationship.
58. It was submitted that the Appellant had shown insufficient insight or reflection, both in his written evidence and during the hearing. Although the Appellant accepted as a general proposition that inappropriate personal comments and unwanted physical contact would breach professional boundaries, he continued to maintain that his comment about the complainant looking like a boy amounted to friendly praise. Mr Raja submitted that this response demonstrated that the Appellant had not properly understood the nature of the concern or the importance of maintaining clear professional boundaries with pupils.
59. Mr Raja further submitted that the explanations advanced by the Appellant for the complainant making false allegations were implausible. The Appellant had suggested that the complainant was racist, principally because she had asked whether he was Muslim. Mr Raja submitted that a question as to whether the Appellant was Muslim could not, without more, reasonably support an allegation of racism. There was no other evidence capable of demonstrating a racist motivation on the complainant’s part.
60. The Appellant had also suggested that the complainant believed she was already a competent driver and considered that he was seeking to prolong her tuition unnecessarily. Mr Raja submitted that this did not provide a plausible explanation for the complainant fabricating detailed allegations of inappropriate questioning, comments about her body and physical contact. He invited the Tribunal, when assessing the competing accounts, to consider carefully whether either of the explanations advanced by the Appellant supplied a credible motive for a false complaint.
61. Mr Raja also relied upon the information obtained from two former pupils during the DVSA investigation. Those accounts raised concerns about personal questioning, prolonged or unnecessary stops during lessons, late arrival, alleged detours for business errands and the possible presence of another person during paid tuition. He accepted that the weight to be attached to this material was a matter for the Tribunal, but submitted that the accounts raised further concerns about the Appellant’s ability to maintain appropriate professional boundaries and conduct himself professionally during lessons.
62. In relation to a former pupil who referred to a prolonged stop at the East Midlands Designer Outlet, the Appellant’s explanation was that the pupil had a medical condition requiring regular toilet breaks and had asked to stop during a motorway lesson. As to the allegations concerning late arrival and business-related detours, the Appellant accepted that he had occasionally been late owing to traffic but denied using lesson time for personal errands. He further maintained that the other adverse respondent was a former business partner with whom he had fallen out. Mr Raja submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to assess those explanations alongside the fact that the former pupils had been selected through a random enquiry exercise conducted by an independent investigation team.
63. Addressing Mr O’Leary’s submissions concerning hearsay, Mr Raja accepted that neither the complainant nor the former pupils had attended the hearing to give oral evidence. He submitted, however, that hearsay evidence was admissible in the Tribunal and that its absence from oral cross-examination did not require it to be excluded. The appropriate course was for the Tribunal to assess the weight of each item of evidence in its particular context. He submitted that the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange was especially important because it existed independently of the later regulatory proceedings and had not been alleged to have been altered or fabricated.
64. Mr Raja submitted that the absence of criminal proceedings or a criminal conviction did not preclude an adverse regulatory finding. The question before the Tribunal was not whether the Appellant had committed a criminal offence, but whether he remained a fit and proper person to hold the official status of an Approved Driving Instructor. That question was to be determined on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and by reference to the professional standards, responsibilities and position of trust associated with registration.
65. The Registrar also rejected the submission that the Appellant’s continuation in practice pending the appeal demonstrated an absence of regulatory concern or significant risk. Mr Raja submitted that the absence of immediate removal did not mean that the Registrar regarded the Appellant as suitable to remain registered indefinitely. On the contrary, the Registrar had concluded that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person and had taken action to remove his name from the Register. The statutory appeal arrangements did not diminish the seriousness of that decision.
66. Mr Raja relied upon Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808 and the importance identified in that authority of maintaining public confidence in the Register. Registration carried an official seal of approval and provided members of the public with assurance that the person registered was suitable to undertake the responsibilities of an Approved Driving Instructor. He submitted that the Appellant’s conduct had to be assessed in that wider context, rather than solely by reference to the personal consequences which removal would have for him.
