Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Leanne Marie Sheppard v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Appeal No. UA-2026-000623-PIP
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER)
Between:
LEANNE MARIE SHEPPARD
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WORK AND PENSIONS
Respondent
Before: Upper Tribunal Judge West
Decided on consideration of the papers: 26 October 2026
On appeal from:
Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement
Chamber)
Tribunal Venue: Walsall
Panel: Judge Verman, Dr Rao, Ms Lock
Tribunal Case No: SC196/24/00706
Tribunal Hearing Date: 2/10/2025
DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Walsall dated 2 October 2025 under file reference SC196/24/00706 involves an error on a point of law. The appeal against that decision is allowed and the decision of the Tribunal is set aside.
The matter is remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a complete rehearing.
The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the mobility component of personal independence payment at the enhanced rate and the daily living component at the standard or the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 20 January 2026 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 4 August 2026.
This decision is made under section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
REASONS
1. This is an appeal, with my permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Walsall on 2 October 2025.
2. I shall refer to the appellant hereafter as “the claimant”. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. I shall refer to him hereafter as “the Secretary of State”. I shall refer to the tribunal which sat on 2 October 2025 as “the Tribunal” and the tribunal to which I am remitting the matter as “the new tribunal”.
3. The claimant appealed against the supersession decision of 9 April 2024 that she was entitled to 4 points for the daily living component and 12 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was therefore entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment, but not the daily living component, at the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027. The decision was subsequently reconsidered, but not revised, on 28 September 2024. She had previously been in receipt of the daily living component at the standard rate and the mobility component at the enhanced rate from and including 11 May 2020 to and including 15 April 2023 (which was subsequently extended to 15 April 2024).
4. The matter came before the Tribunal on 2 October 2025 when the claimant appeared and gave oral evidence. A presenting officer was also in attendance. The appeal was refused.
5. The Tribunal found that the claimant was entitled to 7 points for the daily living component and 12 points for the mobility component of personal independence payment. She was therefore entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment, but not the daily living component, at the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027.
6. On 19 June 2026 I acceded to the claimant’s application and granted her permission to appeal. It seemed to me that there was an arguable case that the Tribunal erred in law for the reasons set out in her grounds of appeal.
7. On 4 August 2026 the Secretary of State provided submissions and supported the appeal.
8. The claimant replied briefly on 8 October 2026.
9. Neither side has asked for an oral hearing and I do not consider that it is necessary to hold one in order to resolve the matter. Both parties have consented to a decision without reasons under rule 40(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
10. The Secretary of State confirmed that the claimant had not made any further claim for personal independence payment since the hearing on 2 October 2025.
11. The Secretary of State submitted that
“4.2 It is my submission that the FtT has erred in law in both its fact finding and duty to provide adequate reasons for its decision. The conclusion from the FtT on how they assessed the claimant’s functional abilities when dealing with the daily living activities appears limited in their reasoning. It seems that what the FtT has provided when reading the SOR, appears to be no more than a rehearsal of evidence and a conclusion without an explanation.
4.3 At paragraph 14 of the SOR, the FtT found as a fact “The appellant has mental health problems, back injury and epilepsy, autistic spectrum disorder.”
4.4 The entirety of the reasons provided in the SOR regarding daily living activity 5 – Managing toilet needs or incontinence read as follows:
“Activity 5 Toileting
50. The appellant has never claimed any difficulty with this activity. The appellant told the HCP that she had no difficulty getting on and off the toilet.
51. The tribunal found that the appellant can manage her toilet needs for more than 50 % of the time and 0 points were awarded.”
4.5 Part 2 of schedule 1 of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 lists the PIP daily living activities; activity 5 is “Managing toilet needs or incontinence.” Part 1 of schedule 1 defines these terms as follows:
““manage incontinence” means manage involuntary evacuation of the bowel or bladder, including use a collecting device or self-catheterisation, and clean oneself afterwards”
““toilet needs” means –
(a) getting on and off an unadapted toilet;
(b) evacuating the bladder and bowel; and
(c) cleaning oneself afterwards”
4.6 The FtT’s reasons at paragraphs 50 and 51 of the SOR solely address the claimant’s ability to get on and off an unadapted toilet. Contrary to the FtT’s assertion at paragraph 50 of the SOR, the claimant did in fact report difficulties with managing incontinence to the Healthcare Professional (HCP). According to page 75 of the HCP’s report, “She states no difficulty getting on and off the toilet, continent, unless she has a seizure.” Page 73 of the report explains “During seizures she becomes unconscious, incontinent of urine, no pre-aura”.
