Administrative United Kingdom

MJ v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/84480/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at The Priory Courts, Birmingham

On 23 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LE GRYS

Between

MJ

(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms S. Kalyan, instructed by Burton & Burton Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mrs M. Morgan, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

DECISION

1. The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

2. The Appellant, a citizen of Libya, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 30 July 2025 to refuse his protection claim made on 23 March 2025. As such, sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

3. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is a protection appeal and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in the particular circumstances of the case.

BACKGROUND

4. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS, and includes a stitched bundle (the “SB”) of 161 pages. Any references in this decision to page numbers will be to the PDF page.

5. The Respondent’s decision summarises the Appellant’s immigration history and asylum claim. In short, the Appellant claims that his brother was killed in Libya after the brother refused to work for a militia group. The Appellant states that he was then targeted for having reported the matter to the authorities, and that he was given an ultimatum to either join the group himself or also be killed. He claims that his leg was broken by the group. He states that he fled Libya as a result, and that he would be killed if he was to now return.

6. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant is a national of Libya but rejected, largely on credibility grounds, the remaining material facts of his claim.

HEARING

Preliminary issues

7. The Appellant was assisted throughout the hearing by an Arabic interpreter. Both confirmed that they fully understood each other and no issues were raised in respect of the interpretation.

Issues in dispute

8. At the outset, I clarified the issues with the representatives. The following was agreed:

(a) The Appellant is a national of Libya.

(b) The treatment he claims to fear, taken at its highest, would amount to persecution.

(c) If the material facts of the Appellant’s claim are accepted, there would not be sufficiency of protection on return and he could not internally relocate.

(d) If the Appellant’s account is not found to be credible, he does not claim to be at risk for any other reason.

(e) The Appellant does not rely on Article 8 as a standalone matter, and this accordingly stands or falls with the protection appeal.

(f) The Appellant does not bring his claim under Article 3 on a medical basis.

9. The following issues are in dispute:

(a) Whether the claim is advanced for a Convention reason. The Appellant states that the Convention reason is imputed political opinion.

(b) Whether the Appellant is credible in his claim to have received adverse attention from the militia group after he refused to be recruited by them.

Evidence

10. I heard evidence from the Appellant, who adopted his two witness statements as his evidence‑in‑chief and was cross‑examined. I heard closing submissions from both parties. I reserved my decision.

11. When asked to confirm that his statements had been read back to him in a language he understood, the Appellant first claimed to have translated them himself, using the internet. He then stated that the declaration from the interpreter, that they had read the statements to the Appellant, had in fact been his friend. He nevertheless confirmed that the statements had indeed been read back to him in a language that he understood, and that he was satisfied that everything within them was true.

12. Ms Kalyan indicated that the interpreter named in the declaration at the end of the statement was the same interpreter she had used for pre-hearing discussions with the Appellant, and that she had not been aware of any relationship between them. The Appellant remained silent in response.

13. Later, when cross-examined, the Appellant stated that he had written the statements himself using ChatGPT. He repeated that the interpreter was his friend, but said that he did not work for the legal representatives. He gave a name for his friend, however, that was different from the name shown as the interpreter on the statements.

14. When it was highlighted that his declaration of truth (SB42) accordingly stated that the statement was read to him by someone other than his named friend, he then claimed that this person had also read the statements back to him, and that they were connected to his first solicitors.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

15. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to section 32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Does the Appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?

(b) Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?

16. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(a) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and

(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the Appellant.

17. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the Appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the Appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.

18. A person may be granted humanitarian protection where they do not qualify as a refugee but substantial grounds exist for believing that, if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm; that they are unable, or owing to that risk unwilling, to avail themselves of the protection of that country; that they cannot reasonably relocate internally; and that they are not excluded from humanitarian protection.

19. In respect of Article 3, the burden of proof is on the Appellant to show a breach to the lower standard of proof, that is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ or ‘real risk.’ Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3; in accordance with Bouyid v Belgium (Application no. 23380/09) and AA (Morocco) [2025] EWCA Civ 144, this will depend on all the circumstances of the case. If the Appellant establishes substantial grounds for believing that expulsion would violate Article 3, then the burden shifts to the Respondent to dispel any serious doubts.

20. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 it was restated that there is no requirement for an Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence. However, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value. Supporting documentary evidence is not required where the requirements of paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules are met. Where those requirements are not met, a judge may take into account the absence of supporting documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected.

21. As per Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, documentary evidence should be appraised in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and all the other evidence in the case.

FINDINGS

22. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons.

Appeal on asylum grounds

23. It is necessary to begin by addressing the issues which arose when the Appellant was asked to adopt his written statements, and claimed to have drafted these statements himself using ChatGPT, and to have had them translated by a friend. While this is clearly irregular, I nevertheless take into account that, however the statements came into existence, the Appellant was adamant that he had fully understood their contents, and that everything within them was true. At no point was it suggested, either by the Appellant in his oral evidence or in closing submissions on his behalf, that any inconsistencies, discrepancies, or omissions might be explained by reference to the circumstances in which the statements were created. I also remind myself that he has been legally represented throughout the proceedings, which includes at the hearing itself, and so find that I have no reasonable basis to conclude that the statements do not properly reflect the evidence he intended to give. I therefore make clear that I do not take the manner in which the statements were prepared into consideration any further in my assessment of the evidence.

24. I accept that the Appellant has, in the most general of terms, been consistent from the outset of his claim to be at risk on account of a militia group in Libya. This was first raised in his screening interview of 20 March 2025 (Q4.1, SB121), and has been maintained since.

25. I also acknowledge the potential support from the documentation provided by the Appellant, which includes references to a fire at his home (SB46); to the fact that two named individuals are wanted by the authorities (SB48); and to the death of an individual, said to be the Appellant’s brother, from a gunshot injury (SB50). I remind myself, however, that it is for the Appellant to establish the reliability of such documentation, which I assess in light of the evidence taken in the round.

26. Beyond these relatively limited points in the Appellant’s favour, however, his evidence was otherwise littered with significant inconsistencies and actions which appear, on their face, difficult to reconcile with the claimed level of risk.

27. For example, the Appellant claimed in his screening interview to have worked in customs and immigration between 2013 and 2023 (Q5.1, SB123). He also claims, however, to have been in hiding from the militia group from around the time of his brother’s death in 2015 (for example, at [11], SB37). His explanation in oral evidence as to how he seemingly continued to work while in hiding was that he had, in fact, stopped working around 2015, but that his uncle would sign in for him, such that he was still at work “on paper”. He claimed that he continued being paid until 2024. When asked how no one had noticed his absence for nine years, he simply stated that “nobody took note”.

28. I remind myself of the inherent dangers of making assumptions about plausibility in an asylum context, and accept that fraud within an employment context can occur. I nevertheless take into account, when considering matters in the round, the apparent contradiction between the Appellant’s claimed dates of employment and the time when he claims to have been in hiding. Furthermore, I note that the Appellant’s explanation for this apparent discrepancy is something which, to be true, requires the acceptance of matters which, on their face, appear inherently unlikely, regardless of the cultural context. In this respect, while it is not something that I consider undermines the Appellant’s account in and of itself, I nevertheless take it into account when considering everything in the round.

29. The Appellant was inconsistent as to why he was targeted by the militia. In his two witness statements, he said that he reported his brother’s death and “kept demanding justice”, but was faced with “indifference or outright hostility” (SB131). He does, of course, nevertheless rely on the police documentation already mentioned. As a result of his claimed persistence in pursuing the matter, he states that he became the subject of adverse attention. In contrast, in his asylum interview of 26 June 2025 it was the Appellant’s father who reported the matter (Q79, SB151). Furthermore, in oral evidence the Appellant did not adequately explain why the army was not involved in any investigation, having said that his brother was a serving soldier. He simply stated that they “wouldn’t do anything” because the brother had died. I accordingly take into account the lack of clarity within the account as to the circumstances in which the adverse attention is said to have arisen.

