Tax United Kingdom

Adrian Vlad and Ion Grab v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01487 (TC)

Case Number: TC10074

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Taylor House, London

Appeal reference: TC/2024/04313, TC/2024/04742 & TC/2025/00159

Late appeal – Martland – reliance on advisor – application refused

Heard on: 11 June 2026

Judgment date: 22 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE JUDITH HARRISON

Between

ADRIAN VLAD AND ION GRAB

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Adrian Vlad, Mrs Ionela Vlad and Mr Ion Grab.

For the Respondents: Miss Simone Poone and Miss Jessica Parlour, litigators of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office

DECISION

Introduction

The application

1. This application concerned whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to admit late appeals in respect of both Mr Adrian Vlad and Mr Ion Grab.

2. In determining that issue, the Tribunal must apply the three-stage approach set out in Martland. In particular this involves consideration of (a) the length of the delay, and whether that was serious and significant; (b) the reason for the delay (c) considering all the circumstances, whether the appeals be permitted to proceed?

Summary

3. The Tribunal decided not to give permission for the appeals to progress out of time.

4. The Tribunal accepts that both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad were badly let down by their former accountant and that this explains at least part of the delay in appealing. However, the delays were very substantial. By no later than March 2022 (for Mr Grab) and July 2022 (for Mr Vlad), each appellant had reason to doubt that the accountant was acting appropriately. The Tribunal was not persuaded that sufficient steps were taken thereafter to protect their appeal rights. Having considered all the circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that permission should not be granted.

5. The Tribunal decided the appeal in HMRC’s favour and issued a summary decision. At the request of Mr Vlad and Mr Grab this is the full decision of this appeal.

Hearing

6. Ms Wilkinson attended the hearing to translate for Mr Grab.

7. The parties each provided their own documentary evidence to the Tribunal in advance of the hearing. HMRC provided two bundles of documents, each of 185 pages, an authorities bundle of 183 pages and a skeleton argument of 17 pages. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad provided the Tribunal with a witness statement from Mr Grab of 2 pages, 3 email chains with the police in respect of the fraud investigation, 4 text message chains between Mr Grab and the accountant, 4 messages which included emails between Mr Grab and the accountant and bank statements, 4 documents described as correspondence, including a late appeal application explanation from Mr Vlad and 18 text message chains between Mr Vlad and the accountant.

8. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad brought along a large hard copy folder with further evidence which they asked to share with the Tribunal mid-way through the hearing. Mr Grab told the Tribunal that he had previously sought to give this folder to Mr Lee, the HMRC investigating officer, and Mr Lee had refused to take it. Mr Vlad explained that this folder contained evidence of the communications with the accountant, and that included evidence that the accountant had told both appellants that they had appealed the HMRC assessments and evidence of Mr Grab and Mr Vlad following up with the accountant. Since HMRC had not had the opportunity to review the folder in preparation for the hearing, and the size of the folder meant that it would take a significant amount of time to review, the Tribunal declined to accept this folder into evidence, on the basis that to do so would be contrary to the overriding objective.

9. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad each gave witness evidence and were cross-examined. The Tribunal permitted both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad to rely on the documents in the hard copy folder described above to ensure that the details of their witness evidence was accurate. The Tribunal found both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad to be honest and credible. The Tribunal accepts both appellants' evidence regarding what they were told by the accountant. Our conclusion does not depend on finding that either appellant acted dishonestly or deliberately delayed bringing an appeal.

THE LAW

General principles

10. The burden is on Mr Grab and Mr Vlad to demonstrate why the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to grant each of their late appeal applications.

11. When a taxpayer misses a deadline for giving notice of his appeal, the Tribunal has discretion whether to allow the appeal to nevertheless proceed late. The principles applicable to whether the Tribunal should give permission for a late appeal were set out by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) ("Martland") , at [44] – [47]. In summary:

(a) The starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be.

(b) In considering that question, the Tribunal can usefully follow a three-stage process:

(i) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being 'neither serious nor significant'), then the Tribunal 'is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages';

(ii) Establish the reason (or reasons) why the default occurred; and

(iii) Evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case'. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.

(c) The balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.

(d) In carrying out the balancing exercise the Tribunal can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case; this goes to the question of prejudice. There is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.

