Administrative United Kingdom
MA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/64302/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham
On 13 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE E Hickey
Between
MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sobowale, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Swaby, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 1 May 2024 to reject his asylum claim made on 25 December 2021.
Anonymity
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant, an Iraqi Kurd, claims that while serving as a chief sergeant/bodyguard he attended a demonstration in August 2021 during which a KDP supporter was shot by a senior colleague. He states that he was subsequently kidnapped and threatened by KDP members seeking information about the shooting and was also warned by his superiors not to speak about it. He fled Iraq and claims to fear persecution from both the KDP and his former superiors if returned.
4. The respondent accepts the appellant's nationality but rejects the core of his protection claim. It is submitted that his account contains significant inconsistencies and is not credible. The respondent therefore contends that he is not entitled to refugee status or humanitarian protection.
The Hearing
5. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.
Issues
6. The respondent conceded the following:
(a) The appellant’s identity, nationality and that he was a Kurd.
(b) That taken at its highest a Convention reason was engaged, namely imputed political opinion.
(c) That if the appellant’s account was found to be credible then he could not obtain state protection and he would not be able to internally relocate.
7. The appellant conceded the following:
(a) That there was no standalone Human Rights argument, it stood or fell with the asylum claim.
8. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) Considering the credibility of the account, is it reasonably likely that the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason? To decide this, I must make factual findings on the following:
(i) Did the appellant work as a security guard for SH?
(ii) Did he attend a demonstration and did he SH shoot at members of the KDP and injure one of them?
(iii) Was the appellant kidnapped and told that he needed to give a statement and testify?
(iv) Did he go to his boss and inform him and was he threatened by SH and others that he must not do so?
(v) As a result, does the appellant fear the KDP and PUK?
(b) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
(c) Would the appellant be able to obtain his documentation? (Note – although identified as an issue the appellant gave evidence that he had a copy of his CSID on his phone which he could retrieve. Mr Sobowale conceded that the appellant in those circumstances would be able to obtain appropriate documentation. It is therefore not an issue I need to resolve).
Preliminary matters
9. When the case was called on Mr Sobowale applied for an adjournment. On the day before the hearing the appellant’s representative had uploaded a 13-page supplemental bundle. One of the items in that bundle was a purported news report. When uploaded, an accompanying note from the representative indicated that the appellant had only provided this to his solicitors on 9 October 2026. It related to one of the persons the appellant allegedly feared who I have anonymised as ‘AA’. Mr Sobowale submitted that it showed that this person had a propensity to violence and of getting away with it. I was informed that the representatives had run it through an online translation tool. It was obvious that the result was a poorly translated document which at times was unfathomable. Mr Sobowale therefore sought an adjournment. I refused the application. The case had had a protracted history in that the original first tier decision had been successfully appealed and it came before me as a remittal. The respondent’s decision had been made on 1 May 2024. The original first tier appeal had been heard on 4 August 2025 and the Upper Tier decision dated 14 January 2026. Notification of the hearing before me had been served on 27 August 2026. I was informed by Mr Sobowale that the appellant had only recently had the idea of doing an AI facilitated search and that this article was the result. I noted that the report purported to be dated 16 August 2016. Given the amount of time the appellant has had to obtain his evidence, the questionable provenance though an unspecified AI platform and what the evidence at its highest showed, I was of the view that further delay was unwarranted. Mr Swaby took no objection to this and the other late evidence being admitted and I granted leave albeit the poor translation and how it was obtained went to the weight that could be given to the article.
10. The parties agreed that the relevant bundle to rely upon was the original one created for an earlier hearing consisting of 162 pages and the further 13-page supplemental bundle.
Legal Framework
11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.
12. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
13. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
FIINDINGS
14. Whilst I am bound to be selective in my references to the evidence before me, I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions as necessary to explain my findings and reasons.
(i) Did the appellant work as a security guard for SH?
(ii) Did he attend a demonstration and did SH shoot at members of the KDP and injure one of them?
(iii) Was the appellant kidnapped and told that he needed to give a statement and testify?
(iv) Did he go to his boss and inform him and was he threatened by SH and others that he must not do so?
(v) As a result, does the appellant fear the KDP and PUK?
