Administrative United Kingdom
M M v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/74485/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 6 November 2026
Before
JUDGE MCMAHON
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
Between
M M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Meadows of Counsel, instructed by Elizabeth Rose solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Lewis, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 15 May 2025.
Anonymity
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the stitched hearing bundle of 459 PDF pages contained in myHMCTS.
4. In summary, the Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return due to his fear of Daesh, or alternatively that he is entitled to humanitarian protection for the same reason. In addition, the Appellant asserts that the Respondent’s decision is an unlawful interference with his rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.
The Hearing
5. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
Issues
6. Ms Lewis confirmed on behalf of the Respondent that the Appellant’s account of his identity, nationality and Kurdish ethnicity was accepted. Ms Meadows also confirmed that there was no freestanding appeal under Articles 2, 3 or 8 ECHR.
7. The representatives agreed that the principal controversial issues are:
(a) Whether the Appellant possesses a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or whether such a characteristic be attributed to him by an actor of persecution;
(b) Whether the Appellant’s account of events in Iraq is credible;
(c) Whether the Appellant would be able to obtain sufficient protection; and
(d) Whether the Appellant would be able to internally relocate.
Evidence
8. I heard evidence from the Appellant who adopted his witness statement as his evidence-in-chief and was cross-examined on the same. The Appellant relied on the assistance of an interpreter who had joined the hearing in person. No concerns were raised about the interpretation provided, and I am satisfied that the Appellant understood the proceedings clearly.
9. In addition to the Appellant’s evidence, I also considered the documentary evidence on myHMCTS.
10. I heard submissions from both representatives and reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”), in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the Appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
12. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the Appellant.
13. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the Appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the Appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
14. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
15. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are set out in Appendix PL.
16. In so far as they rely on Article 8 outside the Rules, it is for the Appellant to show that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the Respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) are relevant to any assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
17. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
18. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
FINDINGS
19. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons.
i. The Appellant’s credibility
20. I begin by considering the issue of credibility. I begin by reminding myself that the Respondent has accepted the Appellant’s account of his identity, nationality and Kurdish ethnicity. I also give significant weight to the country background evidence relied on by both parties which describes the role of Daesh in Iraq, and the role of the Asayish, which is the domestic security agency within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. This background evidence provides the context within which the Appellant’s account should be considered.
21. Having considered all of the evidence, and reminded myself of the applicable standards of proof for protection appeals, I am just about prepared to accept that it is more likely than not that the Appellant informed Asayish about his concerns regarding members of Daesh, which led to two members of Daesh being killed, and one being arrested in November 2022. I reached this conclusion for the following reasons.
22. First, I have found that the Appellant has given a consistent account about reporting his concerns to Asayish throughout the course of these proceedings. The account described in paragraph 4.1 of the Appellant’s screening interview is an account that the Appellant has maintained throughout his substantive interview, witness statement and during cross-examination.
23. Second, I found that the Appellant has given an especially detailed account of these events. He has been able to describe the precise dates, the identities of the people involved, and the specific steps he took which led to him reporting his concerns to Asayish. He has also spoken in detail about the immediate aftermath of the incidents, his precise whereabouts at the time, and exactly what happened during the shooting. The level of detail consistently given by the Appellant could only have been provided by someone with first-hand knowledge of the incident in question.
24. Third, I do find I can give significant weight to some of the media reports relied on by the Appellant. They come from a variety of sources and have been translated. The Respondent does not challenge the translations and criticises some of the articles on the basis they appear incomplete. Overall, given the number and range of different sources, I found I could give significant weight to these documents because they appear to consistently report an incident occurring in November 2022 in which there was a confrontation between Daesh and Asayish during which two members of Daesh were killed and one was detained. That is an account the Appellant spoke about in his initial screening interview, and the fact that various news reports have now been produced by the Appellant which support that account, and lend weight to the Appellant being a credible witness.
25. Of course, I recognise the possibility that the Appellant’s account has been manufactured and moulded around those news reports post-event. I have given specific consideration to this possibility. However, I do not find this to be one of those situations given the level of detail given by the Appellant throughout these proceedings and the timing of the news reports provided appears to post-date the initial disclosures given. Moreover, I do not consider that the Appellant – a shepherd in Iraq – would have the wherewithal to be able to sustain such an account over the course of these proceedings, and maintain that account to the level of detail provided during cross-examination.
