Administrative United Kingdom

Eid Ajam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number:HU/56032/2026

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Nottingham Justice Centre
On 4 November 2026

Before

JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL S. AZIZ

Between

Eid Ajam

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr L. Youssefian, Counsel instructed by A1 solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr A. Swaby, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant was born on 8 July 2005 and is a citizen of Sweden.

2. On 22 April 2026, the respondent made a Deportation Order against the appellant under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. Accompanying that Deportation Order was a decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim. The appellant appealed this decision, leading to these proceedings.

Background (immigration and criminal history)

3. The appellant is a national of Sweden, born on 8 July 2005. He entered the United Kingdom as a child, aged approximately seven or eight years, together with his mother and siblings. He has resided in the United Kingdom continuously since his arrival.

4. On 24 May 2019 he was granted indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme.

5. On 14 November 2025, at Worcester Crown Court, the appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary of dwellings with intent to steal and conspiracy to steal motor vehicles. The offending occurred between 29 November 2023 and 10 December 2023. He received concurrent custodial sentences, the lead sentence being two years and eleven months' detention.

6. Following those convictions, the respondent commenced deportation proceedings pursuant to section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. A notice of intention to deport was served on 12 January 2026. Representations were submitted on the appellant's behalf and, on 22 April 2026, the respondent refused his human rights claim and decided to make a deportation order. The appellant appealed that decision on 29 April 2026.

Hearing

7. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.

8. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation uploaded onto myHMCTS.

9. Preliminary issues: The appeal was listed to commence at 10 am. The appellant was to be produced from HMP Brinsford. We were initially informed that he would not arrive until after 3 pm because the prison van transporting him was required to deliver other prisoners to other courts first. I telephoned the custody staff, who confirmed the information provided by my clerk. Both representatives and I agreed that, if the hearing commenced after 3 pm, there would be insufficient time to conclude the appeal and an adjournment would therefore be necessary. I expressed my dissatisfaction that arrangements had not been made to secure the appellant’s timely attendance, given the importance of the appeal. The hearing was briefly stood down to allow Mr Youssefian to inform the appellant’s mother and other family members, who were in attendance, of the position. I indicated that, following those discussions, I would be willing to convert the hearing into a CMRH if necessary. During that interval, my clerk informed me that the earlier information was incorrect: the appellant had been collected by another prison van and was being transported directly to the court centre. No explanation was provided for the inaccurate information initially given. I telephoned the custody staff again, who confirmed the revised position. By the time the parties were recalled and I updated them, the appellant had arrived at the court centre. I allowed Mr Youssefian time to confer with the appellant before the hearing began.

10. Issues in dispute: Mr Youssefian reaffirmed that the appellant no longer relied upon rights arising under the Withdrawal Agreement (which had previously been advanced on his behalf). It was accepted that, in light of the decision in Molnár v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 31, the enhanced protection against expulsion afforded by the Withdrawal Agreement was not available to him because the index offending occurred after 31 December 2020. The appeal therefore proceeded solely on Article 8 ECHR grounds.

11. The issues in dispute between the parties are limited. The appellant relies upon the private life exception to deportation contained in section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. In particular, the parties disagree as to whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Sweden.

12. In the alternative, the appellant contends that there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, such as to outweigh the strong public interest in his deportation. The respondent disputes that contention and maintains that the appellant's deportation would be proportionate under Article 8 ECHR.

13. Evidence and submissions: I heard from the appellant and his mother. They each adopted the contents of their respective witness statements and were then cross-examined by Mr Swaby at length on the issues in dispute. After the oral evidence was heard, closing submissions were made by both representatives.

The Legal Framework

14. Sections 117A, B and C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 apply whenever a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's rights under Article 8 and would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 117B sets out the considerations which apply in all cases. In cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, the court or tribunal must have regard to the considerations set out in section 117C.

15. Section 117C provides as follows:

117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.

16. As Underhill LJ explained at paragraph 27 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176, Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002 is “a complete code in the sense that the entirety of the proportionality assessment required by article 8 can and must be conducted within it”. Therefore, the assessment of an individual’s circumstances, when determining whether the decision to deport is a disproportionate breach of their Article 8 rights, must be made within the framework of Part 5A of the 2002 Act. There is therefore no scope (and no need) for a separate assessment of proportionality outside the structured approach.

