Administrative United Kingdom
RM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/51022/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 27th October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE hollings-tennant
Between
RM
(anonymity order Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mohzam (Counsel), instructed by Burton & Burton Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ainsworth, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Botswana. He has appealed under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his claim for international protection lodged on 1st October 2023. His appeal is brought on grounds that his removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. I have considered whether it is appropriate to make an anonymity order, bearing in mind the importance of the principle of open justice. I have decided to do so because this case involves matters relating to international protection and the importance of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in documentation contained on MyHMCTS, with all relevant evidence included in a consolidated hearing bundle of [136] pages. The Appellant left Botswana on 30th September 2023. He travelled by plane to the United Kingdom, transiting in Ethiopia, before arriving in this country on 1st October 2023. He claimed asylum on the same day. The Respondent refused that claim by way of a decision dated 21st November 2024. That refusal is the subject of this appeal.
The Appellant’s claim
4. The Appellant claims to be a Botswanan citizen and a member of the Herero tribe. He says that in 1991, whilst he was still at school, family elders tried to convince him to kill people as human sacrifices as part of their witchcraft rituals. He refused to do so because he did not want to participate and told them it is against his religion. In 2009, he filed a complaint against his uncle with the police but was advised it was a family matter and no action would be taken. The Appellant says he relocated to Gaborone but continued to receive threatening messages from family members. The Appellant claims his uncle found him in Gaborone and said things would happen to him if he refused to participate. Shortly thereafter, he was assaulted by an unknown man whom he believes was sent by his uncle. The Appellant fears being killed by his family for refusing to participate in witchcraft rituals which involved human sacrifices.
The Respondent’s case
5. The Respondent accepts the Appellant is a Botswanan citizen, a member of the Herero tribe and that he received threats from family members after refusing to participate in human sacrifices. However, in her reasons for refusal letter (RFRL), the Respondent argues the Appellant’s subjective fears are not well-founded and his claim does not fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention. Whilst he was assaulted in the street, he does not know who attacked him and there is no evidence this was linked to his uncle. It is argued there is no evidence to suggest his family have any power or influence over the state authorities in Botswana and, by his own account, when he reported matters to the police they investigated. It is pointed out he was able to live in Botswana for over 30 years since the issue first arose without coming to serious harm.
6. The Respondent argues there is effective state protection available to the Appellant from any further issues with his family. It is argued the police are generally willing and able to provide effective protection and noted that murder and witchcraft are illegal. There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the Appellant’s uncle or other family members can act with impunity, either on a local or national level and a failure by police to prosecute due to lack of evidence is not indicative of a lack of effective protection. It is also argued, in the alternative, that the Appellant can safely and reasonably relocate to another area of Botswana, particularly given he relocated to Gaborone and lived there for over 20 years before any encounter with his uncle.
HEARING
7. The hearing took place by way of a hybrid hearing with the Appellant and Ms Ainsworth attending in person and Mr Mohzam attending by remote means using Cloud Video Platform (CVP). There were no technical issues arising during proceedings and neither party raised any concerns about the remote aspect of the hearing. The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal and that shall stand as the record of proceedings. As a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing, I confirmed with the parties that I had all relevant documentary evidence adduced and agreed the issues to be decided. Both parties agreed the key issues are whether there is effective state protection or a viable internal relocation alternative. Mr Mohzam confirmed the Appellant was not pursuing a claim on family or private life grounds under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’) so I have not considered that issue in my decision.
Issues in dispute
8. As such, it was agreed with the parties that the following disputed issues fall to be decided by the Tribunal:
(i) whether the Appellant faces any real risk of being targeted by family members on return to Botswana because he refused to participate in witchcraft rituals involving human sacrifice;
(ii) if there is such a risk, whether there is effective state protection available to him or a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative.
Evidence and submissions
9. Thereafter, I heard oral evidence from the Appellant who gave his evidence in English having confirmed he was content to do so. I then heard closing submissions from the legal representatives before reserving my decision. I am grateful to Ms Ainsworth and Mr Mohzam for their assistance and I have taken note of the documentary evidence contained in the consolidated appeal bundle, the oral evidence from the Appellant and submissions on behalf of the Respondent and the Appellant, which are contained in the record of proceedings.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
10. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must establish he is a refugee as defined in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. Given his asylum claim was lodged after 28th June 2022, I must apply a two-stage test pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to him by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether he does in fact fear persecution on return to Botswana as a result of that characteristic.
11. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic and fears persecution as a result, I must determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, there would not be effective state protection available and he could not safely relocate to another part of Botswana.
12. If I am not satisfied the Appellant is a refugee, I must consider whether he meets the requirements for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. To qualify, he must show there are substantial grounds for believing he faces a real risk of suffering serious harm in Botswana and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of state protection there. I must consider whether the decision to refuse, and as a consequence of that decision his removal to Botswana, breaches his human rights on grounds that he faces a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
FINDINGS
13. In coming to a decision in this appeal, I have taken into account all relevant evidence adduced. I have referred in my findings to material aspects of the claim and considered all the evidence in the round, applying the relevant standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, when assessing whether the Appellant genuinely fears persecution and the lower standard of proof, that of a reasonable degree of likelihood, when considering whether he would face persecution on return. Any absence of a reference to a particular piece of evidence should not be taken to mean I have not considered that evidence before reaching my decision.
14. In assessing credibility, I have given full consideration to guidance in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491, in which it was made clear that indicators such as sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment.
Issue (i) – threats from the Appellant’s family
15. The first question, under section 32(2)(a) of the 2022 Act, is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant has a characteristic (or would have such a characteristic attributed to him), which could cause him to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. Whilst the Respondent argued in her RFRL that the Appellant’s claim does not fall within the scope of the Convention, Ms Ainsworth conceded this point at the hearing, acknowledging the Appellant was threatened after refusing to participate in witchcraft rituals due to his religious beliefs as a Christian. I note there is no issue taken with his evidence that he is Christian and the Respondent explicitly accepts the Appellant received threats from family members as claimed. As such, I find he does have a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution.
16. The second question under section 32(2)(b) of the 2022 Act is whether the Appellant does in fact fear persecution due to that characteristic (the ‘subjective fear test’). This also falls to be answered in the Appellant’s favour given the Respondent accepts his account of having been threatened by his uncle and it is not in dispute his family took part in witchcraft rituals involving human sacrifices. In his witness statement, he refers to hearing people screaming as they were being sacrificed (see paragraph [58]), which would have been terrifying and traumatic for a child. In the circumstances described, it is entirely understandable he has a genuine subjective fear of being targeted and killed by his family members after refusing to participate and rejecting their cultural traditions.
17. The next question, under section 32(4)(a) of the 2022 Act, is whether or not there is a reasonable degree of likelihood the Appellant faces a real risk of treatment amounting to persecution or serious harm on return. In other words, is his genuine subjective fear objectively well-founded. On the evidence presented before me, I find he has failed to establish he faces any real risk of coming to serious harm in Botswana. The Appellant claims those who refuse to participate would be killed, though having refused himself he continued to live with his family in the same area until he was old enough to leave and provides no evidence to suggest he came to any physical harm during that period (witness statement, paragraphs [26] and [54]). In fact, whilst he refers to having been followed and experiencing many difficulties, there is no evidence to suggest either his uncle or any other family members subjected him to physical harm at any stage, let alone treatment amounting to persecution as defined in section 31 of the 2022 Act.
18. In his witness statement, he says he started running away from home since childhood and refers to having been employed in various jobs, including in a wholesale shop, as a security guard and in construction. Whilst he refers to being followed by his family and having faced many difficulties, he does not give further detail as to any specific threats received, the frequency of such or how these were conveyed to him. There is no cogent evidence to suggest there were any direct repercussions for the Appellant between 1991, when he says he first refused to get involved, and 2020 or 2021 when confronted by his uncle in Gaborone. The fact that his family members do not appear to have made any attempt to act upon threats to harm him or otherwise force him to participate in witchcraft rituals, notwithstanding his evidence that they were following him, for a period of nearly 30 years, is more indicative that there is no real risk of them targeting him on return to Botswana now.
