Civil United Kingdom
Euro Car Parks Limited v Competition and Markets Authority
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2774 (KB)
Case No: KA-2026-000036
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Date: 22/10/26
Before:
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
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Between:
| EURO CAR PARKS LIMITED | Appellant | |
| – and – | ||
| COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY | Respondent |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
David Cavender KC (instructed by TLT LLP) for the Appellant
Tom Coates (instructed by the Respondent) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 21 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 29 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
Mrs Justice Hill:
Introduction
1. This is an appeal brought by Euro Car Parks Limited under paragraph 16D of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (“the CRA”), against a Final Enforcement Notice (“the FEN”) issued by the Respondent, the Competition and Markets Authority, on 10 December 2025.
2. The appeal concerns new powers to enforce consumer protection legislation conferred on the Respondent by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (“the DMCCA”), which made certain amendments to the CRA. This is the first appeal which has been brought under the special procedure contained in Practice Direction 49H of the CPR, which governs both appeals under paragraph 16D and appeals against consumer protection decisions under s. 202 of the DMCCA.
3. The FEN in this case imposed a fixed penalty of £473,000 on the Appellant for its failure to comply with an Information Notice (“the IN”) which the Respondent had issued in connection with the potential exercise of its consumer enforcement powers. The Appellant had failed to respond to the IN by the deadline the Respondent set; and the Respondent found it had no reasonable excuse for doing so. The £473,000 sum was 75% of the statutory maximum available to the Respondent under paragraph 16C(5) of Schedule 5 to the CRA.
4. The Appellant advances five grounds of appeal to the effect that: (1) the IN was unlawful and involved the Respondent exceeding its powers; (2) the FEN was tainted by apparent bias; (3) the Respondent was wrong to find that the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the IN; (4) the penalty was unreasonable and/or disproportionate; and (5) the Respondent’s penalty guidance was unfair.
5. By an order sealed on 10 July 2026 Ritchie J ordered that a case management conference should be held in respect of the appeal. That hearing took place before me on 21 October 2026. The issues at the hearing were (1) whether to permit the Appellant to rely upon the expert report of Jason Coyne, an IT expert, dated 21 September 2026; (2) whether to permit the Appellant to rely on a further witness statement of Rita Tucker, the Managing Director of the Appellant, dated 22 September 2026 (“Tucker 2”); and (3) the further directions required for the conduct of the appeal hearing, in light of the decisions on issues (1) and (2).
6. This is my judgment on issues (1) and (2). I have been greatly assisted by the submissions from both counsel.
The factual background
7. On 25 July 2025 the Respondent served, or purported to serve, the IN on the Appellant. It required an acknowledgement by 31 July 2025. The deadline for compliance with the IN was 4 September 2025.
8. The Appellant did not confirm receipt before the 31 July 2025 deadline or at all. The Appellant contends that it was not aware of the IN, because it had been served on a single director, Barry Tucker, who was incorrectly identified as the Appellant’s CEO, who did not work at the Appellant’s registered office and who was not involved in the day-to-day running of the business.
9. On 4 August 2025, the Respondent sent an email to the Appellant, indicating that attempts had been made to contact Mr Tucker and referring to the Appellant’s legal obligations. The email was identified by four of the Appellant’s directors as a suspected fraudulent cybercrime attempt commonly known as a “phishing” email. As a result, they blocked the email address from which it originated. Consequently, they did not receive any follow-up emails from the Respondent.
10. On 20 October 2025 the Respondent hand delivered a copy of the Provisional Enforcement Notice (“the PEN”) to the Appellant’s registered office, stating that it was considering imposing a penalty on the Appellant. The Appellant contends that this was the first occasion on which the IN came to its attention. It set about providing the information sought by the IN and provided the first tranche of information within a fortnight. The totalinformation provided, amounting to around 11,000 pages of redacted data, was provided within a 6 week period.
