Administrative United Kingdom
Pridon Bukia v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/68394/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
| Heard at Bradford | Decision Promulgated |
| On 4 November 2026 | On 5 November 2026 |
Before
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL CURTIS
Between
Pridon bukia
(no anonymity DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
Appellant Representing themselves
Respondent Mr Bhurton (Home Office Presenting Officer)
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Georgia, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision, dated 28 April 2025, to refuse his protection claim made on 19 June 2024.
2. I have decided not to make an anonymity direction. There was no application that one ought to be made and the circumstances of this appeal, notwithstanding it is brought on protection grounds, does not outweigh the principal of open justice.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on MyHMCTS. The stitched bundle ran to 105 pages (SB). No other documentation had been uploaded by the parties. I can confirm that I have considered the above material in reaching a decision.
SUMMARY OF CLAIM
4. The Appellant, a national of Georgia, claims to fear persecution on account of an imputed political opinion. He states that in September 2017 he was approached by police officers and associated criminals linked to the governing Georgian Dream party and was asked to assist in influencing local voters during elections. Although he initially agreed because he was afraid, he subsequently refused to become involved. He claims that, as a result, he received threats from criminals and was subjected to harassment by the authorities. He states that he travelled to Greece shortly afterwards but continued to receive threatening calls, and that on returning to Georgia he remained under pressure from both criminals and the authorities. He therefore claims that he cannot safely return to Georgia because of his refusal to assist the ruling party.
HEARING
Preliminary issues
5. The appeal was listed on the standby list. I called it on at 16:50. The Appellant was not in attendance and he is not represented by a solicitor. The Tribunal had tried to call him on the mobile number that had been provided but the number appeared to not be in operation. I considered rule 28 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Immigration & Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. The Tribunal had been provided with an email address for the Appellant. On 27 August 2026 a notice of the hearing scheduled for 4 November 2026 was generated and then issued by the online system. The notifications tab of the system reveals that the email to the Appellant containing the notice was successfully delivered. The Tribunal had also sent an email, containing our pre-hearing checks, on 27 October 2026. That email referred to the hearing of 4 November 2026. The Appellant did not respond to that email. I was therefore satisfied that the Tribunal had properly notified the Appellant of the hearing.
6. As to whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the Appellant’s absence, I noted that the Tribunal had twice directed the Appellant to inform us why he thought the Respondent’s decision was wrong, but he had failed to do so. He has provided no evidence since the appeal was lodged on 6 May 2025 and there is no evidence that he has communicated with the Tribunal thereafter. In fact, the system would appear to indicate that the Appellant has not paid the respective fee to have his appeal heard. It was not, though, struck out in advance of the hearing and I proceed on the basis that I have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. What that demonstrates, in totality, is a disengagement by the Appellant with his appeal. The Appellant had clearly had a reasonable period of time to provide the evidence he wanted to rely on and to explain why he considered the decision was wrong, but had not taken advantage of that opportunity. The Respondent was in attendance and was represented. I had no confidence that adjourning to a new hearing date would result in a different scenario. I concluded that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the Appellant’s absence. Mr Bhurton relied on the decision letter and the review.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
7. On a fair reading of the paperwork, the principal controversial issues appear to be:
(a) The credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have received adverse interest from the authorities in Georgia
(b) In any event, whether there is a requisite risk of persecution on return to the Appellant’s home area
8. The decision maker was not clear in the decision about protection and relocation, declaring unequivocally in para. 12 of the letter that sufficient State protection would not be available and that there was no internal relocation option, before proceeding in paras. 13 and 14 to say there was sufficient State protection and that the Appellant could relocate to Kutaisi, Tbilisi or Poti. The author of the review did not identify that tension and there was no application to withdraw the concession made in para. 12. I therefore proceed on the basis that the issues are as identified in the paragraph above.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
9. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”), in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC) the proper approach is to address each of the statutory questions expressly and sequentially:
(i) Question 1 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. This calls for a specific finding of fact about the asylum seeker.
(ii) Question 2 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant “does in fact fear” such persecution. This is the ‘subjective fear’ test.
(iii) Questions 3-5 are matters of objective evaluation and must each be determined on the lower standard of proof: ‘a reasonable degree of likelihood’; i.e. is it reasonably likely that there is:
(i) a risk of harm (question 3)
(ii) an absence of state protection (question 4), and
(iii) no reasonable internal flight alternative (question 5)
10. Further guidance was provided in DS, as follows:
3. In answering question 1, it may often be relevant to consider evidence concerning events alleged to have taken place in the past as well as present circumstances [42]
4. Question 2 must be answered separately and requires assessment of the appellant’s credibility. The question of whether an appellant does in fact fear persecution may be informed by findings about the probable likelihood of the truth of their account of their past experiences; the likely truth of their account of their present circumstances; section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004; significant change in circumstances. [47] – [50]
FINDINGS OF FACT
11. I have looked at the evidence in the round taking into account all that was relevant, whether I refer to it specifically or not. In light of my assessment of that evidence, I make the findings below.
12. There is, as the decision maker points out, an absence of background information to support the Appellant’s narrative. In other words, the account of the adverse interest is externally inconsistent with, for instance, the Respondent’s CPIN entitled Georgia: Political parties and affiliation, September 2024. In general, it is said in para. 3.1.1, protesters, journalists, supporters and members of opposition parties are unlikely to be subject of persecution or serious harm and that “the vast majority of political activities, protests or online activity are carried out without incident”. The Appellant does not point to any political activity that he undertook. His claim is that he was asked to influence voters and he refused. If protesters, journalists and supporters/members of opposition parties are unlikely to be persecuted, it is difficult to see how a person with no political profile who simply refuses to influence voters in his home area, might be brought within the sphere of those who risk persecution.