(e) Neither shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser) nor the fact that the applicant is self-represented should generally carry any weight in the Tribunal's consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant's explanation of the delay.

12. This approach has recently been confirmed as correct by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14.

Reliance on advisors

13. In Katib v HMRC [2019] UKUT 0189 (TCC), the Upper Tribunal set out a general rule that failings of an advisor should be regarded as failings of an appellant. We are required to apply that general rule. The main thrust of the taxpayer’s case in Katib was that he did not have the expertise to deal with the tax dispute himself, he relied on an adviser who was misleading him that "matters were in hand" and that there was no need for him to be concerned. The First-tier Tribunal in Katib accepted those facts as true. Mr Katib also alleged that his advisor’s behaviour was fraudulent.

14. The First-tier Tribunal in Katib decided to exercise their discretion to allow his appeal to proceed late. The Upper Tribunal held that in doing so the First-tier Tribunal wrongly applied the law and so re-made the decision. In doing so the Upper Tribunal made the following observations on when a taxpayer relies on an advisor:

"[49] We accept HMRC's general point that, in most cases , when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant's advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant and we will return to this issue in the 'Disposition' section that follows. Therefore, in most cases, a litigant seeking permission to make a late appeal on the grounds that previous advisers were deficient will face an uphill task and should expect to provide a full account of exchanges and communications with those advisers. It will often be impossible to give the requisite full account without waiving privilege. In this case Mr Katib did provide a reasonably full account of his dealings with Mr Bridger. He put correspondence with him into evidence and, in doing so, waived any privilege that he had in relation to that correspondence. We reject HMRC's submission that, in the absence of a signed, formal waiver of privilege, this was necessarily insufficient for his application to succeed."

…

[54] It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant's adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant. In Hytec Information Systems Ltd v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 1666, when considering the analogous question of whether a litigant's case should be struck out for breach of an 'unless' order that was said to be the fault of counsel rather than the litigant itself, Ward LJ said, at 1675:

'Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: first, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent (as Mr. MacGregor eloquently put it) were this court to allow almost impossible investigations in apportioning blame between solicitor and counsel on the one hand, or between themselves and their client on the other. The basis of the rule is that orders of the court must be observed and the court is entitled to expect that its officers and counsel who appear before it are more observant of that duty even than the litigant himself.'

[55] We do not accept Mr Magee's general argument that this approach simply involves attributing the actions of legal representatives to their clients and has no bearing on the question whether incorrect advice provided to a client can be a good reason for the client's default. Given the importance of adhering to statutory time limits, we see no reason why a litigant who says that a representative failed to file an appeal on time should necessarily be in a different position from a litigant who says that a representative failed to advise adequately of the time limits within which an appeal should be brought. In any event, it seems from [7] of the Decision that the FTT found that Mr Bridger had been instructed to appeal against the PLNs on Mr Katib's behalf but failed to do so and, therefore, Mr Katib is not simply complaining that Mr Bridger provided defective advice.

[56] Nor do we accept Mr Magee's submission that the decision of the High Court in Boreh v Republic of Djibouti [2015] EWHC 769 (Comm), [2015] 3 All ER 577 establishes an 'exception' to the principle where a representative misleads the client. Rather, we consider that the correct approach in this case is to start with the general rule that the failure of Mr Bridger to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib's behalf, is unlikely to amount to a 'good reason' for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland. However, when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration.

[57] The FTT concluded at [27](3) of the Decision that the general rule set out in Coventry City Council should not apply because Mr Bridger was 'on a frolic of his own acting outside the scope of any possible brief that [Mr Katib] could have given'. That conclusion, however, was reached without having regard to the particular importance of statutory time limits being respected and is thus vitiated by the error of law that has led to us setting aside the Decision. More significantly, we do not consider that the FTT's departure from the general principle is justified by that fact in this case (which we think is probably an additional error of law, though not one relied on in the grounds of appeal).

[58] It is clear from the Decision that Mr Bridger did not provide competent advice to Mr Katib, misled him as to what steps were being taken, and needed to be taken, to appeal against the PLNs and failed to appeal against the PLNs on Mr Katib's behalf (see [7] and [16]). But extraordinary though some of Mr Bridger's correspondence was, the core of Mr Katib's complaint is that Mr Bridger was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one's chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise.