11. On 5 November 2025 the Appellant’s solicitors provided detailed representations in response to the PEN, contending that the proposed penalty should be cancelled in its entirety because the Appellant had a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply with the IN. This was because (1) the Respondent had failed to serve the IN on the appropriate officers of the company; and (2) the Appellant’s directors had genuinely and reasonably believed that the 4 August 2025 email was a scam and so had blocked further emails from the Respondent.
12. The Appellant’s solicitors also provided a series of witness statements from the Appellant’s directors and others. One such statement was from Ms Tucker, dated 5 November 2025 (“Tucker 1”).
13. On 12 November 2025 a hearing took place at which the Appellant was represented by counsel. It proceeded by way of counsel making submissions with some questions being asked by the Respondent.
14. On 10 December 2025 the decision under challenge was finalised and sent to the Appellant.
15. On 6 January 2026 the Appellant filed its Appellant’s Notice, within the 28-day time limit from the date of the decision of the Respondent prescribed by paragraph 16D(5) of Schedule 5.
16. On 20 March 2026 the Respondent filed its Respondent’s Notice.
The legal framework
17. Under paragraph 16D(1) of Schedule 5, a person to whom a final enforcement notice is given may appeal to the appropriate court against (a) a decision to impose a monetary penalty by virtue of the notice; (b) the nature or amount of any such penalty; or (c) the giving of directions by virtue of the notice.
18. Under paragraph 16D(2), the grounds for an appeal against a decision to impose a monetary penalty or the nature or amount of any such penalty are that (a) the decision to impose a monetary penalty was based on an error of fact; (b) the decision was wrong in law; (c) the amount of the penalty is unreasonable; or (d) the decision was unreasonable or wrong for any other reason.
19. The intention behind the new regime is explained in the Explanatory Notes to DMCCA. The Explanatory Notes to paragraph 16D include the following:
“1234. Grounds for appeal are set out in paragraph 16D, subparagraph (2) in relation to appeals against the imposition of a monetary penalty and paragraph 16D, subparagraph (3) in relation to appeals against CMA directions given through a final enforcement notice. These provide for a right of appeal on the merits. The appeal court will be able to:
a. inquire into the correctness of the CMA’s findings of fact and into the correctness of the CMA’s analysis of, and conclusions drawn from, those facts,
b. inquire into the correctness of the CMA’s interpretation of the law,
c. inquire into the correctness of the discretion exercised by the CMA.
1235. The final ground of appeal, in paragraph 16D, subparagraph (2)(d) and subparagraph (3) (d) reflects in particular the Government’s intention that the appeal court will have discretion to hear fresh evidence on appeal. There could therefore arise circumstances where the appeal court finds that on the evidence before it, the CMA arrived at a reasonable conclusion but on the basis of the new evidence before the court, the CMA’s conclusions were nonetheless wrong…
1238. The Government’s policy intent is that a court conducting an appeal on the merits under this section should interfere only if it concludes that the decision is wrong in a material respect (reflecting the observation of the Court of Appeal in T-Mobile v Ofcom[2008] EWCA Civ 1373, as approved by the Court of Appeal in CMA v Flynn Pharma…at paragraphs 143 to 147).”
20. The Explanatory Notes therefore indicate that the appeal regime is intended to operate in a similar manner to that in respect of infringement decisions under s.46 of the Competition Act 1998 (“the CA”) as explained in CMA v Flynn Pharma[2020] EWCA Civ 339, [2020] Bus LR 803.
21. In Flynn, the Court of Appeal made clear that in an appeal under the CA, the judicial body must have full jurisdiction to quash the decision and substitute its own: [140]. However, its jurisdiction is not “unfettered”; “the appeal is not a de novo hearing but takes the decision as its starting, middle and end point”. The appellant “must identify the decision under appeal and set out why it is in error”: [141].
22. The Court cited T-Mobile v Ofcom [2009] 1 WLR 1565 at [31], which had made clear that the task of the Court is not to serve as a “fully equipped duplicate regulatory body waiting in the wings just for appeal” but to “look into whether the regulator has got something material wrong”. The Court further explained that “[t]he reference to materiality is important” such that “[t]he Tribunal should interfere only if it concludes that the decision is wrong in a material respect”: [143].
