Miscellaneous Mauritius

Supreme Court of Mauritius, 7 May 2026, 2026 INT 115 – P. Lucknauth v J.K. Jaudhub

P. Lucknauth v J.K. Jaudhub

2026 INT 115

CN: 294/22 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF MAURITIUS (CIVIL DIVISION) In the matter of:- Preetam Lucknauth Plaintiff v/s Jeetendra Kumar Jaudhub Defendant JUDGMENT: 1. The Plaintiff is praying for a judgment condemning and ordering the Defendant to pay to him the sum of Rs2,000,000/- representing the amount paid to the Defendant in excess of works performed by him on the site situate at Lot 204, Jardin D’Anna. With interest and costs.

2. The Defendant has denied the claim of the Plaintiff and raise a plea in limine litis to the effect that the Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed since the Plaintiff has failed to put “en demeure” the Defendant before entering the present action.

3. It is agreed between the parties that there was a written agreement signed for the (a) construction of grey works, (b) installation of aluminium doors and windows, (c) installation of electrical and plumbing and (d) construction the pool.

4. Subsequent, to the first agreement there was a second verbal agreement in relation to the additional work for the installation of the metal roof sheeting and the false ceilings entered between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

5. I shall consider the first agreement before considering the second agreement.

First agreement

6. The Plaintiff has testified and stated the terms of the agreement are as per the written agreement dated 12 January 2021 (Doc C).

7. As per paragraph 2 of the Defendant’s plea, the Defendant has averred that the price quoted was subject to rectification and adjustment at the termination of the construction. The Defendant has also testified that he informed the Plaintiff several times that there are additional costs which the Plaintiff agreed to pay at first and later refused to pay.

8. I find apt to refer to article 1134 of the Mauritian Code Civil which provides that: “1134. Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi.”

9. Furthermore article 1156 of the Mauritian Code Civil provides that

“On doit dans les conventions rechercher quelle a été la commune intention des parties contractantes, plutôt que de s’arrêter au sens littéral des termes.”

10. In applying article 1134 and 1156 of the Mauritian Code Civil to the present case, I find that the agreement produced in court which is the law of the parties, does not contain any clause to the effect that the agreed price was subjected to rectification or adjustment at the termination of the construction.

11. Moreover, I have assessed the demeanour of the Defendant as a whole and I find that he was inconsistent on this issue. The Defendant agreed that he visited the construction site before signing the agreement [pg 37 of the Transcript of Proceeding dated 26 th May 2025]. He went to the syndic office with the Plaintiff to sign another document and again went on site whereby he was informed by the syndic that the groundbreaking needs to be done before laying the foundation. [pg 39 of the Transcript of Proceeding dated 26 th of May 2025]. The Defendant at no point in time asked the Plaintiff to amend the agreement or change the amount inserted for the work. To the contrary the Defendant signed an agreement whereby an amount is inserted for each item. The Defendant agreed to do the work and even started the work at the agreed price. This agreement was never amended during the course of the construction.

12. This evidently show that the intention of the parties at the time of concluding the agreement was for the construction and the installation to be made at a fixed price of Rs3,905,000 without any adjustment.

13. I have considered all the evidence on record as well as the submissions of both counsel and the demeanour of all the witnesses, I find that the version of the Defendant, to the effect that the agreement was subject to rectification and adjustment at the termination of the construction, is untenable as the common intention of the parties when signing the agreement was clearly for the work to be done at a fixed price of Rs3,905,000.

14. The Plaintiff has testified that he paid the sum of Rs3,905,000 as per the agreement. He produced his bank statement to that effect. The Defendant also agreed having received this amount from the Plaintiff. Consequently, the Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of the agreement.

15. The Plaintiff has further testified that the Defendant has stopped coming to work and was not picking up his calls. He therefore considered that the Defendant has abandoned the work.

16. As per the agreement, it is clearly averred in capitals as follow:

“IN CASE OF DEFAULT BY THE CONTRACTOR, WHICH INCLUDES THE NON -TIMELY COMPLETION OF THE WORKS/ABANDON OF THE WORKS DUE TO FINANCIAL ISSUES OR INCAPACITY TO COMPLETE THE WORKS, THE CONTRACTOR HAS TO REFUND THE MONEY WHICH HAS BEEN PAID IN EXCESS OF THE WORKS EXECUTED ON SITE.”