[59] Mr Magee urged us to give particular weight to the FTT's finding, at [15], that Mr Katib did not have the expertise to deal with the dispute with HMRC himself, but that does not weigh greatly in the balance since most people who instruct a representative to deal with litigation do so because of their own lack of expertise in this arena. We do not consider that, given the particular importance of respecting statutory time limits, Mr Katib's complaints against Mr Bridger or his own lack of experience in tax matters are sufficient to displace the general rule that Mr Katib should bear the consequences of Mr Bridger's failings and, if he wishes, pursue a claim in damages against him or Sovereign Associates for any loss he suffers as a result. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the FTT's findings demonstrate that there were some warning signs that should have alerted Mr Katib to the fact that Mr Bridger was not equal to the task. Despite Mr Bridger assuring Mr Katib that his appeals were in hand, he was still receiving threats of enforcement action ([9]). Mr Bridger's advice to 'cease to be a man by making a declaration to this effect' should have alerted Mr Katib to the warning signs. Mr Katib is not without responsibility in this story.

[60] For the same reasons we do not consider that Mr Bridger's conduct has any real weight when considering the factors relevant to the final stage of the three-stage approach outlined in Martland. Turning to other factors relevant to that third stage, the FTT concluded that the financial consequences of Mr Katib not being able to appeal were very serious because his means were limited such that he would lose his home. That, the FTT concluded, was too unjust to be allowed to stand. We have considered this factor anxiously for ourselves. However, again, when properly analysed, we do not think that this factor is as weighty as the FTT said it was. The core point is that (on the evidence available to the FTT) Mr Katib would suffer hardship if he (in effect) lost the appeal for procedural reasons. However, that again is a common feature which could be propounded by large numbers of appellants, and in the circumstances we do not give it sufficient weight to overcome the difficulties posed by the fact that the delays were very significant, and there was no good reason for them."

15. In Uddin v HMRC [2023] UKUT 99 (TC) the Upper Tribunal further observed that:

“[30] We are not persuaded the FTT's reasoning was inadequate so as to constitute an error of law. The reason why Mr Uddin lost, despite his argument that he had been misled, was clear. That was that, even though Mr Uddin may have relied on his accountant (and been misled into believing that everything was in order), the cursory and general enquiries he made were insufficient to displace the general rule that the taxpayer should bear the consequences of the representative's failings. The FTT's reasoning was such that it did not need to make express findings of fact on whether Mr Uddin was misled because it would not, in its view, have made a difference to the outcome. The fact the FTT engaged with the particular limitations of the evidence it had on Mr Uddin's communications tends in any case to suggest, that it did accept Mr Uddin's account, as far as it went, of what he was told by the adviser. Put another way, a client will always rely on their advisers, but their adviser's failings are still laid at their door. Why the adviser failed and how they led their client to continue to rely on them is not relevant to the Martland analysis, unless the client can show that they did whatever a reasonable taxpayer in that situation would have done (which would generally be to make sufficient efforts to keep tabs on the adviser and make sure that matters were on track). Mr Uddin lost because he did not demonstrate more than a cursory interest in what was (not) going on, he had not done what a reasonable taxpayer in his position would be expected to do, rather than because the tribunal failed to recognise that such cursory enquiries as he made were met with untruthful answers."

FINDINGS OF FACT

16. The Tribunal makes the findings of fact set out below. Except where expressly identified these facts were not disputed.

17. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad ran separate businesses in the building trade. Each set up companies to work through.

18. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad are related due to Mr Vlad having married Mr Grab’s daughter.

19. HMRC made a number of decisions to charge both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad to tax and penalties. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad appealed these late.

20. Two notices of appeal were submitted to the Tribunal for Mr Vlad on 4 August 2024.

21. A notice of appeal was submitted to the Tribunal for Mr Grab on 15 January 2025.

22. The tables below sets out details of the decisions and the appeals. Each of HMRC, Mr Grab and Mr Vlad confirmed these were accurate during the hearing:

Decisions sent to Mr Grab

Date of issue How late the appeal was made
Personal liability notice (“PLN”) based on a VAT penalty of £120,863.43 4 January 2021 1443 days
A PLN based upon a corporation tax penalty of £33,863.80 16 February 2021 1400 days
Discovery assessment regarding income tax of £3,392 20 January 2022 1062 days
Income tax penalty of £28,288.47 14 March 2023 644 days

Decisions sent to Mr Vlad

Appeal reference Date of issue How late the appeal was made
Discovery Assessments relating to self-assessment tax, totalling £98,957.17 TC/2024/04742 5 October 2022 507 days
Penalty Assessment relating to self-assessment tax, totalling £57,224.73 TC/2024/04742 07 November 2022 474 days
A PLN based upon a VAT penalty for £179,529.97 TC/2024/04313 06 January 2021 1276 days

23. Neither Mr Grab nor Mr Vlad are UK tax specialists. They engaged the services of an accountant to ensure that they complied with their tax obligations.