23. The Court also made the following observation:
“146…importantly, it is consistent with a merits appeal for the Tribunal, even having heard the evidence, to conclude that the approach taken by the CMA and its resultant findings are reasonable in all the circumstances and to refrain from interfering upon that basis. If the Tribunal considers that the findings of the CMA are reasonable it might be difficult to say that any findings that it arrives at which differ from those of the CMA are material.”
24. PD 49H makes the following provision in respect of the statements of case on appeal:
“4.6. The following must be provided with the appellant’s notice:
…(f) a copy of every document (or part of a document) upon which the appellant relies, including the written statements of all witnesses of fact and expert witness (if any); and
(g) a statement identifying the evidence (whether witness statements or other documents annexed to the notice of appeal) the substance of which, so far as the appellant is aware, was not before the maker of the disputed decision penalty or direction…
4.9 The following must be provided with the respondent’s notice:
…(d) a statement identifying the evidence (whether witness statements or other documents annexed to the response) the substance of which, so far as the respondent is aware, was not referred to in the disputed decision, penalty or direction, or disclosed to the appellant before that decision, penalty or direction was made; and
(e) as far as practicable, a copy of every document (or part of a document) upon which the respondent relies including the written statements of all witnesses of fact and expert witnesses (if any) but excluding any document (or part of a document) annexed to the appellant’s notice.”
25. As to case management, PD 49H provides that:
“4.14 The appeal court may give directions for a case management conference or pre-hearing review to be held where it considers it necessary or desirable. At such a hearing or otherwise, the court may give directions as to –
(a) the provision by the parties of statements of agreed matters;
(b) the issues on which it requires evidence, and the admission or exclusion from the proceedings of particular evidence;
(c) the nature of the evidence which it requires to decide those issues;
(d) whether the parties are permitted to provide expert evidence;
(e) any limit on the number of witnesses whose evidence a party may put forward, whether in relation to a particular issue or generally;
(f) the way in which evidence is to be placed before the appeal court; and
(g) the provision of skeleton arguments and bundles.”
26. As to expert evidence, PD 49H provides that:
“4.15 In deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence, the appeal court shall have regard to whether it would be just and proportionate to admit or exclude the evidence, including by reference to the following factors—
(a) the statutory provision under which the appeal is brought and the applicable standard of review being applied by the appeal court;
(b) the prejudice that may be suffered by one or more parties if the evidence is admitted or excluded; and
(c) whether the evidence is necessary for the appeal court to determine the case.
4.16 In deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence, the substance of which was not available to the respondent before the disputed decision was taken, in addition to the factors above, the appeal court shall have regard to the reason why the party seeking to adduce the evidence had not made it available to the respondent at that time.”
The expert evidence application
Overview
27. Mr Coyne is an IT professional with extensive experience, including in giving evidence to public inquiries. He was instructed by the Appellant on 7 September 2026 and he signed his report on 21 September 2026. The report is 14 pages long.
28. The key section on which the Appellant sought to rely addressed the issue of whether the Respondent’s 4 August 2025 email was suspicious in character and contained signs of a fraudulent cybercrime phishing email. Mr Coyne’s key conclusion in this regard is as follows:
“92. Given the combination of an unexpected sender, pressurised and threatening language, an apparent tension between the request for confidentiality and the scale of distribution, an invitation to deal directly with a named individual, and a reference to one of their own colleagues of a kind also seen in targeted spear-phishing, it was reasonable for non-specialist ECP staff initially to treat the 4 August 2025 Email as resembling spam or a phishing attempt and to decline to act on it without further verification.”
29. The Appellant contended that these features provide important context for understanding why its directors reasonably regarded the email as suspicious and responded as they did.
30. Mr Coyne’s report also details how individuals may reasonably react to an email that appears suspicious or fraudulent.
