Miscellaneous United Kingdom

Denise Asquez v Ofsted

Official source

First-tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

2026-01867.EY

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01529 (HESC)

Heard on 15 and 16 September 2026

Adjourned for panel deliberations held via video on 9 October 2026

Before

Ms S Goodrich (Judge)

Mr Mike Cann (Specialist Member)

Dr Amit Jinabhai (Specialist Member)

(RESTRICTED REPORTING ORDER MADE REGARDING CHILDREN)

Between:

Ms Denise Asquez

Appellant

-v-

Ofsted

Respondent

DECISION AND REASONS

Representation

The Appellant represented herself.

The Respondent: Ms Woolfson, counsel, instructed by Ofsted Legal Services.

The Appeal

1. This is an appeal by Mrs Asquez against the decision made on 27 March 2026 to cancel her registration as a provider of childcare on non-domestic premises on the Early Years Register and on both the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register. The decision to cancel was made pursuant to Section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006. (“the Act”).

2. The right of appeal lies under section 74 of the Act.

The Parties

3. The Appellant was registered as a childminder on domestic premises from 2006 to 2022 (EY346480). From 2017 to 2019 she was also registered as the responsible person for “Afterschool Chillout” (EY548780) to provide out of school day care on non-domestic premises. From 2018 to date the Appellant was also registered as the responsible person for non-domestic out of school day care provision (EY56115 – the setting/provision was also known as Afterschool Chillout). In the written objections to the notice of intention to cancel reference was made to the Appellant providing “wrap around care” for families. The Appellant explained to us that the model of childcare is that she looks after children before and after school. In effect, children are brought to the setting by their parents/carers to be cared for by the Appellant and her assistants before they go to school. In very broad terms, the children are taken to school, collected at the end of the school day, and looked after at the setting (a church hall) until collected by their parents/carers.

4. The Respondent is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and is the regulatory authority for childminding and childcare providers. Once a provider has been registered, Ofsted’s role is to establish whether the person or entity registered continues to meet the requirements for registration, underthe Regulations made pursuant to the Act, and remains suitable for registration.

Restricted Reporting Order

5. The Tribunal made a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matters likely to lead members of the public to identify children under the age of 18 to whom reference may be made.

The Background

6. This broad chronology appears to be as follows:

14. 10. 25:

Incident re Child A reported by the school to the Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO). The school described Child A as visibly scared and upset. The Incident was said to have place at the Appellant's setting in which she is alleged to have grabbed a child, pinned him to a heater and strangled him by pulling him by his scarf. It was also alleged that the Appellant later strangled him again outside by using her arms and hands.

Mrs Asquez wrote and submitted an incident report to the LADO that day.

At the request of the (LADO), the Appellant appointed Kim Barnetson to provide a Safeguarding Investigation report which was completed on 23 November 2025. She interviewed staff present, including Joan Bobenko. Amongst other matters, Ms Barnetson considered:

“In summary both [Child A] and Denise’s account of the incident on 14/10/2025 have components in common. Denise acknowledges pulling [Child A] by the scarf and although there were no visible marks she has agreed that this was not an appropriate way to manage an altercation between children. Because Denise’s account of removing [Child A] from the middle of the group contrasts with Joan’s that [Child A] was no longer near the other children when Denise approached him. [Child A] s account also agrees with Joan’s, and it seems likely that he had moved away before the incident occurred therefore bringing Denise’s claim that she was removing him from an area where a physical altercation was occurring into doubt.”

The LADO considered overall that Ms Barnetson’s report bought into question the Appellant’s methods of behaviour management and that physically intervening was not evidenced to be necessary or proportionate.

27. 11. 25 The outcome of the LADO investigation was that the allegation was substantiated under the Harm threshold: a person working with children has behaved in a way that has harmed a child, or may have harmed a child

18. 12. 25 Ofsted held a meeting/interview with the Appellant.

13. 01. 26 Notice of Intention to cancel registration was issued.

23.02.26 Mrs Asquez’ representative submitted representations in her behalf.

27. 03. 26 Notice of Decision to cancel registration was issued.

6. 03.26 A meeting between Ofsted and Mrs Asquez was held to consider her objections.

24.04.26 Appeal lodged.

The Decision under Appeal

7. The notice of decision (NoD) dated 27 March 2026 is a matter of record and we need not relate its contents in full. It sets out the facts and matters relied on by Ofsted regarding the past regulatory history.