17. In light of the above clause, the Plaintiff retained the services of Jeetah Consulting Ltd. Mr Jeetah testified in court and explained the percentage of work completed as per the first agreement as follows:

Contract work Amount as per Contract Percentage completed Value of work done Overpaymen t Grey work Rs3,080,000 75% Rs2,310,000 Rs770,000 Pool Rs300,000 60% Rs180,000 Rs120,000 Aluminium Rs175,000 0% 0 Rs175,000 Electric/ plumbing Rs350,000 15% Rs52,500 Rs297,500 Rs3,905,000 Rs2,542,500 Rs1,362,500

18. During cross-examination, it was put to Mr Jeetah that he is not aware of the state the land was at the beginning of the construction or the amount of digging the Defendant had to do in order to construct the foundation. Mr Jeetah has explained that in a construction contract when it mentioned grey work it means:

“Generally, in construction jargon, when we say grey works, the word grey itself shows that you know, you do the rendering or what you call the crepissage, and you leave it. So that is initially a contract, generally done by a lot of contractors because they are easy to calculate and they say ok, complete the house.

What it means is that you start with the excavation, you do the foundation, you do the surface bed, you put the walls and all like you

know columns, beams, slabs, first floor slab, it goes into the second, the roof and everything.

So, that is only grey and when you look it without painting. When you put the painting, you put the finishes, you put the electrical, plumbing, electric, aluminium and all, it becomes a house, like you know 100%, A to Z. like you know you complete.”

[Pg 10 of the Transcript of Proceeding dated 14 th November 2023].

19. Having assessed the demeanour of Mr Jeetah, I find that he was a credible witness on whose testimony I can rely. He is an expert in his field and understand the terminology of construction well. Mr Jeetah has been cross- examined lengthily on the fact that he was not aware of the excavation cost. However, he was never cross-examined that the excavation work was not part and parcel of the amount agreed between the parties. I therefore have no qualms in relying on his definition of the work grey work mention in the agreement.

20. In light of the above, I find that Mr Jeetah has testified in a truthful manner and has maintain even during cross-examination that the work done was according to his report and the amount of Rs1,362,500 was paid to the Defendant for work he has failed to complete.

21. I have also considered the defences raised by the Defendant as follows:

(a) There were modifications to the original plan; (b) A stone wall was constructed as part of the contract and the cost of the wall was not included; (c) Excessive works done to remove the mass of rocks/stones and to level the land; and (d) Increase in cost of materials.

22. I find it apt to quote article 1793 of the Mauritian Code Civil as follows:

“1793. Lorsqu'un architecte ou un entrepreneur s'est chargé de la construction à forfait d'un bâtiment, d'après un plan arrêté et convenu avec le propriétaire du sol, il ne peut demander aucune augmentation de prix, ni sous le prétexte d'augmentation de la main-d'oeuvre ou des matériaux, ni sous celui de changements ou d'augmentations faits sur ce plan, si ces changements ou augmentations, n'ont pas été autorisés par écrit, et le prix convenu avec le propriétaire.

23. In the case of Transinvest Construction Ltd v Dr Jhuboo S [2016 SCJ 428], the Supreme Court, referred to Note 30 of Jurisclasseur, in order to state the conditions which must be satisfied in order for Article 1793 to apply as follows:

“Pour que le régime particulier de l’article 1793 du Code civil soit applicable, il faut, avant tout, que l’on se trouve en présence d’un marché à forfait : condition générale nécessaire (V. no. 10 à 26). Mais il faut, en outre, que soient réunies d’autres conditions spécifiques, en l’occurrence : – la construction d’un bâtiment … ; – … sur le sol du maître de l’ouvrage … ; – … d’après un plan arrêté et convenu avec le maître de l’ouvrage … ; – … dans le délai convenu (Jurisclasseur (supra))”

(Emphassis added is mine.)