4.7 At paragraph 29 of the SOR:
29. “The tribunal found that at the date of the decision the appellant was at risk of a seizure. At the date of the decision the appellant had not been seizure free for at least one year and that she was still at risk of seizures…”
4.8 Given the evidence from the HCP’s report that the claimant became incontinent during seizures, the FtT ought to have considered whether incontinence pads were reasonably required on a precautionary basis. SSWP v NH (PIP) [2017] UKUT 258 (AAC) held:
5. “…The test is whether on the majority of days in the period to be looked at the claimant reasonably required the use of an aid or appliance (in this case incontinence pads) on a precautionary basis in order, in the Secretary of State’s words, to cope with the difficulties of involuntary evacuations of the bowel occurring a couple of times a week. The test is not whether those evacuations occur on more than 50% of the days in the period or whether the pads would actually absorb leakage on more than 50% of those days. Regulation 7 refers to whether a descriptor is satisfied on over 50% of the days in the period. Descriptor 5b can be satisfied in its terms by a reasonable need to use an aid or appliance on a precautionary basis on many more days than those on which incontinence actually occurs."
4.9 I respectfully submit the FtT failed to make proper findings of fact and provide adequate reasons for determining the claimant satisfied descriptor 5a – Can manage toilet needs or incontinence unaided. Upon one’s reading of the SOR, it is not evident the FtT applied the correct legal test and considered whether the claimant could manage her incontinence, and all aspects of her toilet needs, unaided. As a result, the FtT did not consider the evidence concerning the claimant’s incontinence during seizures, and whether descriptor 5b – Needs to use an aid or appliance to be able to manage toilet needs or incontinence, might apply on a precautionary basis on the majority of days.
4.10 Regarding daily living activity 6 – Dressing and undressing; at paragraphs 52 to 55 of the SOR, the FtT summarise the claimant’s oral evidence, and her evidence to the HCP and in her mandatory reconsideration request that she only changes into clean clothes approximately 3 days a week and often stays in pyjamas or wears the same clothes for several days if she is not leaving the house. At paragraph 56, the FtT determined the claimant scored no points for this activity:
56. “The tribunal relied upon the HCP report which was contemporaneous at the time of the decision. The HCP found that the appellant was able to dress herself for at least 50% of the days to a reasonable standard. An ability to get dressed when she needed to go out is an ability to dress to a reasonable standard. The appellant changed her clothes to a reasonable standard for more than 50% of the time. The appellant may have got worse, but the tribunal had to consider the circumstances at the date of the decision. 0 points were awarded.”
4.11 The HCP’s report does not state the claimant is able to dress herself for at least 50% of the days to a reasonable standard. Page 75 of the HCP’s report states:
“She is changing into clean clothes approximately 3 days a week due to fatigue and lack of motivation. Experiences pain in her back when changing her clothes. Able to do buttons and zips. Rests for approximately 30 minutes after dressing.”
The FtT do not appear to deal with their own conflict insofar as relying “upon the HCP report which was contemporaneous at the time of the decision”. It is clear (as noted above), that the HCP did not report what the FtT stated at paragraph 56 (repeated above). The reader is left in doubt as to what the FtT were in fact relying upon.