8. The decision to cancel the Appellant’s registration followed several concerns regarding her ongoing suitability including allegations of physical harm towards a child, (A), a poor safeguarding culture, and a lack of capacity to make or sustain improvements to comply with the statutory requirements of the Early Years Foundation Standards (EYFS).

9. In summary, the Respondent considers that the prescribed requirements for registration have ceased to be satisfied. It considers that Mrs Asquez is no longer suitable to remain registered as a childcare provider.

The Appeal

10. In section H of the Appeal Application Form, Mrs Asquez set out her case. Her position was that:

a) as the setting has permanently stopped trading, cancellation is not necessary or proportionate. It is submitted that, in the context of cessation of the business, there is no ongoing risk to children. The Appellant also submits that the decision to cancel is disproportionate having regard to, amongst other matters, her “intention to continue working lawfully within the childcare sector in other roles”.

b) the cancellation decision has continuing consequences beyond the closed setting, including impact on:

• Future registration and suitability assessments

• The Appellant’s ability to work within regulated childcare

• Reputational and professional consequences that extend beyond the closed provision.

c) “In circumstances where the setting has closed, cancellation operates as a career limiting sanction rather than a safeguarding measure”.

The Scott Schedule

11. In the Scott Schedule (p339 and following) the Respondent summarised its case that the Appellant is no longer suitable to remain registered because an allegation of harm to a child was substantiated and because the evidence demonstrates an ongoing, systemic poor safeguarding culture, insufficient insight and repeated non-compliance with Osted’s registration requirements.

12. The rest of the Scott Schedule set out the seven alleged failures on which the Respondent relies and provided the Appellant with the opportunity to respond and state her position.

13. In summary, the Appellant made clear that she did not accept that she had caused physical harm to Child A (Allegation 1). The balance of the Appellant’s response to the alleged failures in Allegations 2 to 7 was to the overall effect that she wishes to resign her registration and had informed Ofsted of this.

The Hearing

14. We had received and read an indexed and paginated hearing bundle consisting of 360 pages which we had read in advance. Pursuant to the order made on 14 September 2026 we had also received a further supplemental bundle from the Respondent consisting of a further witness statement from Mrs Barwick, EYRI, dated 10 September 2026, by which various documents (pages A4 – A45) were exhibited, and to which there had been no objection from the Appellant.

Reasonable Adjustments

15. The judge asked if there were any requests for adjustments. Mrs Asquez explained that she was born in Gibraltar, and her first language is Spanish. She has lived in the UK for 35 years and speaks both English and Spanish at home. The effect of her representations was that, as English is an additional or second language to her, she sometimes struggles to find the right word to express what she wants to say. We decided that we would take this into account throughout the hearing and in our decision making.

16. We were mindful that Mrs Asquez represented herself. We sought to ensure, so far as practicable, that both parties were able to participate fully in the proceedings. We also endeavoured to make sure that the Appellant was following the process and could raise any matter which she did not understand. The panel ensured that there were frequent and regular further breaks whilst evidence was being given in order to facilitate concentration and allow Mrs Asquez sufficient time to process the oral evidence she heard from Ofsted’s witness and questions put to her by Ms Woolfson and the panel. The requests made by Mrs Asquez for a break or for more time were always accommodated. The judge helped the Appellant formulate questions and also, (with her agreement), helped the Appellant to adduce her evidence in chief.

17. At the start of the hearing the Judge sought clarification of the provisions regarding resignation so that the Appellant was aware of the legal basis for why the Respondent did not accept her request to resign. Ms Wolfson referred to Section 70 of the Act which makes explicit provision for “Voluntary removal from a childcare register: early years and later years providers.” The effect of section 70 (1) and (2) is that if an application for voluntary removal is made it must be granted under subsection (2), but this is prohibited in the following circumstances:

(3) The Chief Inspector must not act under subsection (2) if—

(a) the Chief Inspector has sent the person a notice (in pursuance of section 73(2)) of his intention to cancel his registration, and

(b) the Chief Inspector has not decided that he no longer intends to take that step.

(4) The Chief Inspector must not act under subsection (2) if—

(a) the Chief Inspector has sent the person a notice (in pursuance of section 73(7)) of his decision to cancel his registration, and

(b) the time within which an appeal under section 74 may be brought has not expired or, if such an appeal has been brought, it has not been determined.