15. On the facts of this case, I consider that all five issues stand or fall on my assessment of credibility. I therefore deal with them together.
16. I find that the appellant’s account is credible, and I find in his favour on all five questions. My principal reasons for doing so are as follows:
17. Firstly, the respondent asserted in the refusal decision that the appellant’s account of attending a demonstration in Halabja on 20 August 2021 was externally inconsistent, but no explanation was provided as to why this was said to be so. Mr Swaby did not pursue this point before me and I find that there is no evidential basis for concluding that the account is externally inconsistent. The respondent also contended that the appellant was internally inconsistent because, in his Asylum Claim Questionnaire dated 2 July 2023, he stated that his superior, ‘S’, had shot a member of the KDP, whereas in his substantive asylum interview on 12 October 2023 he stated at question 27 that, at the time, he did not know what was happening. I do not accept that this amounts to an inconsistency. Read fairly and in context, the appellant’s evidence was that he did not know what had occurred at the time of the incident but was subsequently informed of what had happened. Question 27, read in full, is entirely consistent with that account. Accordingly, I find that no internal inconsistency has been established.
18. Secondly, the respondent relied on an alleged inconsistency between the appellant’s account in his ACQ and his evidence in AIR1. In the ACQ, the appellant stated that he returned to the office to change into civilian clothing, whereas in AIR1 he stated that he changed into civilian clothing when he reached the checkpoint at Zamaqi. I do not consider this discrepancy to be material. The appellant was not asked any probing questions during the interview about the location of the office or its relationship to the checkpoint. He has since explained that the small cabin beside the road at the Zamaqi checkpoint was referred to as “the office”. In the absence of any further exploration of this issue during the interview, I consider that explanation to be reasonable and I do not regard this matter as undermining the credibility of his account.
19. Thirdly, the respondent relied on an alleged inconsistency between the appellant’s ACQ and his account in AIR1 regarding his abduction. In the ACQ, the appellant stated that he was kidnapped by a group of four KDP members. In AIR1, however, he stated that, after a period of between one week and ten days, a person approached him and asked him to get into a car. I find that this criticism has no merit. Although the appellant initially referred to a single individual approaching him, it is clear from reading his answer in its entirety that he was describing the actions of a group. He stated that there were two vehicles involved and explained that “they” did not speak to him until the vehicles had reached the mountains, at which point “they” told him that he was required to act as a witness. He further stated that “they” subsequently dropped him off. Whilst the word “they” can sometimes refer to a single person, in the context of an account involving two vehicles, I find that it more naturally reads as a reference to a number of individuals. Read fairly and in context, I do not consider the appellant’s interview evidence to be inconsistent with his earlier account that he was abducted by a group.
20. The respondent also contended that the appellant was inconsistent because, in his ACQ, he stated that he was on his way to meet a friend in a public park when he was kidnapped, whereas in AIR1 he stated that he had gone to the park and was approached there. I do not accept that this amounts to an inconsistency. In his answer to question 27, the appellant explained that he was approached at the entrance to the park. That account is entirely consistent with his statement that he was on his way to meet friends in the park when he was intercepted. The distinction relied upon by the respondent is immaterial and does not undermine the credibility of the appellant’s account.
21. Fourthly, the respondent contended that the appellant had been inconsistent because, in his ACQ, he stated that, after being told that he had one week in which to testify, he went straight to his superior, ‘S’, whereas in AIR1 he stated that he was dropped off at the market and then telephoned S. In his witness statement, the appellant clarified that he was dropped off at the market, immediately telephoned S, and thereafter went to the base to meet him. He explained that S was also present when he arrived. That account is consistent with his evidence at question 27 of AIR1. Whilst I accept that there is a discrepancy between the account given in the ACQ and that provided in AIR1, I do not regard it as a significant inconsistency. The essential substance of the appellant’s evidence has remained the same, namely that he contacted S immediately after his release and sought his assistance. I therefore attach only limited weight to this inconsistency when assessing the overall credibility of the appellant’s account.