24. Both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad used the same accountant to ensure that both their personal and their corporate tax affairs were properly managed. The Tribunal was told that this accountant (the “accountant”) defrauded both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad and that they paid significant sums for him to pass to HMRC (around £60,000 in the case of Mr Grab and £110,000 in the case of Mr Vlad) which the accountant had stolen.

25. Yorkshire Police are dealing with the criminal issues raised by the accountant’s behaviour. We were provided with an email from a police officer which stated that the police had referred a case against the accountant to the Crown Prosecution Service.

26. HMRC challenged whether the police reports provided were sufficient evidence of the accountant’s fraudulent behaviour. The evidence as to the accountant’s behaviour being fraudulent came from witness evidence and from the correspondence between the police and Mr Grab.

27. Since the Tribunal did not have the opportunity to ask questions of the accountant, we decline to make any factual finding whether he acted dishonesty or criminally. However, for the reasons given below, we consider that the accountant’s advice to Mr Grab and Mr Vlad was misleading and that the accountant let down both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad and did not provide them with competent advice.

28. Both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad accepted that they had received a number of letters from HMRC (and from the Insolvency Service). They passed these letters to the accountant. This is supported by contemporaneous text messages which we saw.

29. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad had been told by the accountant that they had appealed all of the tax assessments. They followed up with the accountant on the progress of their appeal on many occasions and were told everything was in hand. Since the accountant had not appealed any tax assessments, we find these statements to be misleading. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad told us that their understanding was that HMRC and the Tribunal were delayed by the fallout from the Covid pandemic. The Tribunal accepts that both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad genuinely believed appeals had been submitted and that delays in obtaining progress updates were attributable, at least in part, to disruption following the Covid-19 pandemic.

30. Despite the assurances of the accountant Mr Grab and Mr Vlad continued to receive letters from HMRC and the Insolvency Service.

31. Mr Grab’s witness statement states that he became aware there was a problem with the accountant on or about March 2022, and that the accountant told him that he would be retiring in April 2022. From the documents provided to us, the Tribunal has identified that Mr Grab had appointed GC Forest (another accountant) to act for him by 10 May 2022. GC Forest filed Mr Grab’s self-assessment return for the tax year ending April 2023. As a result, we find that GC Forest was still acting for Mr Grab on 14 March 2023 (which is that date on which an income tax penalty of £28,288.47 was issued to Mr Grab).

32. The Tribunal has considered whether Mr Grab had reason to doubt the accountant before March 2022. We were provided with emails between Mr Grab and the accountant that refer to a system that the accountant operated to reduce the VAT payable. For example:

(a) An email dated 4 May 2016 sent by the accountant stated: “The full amount of VAT should be £8,066.25. However I can reduce this to £4,848.29. This will be the amount to pay using the system I use for other Romanian owed contractors.”

(b) An email sent on 11 July 2016 stated: “The full amount of VAT for April/ May/ June is £20,026.48. However I can reduce this to £10,855.23 which is giving you a very big saving.”

33. HMRC did not make any submissions on the significance of these messages, and Mr Grab was not asked about them during the hearing. The references to reducing the amount of tax payable related only to VAT, and we were provided with a message on corporation tax which just states the amount owed. The Tribunal has considered whether these messages indicate that Mr Grab should have been aware that the accountant was not dealing with his tax affairs properly. Since VAT in the construction industry is complex, and there are different rates and a reverse charge mechanism, the Tribunal finds on balance that it is more likely that Mr Grab understood these messages to refer to the accountant managing his tax liability so that he paid the least amount properly due, rather than evidence of nefarious behaviour. We do not consider those communications sufficient to establish that Mr Grab should have realised the accountant was acting improperly. As a result, we find that the evidence does not support a finding that Mr Grab had any reason to doubt the accountant before March 2022.