19. The Appellant says he relocated to Gaborone and lived there for around 20 years without incident. Whilst I take into account his evidence that he moved address whenever he was being followed and that his sister told him people were looking for him and his uncle was calling to enquire about his whereabouts, he was nevertheless able to live and work there without coming to any physical harm. The Appellant claims his uncle finally confronted him in person and threatened him in 2020 or 2021. I consider his evidence regarding this incident to be somewhat vague and it is unclear how he managed to avoid more serious repercussions if his uncle was intent on killing him or forcing him to participate in witchcraft and had spent 20 years looking for him to that end. Further, whilst the Appellant may genuinely believe the attack which took place a few days later was connected to his uncle, the perpetrator did not say anything to him and he was unable to identify them. I do not consider this isolated incident gives rise to a well-founded fear of treatment amounting to persecution.
20. Further, the Appellant’s skeleton argument asserts that country information indicates witchcraft and traditional rituals continue to exist in parts of southern Africa and refers to reports from various sources of people being harmed as part of such practices. However, his legal representative has not seen fit to provide the evidence or links to the sources to which the skeleton refers. Whilst there is a country information schedule, those sources relate to general corruption rather than reports of witchcraft. There is no evidence before me to establish the extent or prevalence of these practices across Botswana, how the relevant state authorities are likely to react when such matters are reported to them, and whether those involved are likely to face criminal prosecution in accordance with the rule of law. The distinct lack of such evidence does not assist the Appellant in discharging the burden of proof upon him to establish he faces a real risk of treatment amounting to persecution from family members said to be intent on either killing him or forcing him to participate in witchcraft rituals.
Issue (ii) – state protection or internal relocation
21. The Appellant asserts that the state authorities in Botswana will not provide effective protection against his uncle.In considering whether there is a sufficiency of protection in Botswana for those who fear non-state agents, I first note the principles set out by the House of Lords in Horvath [2000] UKHL 37. It is the duty of the home state to provide protection but if that system is lacking, international protection is available as a substitute. However, no state can achieve complete protection against isolated or random attacks. The standard is therefore not that which eliminates all risk or provides guarantees of protection, rather a practical standard that takes into account the duty a state owes to its citizens. Further, it is of course imperative that victims of crime report matters to the police so that effective action can be taken against those responsible.
22. The Respondent argues that the police in Botswana are generally willing and able to offer effective state protection in the circumstances the Appellant describes. Reference is made to background country information indicating that Botswana has a functioning police force and the practice of witchcraft is prohibited under the Witchcraft Act. By the Appellant’s own account, the rituals his family practiced are illegal in Botswana and, as a result, are carried out in secret. In his submissions, Mr Mohzam argued the police cannot provide effective protection, though he did not refer to any relevant country evidence to support that assertion and instead made a vague reference to general corruption. Whilst I take into account the country information schedule (consolidated bundle, page [43] to [46]), which refers to reports of corruption, the sources are somewhat dated and do not provide any cogent evidence to demonstrate the police would not investigate allegations relating to witchcraft rituals involving human sacrifice and offer the level of protection that the Appellant’s particular circumstances reasonably require, at least to the standard envisaged in Horvath.
23. There is no reliable evidence to establish the Appellant’s family members have any power or influence, either in the area in which he grew up or throughout the country. In his witness statement, he says there are very few police officers in villages and they often become friends with local people. He believes his uncle and family have links with the local police chief, though this assertion is somewhat speculative and appears to be based largely on the fact that he was told there was no evidence of witchcraft after he lodged a complaint with the local police. In his interview, he refers to being suspicious that his family have connections but his response is far more indicative that any influence is confined to the local village (Asylum Interview Record (AIR), question [60]). Further, if his family did have such connections so as to enable them to easily locate him, it raises the rather obvious question as to why they did not use that power and influence to trace him for over 20 years whilst he was resident in Gaborone. I find there is insufficient evidence to establish that his uncle or any other members of his family have any wider connections to preclude him from seeking state protection.
24. Further, by his own account both the local police in Maun and police in Gaborone did investigate when he reported matters to them. He first lodged a complaint in his home area, Maun, in 2009. In his witness statement, the Appellant refers to having been told by police there was no evidence of witchcraft (paragraph [54]) and asserts they did not help despite knowing what was happening and who was involved. He does not suggest the police officers to whom he complained were themselves complicit and whilst it may well be general knowledge that such rituals occur, this does not mean there is sufficient evidence to arrest and prosecute particular individuals in response to a complaint. It is also noteworthy the Appellant claims the police regarded him as a child complaining about his parents (witness statement, paragraph [56]). However, he says he first reported matters in 2009, when he would have been 27 or 28 years old. The Appellant also reported the assault in Gaborone in 2020 or 2021 and confirmed in oral evidence that the police did investigate the matter, though he was unable to identify his assailant or give a description. In the circumstances described, I consider the failure of police to make an arrest does not establish they were unable or unwilling to offer protection.