17. The Ackom case-law: A significant issue in this appeal was the applicability of Ackom v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 537, relied upon by Mr Swaby when addressing the appellant's claim that there would be ‘very significant obstacles’ to his reintegration in Sweden. In Ackom, the appellant was a German national of Ghanaian heritage who arrived in the United Kingdom aged seven and had lived here continuously thereafter. He had never returned to Germany, had completed his education in the United Kingdom, established employment, and had no criminal history until early adulthood, when he committed serious drug offences. The First-tier Tribunal allowed his appeal against deportation, finding that he met Exception 1 in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. The Secretary of State challenged only the finding that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Germany. The Tribunal relied on his lengthy absence from Germany, lack of family or social ties there, absence of cultural connections, and inability to speak, read or write German.

18. The Secretary of State's appeal was dismissed by the Upper Tribunal, which held that those findings were open to the First-tier Tribunal. However, the Court of Appeal allowed a further appeal. Reaffirming the approach in Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, the Court held that the question is whether the identified obstacles would prevent or seriously inhibit integration in the receiving state, including the individual's ability to participate in society, function on a day-to-day basis and establish meaningful relationships within a reasonable time.

19. The Court accepted that the absence of family support, unfamiliarity with the country and inability to speak the language were relevant considerations. However, such factors commonly arise in deportation cases and are not determinative. The Tribunal had failed adequately to explain why those matters would prevent or seriously inhibit integration in Germany, particularly given the appellant's age, education, work history, adaptability and capacity to learn German. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had either misapplied the Kamara test or given insufficient reasons for finding that the elevated threshold of very significant obstacles had been met.

20. I also take account of Dabo v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 907. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that social and cultural integration is to be assessed in accordance with CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and reaffirmed the approach to very significant obstacles explained in Kamara and Ackom. The task is to identify the obstacles to integration in the receiving country and determine whether they would prevent or seriously inhibit reintegration, rather than merely cause hardship or difficulty. Relevant considerations may include prolonged absence from the country, lack of family or social support, absence of accommodation, employment or financial resources and any mental health difficulties. In some cases, the nature of the obstacles may be such that satisfaction of the statutory threshold is self-evident.

Findings of Fact

21. Before I apply the statutory framework to the findings that I make on the evidence presented, I have a number of general observations regarding the evidence that was presented at the hearing, in particular, the oral evidence given by the appellant and his mother.

22. First, there have been many victims of the appellant’s offending. Most obviously, there are the victims of the burglaries he committed. The victim personal statements referred to by the sentencing judge demonstrate the significant impact of his actions upon those affected. However, there are other victims, including members of the appellant’s own family. The appellant’s mother and three sisters attended the hearing in support of him. Before his imprisonment, the family lived together as a close and supportive unit. It was apparent from his mother’s evidence that she has been deeply affected and shocked by her son’s offending. She explained in her evidence that, following the breakdown of her marriage, she eventually moved to the United Kingdom with her children in order to provide them with better educational opportunities and life prospects. The evidence before me demonstrates that the appellant was raised in a warm, stable and nurturing family environment. Prior to these offences, he had no criminal record. His educational history shows that, having completed school, he progressed to college to study engineering and appeared to have a promising future. It is difficult to reconcile that background with his subsequent involvement in a criminal gang and the serious offending committed over a two-week period in November 2023 and which has resulted in his current custodial sentence.

23. Various explanations for the appellant’s offending were advanced during the hearing, including his youth at the time, negative peer-group influences and the absence of a positive male role model within the family home. I take into account the appellant’s evidence concerning those peer influences and his counsel’s submissions concerning his age. Whilst those factors may have played some part, they must be considered alongside the evidence of the positive influences available to him throughout his life.

24. Secondly, having heard the evidence of both witnesses, I do not, in broad terms, take issue with the family and private life history advanced on the appellant’s behalf. Whilst I make more specific findings when applying the statutory framework later in this decision, I am prepared to accept the following having heard from the appellant and his mother and having considered the documentary evidence in the appeal bundle:

(i) The appellant is of Lebanese heritage; both of his parents having been born in Lebanon.

