Criminal United Kingdom

Elle Walton & Anor v R

Official source

[2026] EWCA Crim 1430

Case No: 202603003 A2 and 202603177 A2

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM

MR RECORDER LAWRENCE

IN THE CROWN COURT AT MANCHESTER

Date: 5 November 2026

Before :

LORD JUSTICE HOLGATE

MR JUSTICE GRIFFITHS

HIS HONOUR JUDGE KEARL KC, RECORDER OF LEEDS

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Between :

(1) ELLE WALTON
(2) JAI GASCOYNE
Appellants
– and –
REX Respondent

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Michael O’Brien (instructed by Sonn MacMillan Walker) for the Appellant Walton

Nick Cockrell (instructed by Sonn MacMillan Walker) for the Appellant Gascoyne

The Crown not represented

Hearing date: 5 November 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down by release to The National Archives on 5 November 2026

Mr Justice Griffiths:

1. On 23 June 2026, in the Crown Court at Manchester, the appellants each pleaded guilty to misconduct in public office, contrary to common law. On 7 August 2026 the appellants were sentenced by Mr Recorder Lawrence. Gascoyne (then aged 25) was sentenced to 16 months’ immediate custody. Walton (then aged 27) was sentenced to 13 months’ immediate custody. Each now appeals against their sentence.

Facts

2. The basis of the charge against Gascoyne was that, between 20 January and 4 April 2024, while acting as a prison officer at HMP Buckley Hall, she wilfully misconducted herself by engaging in a relationship with a prisoner called Dil Nawaz (count 2) and in the early hours of 28 March 2024 (which happened to be the day of her arrest) wilfully misconducted herself by communicating via mobile phone with another prisoner called Michael Haigh (count 3).

3. The basis of the charge against Walton was that, between 21 January and 16 March 2024, while acting as a prison officer at HMP Buckley Hall, she wilfully misconducted herself by engaging in a relationship with a prisoner called Haq Nawaz (count 1). Dil and Haq Nawaz were brothers serving long sentences for conspiracy to supply class A drugs passed in March 2023: Dil was serving a sentence of 13 years and 10 months and Haq was serving a sentence of 12 years. HMP Buckley Hall is a category C male prison with 469 prisoners.

4. Dil and Haq Nawaz were sentenced at the same time for encouraging or assisting the appellants’ offences and for possessing prohibited items in prison, namely, mobile phones.

5. Gascoyne had been a prison officer since August 2021 and Walton from January 2023. They were good friends and socialised outside work. They both had security training when first employed, which included modules on corruption prevention and the consequences of forming relationships with prisoners. They both later received additional training in the form of Resilience and Support Meetings with the Counter Corruption Unit, which focussed on methods used by prisoners to corrupt officers and how to report inappropriate behaviour from prisoners. Walton mentioned that the consequences of wrongdoing could include a prison sentence.

6. At the end of the period covered by her indictment, on 15 March 2024, Walton resigned after a period of sickness absence. Gascoyne handed in her notice on 21 March and her last day at work was 28 March.

7. The misconduct first came to light when, on 28 March 2024, Gascoyne was found to be wearing two necklaces linked to her relationship with Dil. One had a love heart pendant engraved with the letter D and another had a tag engraved with a text from Dil’s Muslim religion. She had ordered two bracelets and two necklaces with pendants from Amazon on 21 March. In her car, police found a sealed envelope addressed to Dil, containing a love letter. They also found her mobile phone. She gave them the wrong phone number and the wrong PIN number for this phone.

8. Dil was searched in his cell. He was wearing a silver bracelet with Walton’s initial (J) and a necklace identical to hers, except that it had her initial on the love heart instead of his. He was in possession of a Valentine card addressed to “D”, signed off “I love you always”.

9. Haq Nawaz’s cell was searched too. He was wearing a chain around his neck engraved with Walton’s initial, “E”. He had a Valentine card in his cell.