22. Fifthly, the respondent relied upon an inconsistency between the appellant’s ACQ and his account in AIR1. In the ACQ, the appellant stated that, after speaking to his superior, he went to stay with his maternal uncle and was advised to remain at home whilst arrangements were made for his departure from Iraq. In AIR1, however, he stated that, three days after visiting his superior, he was approached and threatened. The appellant addressed this discrepancy in his witness statement, explaining that the account given in AIR1 is correct. He stated that he had provided a full account to the interpreter who completed the ACQ, but believes that not all of the information he provided was recorded. He further explained that the completed questionnaire was only read back to him briefly before submission. This evidence formed part of his adopted evidence-in-chief and was not challenged in cross-examination by Mr Swaby.
23. In any event, I approach the contents of the ACQ with a degree of caution. The relevant question asks, “What do you fear will happen if you return?”. There is nothing on the face of the form to indicate the level of detail required in response, nor any express guidance that a complete chronological account of all relevant events must be provided. In those circumstances, whilst there is a discrepancy between the two accounts, I attach little weight to it when assessing the overall credibility of the appellant’s evidence.
24. Sixthly, Mr Swaby relied on the answer given by the appellant at Q 3.1 and Q4.1. In particular that the appellant did not refer to his fear being from people in or aligned to the KDP or PUK. I give this little weight. Nothing the appellant says is inconsistent with his later account, it is rather an account that lacks any detail. The screening interview is not designed to allow the appellant the opportunity to give an extensive account. He is asked to give a brief account and he did so.
25. Seventhly, Mr Swaby cross examined the appellant on his answer at Q5.4 of his screening interview. In that interview he is asked if he had ever been detained and he answered ‘no’. I accept the appellant’s explanation as reasonable that he understood this question to refer to someone who had been put in prison as opposed to what happened to him.
26. Eighthly, I do not accept Mr Swaby’s submission that the appellant’s account is inherently implausible because he had no direct knowledge of the shooting and therefore had nothing of value to offer as a witness. The appellant did not need to have witnessed the shooting itself for his evidence to be relevant. His account was that ‘S’ left with three bodyguards and subsequently returned in a hurried manner shortly after the shooting. Depending upon the wider evidential picture, those observations could have constituted circumstantial evidence capable of implicating ‘S’ in the incident. Whether such evidence would ultimately have carried significant weight is beside the point. The appellant’s account is not rendered implausible merely because he was not an eyewitness to the shooting itself, particularly as he would not necessarily have been aware of the other evidence available to those seeking to compel his testimony.
27. Ninthly, Mr Swaby submitted that the appellant’s account lacks credibility because, on the appellant’s own case, his superior, ‘S’, behaved illogically. It was argued that the appellant had demonstrated his loyalty by reporting the incident and there would therefore have been no reason for S to regard him as a threat. I find, however, that there is some force in Mr Sobowale’s submission that the appellant occupied a different position from the others associated with S. On the appellant’s account, he was the only member of the group who did not have a familial connection to S and may therefore have been viewed as more expendable. Moreover, whether S’s actions were irrational depends upon the degree of concern he had regarding the appellant’s ability to withstand the threats being made against him and the pressure to which he was being subjected. If S feared that the appellant might eventually disclose information adverse to him, his conduct is not necessarily implausible and I give it little weight.
28. Tenthly, I am required to consider S8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004. The respondent in the refusal decision relies on the fact that he could have claimed asylum in France or Germany. In his screening interview he stated that he had been fingerprinted in Germany and stayed at a camp for 18 days in France. However, his explanation was that one of the smugglers was a nephew of ‘S’ and he did not feel safe in either country. I am satisfied that he would have had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in either of those countries but I have found the appellant to be a credible witness and find that his explanation for not doing so significantly reduces the weight I should give to his failure to do so. I therefore place limited weight upon his failure to apply in either country.
29. Given my findings I find that it is reasonably likely that the appellant fears persecution for a Convention reason and would be persecuted for that Convention reason. Given the concessions by the Respondent there would not be sufficiency of state protection and internal relocation is not an option.
30. Having allowed the appeal on asylum grounds, it is unnecessary to allow the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds and that aspect of the appeal is therefore dismissed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal on asylum grounds is allowed.
The appeal on Humanitarian Protection grounds is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
31. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including his name or their address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
32. Although the appellant has won his appeal, I do not make a fee award since the decision is based in part on material not before the original decision maker.
Signature
Signed Date 5 November 2026
E Hickey
First-tier Tribunal Judge E Hickey
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