Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Gambee v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; [email protected] SJC-13964 ROBERT GAMBEE vs. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., & another.1 October 29, 2026. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. The petitioner, Robert Gambee, appeals from a judgment of the county court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. This matter arises from the foreclosure of Gambee's Nantucket residence in 2010. Beginning in 2013, Gambee commenced the first of five separate lawsuits challenging the foreclosure. Each one has been unsuccessful. Among these was a 2016 action in the Land Court. Seven years after that matter was dismissed, Gambee filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6),
365 Mass. 828
(1974).
In support of the motion, Gambee asserted that he had since
obtained proof that the foreclosure had been conducted by a bank
that never received any ownership interest in the home, an
allegation that he characterized as newly discovered evidence.
He further argued that this evidence established that one or
both of the defendants in that matter (who are the respondents
in the present action) had engaged in fraud. A judge in the
Land Court denied the motion as untimely, observing that Gambee
was seeking relief based on information he claimed to have
obtained six years prior to filing the motion. On March 13,
2025, Gambee filed a complaint in the Superior Court based upon
the same factual assertions that had served as the basis for the
aforementioned motion. The Superior Court dismissed the
complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. The court also
1 HSBC BANK USA, N.A., as trustee for MLMI 2006-AF2.
2
granted the defendants' request for entry of an order
prohibiting Gambee from filing any additional complaints in the
Superior Court without authorization from the regional
administrative justice. Gambee subsequently filed a motion
requesting leave to file a motion to vacate the Superior Court
judgment, citing rule 60 (b) (6). That motion was denied. On
May 19, 2026, Gambee filed the instant petition seeking relief
from the aforementioned Superior Court orders. A single justice
of this court denied the petition without a hearing, and this
appeal followed.
Gambee has submitted a memorandum and appendix pursuant to
S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended,
434 Mass. 1301
(2001), which requires a petitioner seeking relief from an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means." Because Gambee principally contests the dismissal of his civil action by the Superior Court, rule 2:21 does not technically apply. See Spencer v. Beacon Hill Hotel,
(2007); Gianopoulos v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Attleboro Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't,
(2006). Regardless of the applicability of the rule, however, Gambee is not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, unless he can establish the absence of an adequate alternative remedy. See Darby v. Commonwealth,
494 Mass. 1023
,
1023 (2024). Gambee cannot do so here.
In his memorandum, Gambee argues that a direct appeal from
the dismissal of his complaint does not provide an adequate
alternative remedy because the "correct vehicle" for
adjudicating his claim is a motion for relief from judgment
under rule 60 (b) (6). As indicated, he filed one such motion
in the Land Court and sought leave to do the same in the
Superior Court, based on his assertions about fraud and newly
discovered evidence. Both motions were denied, and Gambee did
not appeal. " The fact that the petitioner failed to pursue [an]
alternative route or pursued it unsuccessfully does not create a
right to relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3" (quotation and citation
omitted). Tavares v. Commonwealth,
(2019). Because Gambee could have sought appellate relief in the ordinary course, the single justice did not commit an error of law or abuse his discretion by denying extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. See Matter of an Impounded Case (No. 4),
497 Mass. 1036
, 1038 (2026) (affirming denial of petition
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, where petitioner could have appealed
judgment in ordinary course, as well as denial of rule 60
3
motion). See also Cooper v. CVS Pharmacy,
(2008) (petitioner seeking relief from Superior Court order
prohibiting him from filing claims without approval of regional
administrative justice failed to demonstrate absence of adequate
alternative remedies).
Judgment affirmed.
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by
a memorandum of law.
Robert Gambee, pro se.
Official sources: view the source page