10. An investigation followed, which included the tracing and examination of phone numbers and social media accounts attributed to each of the four defendants, providing further evidence of their relationships and contacts with each other. This showed that Gascoyne and Walton had been using their personal mobile phones to contact illicit mobile phones used by Dil and Haq inside the prison. The illicit phones are List B articles on the prohibited list for prisons because they allow prisoners to bypass the monitoring of calls on the regulated phone systems. Although Gascoyne and Walton’s phones were recovered, the illicit phones of Dil and Haq were never recovered.

11. Analysis showed that all four of them (Gascoyne, Walton and both Nawaz brothers) were in communication with each other; that is, contact was not simply bilateral between the romantic partners. Every one of the four communicated with and received communications from every one of the other three using (on the brothers’ side) the illicit phones to send and receive these communications.

12. The detected communications between the phones began in January 2024 and continued throughout the indictment period. Frequency was high. Gascoyne sent communications to her romantic partner Dil 286 times and received them from him 96 times. Walton sent communications to her romantic partner Haq 299 times and received them from him 163 times. In addition, there was a total of 85 communications between Gascoyne and Haq, and a total of 9 communications between Walton and Dil. Walton and Gascoyne had a total of 418 direct communications with each other on their phones; and Dil and Haq had a total of 28 communications with each other on the illicit phones.

13. Gascoyne used false identities for herself and Dil in order to communicate on Snapchat with him. Recovered Snapchat messages included mutual expressions of love, and referred to them being in a relationship; they also referred to Gascoyne meeting Dil’s mother and sister.

14. Dil messaged Gascoyne about wanting to have sex with her and suggested various ways in which that might be possible in the prison setting. Gascoyne’s basis of plea was that the relationship was not sexual, and she was correctly sentenced on that basis. However, it was only not sexual in the sense that they did not have sex with each other. It was, with that qualification, a developed romantic relationship.

15. The same goes for the relationship between Walton and Haq. She admitted in her basis of plea being in a relationship with him between 21 January and 16 March 2024, with the qualification that it was not sexual.

16. In communications between each other, Gascoyne and Walton referred to each other as “Mrs N”, i.e. as spouses to the Nawaz brothers.

17. Gascoyne gave her bank details to Dil on 8 March. On the same day, she received a payment of £85 from the sister of the Nawaz brothers. She received another payment of £130 from this sister on 27 March 2024.

18. Walton received money from an associate of the Nawaz brothers called Sami Raza. She had £500 credited to her account by him on 27 February, another £100 on 28 May and £250 on 31 May, the last two payments being after her resignation and outside the indictment period. Sami Raza was on the approved contact list for both brothers on the prison system and was listed as a visitor for Dil Nawaz.

19. The facts of count 3 (also charging misconduct in public office) were that Gascoyne exchanged a series of messages over Instagram with another serving prisoner at HMP Buckley Hall, called Michael Haigh. This was in the early hours of 28 March 2024, when her arrest (which took place later that day) was imminent. Haigh asked her for a cuddle in his cell, and said “I will make it happen luv because I will rago pull you into my pad xxx”, meaning “I will wildly pull you into my cell”. Gascoyne agreed to what she called “a goodbye cuddle”. She also asked him not to tell anyone else about it, because “with everyone always talking to officers, it’ll get around”.

20. Messages after the indictment period indicated that Walton was investigating whether “police can find a full call history from a sim card without the phone” and how she might destroy evidence by deleting messages from a phone she no longer had with her.

21. Other messages showed that both appellants continued their contacts with the brothers after they had ceased to be prison officers and after the brothers had been moved to other prisons.

Sentencing materials

22. Both Gascoyne and Walton were of previous good character, with no previous convictions or cautions.

23. To the author of her Pre Sentence Report, Gascoyne minimised her offending, suggesting that the relationship with Haq was “friendly” and that “this informal way of behaving with prisoners at the time seemed the norm”. She said that her relationship with Dil was “very surface level”. She said that the context of the communications with Michael Haigh was “I am leaving tomorrow, so why not?” She wrote a letter to the judge expressing remorse.