26. I therefore do find that the Appellant told Asayish in November 2022 about concerns he had that there were members of Daesh meeting on a mountain top, which led to a confrontation between Asayish and Daesh, the death of two members of Daesh, and the arrest of a third member.
27. The second element of the Appellant’s account concerns a threatening phone call he claims to have received in August 2024, therefore around 19 months after the incident. He claims that he received a single call of a threatening nature from an individual that he did not know. He attributes that call to his involvement in the incident in November 2022 because the woman who was arrested lived in the local area and would have recognised him.
28. I have considered this element of the Appellant’s account carefully. In considering this element of the account, I also exercise caution when considering the plausibility of events, particularly when those events involve members or supporters of a terrorist organisation such as Daesh. Having taken all the above into account, I do not accept it is even reasonably likely that the Appellant received a threatening phone call in August 2024 as a result of his role in the November 2022 incident.
29. Although I accept that the Appellant has broadly spoken in consistent terms about believing he had been identified by the woman who was arrested during that incident, I still find it remarkable that the Appellant was able to return to his home area, live in the same home and undertake the same job, without encountering any problems whatsoever from anyone for around 19 months. The Appellant attempts to explain this away by the difficulties this woman would have had in communicating with others as she had been arrested. I found this to be speculation. The Appellant does not know who called him on the date in question, but he has linked that call to his involvement in the November 2022 incident. I do not find it reasonably likely that the woman who was arrested would happen to identify the Appellant and use the subsequent 19 months whilst in custody to engage others to ascertain the Appellant’s telephone number and, having done so, simply make a single anonymous call of a threatening nature.
30. The Respondent argued that the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France falls under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 and damages the Appellant’s credibility. The Appellant claims he was under the control of an agent and, in any event, did not know where he was during his time in France. I found the Appellant’s evidence on this point to be vague and lacking, when his account of being under the control of an agent was tested, he could not elaborate on that explanation beyond that simple and broad assertion. I do not accept that there was a reasonable explanation for the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France and I find that his failure damages his credibility when I consider all the evidence in the round.
ii. Risk on return
31. However, even if I were to accept the above, I do not accept it is reasonably likely that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return. Even after reminding myself that past persecution is a significant indicator of future risk, I find that the extent of the Appellant’s past interactions with Daesh concern a single anonymous telephone call over 2 years ago regarding an incident that is now 4 years old.
32. The country background evidence relied on by both parties records a consistent and determined attempt on the part of the authorities within the KRI to tackle Daesh. I found from the translation of the report at PDF page 78 that some 334 suspects have been arrested because of their links to Daesh, and there are recent reports (such as those at pages 325, 328 and 343) which show how Asayish is undertaking proactive operations to arrest and detain those who are believed to be involved in Daesh. I do not accept it is reasonably likely that the Appellant’s return to his home area would lead to him suffering persecution or serious harm. I remind myself that his own evidence is that he remained in that same home area for approximately 19 months after the incident in November 2022 without encountering any problems. Even if I accept his case at its highest, he has never been threatened in person, and has been the recipient of a single phone call from an anonymous individual. His own evidence is that he no longer has that telephone because he provided it to Asayish to be interrogated.
33. But even if the Appellant would be at risk on return to his home area, I do not find it reasonably likely that he would be unable to obtain sufficient protection from the authorities on any return. As Ms Meadows acknowledged, it appears that the authorities went to the effort of ensuring the Appellant’s anonymity following his disclosure to them in November 2022. On the Appellant’s evidence, they took his report of the threat seriously when he reported it to them in 2024. He does not know the outcome of that investigation because he has never asked. However, the objective evidence is clear that the authorities in the KRI are taking significant steps to target and arrest Daesh targets.