34. We find as a fact, based on Mr Grab’s witness evidence, that by March 2022 Mr Grab was aware that there were significant problems with the accountant's conduct of his affairs.

35. Mr Vlad’s evidence is that he had become suspicious of the accountant by July 2022. In February 2022 he received a letter requiring him to attend court in Leeds regarding insolvency proceedings. He was told by the accountant that he should not attend this meeting, and that the accountant would attend on his behalf. In July 2022, Mr Vlad decided to attend an insolvency hearing in Southend, and did not share details of this hearing with the accountant. Mr Vlad told the Tribunal that during this court attendance he was told by the court that the accountant had told the court that he had left the UK and was uncontactable. Mr Vlad spoke to the accountant after the Southend hearing and was told that the accountant had not provided this information about Mr Vlad to the court.

36. The Tribunal has considered whether Mr Vlad had reason to doubt the accountant before July 2022 (for example, in March 2022 when Mr Grab became aware that there were problems with the accountant). None of the evidence provided to us would support that conclusion. As a result, we find that the evidence does not support a finding that Mr Vlad had any reason to doubt the accountant before July 2022.

37. We find as a fact that, by the time Mr Vlad attended the insolvency hearing in Southend (in July 2022) that Mr Vlad was aware that there were significant problems with the accountant’s conduct of his affairs.

38. Despite Mr Vlad’s reasons to doubt the accountant, he continued to use the accountant until January 2023 when the accountant told Mr Vlad he could no longer act for him on the basis that the accountant was unwell.

39. Mr Vlad received a statutory demand to pay £344,599.07 dated 8 September 2023.

40. Mr Vlad was assessed with a serious health condition on 29 September 2023.

41. In February 2024, Mr Stephen Outhwaite began to help Mr Vlad with his tax appeals. By April 2024, Mr Outhwaite was also helping Mr Grab with his tax appeals.

42. Mr Outhwaite notified HMRC that Mr Vlad wished to appeal on 25 March 2024 (and he confirmed on 12 June 2024 that this notification was intended to be a late notice of appeal under section 49 TMA 1970). HMRC rejected the late appeal on 8 July 2024. Mr Vlad’s appeals were made with the Tribunal on 4 August 2024.

43. Mr Outhwaite notified HMRC that Mr Grab wished to appeal on 14 April 2024. HMRC rejected the late appeal on 8 July 2024. Mr Grab’s appeals were made on 15 January 2025.

44. When asked why it took more than a year between accountant telling Mr Vlad that he could no longer act for him and finding a new tax advisor, Mr Vlad explained that he had spoken to numerous accountants to seek help and had been told repeatedly that they could not help him and that he should declare bankruptcy. Mr Vlad explained that he had done the best he could at the time, and we note that during this period he was suffering from a serious health condition, which we infer from the information available to us would have impacted on his ability to manage his affairs. Mr Vlad described a number of difficult conversations he had with court staff, the HMRC debt management team and the police. It was clear from these descriptions that Mr Vlad found it incredibly difficult to navigate his tax problems. For example, he described being called crazy. Given the information Mr Vlad provided to us, we find that during this period he was doing his best to navigate a situation that he found overwhelming.

45. The Tribunal was told that the reason it took so long to file the appeals once Mr Outhwaite became involved was due to the time taken to unravel what had happened.

46. We were told that Mr Outhwaite was asked to file appeals for both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad at the same time, and Mr Grab could not explain why his appeal had been filed several months after Mr Vlad’s appeals.

47. Mr Grab, together with Mr Outhwaite had a meeting with HMRC in August 2024, during which meeting Mr Grab agreed to provided information to HMRC. HMRC told us this information was not provided.

Decision

48. The Tribunal applied the three-stage approach set out by the Upper Tribunal in WilliamMartland v HMRC ([2018] UKUT 0178 (TCC)) to decide whether to exercise its discretion to allow the appeals to proceed out of time. Applying the Martland tests in turn:

Length of the delay

49. The Tribunal finds that the delays in bringing an appeal (see paragraph 22 above, constituted a significant and serious delay. This was not a marginal or de minimis breach of the 30-day statutory time limit.