24. Walton’s Pre Sentence Report noted her as saying that, at the time, she genuinely believed she was in love with Haq Nawaz. She felt that her relationship with him protected her in the prison, because he was respected there. She also wrote a letter of remorse.

25. The impact of the appellants’ conduct was dealt with at the sentencing hearing by a witness statement from Stuart Proctor, Head of Security at HMP Buckley Hall. He is also the Deputy Local Corruption Prevention Manager. He stated (and this was not disputed) that the appellants’ training had specifically covered corruption, inappropriate relationships, misconduct in public office, the consequences of corruption, how to avoid being corrupted, how to report corruption, and how to access support should they feel they were being targeted. Inappropriate relationships between prisoners and staff members left the staff member vulnerable to coercion. It is invariably the case that other prisoners will be aware of the relationship and may try to exploit it. Perceived preferential treatment of prisoners can lead to instability and violence. Inappropriate relationships undermine prisoners’ confidence in the integrity of staff. They are often the precursor to more serious corrupt activity, such as the introduction of drugs, weapons and mobile phones, and the facilitation of escapes. Mr Proctor explained that List B prohibited mobile phones in prison represent a significant threat to the prevention and detection of crime and the maintenance of good order and security. The supply of mobile phones is a lucrative operation organised by criminal organised crime groups.

The sentence

26. The judge noted that there is no Sentencing Guideline for misconduct in public office and there is no maximum sentence. He referred, however, to the cases of Hibbs [2022] EWCA Crim 1927 at para 17, Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim 1468, Winkless and Novas [2026] EWCA Crim 904 and Waddington [2015] EWCA Crim 367.

27. The judge said that deterrent sentences were required. He noted the duration of the relationships, which was not short. Other features indicating seriousness were the receipt of money, the very high frequency of contact, and, in addition to the inappropriate relationships, the failure to report the possession and use of the illicit phones, which encouraged it. On the other hand, no articles (such as phones or drugs or weapons) were conveyed into prison by the appellants, and there was no other criminality. Culpability was high. There was a breach of trust with the employers and the public. The appellants knew that what they were doing was wrong and they did it deliberately. Harm was high, demonstrated by the witness statement of Mr Proctor.

28. Passing sentence on Walton, the judge said that her sentence after trial would have been 22 months before considering mitigation.

29. Whilst acknowledging her good character, the judge pointed out that almost all (if not all) defendants guilty of this sort of misconduct in public office are not only of good character, in the sense of having no previous convictions, but also of at least some positive good character, because they would not otherwise obtain employment in the prison service. However, he was impressed by the mitigation afforded by Walton’s important caring responsibility for a cousin. On account of mitigation, he reduced the sentence from 22 months to 20 months. He then gave a full one third credit for plea, resulting in his final sentence of 13 months.

30. He recognised that this sentence was capable of suspension, although the presumption of suspension did not apply to it. Applying the Imposition Guideline, he noted a low risk of re-offending, strong personal mitigation, a good prospect of rehabilitation, no history of poor compliance with court orders and the harmful impact on Walton’s cousin should she be sentenced to immediate custody, because of the care Walton provided to her. However, he said that the offence strikes at the heart of the public’s faith in the prison system. Together with the need for a deterrent sentence, the seriousness of the offence meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. The sentence was not, therefore, suspended.

31. Passing sentence on Gascoyne, the judge found her case to be more serious than Walton’s. There were two offences. There were inappropriate relationships with three prisoners. Her relationship lasted longer. She gave him jewellery. She lied about her mobile phone. He said her sentence after a trial, and before considering mitigation, would have been 26 months, for the totality of both offences. There was personal mitigation, but of a type to be expected of a defendant in her position. He was willing to make a small reduction to reflect her age at the time of the offending. That brought her sentence down to 24 months. Applying a full one third credit for plea led to the final sentence of 16 months for the totality of offending on counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other.

32. This sentence, too, was capable of suspension. For the reasons he had given in relation to Walton, however, and particularly emphasising the need for deterrence, he decided not to suspend Gascoyne’s sentence either.