4.12 Regulation 4(2A) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 states claimants are to be assessed as satisfying a descriptor only if they can do so to an “acceptable standard”, rather than a reasonable standard. DE v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2021] UKUT 226 (AAC) considered the meaning of “to an acceptable standard”:
63. “Where [the Claimant’s] ability to carry out an activity is assessed, [the Claimant] is to be assessed as satisfying a descriptor only if [the Claimant] can do so… (b) to an acceptable standard” (Regulation 4(2A), PIP Regulations 2013). The concept of an “acceptable standard” is not defined in the Regulations but it should be given its everyday meaning and should be determined with reference to both an objective viewpoint and a subjective viewpoint: does an independent outsider consider the activity to be done to an acceptable standard, and does the Appellant consider the activity is done to an acceptable standard also (PA v SSWP (PIP) [2019] UKUT 270 (AAC)). The Department of Work and Pensions PIP Assessment Guide, which is not legally binding but which provides helpful guidance, suggests that an acceptable standard is anywhere between an extremely high standard at the top end of the range and a “not perfect but sufficient” standard at the lower end of the range (paragraph 2.2.12). It can therefore be said that an acceptable standard is a standard which is “good enough”.”
4.13 While the FtT found “An ability to get dressed when she needed to go out is an ability to dress to a reasonable standard” [para 56], objectively and subjectively, remaining in dirty and malodorous clothing for days cannot be understood to be dressing and undressing to a ‘good enough’ standard simply because these clothes are not worn in public. Regulation 4(2A) requires claimants are only to be assessed as satisfying a descriptor if they are able to do so safely, to an acceptable standard, repeatedly, and within a reasonable time period. Regulation 4(4)(b) explains “repeatedly” means as often as the activity being assessed is reasonably required to be completed. The FtT do not appear to have considered whether the claimant can be understood to be able to dress and undress as often as is reasonably required if she is only changing into clean clothes on approximately 3 days a week. Moreover, the claimant stated at page 153 that “I will often wear the same clothes for a number of days”. Therefore, in remaining in the same clothes, is the claimant dressing to a reasonable standard?
4.14 The claimant’s “ability to get dressed when she needed to go out” [para 56] does not necessarily demonstrate that she is able to dress herself unprompted on the majority of days. GG v SSWP (PIP) [2016] UKUT 0194 (AAC) held it is not appropriate to limit the scope of enquiry to days where there is a specific impetus for a claimant to perform a task:
7. “Further, regulation 7(1)(a) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013 indicates that a particular descriptor is satisfied in circumstances where a claimant is unable to perform the relevant function on over 50% of the days of the period under consideration. The tribunal appeared to accept that around the time of the decision, though it seems matters may have subsequently improved, the claimant did not normally attend to his hygiene needs adequately and, perhaps by implication, did not always dress himself either. However, it appears to have taken the view that prompting was not needed for the majority of the time because when there was an imperative he was capable of acting. That seems to me to be too simplistic an approach. The mere fact that a claimant might be sufficiently motivated to perform a task when there is specific or unusual impetus to do so does not, of itself, inform as to the overall position and the generality of the situation. So it is not appropriate to limit the scope of the enquiry to such days. True an ability to perform a task without prompting when there is particular pressure to do so might be indicative of a claimant simply exercising a choice not to perform such a task on impetus absent days but that will not necessarily follow. What has to be undertaken is a more general and all encompassing consideration. So, there needs to be an assessment, in such cases, of why it is that, on days when a claimant does not perform certain tasks, he/she does not do so. If it is because, without any specific impetus, he/she is not motivated to do so as a result of health difficulties and that such days exist for more than 50% of the time in the relevant assessment period, then absent other pertinent considerations, the relevant descriptor or descriptors will apply. That was not this tribunal’s approach and I conclude that, in consequence, it did err in law. Of course, though, and obviously, mere indolence will not lead to a genuine need for prompting being established.”
4.15 At paragraphs 53 and 54 of the SOR, the FtT acknowledge the claimant’s evidence to the HCP that she is only changing her clothes on the minority of days “due to fatigue and lack of motivation” and in her mandatory reconsideration request that she does not change her clothes for several days when “experiencing a depressive episode.” The FtT’s reasons fail to explain why, in light of the evidence suggesting that due to the claimant’s health conditions without any specific impetus she lacks the motivation to dress and undress on the majority of days, they concluded she scored no points for daily living activity 6.