(ii) The appellant’s father moved to Sweden on an unknown date and subsequently acquired Swedish nationality. The appellant’s mother moved to Sweden following her marriage in 2003. By that time, her husband had been living in Sweden for some years and had obtained Swedish citizenship. Following the marriage, she also acquired Swedish nationality.

(iii) The family had no wider family members residing in Sweden.

(iv) The eldest daughter was born in Lebanon in 2004. The remaining children, including the appellant, were born in Sweden between 2005 and 2008.

(v) The family relocated to Lebanon when the appellant was approximately two to three years old. He attended reception classes there at around the age of four or five and subsequently attended an English-medium school until he was approximately seven years old.

(vi) The family then returned to Sweden when the appellant was about seven years old as a result of the conflict in Lebanon. Around the same time, the relationship between the appellant’s parents was breaking down.

(vii) The appellant and his siblings struggled to settle in Sweden and, after only a few months, their mother relocated them to the United Kingdom. This was around 2012. By that stage, the marriage had broken down and the appellant’s father was no longer living with the family. The children had attended English-medium schools in Lebanon and struggled to learn Swedish. I accept that one of the reasons for the move to the United Kingdom was the mother’s belief that the children would have better educational opportunities and prospects here.

(viii) Since their parents’ separation, the appellant and his siblings have maintained contact with their father through modern means of communication and occasional visits. The evidence concerning the father’s current residence was not entirely clear. Both witnesses stated that he travelled extensively for business purposes and divided his time between a number of countries, principally Germany and Lebanon (according to the appellant’s mother). Whilst greater clarity could have been provided, I accept that the uncertainty in the evidence is more likely attributable to the father’s transient lifestyle and limited involvement in the family’s day-to-day affairs than to any deliberate attempt to conceal his whereabouts or to suggest that he is, in fact, permanently resident in Sweden, as submitted by Mr Swaby (there is simply no evidence before me to make such a finding).

(ix) Since arriving in the United Kingdom, the appellant has lived with his mother and three sisters as part of a close and supportive family unit. He was educated in the United Kingdom, attended college and, prior to his arrest, undertook part-time employment. Before the index offences, he was of good character and had no criminal record. The offending took place over a relatively short period between 29 November 2023 and 10 December 2023, when the appellant was 18 years old. Notwithstanding his youth and previous good character, the offending was sufficiently serious that, as a first-time offender, he received a custodial sentence of just under three years’ imprisonment.

25. I next turn to the statutory framework that needs to be applied in these deportation hearings.

Section 117B

26. I am required to consider the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The maintenance of effective immigration controls weighs in favour of the respondent pursuant to section 117B(1). I accept that the appellant speaks English and has been educated in the United Kingdom. Given his long residence and settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme, I attach little weight either for or against him under sections 117B(2) to (5). Section 117B(6) does not apply. The principal public interest consideration in this appeal is that set out in section 117C, namely the strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals.

Section 117C

27. The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest: Section 117C(1) of the 2002 Act makes clear the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. A foreign criminal is defined at section 117D of the 2002 Act as someone: a) who is not a British citizen, b) who has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence and c) who has, i) been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months, or ii) been convicted of an offence causing serious harm, or iii) is a persistent offender. The appellant is a Swedish national and it is accepted that he has been convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. This requirement is met.

28. Seriousness of the appellant’s offence: Section 117C(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater the public interest in deportation. There can be no dispute that the appellant's offending is serious. Although he was a first-time offender with no previous convictions, the seriousness of the offences was such that a custodial sentence was imposed. As Mr Swaby rightly submitted, there was a reason why the appellant received an immediate term of imprisonment despite his previous good character: the gravity of the offending plainly warranted it. Accordingly, I attach considerable weight to the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.

29. A copy of the judge’s sentencing remarks dated 14 November 2025 are contained at pages 469-477 of the stitched bundle. The sentencing remarks of the judge may be summarised as follows.