31. The Respondent opposed the admission of Mr Coyne’s evidence on the basis that (1) the evidence was late; (2) it would not be of assistance to the court hearing the appeal; and (3) it would cause prejudice to the Respondent if it was admitted by leading to an increase in the duration and costs of the appeal hearing.
Submissions and analysis
32. It is necessary to consider this application by reference to the factors set out in PD 49H, paragraphs 4.15 and 4.16.
Paragraph 4.15
33. PD 49H, paragraph 4.15 requires the court to determine whether it would be “just and proportionate” to admit the evidence in question.
(i): Paragraph 4.15(a)
34. The overall determination under paragraph 4.15 should include reference to “(a) the statutory provision under which the appeal is brought and the applicable standard of review being applied by the appeal court”.
35. Here, the standard of review and the approach of the appeal court is as described in Flynn at [21]-[23] above. In summary, the appeal court will have full jurisdiction to quash the decision and substitute its own, but the appeal is not a de novo hearing. Rather it “takes the decision as its starting, middle and end point”.
36. There is no doubt that the appeal court can consider fresh evidence on appeal and assess it by reference to the standard of review and the above approach.
(ii): Paragraph 4.15(b)
37. The determination under paragraph 4.15 also requires reference to “(b) the prejudice that may be suffered by one or more parties if the evidence is admitted or excluded”.
38. Here, I accept the Appellant’s submission that it would suffer substantial prejudice if it were not permitted to rely on Mr Coyne’s evidence.
39. The Respondent argued that expert evidence was not required because the issue to which Mr Coyne’s evidence was directed related to what non-expert people had done, namely the Appellant’s directors. On that basis it was argued that the court could use its own experience of phishing emails to assess the reasonableness of their beliefs.
40. I do not accept this submission. The Appellant’s directors were operating in a different context to “ordinary” people, namely one in which they had been advised by partner companies with whom they worked to be alert to cybercrime activity given what had happened to others. In any event, I do not consider that the indicators of a phishing email are matters which are necessarily consistent common knowledge, such that expert evidence cannot assist.
41. The court’s assessment of the objective reasonableness of the Appellant’s directors’ beliefs is therefore likely to be assisted by Mr Coyne’s evidence. That, in turn, will assist the court in determining the Appellant’s case on appeal that the Appellant’s directors’ belief that the 4 August 2025 email was a phishing email was reasonably held. That matter is squarely in issue on the appeal: the decision under appeal found that the Appellant had been “reckless” in this regard and that its belief that the communications were fraudulent was “unreasonable”; and the Respondent’s Notice at [63.1] makes clear that it maintains the position on appeal that any such belief was not reasonably held.
42. Mr Coyne’s evidence is therefore relevant to Ground (3), which is focused on the Respondent’s finding that the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the IN. It is right, as the Respondent highlighted, that the decision-maker did not reach the conclusion that the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the IN solely by reference to the 4 August 2025 email. However, the directors’ response to that email provide a key part of the initial reasoning and of the Appellant’s case on appeal on this issue.
43. Mr Coyne’s evidence is also relevant to Ground (4) which contends in the alternative that the penalty was unreasonable and/or disproportionate. The penalty was imposed by reference to the Respondent’s guidance which required consideration of seriousness and culpability. The decision under appeal found that the breach was in Category 1 (the most serious) and the level of culpability was “high”. Whether the Respondent erred in making this finding is likely to be informed by evidence as to the objective reasonableness of the directors’ actions, even if the finding on the reasonable excuse issue is upheld on appeal.
44. Mr Coyne’s evidence is also, to a marginal degree, relevant to Ground (2). That ground is critical of the fact that two members of the Respondent’s Case Team who oversaw the sending of the 4 August 2025 email were directly involved in the making of the decision under appeal, which required consideration of the Appellant’s case that the email was reasonably understood to be a phishing email. The Appellant submitted that this involved the Respondent “marking its own homework” in a way that was procedurally unfair. The Respondent disputes that the two Case Team members were involved in the way alleged. However, if the Appellant’s case on the factual background is accepted, an independent assessment of the 4 August 2025 email may be of some assistance to the appeal court.