30. The Appellant was inconsistent as to the nature of the adverse attention he received. In his screening interview he is unambiguous in stating that the threats were made “in a verbal way” (Q4.1, SB121), and makes no reference to any physical assault. His subsequent account, however, is that he was attacked, his legs were broken, and his cousin was shot (for example at [12], SB38).

31. While I remind myself that an individual may not always mention everything when asked to briefly explain the reasons for their claim within the potentially stressful environment of a screening interview, I find that the failure to mention a serious physical assault, and instead to rely only on verbal threats, is a striking omission, even after the need for caution is taken into account. The apparently significant shift in respect of the nature of the claimed risk is accordingly another matter which I take into consideration when looking at everything in the round.

32. The Appellant was inconsistent as to how any injuries he may have were sustained. In his screening interview, he referred to broken bones in his legs and feet, operations in 2019 and 2023, and shrapnel injuries sustained during military action in Tripoli (Q2.1, SB115). In his asylum interview, however, he stated that it was the militia who had broken his “legs” (plural) (Q58, SB148). In his witness statements, he then claimed that only his left leg had been broken (at [12], SB38). While I acknowledge that the reference to “legs” in the interview could be explained by poor expression or misunderstanding, this does not explain why he previously grouped the “broken bones in my legs and feet” with the other injuries that he described as having resulted “from bombs during the war”, while also stating that the risk from the militia had been purely verbal. At the very least, his accounts lacked clarity and consistency.

33. I do acknowledge that the UK medical notes are capable of supporting the Appellant’s claim that he previously suffered an injury to his left leg and underwent treatment. They nevertheless do not establish when, where or how that injury was sustained. The Libyan medical report (SB44) concerns a shrapnel injury to the neck and provides no information about the leg injury.

34. The medical notes also show that the Appellant requested a detailed medical report concerning his injuries for use in his asylum claim (SB53). Such a report was not served. When asked why, the Appellant first stated that he had the report at home and had not appreciated the need to give it to the Tribunal. He then said that he could bring it; then that he had provided everything already and it had slipped his mind; and finally that he had, in fact, given a copy to his lawyer. I do not draw an adverse inference from the mere absence of corroboration. I do, however, take into account that a report specifically requested for these proceedings was not produced, and that the Appellant gave inconsistent explanations for its absence.

35. While I accordingly accept that the Appellant suffered a historical injury to his leg, I do not accept that the medical evidence establishes that the injury was inflicted by the militia in the circumstances claimed.

36. The Appellant was inconsistent as to what happened in the 2019 attack. In his witness statement of 24 June 2025, he was ambushed, beaten, and left for dead on the roadside, before being rescued by “kind-hearted passers-by” who “found me and took me to my family”. There is no mention of anyone else being present. In his statement of 9 March 2026, however, his cousin was also there, and was shot by the attackers. Furthermore, rather than being left at the roadside, the Appellant now claims that he was able to escape to a “nearby farm”, where he was assisted by a family.

37. The Appellant maintained in oral evidence that he had run to a farm. When asked why his first statement referred to being found by passers-by at the roadside, he initially stated that this was the road to the farm, where he was found by the people who took him into the farmhouse. He then said that he had run away, where he came across the owner of the farm. When asked how he had run if his leg was broken, he said he “had to” because he was “running away from death”. When asked why he had not previously mentioned the presence of his cousin, he insisted that he had. He then stated that the “passers-by” he had first described had, in fact, helped his cousin, rather than him.

38. In this respect I take into account the fact that the Appellant’s account as to a core aspect of his claim has repeatedly changed in a number of significant ways, and treat this as further undermining his credibility.

39. The Appellant claims to have then fled to Tunisia. He was inconsistent as to how long he was there for. In his statement of 24 June 2025, he was there for one month (SB131). In his statement of 9 March 2026, he was there for eight months (at [14], SB38).

40. However long it was, and notwithstanding the absence of any asserted risk in Tunisia, the Appellant states that he returned to Libya. He was seemingly not traced by the militia despite having his passport stamped on re-entry. The explanation for this was limited to an assertion that his uncle was able to arrange this in such a way that he was “not entered into the official system”.