(5) Subsections (3) and (4) do not apply if the person is seeking removal from Part B of the general childcare register.

18. Ms Woolfson confirmed that the restrictions regarding voluntary removal from the compulsory registers do not apply to Part B of the general childcare register for which registration is voluntary.

19. We consider that the provisions at section 70 (3) and (4) reflect the public interest in ensuring that the potential consequences of cancellation cannot be avoided by resignation/voluntary removal.

20. We also agree with the point made in the response to the appeal and the contention that there can be no risk because the setting is closed. The statutory test under Section 68 of the Act is whether the registered person remains suitable to be registered. In other words, section 68 relates to the individual who is registered, and not the setting from which they have operated.

The Oral Evidence

21. We heard oral evidence from the following witnesses:

For the Respondent

Mrs Meredith-Jenkins, EYRI

Mrs Lynsey Barwick, EYSO

For the Appellant

Mrs Asquez

22. All witnesses called to give evidence adopted the contents of their statements as the truth, and these stood as their main evidence. Each witness then answered questions by the other party and some questions from the panel. We do not intend to rehearse the evidence but will refer to aspects of the oral evidence and submissions as necessary when giving our reasons.

The Law

23. The legal framework for the registration and regulation of childminders is to be found in Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“the Act”).

24. Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) contains those providers registered to provide early years childminding/childcare for children from birth to the age of five years for which registration is compulsory. The second register (“the General Childcare Register”) is divided into two parts: A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged between 5 and 8 years for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”). A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged over 8 years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”).

25. Section 68 of the Act provides for the cancellation of a person’s registration in certain circumstances. Section 68(2) provides that Ofsted may cancel registration of a person registered on the Early Years Register or on either part of the General Childcare Register, if it appears:

(a) that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply in relation to the person’s registration under that Chapter have ceased, or will cease, to be satisfied,

(c) that he has failed to comply with a requirement imposed on him by regulations under that Chapter.

26. Section 74(1) of the Act provides a right of appeal to the Tribunal. Section 74 (4) provides that:

(4) On an appeal the Tribunal must either—

(a) confirm the taking of the step, the making of the other determination or the making of the order (as the case may be), or

(b) direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect.

(5) Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following—

(a) impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned;

(b) vary or remove any condition previously imposed on the registration.

The Early Years Register

27. The prescribed requirements differ in respect of Early Years Provision, Later Years Provision, and Voluntary Registration. However, all three sets of requirements contain a requirement that the registered individual “is suitable” to provide the relevant type of childminding.

The Burden and Standard of Proof

28. The core issue is whether or not the Appellant has ceased to meet the prescribed requirement that she “is suitable”. The Respondent bears the burden of proof in establishing that the Appellant has is no longer suitable. The standard of proof is the civil standard, that is on the balance of probabilities.

29. The burden rests on the Respondent to satisfy us that cancellation is justified, necessary and proportionately required in the public interest. The issue of proportionality involves a judgement which balances the public interests engaged against the interests of the Appellant.

Our Consideration

30. We are required to determine the matter afresh and to make our own decision on the evidence as at today’s date. This includes consideration of new information or material that was not available at the date of the decision which is relevant to the decision made. It is open to any appellant in any given case to rely on evidence to show that the facts were not as alleged and/or to dispute alleged breaches and/or to contend that opinions or views reached were wrong and/or mistaken and/or unjustified and/or that the issues have since been addressed. It is also open to any appellant to show that, whatever the past, there has been a change since the decision made, such that the decision to cancel is no longer in accordance with the law and/or is not today necessary, justified or proportionate.

31. The redetermination in this appeal includes consideration of the more detailed evidence provided by both sides in this appeal, as well as the oral evidence which has now been subjected to cross examination. We have considered all the evidence and submissions before us. If we do not refer to any particular aspect of the evidence/submissions it should not be assumed that we have not taken these into account. It is not necessary for us to decide every point in dispute before us. We will not set out all the oral or documentary evidence placed before us, but will refer to parts of it when making our key findings.

32. The main issue in this appeal is whether the concerns regarding the Appellant’s suitability are proven and/or justified. The concept of suitability goes to the very of registration.

Our Findings

33. We have considered all of the evidence in the round. We find that the background facts are as set out in paragraph 6 above.

Allegation 1

“On 14 October 2025, the Appellant used inappropriate physical intervention against an eight-year-old child, causing physical harm”.