Reasons for the delay

50. Both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad submitted that the delay arose because their former agent acted fraudulently, failed to deal with HMRC correspondence, failed to advise them properly, and misled them regarding their tax affairs and appeal rights. We accept that this is the reason for at least some of delay, other than for the income tax penalty of £28,288.47 issued to Mr Grab on 14 March 2023). The reason that we do not accept this for the 14 March 2023 penalty is that by the time that penalty was issued Mr Grab had appointed another accountant, GC Forest to act for him.

51. We were not provided with any evidence as to why Mr Grab did not appeal the assessments between March 2022 and January 2025, particularly as he had appointed a new accountant by May 2022. No evidence was provided explaining the reason for the delay in Mr Grab filing the appeal in respect of the 14 March 2023 penalty.

52. Mr Vlad explained that the delay from January 2023 (when the accountant stopped acting for him) until February 2024 (when Mr Outhwaite began acting for him) was due to difficulties in finding another advisor. Mr Outhwaite needed some time to work out what had happened, and that caused some further delay in appealing. We accept this.

All the circumstances of the case

53. The Tribunal must finally consider all the circumstances of the case, carrying out a balancing exercise which takes account of the importance of compliance with time limits, the reasons for the delay, and the prejudice to each party.

54. The Tribunal attaches significant weight to the public interest in the observance of statutory time limits and the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and with finality. Those considerations apply with particular force where, as here, the relevant decision was clearly communicated and the delay was substantial.

55. The Tribunal accepts that refusal of permission will result in Mr Grab and Mr Vlad being unable to pursue their appeals. Given the sums involved, we accept that refusal of permission may have serious financial consequences for Mr Grab and Mr Vlad and their families. This is a factor in favour of the grant of permission, albeit the prejudice suffered by Mr Grab and Mr Vlad is not materially different in nature from the prejudice suffered by any appellant who fails to bring an appeal within time.

56. A key point of disagreement during the hearing was the extent to which Mr Grab and Mr Vlad should be responsible for the accountant’s failings. We have found that the accountant’s advice was misleading and that he failed both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad. This is a factor in favour of granting permission.

57. We consider that from March 2022 (for Mr Grab – this is the date when Mr Grab accepted he knew that his tax position was not as he had been led to believe by the accountant in his witness evidence) and July 2022 (for Mr Vlad – this is the date he attended the insolvency hearing in Southend and received information fundamentally inconsistent with what he had been told by the accountant) the appellants were aware that there were significant problems with the accountant’s conduct of their affairs. The Tribunal therefore regards these dates as the point at which continued reliance on assurances required independent verification.

58. Up to those dates, we consider that the accountant’s behaviour should not be attributed to Mr Grab or Mr Vlad. We accept that before those dates a reasonable taxpayer would not have been aware that the accountant’s conduct was problematic. The Tribunal accepts that the case law recognises that the extent of the taxpayer's own efforts remains relevant. A taxpayer who has taken reasonable steps to monitor the position may be in a stronger position than one who passively delegates matters to an adviser. However, after March 2022 and July 2022 respectively, neither Mr Grab nor Mr Vlad took sufficient steps to satisfy the Tribunal that they had acted as a reasonable taxpayer would have done. From those dates onwards, continued reliance on the accountant became increasingly unreasonable. Adviser default is normally attributed to the taxpayer. The Tribunal has nevertheless considered the unusual facts of this case, including allegations of fraud, language difficulties, repeated reassurances, and the appellants' attempts to obtain assistance. While the accountant's earlier misconduct explains a significant part of the delay, once warning signs emerged the appellants were required to take reasonable steps to protect their own positions. They did not do so.

59. The Tribunal accepts that both appellants genuinely believed appeals had been lodged. The issue is not the genuineness of that belief but whether, once warning signs emerged, it remained reasonable to rely solely on the accountant's assurances. The difficulty for both Mr Grab and Mr Vlad is that once they became suspicious that the accountant was not acting appropriately, they did not take sufficient steps to satisfy themselves that their appeal rights had been protected. Like the taxpayer in Katib, Mr Grab and Mr Vlad continued to receive correspondence from HMRC and, insolvency proceedings were progressing despite assurances that matters were under control. Those events were sufficiently inconsistent with the accountant's reassurances that, by March 2022 (for Mr Grab) and July 2022 (for Mr Vlad), a reasonable taxpayer would have appreciated the need to take independent steps to check the position. Once Mr Grab and Mr Vlad became aware of matters inconsistent with the accountant's assurances, a reasonable taxpayer would ordinarily have sought direct confirmation from HMRC that appeals had been lodged, requested documentary evidence of any appeals, or sought independent professional advice. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad did not do that. That is a factor against the grant of permission.