4.16 I respectfully submit the FtT have failed to provide adequate reasons for determining the claimant satisfied descriptor 6a – Can dress and undress unaided repeatedly and to an acceptable standard on the majority of days under regulations 4(2A) and 7 of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013. The FtT failed to consider the evidence in a holistic manner and make proper findings of fact concerning the claimant’s difficulties with daily living activity 6. As a result, the FtT did not consider whether any of the scoring descriptors might apply on the majority of days.
4.17 Regarding daily living activity 9 – Engaging with other people face-to-face; at paragraph 73 of the SOR, the FtT found:
73. “The tribunal found that the appellant had been able to establish a relationship with a neighbour who now assists her to walk the dog. The appellant had maintained relationships with family members including her mother and stepfather and with friends at the date of the decision. There is no evidence that the appellant has or requires social support to engage socially.”
While the FtT acknowledge at paragraph 67 the claimant told the HCP she “would delay engaging with someone unfamiliar as long as possible” and at paragraph 69 that she stated in her mandatory reconsideration request “she avoids meeting people”, at paragraph 74 they concluded:
74. “The tribunal found no medical reason why the appellant could not engage with people for 50% of the time. At the date of the decision the appellant interacted with family members and a number of friends. 0 points were awarded.”
4.18 HA v SSWP (PIP) [2018] UKUT 56 (AAC) held:
13. “It is now widely accepted that the definition of "engage socially" in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Social Security (Personal Independence Payments) Regulations 2013 applies to daily living activity 9, even though the expression does not actually appear within the terms of the activity or its descriptors. The expression is defined as meaning: “(a) interact with others in a contextually and socially appropriate manner; (b) understand body language; and (c) establish relationships”. If a claimant is unable to satisfy these criteria, it follows that (s)he is unable to engage with other people “to an acceptable standard” (regulation 4(2A)(b)).”
The claimant’s representative submits [UT bundle, page 8] the claimant has known the neighbour the FtT referred to in paragraph 73 of the SOR for 11 years; therefore, this relationship was clearly not established during the relevant period.
4.19 The FtT’s reasoning in paragraphs 73 and 74 relies on the claimant’s ability maintain relationships with close family and friends; however, in HJ v SSWP [2016] UKUT 0487 (AAC) it was held:
18. “…There is no indication in the regulations that the term “engage socially” is limited to engagement with people who a claimant knows. Indeed the use of the word “others” in the definition of “engage socially”, which is unqualified, strongly suggests that it is not so limited. Moreover, the requirement to be able to establish relationships suggests that the activity is not limited to considering engagement with those known to a claimant. Although it is not itself a statement of the law, I am reinforced in this by the PIP Assessment Guide published by the Department for Work and Pensions which states (page 122):
“When considering whether claimants can engage with others, consideration should be given to whether they can engage with people generally, not just those people they know well”.”
HA confirms tribunals must consider a claimant’s ability to engage with people generally, not just people they know well:
18. “Further, the “other people” relied upon by the tribunal were all people known to the claimant. However, the term “engage socially” is not limited to such people. Rather, a tribunal must consider a claimant’s ability to engage with people generally, and not just those people they know well (HJ v SSWP [2016] UKUT 0487 (AAC)). The tribunal did not address whether the claimant’s ability to engage with those listed by it showed that he was able to engage with people generally, rather than just those whom he knew well. That, also, constituted an error of law.”
4.20 The only unfamiliar person the SOR describes the claimant engaging with is the HCP [paras 66 and 68]. The FtT neglect to note that this was during a telephone assessment [page 72]. HA held relying on a claimant’s ability to engage with others using the telephone amounted to an error of law:
19. “Finally, the tribunal’s reliance on the claimant’s ability to use a phone to engage with others was misplaced, and amounted to a further error of law. The tribunal did not explain in what way it considered that the claimant could use a phone to engage with other people. In fact, the evidence was that he would send texts by phone. The description of the activity is “engaging with other people face to face” (my emphasis). I am quite unable to see how a claimant’s ability to use a phone to send texts could possibly demonstrate an ability to engage with other people “face to face”, not least because one of the requisite criteria of an ability to “engage socially” is an ability to understand body language.”