41. Furthermore, the Appellant was seemingly able to not only enter the country undetected, but also to purchase a house. While his written evidence had referred to this property being on the “border”, he confirmed in oral evidence that it was inside Libya. He then lived there for up to two years, which included doing considerable work on the house, having stated in oral evidence that it had been derelict, but was nevertheless not discovered. He makes no mention of taking any further action in respect of his brother’s death during this period, notwithstanding the sole claimed reason for his return to the country of risk being his “sense of duty” and the “need to seek justice” for his brother (SB131). When he does assert that he was eventually found and his house was burned down, the purported police report (SB46) makes no mention of a deliberately started fire.

42. I accordingly take into account the apparent discrepancy between the Appellant’s claimed level of risk and the decision to return to Libya, alongside the discrepancy between the claimed level of adverse interest and the apparent ability to safely re-enter and then reside in the country there for an extended period.

43. Even after this claimed arson attack, the Appellant remained in Libya for approximately a further two years, before obtaining a visa for Malta. Again, neither the process of obtaining a visa, nor his leaving the country using his own details, appears to have come to the attention of any adverse actors. While in Malta, he claims to have then sought to reach Germany (at [15], SB38), but was prevented from doing so by the authorities, who sought instead to return him to Libya.

44. In his witness statement of 9 March 2026, the Appellant is unambiguous in stating that he “insisted” that the authorities in Malta returned him to Tunisia. When asked in oral evidence why he did not instead claim asylum in Malta, he repeatedly stated that they had not given him the chance to do so, but also said that he had pleaded with them not to send him to Libya. When asked why, if he could plead with them, he was not able to tell them what the problem was or claim asylum, he then claimed that he had simply been placed into an office and left there, before he was put on a plane.

45. When asked why he had then chosen to return, for the second time, to Libya from Tunisia, when he himself had demanded to go to Tunisia, he denied ever having asked to be sent there. He repeated that he was instead placed in an office, before being put on a plane. When the discrepancy with his written statement was highlighted, he then said that he had been placed in a waiting area with Tunisian citizens, rather than an office, and said that he did, in fact, ask to be sent back with them.

46. I find in the circumstances that the Appellant’s explanation as to why he did not claim asylum while in Malta was unclear and inconsistent, and treat this as damaging to his credibility in accordance with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Furthermore, I additionally take into account the fact that the Appellant then returned for a second time to Libya from the apparent safety of Tunisia, and was again not tracked upon his re-entry.

47. The Appellant was inconsistent as to his intended destination on leaving Libya. In his screening interview, he was unambiguous in stating that the intention was always to reach the UK; it is, in fact, an answer he gives twice (Q3.7, SB119, and Q3.9). In his written and oral evidence, however, he stated that his intention was to reach Germany, and denied ever planning to reach the UK. Notwithstanding that claim, he never actually went to Germany. Having obtained a second visa, this time for Italy, he instead travelled through Italy, into France, and then on to the UK. When asked in oral evidence why he chose to go to France from Italy and then the UK rather than Germany, he gave no explanation beyond claiming to have been “confused”.

48. Before undertaking any of these travels, he yet again appears to have been able to safely leave Libya without being traced, during either the application process for a visa, or on departure.

49. The Appellant did not claim asylum when he was in Italy, claiming a fear of being returned to Libya. He did not clearly explain why he feared that the Italian authorities would return him, but not the French or British authorities. His evidence as to his actions in France was also inconsistent. In his screening interview, he is clear that he claimed asylum in France, but that this was refused (Q3.3, SB117). He repeats that he claimed asylum in France during his asylum interview, but states that this was only to get a “piece of paper” (Q97, SB155), so he could travel freely within the country, without being arrested. In his statement of 9 March 2026, he then states that his claim in France had in fact been genuine (at [40], SB41), and makes no mention of being refused. In oral evidence, he was adamant that he was never refused.

50. Taken together, I do not find that the Appellant has provided a coherent or consistent explanation as to why he did not claim asylum in Italy, or remain in France for his claim to be determined. In the alternative, I find that he demonstrated a willingness to misuse the French asylum system as a means of facilitating his onward journey to the UK. In either case, I treat these matters as significantly damaging to his credibility.