30. The sentencing judge found that the appellant played a substantial and direct role in a sophisticated conspiracy to burgle dwellings and steal high-value vehicles over an eleven-day period between 29 November and 10 December 2023. The judge expressly found that the appellant was involved in all eleven burglaries and the theft of all seven stolen vehicles. The offending involved entering residential properties during the night or early hours of the morning whilst occupants were often present, stealing vehicle keys and then removing vehicles from driveways. The judge detailed the appellant's participation across the series of offences and found that he was involved in every break-in committed by the group. When considering the appellant's role within the conspiracy, the judge rejected any suggestion that he occupied only a peripheral position. Although there was some dispute about whether the offenders occupied leading or significant roles, the judge concluded that the appellant was "certainly on the cusp of significant/leading roles" because of the number of offences in which he participated and the level of planning involved. The judge found the offending to be at the highest level of culpability (Category A). This was because there was:

• Significant planning.

• Deliberate targeting of specific vehicles.

• Use of disguises.

• Possession of burglary tools and equipment.

• Organised activity over multiple incidents.

• Co-ordinated disposal of stolen vehicles.

31. The judge assessed the harm as Category 1. The stolen vehicles had a combined value exceeding £100,000. In addition to the financial loss, the judge emphasized the emotional impact on victims, finding that the burglaries caused fear, distress, paranoia and damage to victims' sense of security in their own homes. One victim's family ultimately moved away because of the lasting impact of the offences.

32. The judge accepted a number of mitigating features specific to the appellant:

• He was only 18 at the time of the offending.

• He had no previous convictions.

• He had undertaken engineering qualifications and had positive educational prospects.

• He enjoyed close family support.

• He suffered from ADHD, which might have made custody more difficult and modestly reduced culpability.

• He expressed remorse and a desire not to reoffend.

33. The judge also accepted that youth and immaturity reduced his culpability to some extent and recognised that young people are more susceptible to peer pressure and risk-taking without fully considering the consequences of their actions.

34. However, notwithstanding those mitigating factors, the judge considered the offences extremely serious. He described the offending as a "catalogue of serious offending" motivated by financial gain and concluded that only an immediate custodial sentence could properly reflect the gravity of the criminality. The judge observed that the appellant was a bright young man with considerable qualifications and very good employment prospects, but that these positive characteristics made his participation in the offending more difficult to explain. The judge noted that he came from a supportive family and did not have a background of unusual trauma or deprivation that might have accounted for his conduct. In the judge's view, the motivation for the offending appeared to be financial.

35. Having summarised the sentencing judge's remarks, which fully set out the basis of the appellant's offending and level of culpability, it is necessary to consider the appellant's own account of his involvement. At paragraphs 19 to 21 of his witness statement (pages 90-91 of the stitched bundle), the appellant describes his role in the offences as follows:

“19. On one evening during the period between 30 November and 9 December 2023, at approximately 10:00 p.m., my high school friend, Suffian, who was in his early twenties at the time, contacted me and asked whether I wanted to go for a drive with him. We had known each other for several years and there was nothing unusual about his invitation, so I agreed. Before we set off, Suffian received a call from three individuals asking whether he could give them a lift. He agreed because he knew them better than I did. In total, there were five people in the vehicle, including myself and Suffian. I knew two of the passengers by name, namely Suleman Khan and Alfie Flynn, who were approximately 16 and 17 years old at the time. Although I recognised them, I was not friends with either of them and had no close relationship with them. I cannot remember the name of the third passenger because I did not know him personally and had very little interaction with him.

20. The vehicle we were travelling in was a Toyota owned by Suffian. From what I understood, it was one of the vehicles connected with his father's garage business. We were simply travelling together and were due to drop off the three passengers when, shortly before reaching their destination, the police stopped the vehicle. I recall the officers informing us that the vehicle had been linked to a number of burglaries and that a mobile phone had been tracked to its location. I was completely shocked by what I was hearing, as I had no knowledge of the background to these allegations or any criminal activity. I fully cooperated with the police and complied with their instructions throughout the stop.

21. Following the police stop, I was arrested and the matter proceeded through the criminal justice process. The incidents which ultimately led to my conviction took place between 30 November and 9 December 2023, and I was subsequently charged in December 2024, when I was only 18 years old. In November 2025, I received a custodial sentence following my conviction for conspiracy to commit burglary. Although I accept the Court's decision and take responsibility for my actions, I still struggle to understand how one poor period of judgement led to such devastating consequences for both me and my family. The entire experience left me frightened, confused and overwhelmed, and it has had a profound impact on my life.”