Mrs Asquez’s position in the Scott Schedule was that she did not accept that she caused Child A physical harm. In the incident report form dated 14 October 2025 she provided her account. This included that A had been aggravating other children, had hit and kicked another child at different times, and had banged on a toy from Child C was playing with, hurting her hand. The Appellant said that she pulled Child A “away from the children using the scarf he was wearing whilst ensuring that it was not hurting him.” She said “when it was time for school he did not want to be part of the group. When outside he was shouting and crying. He then kicked her so she took him to one side and had a word with him. He did not want to be held onto but I didn’t trust him to walk with the group nicely.” She said that as he was wearing his backpack she held onto the strap as they walked to the corner shop. She said “Every few steps I would ask him if he had calmed down and he just kept blubbering…He started to say that I had strangled him twice.”

We have considered all the evidence. Mrs Asquez appointed Ms Barnetson to investigate the safeguarding incident as she was confident in her experience and competence. She accepted that Ms Barnetson undertook a thorough investigation. In our view Ms Barnetson’s investigation and her analysis of the evidence was detailed, objective, balanced and measured.

Initially Mrs Asquez did not accept that on 14 October 2025 there were two incidents with Child A which had involved his scarf. However, in cross examination she agreed that she “pulled” child A by the scarf on two occasions: once in the hall and also on a separate occasion outside the hall after she had taken Child A aside. On the basis of this admission alone, this is clear evidence of inappropriate physical behaviour by Mrs Asquez on both occasions.

Mrs Asquez had said in the interview on 9 July 2026 (even based on her original position that there had only been one incident) that maybe this would have frightened Child A. She also accepted in cross examination that Child A would have seen the two events as two sets of strangulation. Overall, she agreed that this was mistreatment of the child, however she continued to rely on the lack of any physical signs of injury on Child A after the interventions had occurred.

In our view the lack of physical signs of injury is not material. Harm can be, and often is, caused in the absence of any physical injury. We have little doubt that Child A suffered emotional harm because of these incidents. By all accounts he was very distressed indeed when he arrived at school that morning. He made the allegation to school staff as soon as he arrived at the school.

In our view it was clear in cross examination that the reality was that Mrs Asquez objected to Ofsted’s reference to “physical” harm. Once the definition of “harm” under the law (section 31 (9) of the Children Act 1989) was explained she said: “there’s no way I can say it is not harm”.

We noted the Appellant’s oral evidence that A was “calm and thoughtful” and “calm and cool” when he had made his allegation directly to her. She said that this was prior to his arrival at school and was that he had been strangled by her twice. Mrs Asquez had not mentioned Child A’s calm and cool demeanour in her appeal documents or in her written evidence/witness statement. In our view the account she gave in oral evidence is at odds with her having said previously that A was “blubbering” or “blabbering” each time she asked him, on the way to school, if he had calmed down. We did not consider Mrs Asquez’s account to be reliable.

Having considered all the evidence in the round we find that on 14 October 2025 the Appellant used inappropriate physical intervention against an eight-year-old child which caused him emotional harm.

Allegation 2

“The Appellant failed to manage an allegation against herself through sufficiently robust and independent safeguarding procedures. As provider, manager, nominated individual and DSL, she did not demonstrate a clear procedure for allegations against the registered person.”

The Appellant’s response to this in the Scott Schedule was to the effect that she is registered a Sole Trader. In our view this does not address the real point. In her witness statement she did, however, accept that her policies were inadequate at the material time. We find the allegation proved.

Allegation 3

“The Appellant failed to keep adequate and timely records of significant incidents, children’s behaviour and the use of physical intervention, including the events of 14 October 2025.”

On the Appellant’s own evidence there were previous incidents with Child A, and these had not been recorded anywhere.

In her report, Ms Barnetson stated: “None of the staff know how to report any incidents, they did not know the format for reporting i.e. paper or digital and one told me she would send Denise a text. This is a SG (safeguarding) issue as all incidents must be recorded securely and witnessed.”

During cross examination Mrs Asquez said that that she had had tangible concerns about “going digital” and cited her reasoning as “data protection issues”. She said one app which she used “worked well for bookings” but did not “have enough characters” to allow staff to report incidents. The overall effect of her evidence was that changes had been successfully made to achieve bookings, but to the detriment of having robust safeguarding policies in place. Mrs Asquez told us that she did previously have a manual ‘folder’ system which she stopped. She said, “I took my eye off the ball”.