45. In summary, Mr Coyne’s evidence forms an important part of the Appellant’s case on appeal. The Appellant is seeking to appeal a very significant financial penalty. It would suffer substantial prejudice if it was not permitted to rely on the evidence.
46. Against that, the prejudice to the Respondent if the evidence was admitted would be much less. The Respondent has had the expert evidence for several weeks and no date has yet been set for the hearing of the appeal. The prejudice to the Respondent is limited to the Respondent’s additional costs of obtaining expert evidence of its own, if it chooses to do so, and there is time for that to occur. There is also some additional prejudice given that the admission of the expert evidence, if fully contested by an expert instructed by the Respondent and if cross-examination of both experts is required, will add perhaps one day to the time estimate for the appeal. In the context of this complex case, I consider that the overall prejudice to the Respondent is relatively limited.
(iii): Paragraph 4.15(c)
47. Under this paragraph regard must also be had to “(c) whether the evidence is necessary for the appeal court to determine the case”. In my judgment this test is met for the reasons I have given under paragraph 4.15(b).
Paragraph 4.16
48. As Mr Coyne’s evidence was not available when the decision under appeal was taken, it is necessary under paragraph 4.16 to have regard to “the reason why the party seeking to adduce the evidence had not made it available to the respondent at that time”.
49. The Respondent contended that the Appellant had failed to offer any good reason why it had not obtained Mr Coyne’s evidence earlier: it could and should have been provided before the 10 December 2025 decision was taken; and yet it was not served on the Respondent until 25 September 2026, when the Appellant filed an application notice seeking to admit the evidence.
50. The Appellant argued that it was not until the 10 December 2025 decision was received that the need for expert evidence was considered, because it was only then that the Appellant appreciated that the Respondent would not accept that its directors’ belief was not only subjectively held but was objectively reasonable.
51. I have some sympathy with this position. The chronology set out at [10]-[13] above suggests that on becoming aware of the IN on 22 October 2025 the Appellant was not only seeking to provide a large amount of information in response to the IN but also engaging with the PEN process, by providing representations and a series of witness statements on 5 November 2025, ahead of the hearing on 12 November 2025. This was a relatively tight timescale in which the Appellant was focussed on different workstreams. More substantively, it was seeking to persuade the decision-maker of the subjective and objective elements of the directors’ beliefs by reference to its own factual witness evidence.
52. Accordingly, I do not consider that paragraph 4.16 militates against Mr Coyne’s evidence being admitted.
The overall paragraph 4.15 assessment
53. In assessing whether it would, overall, be “just and proportionate” to admit the evidence, it is necessary to consider further arguments advanced by the Respondent in this case relating to timing.
54. The Respondent contended that PD 49H, paragraph 4.6(f) contained a mandatory rule requiring an Appellant to append to their Appellant’s Notice all the evidence on which it seeks to rely.
55. Counsel highlighted that the draftsperson of the PD had deliberately chosen not to include in paragraph 4.6(f) the words “as far as practicable” which did feature in paragraph 4.9(e), the comparable provision in relation to Respondent’s Notices. It was argued that the court could only give directions under paragraph 4.14 in relation to the admission or exclusion of evidence which had already been provided by an Appellant in accordance with paragraph 4.6(f). The Appellant had failed to comply with this mandatory rule, because its Appellant’s Notice had been filed on 6 January 2026 but Mr Coyne’s report had not been served on the Respondent until 25 September 2026.
56. I do not consider it likely that paragraph 4.6(f) is intended to provide an absolute bar to an Appellant relying on evidence over and above that which is appended to the Appellant’s Notice, for the following reasons.