36. The appellant’s account of the offending differs markedly from the findings made by the sentencing judge. In his witness statement, he presents himself as having had only peripheral involvement in the events. He describes being in a vehicle with friends in November or December 2023 when it was stopped by the police and states that he was shocked to learn that the vehicle had been linked to a number of burglaries. He asserts at paragraph 20: “I was completely shocked by what I was hearing, as I had no knowledge of the background to these allegations or any criminal activity.” I agree with Mr Swaby that, notwithstanding the appellant’s assertion elsewhere in his statement that he accepts responsibility for his actions, the statement contains no clear admission of criminal wrongdoing and is, in substance, inconsistent with the basis upon which he was convicted.

37. Much of the cross-examination focused upon this inconsistency. The appellant initially sought to explain the contents of his statement by suggesting that he had been misunderstood by the solicitor who attended the prison to take his instructions. I reject that explanation. This is not a case in which a word, phrase or isolated sentence may have been inaccurately recorded. The relevant passages consist of several lengthy paragraphs which minimise or deny any meaningful involvement in the offending. The suggestion that this was the result of a misunderstanding is not credible.

38. That explanation was further undermined by the appellant’s oral evidence. When questioned about his role in the offending, he again appeared reluctant to acknowledge criminal responsibility. In response to Mr Swaby’s questions, he emphasised that he had not entered any of the burgled properties, had not physically broken into any homes, and had not personally stolen any items. Rather, he described himself as remaining in a vehicle outside. It was only after repeated questioning, including intervention by the Tribunal, that the appellant eventually accepted that he had acted as a “watcher”, sitting alongside the getaway driver, and that he had on occasions driven vehicles away following the offences.

39. Even then, I was left with the impression that the appellant had not been entirely candid about the extent of his involvement in the criminal enterprise. I find that he has demonstrated only partial acceptance of responsibility for his offending. Whilst he may have genuine reservations about openly discussing his role and may fear the consequences of doing so, his continuing reluctance to provide a full account is indicative of a lack of complete insight and contrition.

40. I accept that the appellant has demonstrated some remorse. The sentencing judge noted his remorse and I accept that his period of imprisonment, together with the impact of his offending upon both himself and his immediate family, has caused him to reflect upon his behaviour and strengthened his desire not to offend again. Nevertheless, I find that his rehabilitation remains incomplete. His reluctance fully to acknowledge the nature and extent of his participation in the offending leads me to conclude that there remains meaningful rehabilitative work for him to undertake before it can be said that he has fully accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. I take all of this into account in my assessment of the public interest.

41. Public interest in deportation and the statutory exceptions: Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. In the case of an offender who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years, the public interest requires deportation unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. The exception relied upon by the appellant is the private life exception contained in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act.

42. The respondent accepts that the appellant satisfies the first limb of section 117C(4), namely that he has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. The issues in dispute concern the second and third limbs of that exception: whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Sweden if he were deported.

43. Social and cultural integration: The appellant contends that he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. He relies upon the fact that he arrived here as a child aged seven or eight and has spent the overwhelming majority of his life in this country. He has been educated almost entirely in the United Kingdom, undertaking primary and secondary education before studying engineering at college. He has indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme and maintains close relationships with his mother and siblings, all of whom reside in the United Kingdom. He submits that his identity, education, social connections and personal development are rooted in this country and that, notwithstanding his serious offending, he remains socially and culturally integrated.

44. The respondent disputes that contention. Whilst accepting the appellant's lengthy residence in the United Kingdom, the respondent places reliance upon the seriousness of the index offences, which involved organised criminality and resulted in a substantial custodial sentence. It is submitted that such offending is inconsistent with meaningful integration and demonstrates a failure to adhere to the norms and values of British society.

45. As explained in CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, criminal offending is a highly material consideration but is not determinative. The question is whether the offending and its consequences demonstrate such a rejection of, or exclusion from, the social and cultural life of the United Kingdom that integration can no longer be said to exist.