34. I recognise from the country background evidence that there are deficiencies in the justice system in the KRI. I accept there is evidence of corruption. However, this is not a case where the Appellant is seeking protection against a political opponent or a rogue arm of the state: he is seeking protection from a terrorist organisation that is regarded as such within the KRI, and one that has been subject to the intense use of resources by the authorities in the KRI. Given the nature of the group feared by the Appellant, I find that the Appellant would be able to obtain protection to the Horvath standard.
35. But even if I am wrong about the above, I do not find that any relocation elsewhere within the KRI would be unreasonable or unduly harsh upon the Appellant. He is a young man of working age with no notable health problems. He spoke about a problem with his eye, but it is clear from this evidence that this problem was being treated within the KRI before he left. I do not find on the evidence before me that Daesh would have the wherewithal or inclination to locate the Appellant on any return to the country. He spent 19 months living in the same village without encountering any problems, and the height of his problems derive from a single phone call to a telephone which he no longer possesses. The same is true for the families of those killed by Asayish following that incident in November 2022: there is nothing to suggest that they have the means to identify the Appellant or locate him on any return.
36. I have no hesitation in concluding that the Appellant does not want to return to the KRI. However, his own evidence is that he has family in the country but has chosen not to contact them. I find on the evidence before me that if the Appellant were to return to Iraq, he would contact his family and seek some support from them. But even if he did not, given the Appellant’s characteristics as a young man of working age without any notable health issues, coupled with the fact he has spent the majority of his life in the KRI, I do not find that any relocation would be unduly harsh or unreasonable.
37. Although Ms Meadows sought to argue that the Appellant would encounter difficulties in re-documenting himself on any return to Iraq, I found from the evidence that the Appellant has not established that he is unable to recover his INID or obtain the assistance necessary to do so. On the country evidence relied upon by the parties, possession of an INID would enable him to undertake onward travel and live within Iraq, including in Erbil. The Appellant has therefore not established that an absence of civil identity documentation would prevent his return or onward travel. But even if it did, I find from the evidence relied on by the Respondent as set out in the country bulletin that there now exists a process at the Iraqi Embassy in London whereby identity documents can be obtained. The Appellant’s own evidence is that he has a photograph of his passport and I find that he is able, but unwilling, to contact family members in Iraq. Ms Meadows did not seek to challenge the position set out in the country bulletin and I find that the Appellant has failed to establish that he would be unable to return to Iraq on account of lacking the necessary identity documentation.
Application of the law to the facts
(i) The Refugee Convention
38. Given the findings set out above, the Appellant’s removal would not cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention because he would be able to obtain sufficient protection and/or internally relocate on any return.
39. I do not need to resolve the question of whether the persecution the Appellant fears is because of a Convention reason. However, had I needed to do so, I would not have found the Appellant to be a member of a particular social group within the definition set out in section 33 of the 2022 Act because I was not satisfied that the Appellant meets the second condition as set out in subsection (4). I also would not have found that the Appellant’s persecution was on account of an imputed political opinion because I did not find that Daesh’s actions are linked in some way to some political aim, but are rather simply criminal in nature, as recognised by their designation as a terrorist group.
40. The Appellant’s appeal therefore fails under the Refugee Convention.
(ii) Humanitarian Protection
41. I have considered this aspect of the appeal separately from the asylum appeal. I have not found that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm on any return to Iraq.
42. For the reasons already set out, I find that substantial grounds have not been shown for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned to Iraq.
(iii) Human Rights
43. On the facts as established, I find that if the Appellant were returned to Iraq, there is not a real risk that he will suffer a breach of his protected rights under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR for the reasons already set out.
44. As for Article 8 of the ECHR, I do not find for the reasons already set out that the Appellant would encounter very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Iraq for the reasons already set out.
45. As for Article 8 outside the Rules, Ms Meadows concedes that the Appellant’s appeal stands and falls on the same facts as the protection appeal, so it follows that the statutory factors set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, together with the broader proportionality exercise, lead me to conclude that the Respondent’s decision does not amount to a disproportionate interference with any private or family life the Appellant might have.
46. Given my findings, I am satisfied that the Respondent’s decision is a proportionate and lawful interference with any rights the Appellant has under Article 8 of the ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 9 November 2026
Judge McMahon
Judge McMahon
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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