25. Having considered the evidence presented before me, I find the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof upon him to establish there is no effective state protection available to him in Botswana. There is insufficient evidence to establish the relevant state authorities would be unwilling or unable to take appropriate action if the Appellant is threatened again by his uncle or other family members and such matters are properly and timeously reported to the police, particularly in Gaborone. I also find there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate his uncle or family have any power or influence beyond their own rural village and the vague references to corruption fall considerably short of establishing there is no effective state protection for ordinary citizens threatened in the circumstances the Appellant has described.
Internal relocation
26. To qualify for international protection, the Appellant must also show that he cannot relocate to another area in Botswana in which he would not face treatment amounting to persecution or serious harm, or where there is a place of safety, it is unreasonable to expect him to do so. The appropriate test is not whether he will face difficulties in an area of relocation but rather whether it would be unduly harsh, or unreasonable, to expect him to do so based on an holistic assessment of his particular circumstances (see Januzi [2006] UKHL 5 and AS (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 873).
27. Given my findings of fact that there would be effective protection in Gaborone, which was the Appellant’s home area for over 20 years, the question of internal relocation does not strictly arise. Nevertheless, for the avoidance of doubt, I find it would not be unreasonable to expect him to return there if his home area is taken to be Maun, where he grew up as a child before relocating to Gaborone. Whilst I accept he has genuine subjective fears of living in Botswana which is capable of carrying some weight in his favour given this may present some challenges to re-integration, I find there is no real risk he would be subjected to treatment amounting to persecution there. As such, the question is whether it is unreasonable to expect him to return to the area of relocation.
28. With regards to his personal characteristics, the Appellant is an adult of working age who would be returning to a city with which he is very familiar. He has work experience in Gaborone having been employed in a variety of roles and there is no evidence to suggest he would be unable to obtain suitable employment to make a living for himself there. In his witness statement, he states that he has a sister in Botswana with whom he remains in contact and to whom he could turn for support. He also refers to having three children, though it is unclear where those children currently reside. There is no evidence before me to suggest the Appellant has any medical conditions which may make it more difficult for him to reintegrate on return. Whilst I take into account the reference in his witness statement to him having developed tuberculosis in this country and other health concerns there is no evidence to suggest he is currently on medication or would not be able to obtain any medical treatment as may be required in Gaborone.
29. Further, the Appellant is a Christian and has provided a letter from a Pastor Muda at Mount Zion Church, who says the Appellant is a long-standing member of the church community. It seems to me that on return, it would be open to the Appellant to turn to his local church for a least some degree of practical and emotional support, bearing in mind he has become involved with a church here. He can also take advantage of the financial support offered through the Home Office voluntary returns scheme.
30. Having considered the various factors both individually and cumulatively, I find it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate to another area within Botswana if he does not wish to return to his original home area in Maun on account of his subjective fears of his uncle and other family members. On the evidence presented, I find there is no real risk he will be targeted in Gaborone, where he has lived for over 20 years, or another area of relocation.
Application of the law to the facts
31. Having considered all the evidence presented in the round to the appropriate standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities when assessing whether the Appellant holds a genuine fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, and applying the lower standard to the assessment of risk, I find that whilst the Appellant has understandable and genuine subjective fears of returning to Botswana, there is no real risk of him being subjected to treatment amounting to persecution. I find his fears are not well-founded given he lived with his family for a period of time without coming to physical harm after refusing to participate in witchcraft rituals and also lived in Gaborone for a considerable period of time without encountering any significant problems save for one isolated incident in which he was assaulted by an individual unknown to him.
32. Further, he has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish he would be unable to avail himself of effective state protection if any further threats received are properly reported to the relevant authorities in Botswana at least to the standard envisaged in Horvath and Bagdanavicius [2005] EWCA Civ 1605. As such, I find he does not qualify for asylum or humanitarian protection and his appeal falls to be dismissed.
NOTICE OF DECISION
I dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds and human rights grounds.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed: D. Hollings-Tennant Date: 6th November 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of Court.
This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, the Immigration Advice Authority, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).