4.21 The FtT appear to have further erred in relying on the claimant’s ability to engage socially using a phone when considering her friendships. Paragraph 71 of the SOR refers to a friend who helped to look after the claimant’s son during the relevant period, who the claimant presumably engaged with face-to-face; however, the other friends the claimant referred to in her oral evidence “do not live nearby and the three of them are in a chat group. She last went to Manchester to see her friends before lockdown” [para 70]. The claimant does not appear to have engaged with these friends face-to-face during the relevant period.
4.22 I respectfully submit the FtT have failed to provide adequate reasons for determining the claimant satisfied descriptor 9a – Can engage with other people unaided on the majority of days under regulation 7 of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013. Upon one’s reading of the SOR, the FtT do not appear to have considered whether the three elements of engaging socially, as outlined in the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013, could be satisfied through the claimant maintaining relationships with close family and friends, or through telephone communication. The FtT failed to consider the evidence in a holistic manner and make proper findings of fact concerning the claimant’s difficulties with daily living activity 9. As a result, the FtT did not consider whether any of the scoring descriptors might apply on the majority of days.
4.23 Although the FtT is entitled to give weighting to whatever evidence that it chooses, where there is conflicting evidence, it must in the first instance explore and consider it in a holistic manner and provide sufficient reasons explaining why it preferred the evidence that it had. In this appeal the FtT does not appear to have done that. There seems to be a distinct lack of evaluation of the claimant’s evidence concerning how her health conditions impact upon her functional ability to undertake the daily living activities. Therefore, it could be said that had the FtT given appropriate consideration to all the evidence, including accurately identifying the lack of motivation and the effects of the claimant’s conditions, the FtT may have considered the claimant’s limitations. As such, I submit that the FtT have failed to give adequate reasons as to why evidence in parts was not accepted when deciding what points were awarded.
4.24 In view of the above, I respectfully submit that the inadequacy of reasons makes it difficult for the claimant to know whether the FtT applied the correct legal tests in assessing the evidence, making their findings of fact, and arriving at their decision. If the UT Judge accepts my submission that the FtT has erred in law on points identified earlier in this submission, then I respectfully request that the appeal be remitted to a different First-tier Tribunal for further fact finding. Notwithstanding my support of the above grounds, I courteously submit that any further grounds raised by the claimant’s representative will be subsumed by the newly constituted FtT.”
12. For the reasons identified by the Secretary of State, I am satisfied that the Tribunal made errors of law which were material to the decision and for that reason the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.
13. In the circumstances I do not need to consider whether the Tribunal made any other errors of law.
14. I am satisfied that the resolution of any other grounds of appeal will fall to be subsumed at the hearing before the new tribunal.
15. I therefore allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. I remit the matter to a new tribunal which should conduct a complete rehearing of the matter.
16. I must stress that the fact that this appeal to the Upper Tribunal has succeeded should not be taken as any indication as to the outcome of the rehearing by the new tribunal. It is quite possible that the new tribunal may end up effectively coming to the same decision as the previous Tribunal, namely that the claimant was entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment, but not the daily living component, at the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027.
17. Alternatively, it is possible that the new tribunal might take a different view of the facts from that of the Tribunal and reach the conclusion that in fact the claimant was entitled to the mobility component of personal independence payment at the enhanced rate and the daily living component at the standard or the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027.
18. It is for the new tribunal itself to decide which of these alternative options open to it applies, depending on the view it takes of the facts and providing it makes proper findings of fact and gives adequate reasons. It would not be appropriate for me to express any opinion either way on the merits of the appeal.
19. The following directions apply to the hearing before the new tribunal:
(1) The new tribunal should not involve any member who was a member of the Tribunal involved in the hearing of the appeal.
(2) The new tribunal must considerand make relevant findings as to whether or not the claimant satisfied the criteria to be awarded the mobility component of personal independence payment at the enhanced rate and the daily living component at the standard or the enhanced rate from and including 9 April 2024 to and including 19 February 2027. In so doing the new tribunal should in particular have regard to the claimant’s grounds of appeal dated 20 January 2026 and the submissions of the Secretary of State dated 4 August 2026.
Mark West
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Signed on the original on 26 October 2026
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