The appeals

33. The appeals have been argued, in both oral and written submissions to the court, by Mr Cockrell on behalf of Gascoyne and Mr O’Brien on behalf of Walton. We are grateful to them.

34. Ground 1 of Gascoyne’s appeal is that the sentence was manifestly excessive. It is argued that the judge’s starting point should have been 20 months, not 26 months. The cases referred to by the judge, notably Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim 1468, Novas [2026] EWCA Crim 904 and Waddington [2015] EWCA Crim 367 were, it is said, more serious and did not justify his sentence. Reliance is also placed on Hibbs [2022] EWCA Crim 1927 and Morgan [2026] EWCA Crim 886.

35. It is said that the judge failed to reduce the sentence sufficiently on account of the mitigation: positive good character, personal mitigation in the Pre Sentence Report and in letters from her family, remorse, and her age, which (during the period of indictment) was 23, after a career in the prison service which began when she was 20. These features should, it is argued, taking account also of delay, have reduced the sentence to 18 months before credit for plea. After full credit, it is said, the sentence should have been 12 months.

36. Ground 2 is that the sentence should have been suspended, particularly in view of Gascoyne’s good character and personal mitigation.

37. Ground 1 of Walton’s appeal is that the overall sentence of 13 months was manifestly excessive. Ground 2 is that the starting point of 22 months was too high and did not sufficiently reflect Hibbs [2022] EWCA Crim 1927 and Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim 1468. There was no sexual contact, no conveyance of prohibited articles into prison, contact was for what is said to have been a relatively short time (eight weeks) and there was no evidence that Walton was being groomed for further breaches. It was therefore less serious than the case of Novas [2026] EWCA Crim 904, cited by the judge. Ground 3 is that the reduction of 2 months for personal mitigation was not sufficient, bearing in mind Walton’s care and support for her cousin (who has written a letter to this court, reinforcing the importance of this), her positive good character, her poor mental health, and her subsequent employment record. Ground 4 is that the sentence should have been suspended, even if it was in excess of 12 months. If it was 12 months or less, the presumption in section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2026 is relied upon.

The authorities

38. Notwithstanding the citation of several authorities to us, and by the judge in his sentencing remarks, we emphasise that every case is fact specific. Nothing in the existing caselaw provides either a starting point or a range applicable to sentencing for this type of offending generally. Limited if any assistance on starting point, and none on range, can be found from sentences passed on different facts in other cases. Nor do we intend, when considering an appeal in which the question is whether the sentences passed in this case were manifestly excessive, to provide the sort of general guidance which, if it were to be provided at all, might come from a Guideline from the Sentencing Council.

39. In the absence of such a Guideline, the principles in the Sentencing Act 2020 apply. The court must have regard to the purposes of sentencing which include, by section 57, the punishment of offenders, the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), and the protection of the public. When considering seriousness, the court must consider the offender’s culpability in committing the offence, and the harm which the offence caused, was intended to cause, or might foreseeably have caused (section 63).

40. Ratcliffe [2009] EWCA Crim 1468 laid down no general principles. A female prison officer was sentenced for three counts of misconduct in public office, arising out of a relationship with a prisoner, the extent of which was said (at para 3) not to be clear. They had frequent telephone contact over a period of 14 days and her phone included a picture of his face and genitals. This was count 2. Another count reflected her failure to take action in respect of the prisoner’s use of a phone. A count alleging that she herself had taken a mobile phone into the prison was dropped. A sentence after trial of 15 months, before credit for mitigation and pleas reduced it to 10 months, was held not to be manifestly excessive.

41. In Waddington [2015] EWCA Crim 367, consecutive sentences were passed for an inappropriate relationship with a prisoner lasting four months, charged as misconduct in public office (count 1), and conveyance of a List B article into prison (charged separately as count 2). The relationship covered by count 1 was said to be emotional, but not sexual. Count 2 concerned 10 mobile phones, provided to the same prisoner, but not for profit. The total sentence before credit for mitigation and plea was 26 months, reduced to 19 months. This was upheld as not manifestly excessive. Giving the judgment of the court, Carr J said:

“…in circumstances of sentencing for offences such as these, there is always a strong deterrent function in the sentencing process.”