51. The Appellant provided only limited and inconsistent evidence concerning how the documents he relies upon were obtained and transmitted to him. At different points he referred to his uncle obtaining documents and to his father sending documents to him. The documents were not provided before his claim was determined, notwithstanding the fact that they appear to have been available before then. I take both matters into account when assessing their reliability. Furthermore, while I have already acknowledged that the documents may support the occurrence of a fire, the death of a named person from a gunshot injury, and the existence of proceedings concerning two named individuals, they do not establish that the deceased was the Appellant’s brother, that the militia was responsible for the death, that the death resulted from refused recruitment, or that the Appellant was subsequently threatened or attacked.

52. Taking everything together, I find the Appellant’s account lacked even a basic degree of consistency, in respect of what ought to have been relatively straightforward matters sitting at the heart of his claim. The detail instead varied significantly. This occurred both in his written statements and in his oral evidence, where he would frequently contradict himself even within the course of giving a single answer. As much of this related to basic details, about which it is accordingly reasonable to expect a greater level of consistency, I find this significantly undermines his credibility.

53. Indeed, I find that the accounts varied so significantly, and in a manner where the different answers cannot be reasonably reconciled, that I instead draw the reasonable inference that the Appellant was not providing his genuine recollection of true events but was instead seeking to adapt aspects of his account as questions were put to him.

54. When this is viewed alongside his initial account that the intention was always to reach the UK, his oral evidence that the Libyan medical document was originally obtained so that he could obtain treatment abroad, his failure to claim asylum in Malta or Italy, and the evidence concerning his misuse of the asylum process in France to facilitate his onward journey, I also draw the inference that the Appellant's departure from Libya was motivated principally by a desire to obtain medical treatment rather than by a fear of persecution.

55. I therefore do not accept that the Appellant has shown that he was targeted by the militia in Libya. I do not accept that his documentation has been shown to be reliable. While I am prepared to accept that he previously suffered physical injuries, I do not accept that they were inflicted by the militia. I find that the more likely explanation is the one he originally gave, namely that they resulted from unconnected military action. I accordingly do not find that such injuries are themselves indicative of an ongoing risk.

56. I instead find that the Appellant’s ability to live in Libya for many years, alongside his ability to repeatedly travel into and out of the country, obtain visas, acquire and repair a property, and remain registered in government employment until 2024, is inconsistent with his claim to have been in continuous hiding from a powerful militia throughout that period. The more natural inference to be drawn from these facts is that he was instead safely living and working in the country until he chose to leave.

57. I therefore do not find that the Appellant has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that a Convention characteristic would be attributed to him, or that he genuinely fears return on that basis. Nor do I find, to the lower standard, that any such fear would be objectively well-founded. Realistically, the conclusion that must inevitably be drawn from my findings of fact and the consequential inferences is that the Appellant has sought to construct a claim out of his pre-existing injuries. The asylum appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Appeal on humanitarian protection grounds

58. As set out above, I have not accepted the Appellant’s account of events, including when assessed to the applicable lower standard of proof. I therefore find that he has not established substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm on return. It was not suggested that the Appellant would otherwise be at risk, absent a positive credibility finding in relation to the claimed events, as a result of the general country situation. The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is accordingly also dismissed.

Appeal on human rights grounds

59. For the same reasons, I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on return.

60. The appeal on Article 8 grounds stood and fell with the protection appeal and is therefore also dismissed. For completeness, I note that the Appellant will be returning to the country of his nationality, where he previously lived and worked. He continues to speak the language, and it is reasonable to infer that he retains an understanding of the culture and how society operates. He has family remaining there, and there is no reasonable basis on which to conclude that they would be unable or unwilling to assist him in his re-integration. He gave no evidence of any significant private life in the UK, and any such private life that has been formed was at a time when the Appellant was aware that he had no long term right to remain.

61. In those circumstances, it has not been shown that there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Libya, and the factors relied upon by him do not outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. The decision is accordingly proportionate.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.

The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.

The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed: J Le Grys

First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys Date: 28 October 2026

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