67. Mr Raja also referred by analogy to the observations of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 concerning the importance of maintaining professional standards and public confidence. He submitted that, in determining the appropriate regulatory response, the protection of the public and the maintenance of confidence in the profession were of greater importance than the personal and financial consequences for the individual concerned.
68. The Registrar acknowledged that the Appellant’s previous record, the absence of criminal convictions, the impact upon his livelihood and his wider financial circumstances were relevant matters which weighed in his favour. Mr Raja did not invite the Tribunal to disregard those matters. He submitted, however, that they had to be balanced against the seriousness of the conduct alleged, the position of trust occupied by an instructor providing one-to-one tuition and the particular vulnerability of pupils receiving instruction alone within a vehicle.
69. Mr Raja submitted that the concerns were not adequately addressed by the Appellant’s proposed professional-conduct course. The course had not been completed as at the date of the hearing and there was therefore no evidence before the Tribunal as to its content, outcome or effect upon the Appellant’s professional practice. Further, notwithstanding his assertion that he had refreshed his knowledge of the relevant guidance, the Appellant had maintained in evidence that he did not require any particular refresher training concerning equality or professional standards because he was already fully aware of the applicable requirements. Mr Raja submitted that this response did not demonstrate sufficient insight into the concerns arising from the complaint or the Appellant’s admitted comments concerning the complainant’s appearance.
70. In conclusion, Mr Raja submitted that the allegations were serious and struck directly at the relationship of trust which must exist between an instructor and a pupil. When the complainant’s detailed account was considered alongside the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange, the Appellant’s explanations, his lack of insight and the further concerns raised during the investigation, the Registrar had established on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant had ceased to be a fit and proper person to remain registered. No lesser response would adequately protect pupils or maintain public confidence in the Register. The Tribunal was accordingly invited to dismiss the appeal and uphold the Registrar’s decision dated 5 May 2026.
Conclusions
71. We have considered all of the evidence and submissions before us, including the Appellant’s oral and written evidence, the complainant’s witness statement, the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange, the investigation material relating to former pupils, the Appellant’s evidence of good character and the submissions made on behalf of both parties. We have assessed the evidence cumulatively and applied the civil standard of proof. The burden rests throughout upon the Registrar to establish that the Appellant has ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register.
72. We recognise that the complainant did not attend the hearing and that her evidence was therefore not tested in cross-examination. We have taken that matter into account when deciding what weight to attach to her account. The fact that evidence is hearsay does not, however, mean that it must be disregarded. The appropriate weight depends upon the nature and quality of the evidence, its consistency with the other material before us and whether it is supported by contemporaneous documentation.
73. We found the complainant’s account to be detailed, coherent and credible. She provided a specific account of the lessons, including the circumstances in which particular conversations were said to have taken place, the roads upon which she had been driving and the sequence of the alleged incidents. The level and nature of that detail were consistent with her describing events which she had experienced. We acknowledge that she was mistaken as to the colour of the Appellant’s tuition vehicle. We also take into account the Appellant’s evidence that the lessons took place during the hours of darkness, which, in the Tribunal’s view, may explain the complainant’s mistaken recollection of the colour of the tuition vehicle. We do not, however, consider that a mistake about the colour of the vehicle materially undermines the remainder of her account. A witness may be mistaken about one matter without being unreliable about every other matter.
74. We found the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange to be of particular significance. At 20:51, the complainant informed the Appellant that she wished to cancel her remaining lessons because she had felt uncomfortable when he kissed her hand and commented upon her body. The Appellant replied at 21:13, 22 minutes later. His response did not deny either of the specific allegations which the complainant had made. Instead, he apologised and characterised his conduct as having occurred within a friendly atmosphere.
75. The contemporaneous exchange provides particularly strong support for the allegations expressly identified in the complainant’s message. It also lends contextual support to her wider account, although we have assessed each allegation separately and have not treated the message as proving every aspect of her statement.