42. She referred to McDade and Reynolds [2010] EWCA Crim 249:

“A corrupt prison officer is much better placed than an outsider to find ways of defeating a prison security system. The effect of this activity is twofold. First, the discipline and order of the prison is undermined and with it the safety and human rights of the inmates. One of the three key objectives of the prison service is stated in these terms: ‘Providing safe and well-ordered establishments in which we treat prisoners humanely, decently and lawfully.’ Secondly, those prison officers who are true to the trust imposed in them, and resist such attempts to corrupt them will suffer. They will come under suspicion themselves. They will be subject to closer scrutiny and checks. They will also naturally resent the rewards their corrupt colleagues enjoy.”

43. In Hibbs [2022] EWCA Crim 1927, the appellant was not a prison officer, but a nurse. She was not responsible for managing or supervising prisoners and any contact she had directly with inmates was always in the company of a prison officer. She pleaded guilty to one offence of misconduct in public office, arising out of improper and clandestine telephone-only contact with a male prisoner over a period of one month, consisting of calls initiated by the prisoner and said to be flirtatious. That is far removed from the facts of the present case. Both the nature and the duration of the contact was less, and only one other person (the prisoner) was involved. There was no collaboration with another prison officer. The nurse received no payments. Her contact with the prisoner was only on the phone and, when the prisoner suggested they might meet up after he was released, the appellant told him that was unlikely to happen. She was afraid of him. When the prisoner moved messaging to Instagram via an intermediary, the nurse told him she wanted him to stop. It was not established that the prisoner had used an unauthorised phone at any time (para 7), although she suspected him, and ought to have made a report (para 5). For most of the time when she was in contact with the prisoner, she was not at work in any prison establishment. A sentence of 9 months before credit for plea was upheld. Although all the Imposition Guideline factors except offence seriousness pointed towards suspension, immediate custody was also upheld. The court said that any sentence must have “a strong deterrent element” and, in relation to suspension, said (at para 17):

“…it is likely that, save in exceptional cases, an offence such as this will result in a sentence of immediate custody, even for a defendant who is of good character and where, as here, the illegitimate conduct did not last for very long.”

44. In Winkless and Novas [2026] EWCA Crim 904, Novas was a female prison officer who pleaded guilty to two counts of misconduct in public office, two counts of authorised transmission of an image or sound from a prison, one count of conveying a List A article into or out of prison, and one count of conveying a List B article. The basis of the first misconduct count was an inappropriate romantic and sexual relationship with the prisoner Winkless when she was 18, lasting about two months, including a high volume of phone contact and messaging. In the course of that relationship, she brought him phones and cannabis. The basis of the second misconduct count was that she revealed to him the identity of a prison informant. A feature of the case, not present in the case before us, was that the young prison officer was groomed and manipulated by the prisoner. This court granted leave to the Solicitor General to refer her sentence as unduly lenient, but concluded that it was not. The sentence on the two misconduct counts (concurrent with lesser sentences on the other four counts) was 3 years’ detention. This was equivalent to a notional sentence of 5 years and 7 months, before reduction for personal mitigation and credit for her guilty pleas (para 34). This court said that the least aggregate sentence that would have been appropriate after a trial would have been in the region of 6 to 7 years, before reductions for mitigation and plea (para 46). However, we think the facts of that case are so different from the facts of the present cases that it provides no assistance.