We find the allegation proved.

Allegation 4

“The Appellant failed to maintain an accurate daily record of children’s attendance, including actual arrival and departure times. Ofsted says sign-in and collection arrangements were lax and undermined safeguarding oversight.”

We find that the need for accurate daily records had been raised as a concern with Mrs Asquez in a previous Ofsted inspection in 2018 and was the subject of actions that were then recommended by Ofsted. In our view adequate registers are fundamental to safeguarding. In cross-examination Mrs Asquez ultimately conceded that Ms Barnetson was correct in her Safeguarding Investigation Report (page 137) to conclude that, “Although children are signed in and out it is not the time they leave the setting for example St Georges school starts at 8.40am, all of the children on the day of the incident were signed out at 9.04am”. Overall, this highlights that Mrs Asquez has not demonstrated the capacity to sustain change despite previous advice and recommended actions from Ofsted. The allegation is proved.

Allegation 5

“The Appellant failed to demonstrate an adequate risk assessment and safe system for school runs and handovers, including maintaining sight and supervision of children, accounting for younger children, group size and children with SEND.”

In cross examination Mrs Asquez accepted Ms Woolfson’s proposition that that this was not a safe system as “someone did not have eyes on each child all the time”. She also admitted that she did not undertake an adequate risk assessment for the handover of the children in her care. In our view her position was very concerning. She said that she “was never asked to do a risk assessment for handover” and she asserted twice that she had never come across one before. We find that the responsibility for risk assessment regarding the adequacy of handover of the children in her care was hers, and hers alone.

The allegation is proved.

Allegation 6

“The Appellant failed to maintain confidentiality and appropriate information sharing controls by allowing elder siblings to pass on messages to parents regarding other children, and by sharing information with parents/members of the public regarding the independent investigation.”

Mrs Asquez did not dispute that she had asked the sisters of Child A to convey messages to their mother – essentially about A’s behaviour. She said that the eldest sister was six years older than Child A, the apparent implication being that this somehow mitigated the lack of confidentiality involved. In our view, Mrs Asquez showed no understanding that using a sibling to communicate with the mother was wholly inappropriate at many levels. Firstly, it did not respect A’s rights to privacy/confidentiality. Secondly, it did not show proper respect for the rights or potential needs of the child sibling (i.e. not to be burdened with such responsibility). Thirdly, and in any event, it was not a reliable method of communication.

The residual part of this allegation relates to Ms Barnetson’s concern that her identity had been revealed by Mrs Asquez to some of the parents of the children that she cared for and this had resulted in her being approached by some of them. We do not consider that the evidence is sufficiently clear to make a finding one way or the other on the balance of probabilities. Even if we are wrong in this, this aspect of the allegation is not of significant importance in the overall context of this case.

Allegation 7

“The Appellant failed to show sufficient insight into the seriousness of the substantiated allegation and the wider safeguarding failures. Ofsted says she continued to minimise the child’s account, (and) attribute blame to the child”.

We consider that in her evidence Mrs Asquez sought to minimise the seriousness of how she had behaved towards Child A. It is a stark fact that she did not originally acknowledge that there had been two specific incidents of inappropriate physical handling of Child A by her that morning (on her own evidence related to his scarf). Her acknowledgment regarding the second incident with his scarf only arose in cross examination. This caused us significant concern regarding her ability to recognise the extent to which her behaviour was inappropriate and to take responsibility accordingly. In our view the ability to acknowledge and take responsibility when things have gone wrong is a core value that underpins the issue of suitability.

We were concerned that Mrs Asquez sought to blame Child A for her behaviour. We also consider her use of language such as “snidey” and “blubbering” of “blabbering” was unprofessional and inappropriate. We accept the evidence that Mrs Asquez said in interview that she felt that Child A was “playing with his spit whilst leaning up against the wall eyeing” her. She said she found this was “disgusting”. In our view this suggests a hostile and negative attitude to Child A, an 8 year-old child, and amounts to victim blaming.

As Mrs Asquez’s oral evidence progressed it became clear that the world of EYFS standards, which are designed to ensure quality standards (and also equal treatment), is not one in which she feels comfortable.

Mrs Asquez said in terms that “I don’t want to be involved with children’s trauma.” She said that she did not feel that she was trained correctly to look after children with SEN (special educational needs). The overall impact of Mrs Asquez’s evidence was that she likes looking after children who behave well. In our view this attitude or disposition is highly problematic in the provision of childcare to young children, many of whom may well be very vulnerable, and who may well have needs for many different reasons, and which may, or may not, include special educational needs. In our view Mrs Asquez’s attitude renders her unsuitable to provide registered childcare.