76. We reject the Appellant’s explanation that he did not read the message properly before replying. His response was not an automatic or generic response to a routine enquiry. It was addressed personally to the complainant, referred to his conduct towards her and directly addressed the question of his having been “friendly”. It was sent 22 minutes after the complainant’s message and was not the immediate response suggested in parts of the Appellant’s case. In the context of this exchange, we regard the absence of any denial of either serious and specific allegation as significant. The Appellant’s apology and characterisation of his conduct as friendliness were more consistent with an attempt to explain or minimise the conduct than with a response from someone who had not understood what was being alleged.
77. We accept that the Appellant subsequently denied the allegations during the DVSA investigation, in his written representations, in his appeal and before this Tribunal. Those later denials are relevant, but they were made after the allegations had become the subject of a formal complaint or regulatory investigation. We place greater weight upon the exchange which occurred at the time, before the prospect of regulatory proceedings had arisen. The Appellant’s later denials do not adequately explain his failure to challenge either allegation when it was first and directly made to him.
78. The Appellant accepted that, at the beginning of the first lesson, he told the complainant that he had initially thought she was a boy or that she looked like a boy. Although we find that the comment was made during the first lesson, the Appellant’s evidence about its timing was inconsistent. He initially placed the comment at the beginning of the first lesson but later said that it might have been made during the second lesson. That inconsistency affected the reliability of his recollection. His explanation for the WhatsApp response depended upon his assertion that he believed the complainant was objecting to that earlier comment. We do not accept that explanation. The complainant’s message, sent after the final lesson, expressly referred to the Appellant kissing her hand and commenting upon her body. It did not refer to his earlier remark that he had thought she was a boy.
79. We consider that telling a pupil that she looked like a boy, with reference to her hairstyle, clothing and appearance, was an inappropriate personal remark which served no legitimate instructional purpose. The Appellant continued during the hearing to defend the remark as an accurate observation and as a form of friendly praise. That evidence demonstrated a failure on his part to recognise why a comment of that nature was inappropriate within a professional instructor-pupil relationship.
80. We accept, on the balance of probabilities, the complainant’s account that the Appellant questioned her about her sexuality and personal relationships, asked whether she had had sex with another woman and made a comment concerning her body. We also accept her evidence that the Appellant took her hand and kissed her knuckles during the lesson. Those findings are supported materially by the contemporaneous message in which she referred expressly to the Appellant kissing her hand and commenting upon her body, and by the nature of the Appellant’s response.
81. We have considered the absence of criminal proceedings and the fact that the police took no further action. Those matters do not determine the issues before us. The Tribunal is not deciding whether the Appellant committed a criminal offence. It is deciding, on the balance of probabilities, whether he remains a fit and proper person to have his name included in a professional register. The statutory and regulatory standards applicable to an Approved Driving Instructor are distinct from the test applied when deciding whether to commence a criminal prosecution.
82. We have also considered the Appellant’s allegation that the complaint may have been motivated by racial or religious prejudice. The principal factual basis advanced in support of that allegation was an exchange in which the complainant asked whether the Appellant was Muslim and, when he confirmed that he was, informed him that she was a lesbian. The question and response must be considered together. One possible and entirely innocent explanation, explored by the Tribunal, is that the complainant wished to establish whether the Appellant would be comfortable teaching a lesbian pupil or whether her sexuality might cause offence. We cannot determine precisely what prompted the exchange. We are, however, satisfied that the exchange, without more, provides no proper evidential basis for an inference that the complainant was racially or religiously prejudiced against the Appellant. She made no expressly racist or anti-Muslim remark, and the Appellant did not initially rely upon prejudice when asked during the DVSA investigation why she might have made allegations against him. We are not satisfied that there is any evidential basis for concluding that the complaint was motivated or influenced by racial or religious prejudice. We reject the Appellant’s contention to that effect.
83. The Appellant advanced two further possible explanations for the complaint. First, he suggested that the complainant considered herself to be a competent driver and believed that he was seeking to prolong her tuition unnecessarily. Secondly, in his written representations dated 1 May 2026, he referred to having cancelled a further lesson on 2 December because it was due to take place during the rush hour. We have considered whether dissatisfaction arising from either the number of lessons recommended or the cancellation of that lesson might have prompted the complaint. We do not find either explanation persuasive. The complainant had booked a course of seven lessons but retained control over whether she continued to receive tuition from the Appellant. Neither a disagreement about the amount of tuition required nor the cancellation of a lesson because of traffic provides a plausible explanation for her fabricating a detailed account of inappropriate personal questioning, comments about her body and physical contact.