60. In Mr Grab’s case, he appointed a new advisor who does not appear to have made any appeals (including against the 14 March 2023 penalty), although the new advisor did file tax returns. No evidence was provided explaining why that was. We also were not provided with any evidence as to whether Mr Grab had instructed GC Forest to appeal or that he had asked for any advice in respect of the appeals. The burden lay on Mr Grab to explain the continuing delay and he has not done this. This is a factor against allowing permission to appeal that penalty late.

61. We have also taken into account in Mr Grab’s cases that, following the August 2024 meeting with HMRC, he agreed to provide further information, but that information was not subsequently supplied. While this post-dates the delay in making appeals, it provides further evidence that the matters were not pursued with the degree of urgency that would ordinarily be expected where substantial assessments and penalties were in dispute.

62. In Mr Vlad’s case, the accountant continued to act for him between July 2022 and January 2023, despite there being warning signs that the accountant was not acting appropriately. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Vlad was suspicious of the accountant and found the situation difficult to navigate. However, once he had attended the Southend hearing and discovered information inconsistent with what he had been told, a reasonable taxpayer would ordinarily have taken active steps either to obtain independent advice or to verify directly with HMRC the status of any appeals.

63. In Mr Vlad’s case we have taken into account the impact his health issues and the evidence as to the difficulties in finding a new advisor had on making the appeals. These factors impeded his ability to address his tax affairs. The difficulties in finding a new advisor is a factor in Mr Vlad’s favour. The Tribunal considers Mr Vlad's health difficulties to be a significant factor in his favour and accepts they materially impaired his ability to manage his affairs. However, even giving substantial weight to that factor, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it explains the entirety of the delay. The difficulty for Mr Vlad is that he continued to use the accountant until January 2023, we were not provided with any evidence that he was seeking alternative advice during the six months after he became suspicious but before the accountant stopped acting and Mr Vlad’s health assessment is dated September 2023. We did not have any evidence that that Mr Vlad was unwell or that he was looking for a new advisor between July 2022 and January 2023. We therefore treat Mr Vlad’s health issues and difficulties in finding a new advisor as factors in favour of granting permission. However, even giving full weight to these factors, they do not adequately explain the entirety of the delay nor outweigh the other factors identified.

64. By contrast, granting permission would result in some prejudice to HMRC, which would be required to devote time and resources to defending an appeal that Parliament has required to be brought within a defined time frame. Given the length of the delay there is likely to be some difficulty in investigating the facts, with a consequent impact on the allocation of public resources. This is a factor weighing against the grant of permission.

65. In accordance with Martland, the Tribunal considered whether it should take account of the underlying merits of the appeal. HMRC submitted that the underlying appeals were very weak, but did not explain the basis for that submission. Mr Grab and Mr Vlad disagreed, and explained that, for example, the tax assessments did not take expenses correctly into account. The Tribunal did not have sufficient information to assess the underlying merits and therefore treated this as a neutral factor.

66. We find therefore that weighing up all the circumstances of this case, the prejudice to Mr Grab and Mr Vlad of this Tribunal not allowing the appeals to proceed out of time is outweighed by the need for time limits to be respected and for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost. We have considerable sympathy for both appellants and accept that they were let down by their former advisor. However, having weighed all of these factors together, the Tribunal concludes that neither Mr Grab nor Mr Vlad has demonstrated a sufficient basis for the exercise of discretion to admit the appeal out of time. The appeal was accordingly not admitted.

Conclusion

67. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal concludes that the delays in bringing the appeals were substantial. The appeal is not refused because the Tribunal rejects Mr Grab’s and Mr Vlad’s evidence. The Tribunal accepts much of that evidence. The difficulty is that, even taking the evidence at its highest, it does not adequately explain the whole of the lengthy delays. For example, whilst the accountant's conduct explains part of those delays, the appellants have not demonstrated sufficient justification for the continuing delays after concerns about the accountant had arisen. Considering all of the circumstances, the Tribunal declines to exercise its discretion to admit any of the appeals out of time.

68. The appeals are therefore dismissed.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

69. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

22 October 2026


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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