Discussion and decision

45. We agree with the sentencing judge that both culpability and harm were high in these cases. We note, in particular:

i) Both appellants had been recently and specifically trained about why this sort of conduct was unacceptable and dangerous, and how to get support, and how to report it. They knew that it was a form of corruption, which undermined the integrity of the system.

ii) There was no evidence of grooming or manipulation by the prisoners. Both appellants acted with their eyes open. They did not act in fear, or under threat.

iii) The conduct, although there was no sexual activity, was in the context of committed and intense romantic relationships, freely entered into and pursued.

iv) Both appellants acted in breach of trust. They were prison officers serving at the prison in which the Nawaz brothers were incarcerated, and they were responsible for managing them in custody.

v) Both appellants acted in a way likely to come to the attention of other prisoners, wearing matching jewellery with personal initials.

vi) Although there is no suggestion that either appellant conveyed illicit phones to the prisoners, they strongly promoted the use of the prisoners’ illicit phones by their activity.

vii) Both appellants were under a duty to report the illicit phones, and neither did so.

viii) The volume of messaging and other contacts was high.

ix) The period covered by the indictment was significant: about two months.

x) The appellants did not desist voluntarily. Indeed, they did not immediately break off the relationships even when they were discovered.

xi) The two appellants acted in concert with each other, and in concert not only with the prisoner in whom they had a primary romantic interest, but also his brother. That is a very unusual and serious feature. All four of them acted together.

xii) Both appellants received money in connection with their relationships with the Nawaz brothers: in Gascoyne’s case from a sister, and in Walton’s case from an associate.

46. It was important that the sentences should, not only punish the appellants, but also deter others.

47. In those circumstances, we are not at all persuaded that the starting point of 22 months for Walton, before reductions for mitigation and credit for plea, was too high.

48. The starting point for Gascoyne, of 26 months before reductions for mitigation and credit for plea, had to cover the additional count in relation to the prisoner Michael Haigh. Her case was also more serious because she appears to have been the first mover as between herself and Walton, and her contacts lasted somewhat longer. This starting point was also not, in our judgment, too high.

49. We agree that both appellants had significant mitigation which had to be reflected in their final sentences. However, previous good character, and even positive character, is a common feature of cases involving prison officers, and the starting point for misconduct in public office will ordinarily be on the basis of previous good character. Rare cases of relevant previous convictions would present an aggravating feature.

50. The other mitigation presented by each appellant was reflected by significant downward movement in the sentences imposed by the judge. We are invited, in Gascoyne’s case, to say that there should have been a reduction on account of delay. The Overarching Principles general guideline says:

“Where there has been an unreasonable delay in proceedings since apprehension which is not the fault of the offender, the court may take this into account by reducing the sentence if this has had a detrimental effect on the offender.”

However, this case involved four defendants, and four phones, two of which had not been recovered, and the appellants were offering no assistance. The period of investigation was not unreasonable. It also does not appear from the letters submitted to the Crown Court from the defendant and her mother that the passage of time in itself caused detrimental impact.

51. The question for us is whether the final sentences (16 months for Gascoyne and 13 months for Walton) were manifestly excessive. That question is to be answered by taking a step back and assessing them in relation to the offending as a whole, taking full account of the seriousness of the offending, the mitigating features, and credits for plea. It is not a mathematical exercise. Movements between the starting point and the final sentence do not have to be precisely calibrated: Ratcliffe [2024] EWCA Crim 1498; [2025] 1 Cr app R(S) 45, per Baroness Carr of Walton-on-the-Hill at para 80. In cases such as the present, where there is no Sentencing Guideline providing a structured approach to the identification of the notional starting point, the emphasis when assessing whether a sentence is manifestly excessive will be on the end point before credit for plea, because questions about Guideline categorisation do not arise.

52. We are not persuaded that either sentence was manifestly excessive.

53. That leaves only the question of suspension.

54. The sentencing judge carefully applied the Imposition Guideline, and identified all the relevant factors. He was not bound to suspend the sentence even if the only factor pointing towards suspension was the seriousness of the offending: Price [2023] EWCA Crim 1060 at para 12.

55. Moreover, cases of this sort are most unlikely to result in anything other than an immediate custodial sentence, not least because of the need for deterrence.

56. We therefore reject the submission that he was wrong not to suspend the sentences.

57. The appeals are dismissed.

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