84. We are not satisfied that there is any evidential basis for concluding that the complaint was motivated or influenced by racial or religious prejudice or the notion that the complainant was aggrieved by her lessons being drawn out. We reject the Appellant’s contention to that effect.
85. We have considered separately the information obtained from former pupils during the DVSA investigation. We accept Mr O’Leary’s submission that this material did not form part of the Registrar’s stated reasons for the original decision and that the individuals concerned did not provide oral evidence before us. We have therefore approached that evidence cautiously. Nevertheless, this appeal is a full rehearing and we are required to reach our own decision upon all the relevant evidence now available to us.
86. Five former pupils were approached through a random enquiry exercise undertaken by an independent investigation team. Two adverse responses were received. The concerns raised included lateness, prolonged stops at retail premises, alleged detours connected with personal or business errands, personal questioning and the possible presence of another person during a paid lesson. One former pupil described a two-hour lesson which lasted approximately four hours and involved a prolonged stop at the East Midlands Designer Outlet. The Appellant explained that the pupil had a medical condition requiring a toilet break and that he purchased a coffee while she used the facilities. He denied using lesson time for any improper purpose.
87. The other adverse response included allegations concerning stops at shops or business-related errands. The Appellant said that the respondent was a former business partner with whom he had fallen out and that the complaint was motivated by that dispute. We have taken that explanation into account. We also note, however, that the individual had previously been a pupil of the Appellant and was selected through the random enquiry process. That evidence therefore cannot be dismissed merely because a separate business relationship had also existed between them.
88. The former-pupil material also referred to the Appellant becoming involved in the purchase of a vehicle for a pupil and to money connected with that transaction remaining outstanding. We have considered the Appellant’s explanation for his involvement. The ADI Code of Practice cautions instructors against becoming improperly involved in pupils’ personal affairs. An instructor’s involvement in a pupil’s vehicle purchase or related financial arrangements is therefore capable of raising legitimate concerns about the maintenance of professional boundaries, even where the instructor considers that he is acting helpfully. We treat this evidence with the same caution as the other former-pupil material and do not regard it as determinative of the appeal.
89. Mr O’Leary submitted expressly that stopping at a shop during a driving lesson was not a matter requiring regulatory intervention. We disagree. A pupil pays for the instructor’s time and is entitled to expect that the lesson will be devoted to driving instruction, subject only to reasonable breaks or stops which are genuinely necessary for the pupil’s welfare or the proper conduct of the lesson. An instructor who uses paid lesson time to attend to personal or business matters may raise legitimate regulatory concerns about professionalism, judgment and the proper treatment of pupils.
90. That does not mean that every brief or necessary stop during a lesson will amount to regulatory misconduct. The circumstances, purpose and duration of the stop will always be relevant. A stop to enable a pupil to use toilet facilities, for example, may be entirely appropriate. However, it is wrong in principle to suggest that an allegation that an instructor used paid lesson time to visit shops or conduct personal errands is incapable of requiring regulatory consideration. Such conduct falls properly within the Registrar’s responsibility to maintain professional standards.
91. We do not conclude that every unauthorised stop or personal errand would, viewed in isolation, justify removal from the Register. We are satisfied, however, that the use of paid lesson time for an instructor’s personal or business purposes is properly a matter of regulatory concern and is relevant to the assessment of professional judgment and fitness.
92. We do not treat the evidence from the former pupils as determinative of this appeal, nor do we rely upon it as proof of the complainant’s allegations. Our principal findings concerning the complainant are based upon the detail and credibility of her account, the contemporaneous WhatsApp exchange and our assessment of the Appellant’s evidence. The former-pupil material nevertheless provides relevant additional context concerning the Appellant’s professional judgment and his approach to the use of paid lesson time.