24. In applying the above principle to the present case, I find that the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is a marché à forfeit for the construction d’un bâtiment sur le sol du maître de l’ouvrage, i.e. the Plaintiff, d’après un plan arrêté et convenu with the Plaintiff, which is also attached to the agreement and within a delay provided.

25. Since the written agreement meets all the required conditions, article 1793 is applicable.

26. Having found that the article 1793 is applicable in the present case, I find the Defendant is debarred from claiming any extra money from the Plaintiff with regards to the modifications made to the original plan unless the Defendant has a written authorisation from the Plaintiff.

27. The issue then arose as to what is the consequences of the Plaintiff having agreed on oath that he was agreeable to the modification.

28. I refer to the case of Nilcant Awotar Associates Ltd v Bhumi Fund Ltd [2015 SCJ 116] which refer to the principles established in the case Perette v Boolaky [1971 MR 36], by the Appellate Court as follows:

“On appeal, it was held in Perette v Boolaky (supra) that

(a) “the terms of article 1793 C. Nap. are peremptory and that under an agreement made “à forfait”, a builder cannot claim additional remuneration from the owner of the land for any modifications brought to the agreed building plan in the absence of the owner’s consent given in writing, unless the parties have added to their agreement some clause taking it out of the four corners of the said article;

(b) that an admission made in his pleadings by the respondent concerning the modifications to the building plan could not, in default of the writing required by article 1793 C. Nap. be received as proof of the consent to those modifications;

(c) that the fact that the respondent had, after the completion of the works, agreed to pay and paid a sum of money over and above the contractual price did not, in the circumstances, constitute a waiver on his part of his right under article 1793 C. Nap.;

(d) that the terms of article 1793 C. Nap. also excluded the possibility for the appellant of resorting to an action de in ren verso”.

(Emphasis added is mine.)

29. The Appellate Court in the case of Perrette (Supra) also find that even the testimony of the owner on oath which would amount to an aveu judiciarie concerning the modifications to the original plan could not, in default of writing required by article 1793 of the Mauritian Civil Code be received as proof of the consent to those modifications.

30. In the present case, the Defendant has not provided any writing with regards to any modifications made to the original plan.

31. With regards to the excessive works done to remove the mass of rocks and stones and to level the land and the increase in the cost of materials, I find that article 1793 of the Mauritian Civil Code is clear that the Defendant is precluded from claiming any additional cost unless those increases and excessive works have been agreed with the Plaintiff in writing. There is no writing produced by the Defendant in Court to that effect.

32. With regards to the stone wall, Clause 5 provides that “the Contractor has agreed to construct boundary walls including the stone works as enclosed in the building plans without charging any additional costs.” Therefore, the Defendant cannot now claim any additional cost with regards to same since clause 5 “tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites” (Art 1134 of the Mauritian Civil Code).

33. In light of the above, I find that the Defendant was precluded to stop work and request for an increase of the amount agreed in the written agreement. He should have completed his work since he did not have any writing with regards to increase of the cost of materials or cost of excessive works done to remove the mass of rocks and stones and to level the land or modifications made.

34. Having stopped the work despite the Plaintiff having paid him the full amount as per the written agreement, the Defendant has made a breach of the agreement.

35. The Defendant has pleaded “l’exception d’inexécution” to justify his refusal to complete the construction of the house.

36. The law relating to exception d’inexécution was set out in the case of Manser Saxon Contracting Ltd v Goundan Co. Ltd [2017 SCJ 409] as follows:

“At this juncture it is apposite to set out the law and the principles applicable to “l’exception d’inexécution” and the circumstances in which it may be invoked by a party in order to justify its failure to carry out any part of its contractual obligations. It has been defined as follows: « L’exception d’inexécution est le droit qu’a chaque partie à un contrat synallagmatique de refuser d’exécuter son obligation tant qu’elle n’a pas reçu la prestation qui lui est due … » – (Jurisclasseur Civil Code –Art. 1219 et 1220 –Fasc. Unique : Contrat –Inexécution du contrat. –Exception d’inexécution)

In Mauritius there is no specific legislation pertaining to this concept. Our Civil Code does not contain any express provision dealing with it and the exception arises in relation to provisions inserted in specific contracts.