13. The claim in the screening interview was that the Appellant was at risk because he supported the opposition party. As I have said, the CPIN would not support the contention that mere supporters of the opposition party are at risk. Moreover, as pointed out in the decision letter, having said in the screening interview that he was at risk because of this support, in the SEF he denied having said that and went on to say he was not a supporter of any party and was not interested in politics (Q33/34). He does not explain why Q4.1 of the screening interview would record his account in the way that it does if he had not said it. I find that there is a significant internal inconsistency here.
14. As a general matter, I found the Appellant’s account in the SEF to be vague and lacking any real detail to support the asserted fear (see, for instance, Q11, Q16, Q69, Q87). He also refused to name any of the people he feared. The level of detail that an asylum seeker provides during their claim, and appeal, is a matter that I can take into account during the credibility assessment. Here, the detail is notably lacking and, in my view, that affects the Appellant’s overall credibility.
15. The Appellant was given an opportunity to respond to the points taken by the decision maker. He failed to take advantage of that opportunity and did not attend the hearing in order to give evidence in support of his appeal. He does not, then, in terms challenge any specific part of the decision. That does not mean, of course, that it automatically follows that his appeal fails, but the absence of evidence from him, whether written or oral, is a matter that damages the Appellant’s credibility.
16. The Appellant confirms in the screening interview that he spent three years in Germany, claiming asylum in 2021, but was returned to Georgia in March 2022 when that claim was refused. He left Georgia fairly promptly and gives a narrative which includes a period of two years residence in the Czech Republic where he worked as a labourer. He then stayed in Italy for two months, and France for a week. He organised the journey himself and clearly had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in one of those safe countries which he failed to take. I agree with the decision maker that the Appellant’s credibility is damaged by that failure, in accordance with s.8 of the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
17. Taking all of those matters into account, I do not accept that the Appellant has established that he suffered adverse attention from any person in Georgia because of his political opinion, imputed or otherwise, and I do not accept that he left the country for the reasons he said he did. For completeness, I do not accept that he was asked to influence voters and I do not accept that he refused to do so.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS
18. In answering Question 1, it must follow from my above findings that the Appellant does not have a characteristic that could cause him to fear persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.
19. In answering Question 2, again, it must follow from my above findings that the Appellant does not in fact fear persecution on return to Georgia.
20. Turning to question 3, given that I have answered Question 1 and 2 against the Appellant, there is no cogent basis to conclude that it is reasonably likely he would be persecuted on return. In any event, though, the way that the Appellant describes the core of his claim lends weight to a conclusion that he has not been persecuted before and that the treatment he describes occurring to him did not amount to persecution, as defined in NABA. For instance, in Q19 he says “I had pressure from police and things like that and that’s why I just got up and left”. The word he used was “pressure”. In Q35 he used the words “oppressed”, “harassed” and “pressurised” and that he was told if he did not like the government he should “go away”. That answer did not include an act of persecution, or even a threat of the same.
21. Furthermore, he said in Q49 that he first had contact with the asserted actors of persecution in September 2017, when he agreed to help them. He then gave it a “little thought” and changed his mind (Q64). At the end of October 2017 he had a “serious conversation” with them but, by then, he was in Greece. The people who contacted him are not even in Georgia any more, he confirmed (Q88). He then returned to Georgia, from Greece, notwithstanding the asserted fear, at the beginning of December 2017. He says he was approached again, but was simply told, if he did not like Georgia, to “go, the road is wide. He then stayed in Georgia until 2019 and, when repeatedly asked how he was able to stay safe during that period, he pointedly refused to answer the question (see Q107, Q109 and Q110).
22. The Appellant does not describe in the SEF ever being harmed by any person in Georgia. Even on the case as presented by him therein, it is difficult to see where any risk on return might materialise. Put another way, the Appellant’s own account does not establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted on return.
23. I remind myself that the Appellant could be entitled to humanitarian protection if he can establish, to the lower standard, that he is at risk of serious harm, or article 3 ECHR ill-treatment, in Georgia. However, for the reasons I have stated, I am not satisfied that he has established to that lower standard that he has told the truth about events in Georgia and, as with Question 3, he has not established it is reasonably likely he would suffer serious harm, or article 3 ill-treatment, on return.
ARTICLE 8 ECHR
24. To touch relatively briefly on article 8 ECHR, given that the matter cannot be considered conceded by the Appellant, there is no suggestion that he has established a family life in the UK. In terms of any private life, I am willing to accept that he has established something of a private life since he arrived on 18 June 2024. However, the nature of that private life is not set out and the Appellant’s residence in the UK is relatively short, amounting only to less than 2½ years. The Appellant’s status in the UK has been, at best, precarious and the 2002 Act instructs that, in general, a private life established in those circumstances should be afforded little weight. There is no feature of this appeal that would point away from the statutory steer being properly applied. I therefore attach little weight to the Appellant’s private life.
25. The Appellant used an interpreter during his interviews with the Respondent and there is nothing to suggest he can speak English. There is also no evidence on which I could conclude that he is financially independent.
26. It cannot properly be argued that the Appellant meets the requirements for a grant of leave to remain under the Rules. His wife is said to be in Georgia and he speaks Georgian. He has spent the majority of his life there and there is little evidence to suggest there would be any obstacles to integration, much less significant ones.
27. Significant weight should be attached to the public interest in circumstances where the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Rules. The weight of his private life falls well short of the weight of the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. There are no exceptional circumstances which would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences being caused to any person and the interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for his private life is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.
28. I therefore find that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a convention reason, does not face a real risk of serious harm and the decision is not unlawful with reference to s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
TO THE RESPONDENT: FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed Dated: 5 November 2026
Judge Curtis
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Curtis
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