57. First, if paragraph 4.6(f) was interpreted in that way, it would preclude an Appellant from relying on any evidence that was not in existence, or had not come to its attention, by the time the Appellant’s Notice was filed. It is hard to see how such a strict reading of the paragraph would be consistent with the overriding objective. The Appellant highlighted that the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, which are otherwise very similar to the provisions of PD 49H, provide at Rules 9(6)(b) that evidence must be attached to the appeal notice, “so far as practicable”. Further, I cannot discern an obvious and persuasive reason why Respondents to these kind of appeals should being afforded more leeway in this regard, as would be the case given the wording of paragraph 4.9(e), if that were accompanied by a strict reading of paragraph 4.6(f).
58. Second, the wording of the court’s power under paragraph 4.14(d) to decide whether the parties are permitted “to provide” expert evidence suggests a future-facing exercise, meaning that an Appellant would not be limited to expert evidence that had been filed with the Appellant’s Notice.
59. In fairness, it was not clear that the Respondent was advancing such a “hard-edged” position, as counsel contended that the Appellant was effectively seeking a retrospective application for an extension of time to rely on the expert evidence, suggesting that the Respondent accepts that such an application is possible.
60. If I am correct that paragraph 4.6(f) does not preclude an Appellant from seeking to rely on appeal on evidence not appended to the Appellant’s Notice, then no extension of time is needed to rely on Mr Coyne’s report.
61. However, even if the Appellant does require an extension of time, then in my judgment the “ethos” of the principles applicable to relief from sanctions applications set out in Denton v T. H. White Ltd[2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 WLR 3926 which apply (see Health and Home Ltd v Elite Property Holdings Ltd[2026] EWCA Civ 933 at [35] per Arnold LJ) and/or the general overriding objective justify admission of Mr Coyne’s evidence for the reasons I have already given.
62. To those reasons I would add that I accept the Respondent’s observation that even if there was no duty on the Appellant to file Mr Coyne’s report with the Appellant’s Notice on 6 January 2026, there was still a gap of some months until it was served on 25 September 2026. However, the Appellant did highlight the possibility of adducing expert evidence in the Grounds; at the time Mr Coyne’s report was served there was still no date for the appeal hearing fixed; and it was served well in advance of the case management conference at which the court would inevitably consider the application, given the specific reference to the case management role in respect of expert evidence in paragraph 4.14(d).
Conclusion
63. For these reasons I conclude that overall, it would be appropriate to permit the Appellant to rely on Mr Coyne’s expert evidence in this appeal.
64. I will grant permission to the Respondent to obtain its own expert evidence if it wishes to do so; and timetable the appeal to accommodate for the fact that cross-examination of both experts may be needed. That course preserves the ability of both parties to indicate to the court before the hearing that cross-examination of the expert(s) will not be required such that the time estimate for the hearing can be reduced. It also permits them to argue at the appeal hearing, if so advised, that such cross-examination is not appropriate given the nature of the appeal process (a proposition on which I only heard limited argument) and/or not necessary in the circumstances of this case.
The Tucker 2 application
65. As noted above Ms Tucker provided evidence before the original decision-maker. In Tucker 2, she states that she tried without success to phone a telephone number contained in an email sent by the Respondent. She suggests that she was reminded of this when she read Mr Coyne’s report. This relatively narrow evidence may assist the appeal court in completing the evidential picture and I consider it appropriate to admit it.
66. I am not, however, persuaded that the Respondent should be permitted to cross-examine Ms Tucker or the other directors who provided statements previously, as was suggested by counsel. These witnesses were not questioned at the original hearing. The original decision proceeded on the basis that even if the directors honestly believed that the 4 August 2025 email was a phishing attempt, there were no reasonable grounds for such a belief. I cannot see a proper basis for opening up at the appeal stage the issue of the honesty of their belief, which would be the primary purpose of such cross-examination. Further, to expand the scope of the appeal in this way would run the risk of the necessary focus on the decision as the “starting, middle and end point” of the process being lost.
Conclusion
67. Accordingly, for all these reasons, I admit Mr Coyne’s evidence and Tucker 2.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).