The exception derives from Article 1184 of the Civil Code which provides:

«La condition résolutoire est toujours sous-entendue dans les contrats synallagmatiques, pour le cas où l’une des deux parties ne satisfera point à son engagement.

Dans ce cas, le contrat, n’est point résolu de plein droit. La partie envers laquelle l’engagement n’a point été exécuté, à le choix ou de forcer l’autre à l’exécution de la convention

lorsqu’elle est possible, ou d’en demander la résolution avec dommages et intérêts.

La résolution doit être demandée en justice, et il peut être accordé au défendeur un délai selon les circonstances.» This mechanism entitles a party to a contract to refuse to perform its share of obligation when its counterpart has failed to fulfill its own obligations.

In order for the exception to become operative, certain conditions must be fulfilled. These are set out in the following extracts:

Note 422 -“Pour que l’exception d’inexécution puisse être opposée, plusieurs conditions doivent être réunies: 1o Il faut qu’on se trouve en présence d’obligations ayant une certaine connexité de par leur origine commune et apparaissant de ce fait comme ayant un caractère d’interdépendance …»

Note 423–2oLa possibilité d’utiliser l’exception tient à l’inexécution par l’autre partie de sa propre obligation. Cette inexécution doit être prouvée (Com. 27 oct. 1981, Bull. civ. IV, No 372) et le refus ne peut être opposé s’il s’agit d’une obligation à terme … »

Note 424– «Peu importe que l’inexécution soit non fautive (Marty et Raynaud, op. cit., no 324; ………. Peu importe également qu’il s’agisse d’une inexécution totale ou simplement partielle telle celle résultant d’un défaut de conformité ou de vices affectant la chose livrée (Req. 20 avr. 1921, D.p.1922.1.181; 5 févr. 1929, Sem. jurid. 1929.345;…»

Note 425 –«Du moins, l’inexécution doit-elle présenter un certain caractère de gravité (Soc. 12 janv. 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1945.1.88; Civ. 1re, 23 oct. 1963, D. 1964.33, note P. Voirin, J. C.p. 1964. II. 13485, note J. Mazeaud; Com. 16 juill. 1980, Bull, civ. IV, no297), ceci pour éviter des abus….»

Note 426 –3o «Il faut insister sur la nécessité pour l’excipiens d’agir avec bonne foi; telle est la raison pour laquelle l’exception lui est refusée si lui-même n’exécute pas ou encore si l’inexécution de l’autre partie lui est imputable (Civ. 3e, 5 mars 1970, Bull. civ. III, no. 173; comp. Civ. 1re, 29 avr. 1981, J. C. p. 1982. II. 19730, note P. Courbe) …» (Dalloz Répertoire Droit Civil –VoContrats et Conventions (L’inéxecution du contrat) Titre 3)

The party who seeks to rely on the “exception” bears the burden of establishing that the conditions for the application of the “exception”, exist.”

37. In applying the above principle to the present case, the Defendant needs to prove that there is a lien de connexité between his non-performance and the manquement of the Plaintiff. He also needs to prove that the manquement by the Plaintiff was suffisament grave and that he acted in good faith.

38. In light of the above principles, I find that the Defendant cannot rely on “l’exception d’inexécution” in the present case since the Plaintiff has fulfilled his part of the agreement and there is no manquement on his part. The manquement is made by the Def enadant in not fulfilling his part of the agreement.

39. The Defendant’s Counsel has filed the case of Ayen v Mahadeo [2025 INT 221] to support her submission on “l’exception d’inexécution”. The case of Ayen (Supra) is distinguishable to the present case since in the case of Ayen (Supra), the mode of payment was not agreed but payment was made regularly until the Plaintiff stopped the payment due to personal issues. After two years the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant to continue the construction. In the present case, there is no gap of 2 years in the payment. To the contrary, the Plaintiff has paid the full price of the agreement. Moreover, in the case of Ayen (Supra), the terms of the agreement between the parties were not clear which is contrary to the present case.