93. We would have reached the same conclusion concerning the complainant’s allegations and the Appellant’s fitness and propriety without relying upon the former-pupil evidence. We have treated that material only as limited supporting context concerning the Appellant’s professional judgment, and not as proof of the complainant’s allegations or of a wider pattern of conduct.
94. We also take into account the evidence that the Appellant arrived substantially late for one of the complainant’s lessons. The Appellant explained that he had been delayed by traffic while travelling from a previous lesson. We accept that unexpected traffic delays may occur. However, an Approved Driving Instructor is responsible for managing appointments and allowing reasonable travelling time between pupils, particularly where the instructor is familiar with the area and knows that significant congestion is likely at the relevant time. Although lateness is not by itself decisive, it forms part of the overall picture of the Appellant’s professional conduct.
95. We have given appropriate weight to the Appellant’s previous good character, the absence of criminal convictions and the absence of any previous substantiated regulatory findings. We also take account of the two earlier complaints referred to in the investigation material, which were unsubstantiated and which we have not held against the Appellant. We accept that the Appellant has taught many pupils and that removal from the Register will have serious personal and financial consequences for him.
96. We have also considered the Appellant’s evidence that he had reviewed relevant professional guidance and had booked a professional-conduct course due to take place on 31 October 2026. His willingness to undertake further professional development is a relevant matter in his favour. At the date of the hearing, however, the course had not been completed and there was no evidence before us as to its content, outcome or effect upon his professional practice.
97. More importantly, we were not satisfied that the Appellant had demonstrated sufficient insight into the conduct which concerned us. He continued to defend telling the complainant that she looked like a boy as friendly praise. He denied having any need to refresh his knowledge of equality matters because he considered that he was already fully aware of the relevant standards. He also denied all of the complainant’s material allegations and attributed the complaint either to racial prejudice or to dissatisfaction about the amount of tuition required. In those circumstances, we are not satisfied that attendance upon the proposed course, or the experience of these proceedings alone, adequately addresses the risk of similar failures of professional judgment recurring.
98. Approved Driving Instructors provide one-to-one tuition, frequently to young or otherwise inexperienced pupils, within the confined and private environment of a vehicle. That relationship necessarily involves trust and a potential imbalance of confidence and authority. Pupils are entitled to expect that their instructor will maintain clear professional boundaries, refrain from inappropriate personal or sexual questioning and avoid unwarranted physical contact.
99. The conduct which we have found proved was not a single minor error of judgment. It involved inappropriate comments concerning the complainant’s appearance and body, intrusive questioning about her sexuality and sexual experience, and the kissing of her hand during a lesson. Viewed cumulatively, that conduct represented a serious departure from the professional standards expected of an Approved Driving Instructor and a significant failure to maintain the boundaries required within the instructor-pupil relationship.
100. We have considered whether the legitimate regulatory objectives could be achieved by a response short of removal from the Register. We have balanced the seriousness of the conduct against the Appellant’s previous good character, the impact upon his livelihood, his continuing work pending the appeal and his stated intention to undertake further professional development. We have also considered Mr O’Leary’s submission that the proceedings themselves have had a salutary effect.
101. We are not satisfied that a lesser response would be sufficient. The seriousness of the conduct and the Appellant’s failure to acknowledge the inappropriateness of his admitted comments mean that we cannot be satisfied that the concerns identified have been adequately addressed or that similar failures of professional judgment would not recur. Nor that public confidence in the Register would be maintained. The fact that the Appellant was permitted to continue working pending the outcome of the appeal does not alter our assessment of his present fitness and propriety.
102. Registration as an Approved Driving Instructor carries an official assurance to members of the public that the person registered is suitable to undertake the responsibilities of that role. In light of the findings set out above, we conclude that the Appellant has ceased to be a fit and proper person to have his name included in the Register. The Registrar’s decision was justified and proportionate.
103. The appeal is therefore dismissed and the Registrar’s decision to remove the Appellant’s name from the Register of Approved Driving Instructors is upheld.
Signed: Judge Peri Mornington Dated: 4 November 2026
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