34. The core issue of suitability must be judged on an objective basis. The public, families and children in general are entitled to expect that the regulator will ensure that children receive care from a provider who is suitable. They are entitled to expect that Ofsted will take necessary steps to prevent the continuation of registration if the provider is not suitable. Mistreatment by a care provider is capable of causing significant and lasting harm to a child. It is wholly unacceptable in any registered setting.

35. We have found that Mrs Asquez no longer meets the suitability requirements of the EYFS and the Childcare Register. We find that she is no longer suitable to be a registered provider. The Respondent has satisfied us that the discretionary decision to cancel registration was, and is, very clearly justified under section 68 of the Childcare Act.

36. As to proportionality, the Appellant told us that she has no intention of applying for registration in childcare, or even in seeking to work, for example, as a nursery assistant. She said that the point of her appeal was that she did not think the decision was just because she considers that she is suitable. She also considers that the consequences of the decision are disproportionate. She said that she is responsible for organising two children’s playgroup venues at two local churches. Her role in this capacity is entirely voluntary. Effectively, she opens up the premises, sets out toys, and meets and greets parents and children who come to socialise with other parents/carers. Children are not left with Mrs Asquez at the venue by the parents/carers; the child’s parent/carer is in attendance at all times. She wants to be able to continue to do this voluntary work and fears that cancellation will prevent this. She is concerned that the Disclosure and Barring Service (the DBS) will not provide her with a DBS certificate.

37. Ofsted’s position is that the playgroup role that the Appellant described is not an activity for which registration with Ofsted is required. This is because children are not left at the venue by their parents/carers.

38. We recognise that the Appellant is concerned as to whether she will be able to carry on with her charitable and voluntary work at the playgroups. However, our sole role is to determine the appeal before us which relates to her suitability to be registered as a childcare provider. It is open to the Appellant to make representations to the DBS, if needed, regarding her role in these voluntary capacities,

39. We consider that the Appellant’s personal interests are such as to merit the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by reference to Article 1 of Protocol 1 and Article 8.

40. The Respondent has satisfied us that that the decision taken was in accordance with the law.

41. We are also satisfied that the decision was objectively justified and necessary in order to protect the public interests engaged.

42. In reaching our decision on the issue of proportionality we have considered all aspects of the potential impact of this decision on the Appellant. Cancellation will bring an immediate end to her registration. It will bring to an end her ability to earn her living by providing childcare services for which Ofsted registration is required. She has done so for twenty years.The adverse effect of a cancellation decision is substantially less than would be usual, given that Mrs Asquez said in her evidence that she does not wish or intend to work in any registrable capacity ever again. However, we recognise the potential that a decision to confirm cancellation may well have an adverse impact upon her future ability to work in any post that requires a DBS certificate, such as teaching or allied posts, or health care or related posts. The reasons for cancellation may well also have broader reputational implications for the Appellant, affecting her standing in the community and/or her employability in general. We recognise and understand that the ability to fulfil a role in playgroups in her church community is a very important part of Mrs Asquez’s private life and identity.

43. On the other side of the balance we must weigh the public interest. We attach very significant weight to the public interest in the system of registration. This includes that decisions are made by a public body, applying published requirements and standards, regarding the suitability of a registered person whenever allegations arise. We attach significant weight to the importance of declaring and maintaining appropriate standards regarding the standards of care to be provided to young children

44. We accept, as a matter of principle, that the prospect that conditions imposed by Ofsted might potentially address the public interest is relevant to the issue of proportionality and so must be considered.

45. We do not consider that any conditions could realistically be devised or imposed that would address the serious nature of the Appellant’s behaviour. Her conduct towards Child A was wholly unacceptable. In our view it is not realistic that conditions could address the attitudinal issues involved in her behaviour.

46. We have balanced the impact of the decision upon the interests of the Appellant against the public interest. We consider that the facets of the public interest engaged far outweigh the interests of the Appellant. In our view the decision to cancel registration was (and remains) reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

Decision

The decision to cancel registration is confirmed.

The appeal is dismissed.

Judge Goodrich

First-tier Tribunal (Health, Education and Social Care)

Date Issued: 09 November 2026

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