Second agreement

40. There was a verbal agreement between the parties with regards to the installation of roof sheeting and false ceiling for an amount of Rs720,000.

41. Despite the fact that this amount has been paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, the later has failed to do the work and has therefore breach this agreement.

42. The Defendant has testified that he has already bought the metal roof sheeting and that same was being painted at his place. However, no receipt of such purchase has been produced in Court. To the contrary, there is the testimony of Mr Jeetah that the metal roof sheeting and the false ceiling were not done by the Defendant. There is also the testimony of the Plaintiff that he has never seen those metal roof sheeting.

43. Having assessed the demeanour of all the witnesses in the present case whilst they testified in front of me, I am more convinced by the testimony of the Plaintiff and Mr Jeetah to the effect that the work was not done according to the agreement. I therefore find that the Plaintiff has proved on a balance of probability that the Defendant has breached the verbal agreement in not installing the roof sheeting and false ceiling.

Notice Mise en Demeure 44. The Defendant’s Counsel has submitted that the Plaintiff has failed to sent a Mise en Demeure to the Defendant asking him to continue the work.

45. It is however admitted between the parties that a Mise en Demeure was sent to the Defendant asking him for a refund of the money already paid to him in excess of the work he has completed.

46. In order to determine whether a Mise en Demeure requesting the Defendant to completed the work was required, I find it apt to quote the following paragraphs from the case of Manser Saxon Contracting Ltd v Goundan Co. Ltd [2017 SCJ 409] as follows:

“As a result where it is no longer possible for a contracting party to carry out its contractual obligations or where a contracting party has

clearly declared his refusal to execute his contractual obligations, there is no necessity for a mise en demeure.

This is explained in the following extracts from Notes 22 and 23 – Dalloz – Répertoire de Procédure Civile – Tome IV:

Note 22 – “… C’est dire que, chaque fois que le débiteur de l’obligation ne respecte pas le délai qui lui était imposé pour s’exécuter, la mise en demeure se révèle inutile, pour la simple raison que le préjudice se trouve constitué, tandis que l’obligation en cause ne pourra plus être exécutée. … »

Note 23 – «Pour l’application de l’article 1146, la jurisprudence n’a pas hésité à assimiler à l’inexécution définitive du débiteur – généralement d’un préjudice définitif pour le créancier – le refus d’exécution affirmé par le débiteur au créancier………… Il est vrai qu’en déclarant au créancier qu’il n’exécutera pas son obligation, le débiteur rend avérés et définitifs l’inexécution et le préjudice en découlant, de sorte que la résolution du contrat et les dommages – intérêts s’imposent, sans qu’il soit besoin de recourir à une mise en demeure du débiteur ainsi officiellement défaillant et réfractaire à toute exécution.»”

[Emphasis is mine.]

47. In applying the above principle to the present case, I find that the Defendant had made it clear to the Plaintiff that he would not complete the work unless he was given more money. This is even born out clearly in his testimony in court. There was therefore no need for a mise en demeure to be sent to the Defendant requesting him to complete the work. However, there was a need

to send the Defendant a mise en demeure with regards to the amount the Plaintiff wanted to claim which was done in the present case.

Damages

48. In light of the above, I find that the Defendant has breached the agreement by refusing to perform his part of the agreement. Pursuant to the agreement in case of default of the Defendant, the latter had to refund the money which has been paid in excess of the works executed on site.

49. The report of Mr Jeetah is clear that the Defendant was paid Rs3,905,000 under the first agreement for a work which has been valued at Rs2,542,500. There is therefore an overpayment of Rs1,362,500.

50. Under the second verbal agreement, there has been a payment of Rs720,000 paid for work that has never been completed.

Conclusion

51. Consequently, the Defendant should pay Rs2,082,500 (Rs1,362,500 + Rs720,000) to the Plaintiff. However, the Plaintiff having agreement to reduced his claim to only Rs2 million, I order the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Rs2,000,000 with interest from the date of Judgment until final payment. With Cost.

U. Rawat Neerooa Magistrate Intermediate Court Delivered this 07 May 2026

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