46. Having considered the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that the appellant remains socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. He arrived here as a young child and has spent virtually all of his formative years in this country. He has been educated entirely within the British education system, obtained academic and vocational qualifications, undertaken employment, and established his social identity and future aspirations here. I also accept that he enjoys close and enduring family relationships with his mother and siblings, all of whom reside in the United Kingdom and continue to provide significant emotional and practical support.

47. I have taken full account of the seriousness of the appellant's offending. However, whilst it represents a serious departure from the norms and values of society, it does not extinguish the extensive ties arising from his lengthy residence, education, family life, employment history and social development in this country. Looking at the evidence holistically, I am satisfied that the appellant remains socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom for the purposes of section 117C(4)(b) of the 2002 Act.

48. Very Significant Obstacles to Integration in Sweden: I turn next to consider whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration in Sweden for the purposes of section 117C(4)(c).

49. I remind myself that this is a demanding test. In Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, the Court of Appeal explained that integration is a broad evaluative concept. The question is not merely whether an individual can survive, obtain accommodation or secure employment in the receiving country. Rather, the issue is whether the individual would be enough of an insider, in terms of understanding how life in that society is carried on and possessing the capacity to participate in it, so as to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis and build the human relationships that give substance to private and family life.

50. The factors identified in Kamara include language ability, cultural familiarity, length of absence from the country, family and social networks, previous residence there, education and employment experience, together with the appellant's age and stage of life. I have assessed the evidence by reference to those considerations.

51. As to language ability, I accept the appellant's evidence that he does not speak Swedish despite holding Swedish nationality. His residence in Sweden was limited to the first two or three years of his life and a further brief period when he was approximately seven years old. Whilst I accept that there is nothing preventing him from learning Swedish in the future, and that his mother accepted as much in her evidence, he would nevertheless arrive in Sweden unable to communicate in the language spoken by the overwhelming majority of the population. In practical terms, this would create immediate and significant difficulties in obtaining employment, accessing services, establishing social relationships and navigating everyday life.

52. As to cultural familiarity, I accept that the appellant possesses little meaningful knowledge of Swedish society. Although he is a Swedish citizen, nationality is not synonymous with integration. The appellant has spent virtually all of his formative years outside Sweden. His education, friendships, family life and social development have all taken place elsewhere. He has not participated in Swedish social, educational or employment institutions (apart from a brief period of attendance at a Swedish school, lasting 3–4 months, when he was 7 years old). In those circumstances, I accept the submission that he would arrive as a cultural outsider with only a limited understanding of how life is conducted in Swedish society.

53. The length of the appellant's absence from Sweden is also a significant factor. Save for the brief periods already referred to, he has lived outside Sweden for almost the entirety of his life. He has spent over a decade residing continuously in the United Kingdom. Consequently, whatever limited connection he may once have had with Sweden has long since diminished.

54. As to family and social networks, I find that the appellant has no meaningful support network available to him in Sweden. There are no family members residing there. Whilst he remains in intermittent contact with his father, I am not satisfied that his father would provide practical or financial support following his return. I find that there is a lack of evidence before me to indicate that he is even residing in Sweden (as Mr Swaby suggested he might be). I also accept the mother's evidence that she is already struggling financially as a single parent and would not be in a position to provide any significant financial support from the United Kingdom. Equally importantly, there is no evidence that the appellant has any friends, acquaintances or wider social connections in Sweden upon whom he could rely.

55. In relation to previous residence in Sweden, I note that the appellant has technically lived there before. However, those periods of residence were both brief and occurred when he was a very young child. I am not persuaded that they provided him with any meaningful familiarity with Swedish society or equipped him with the practical knowledge required to reintegrate there as an adult. The fact of previous residence therefore carries limited weight in the overall assessment.

56. As to education and employment experience, the appellant's schooling, college education and employment experience were all acquired outside Sweden. He has no educational qualifications obtained in Sweden, no employment history there, and no familiarity with Swedish workplaces. Whilst I accept the respondent's submission that the appellant is clearly an intelligent young man who has demonstrated academic ability and is capable of learning, I also accept that his inability to speak Swedish would place him at a substantial disadvantage in accessing the labour market, at least in the short to medium term.

57. Finally, I take account of the appellant's age and stage of life. Although he is now in his early twenties, I accept that he has never lived independently. Prior to his imprisonment, he resided with his mother and sisters as part of a close family unit. The offending occurred shortly after he had turned eighteen and, since then, he has spent a substantial period in custody. I accept the submission that he has had limited opportunity to acquire the practical skills associated with independent adult living. Whilst he is no longer a child, neither is he someone who has established an independent adult life. I also take into account the evidence that he has been diagnosed with ADHD. Whilst the evidence relating to that condition is limited and I accept that it is not determinative, it is nevertheless a relevant factor which is capable of increasing the practical difficulties he would encounter when attempting to establish a life alone in an unfamiliar country.

58. I have carefully considered the respondent's submissions. I accept that the appellant is a Swedish citizen and that he would not face legal barriers to residence or employment. I further accept that he would have access to the Swedish welfare system and would not be left destitute. The respondent is also correct to observe that the appellant is intelligent, capable of learning a new language and capable of adapting over time.

59. However, the guidance in Kamara makes clear that the issue is not whether the appellant could physically survive in Sweden or eventually secure work and accommodation. The question is whether he would have a reasonable opportunity to become sufficiently integrated into Swedish society so as to operate on a day-to-day basis and build meaningful social relationships there.

60. I have specifically considered whether the factors relied upon by the appellant amount to no more than the ordinary difficulties commonly encountered by foreign criminals who have spent lengthy periods in the United Kingdom and which, as the Court of Appeal observed in Ackom, will not without more establish very significant obstacles to integration. If the appellant's case rested solely upon his inability to speak Swedish, his lengthy absence from Sweden, or the absence of family support there, I would not have been satisfied that the statutory threshold was met. However, I am required to assess the cumulative impact of all relevant factors. In the present case, I attach particular weight to the appellant's lack of an established independent adult life, the fact that he has spent virtually all of his remembered life outside Sweden, the absence of identified accommodation, any established support network, or any realistic prospect of significant financial assistance from family members. He would be required to establish himself alone in an unfamiliar society immediately following a substantial period of detention. Those circumstances, when considered together with his ADHD and lack of practical experience of independent living, elevate the obstacles he would face beyond the ordinary disruption and hardship inherent in relocation. Looking at all of the evidence in the round, I find, albeit by a relatively narrow margin, that the cumulative effect of the appellant's circumstances satisfies the statutory test.

61. I therefore find that the appellant satisfies Exception 1 contained in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act. By operation of section 117C(3), the public interest does not require his deportation. The appeal therefore succeeds under Article 8 ECHR. In light of my finding that Exception 1 applies, it is unnecessary to determine the appellant's alternative case based on very compelling circumstances.

62. Before leaving the appeal, I observe that this has not been an easy case and that my conclusion has been reached by a relatively narrow margin. I have taken into account that the appellant has expressed remorse for his offending and has demonstrated a measure of insight into the consequences of his conduct. Prior to the index offences, he was of good character and had no criminal record. The offending, whilst undoubtedly serious, occurred over a relatively short period when the appellant had only recently attained adulthood. I have also taken into account the submissions made on his behalf concerning his youth at the time of the offences, his susceptibility to negative peer influences, his otherwise positive family background, and the impact which a substantial period of imprisonment has had upon him.

63. In allowing the appeal, I do not minimise the seriousness of the offending behaviour or the impact that his criminality has had on the victims of his offences. Nor should this decision be understood by the appellant as preventing the respondent from taking future deportation action should circumstances materially change. The appellant should understand that this appeal has succeeded on its particular facts and by a fine margin. Should he commit further offences, the respondent would be entitled to consider afresh whether deportation action is appropriate, and any future Tribunal would be required to assess the circumstances then prevailing.

Notice of Decision

64. The appeal is allowed.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

Although the appeal was allowed, it was so on the basis of evidence adduced at the appeal hearing and which was not before the original decision-maker. In the circumstances I do not find it appropriate to make a fee award in favour of the appellant.

Signed Date: 5 November 2026

S. Aziz

First Tier Tribunal Judge S. Aziz

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