Civil United Kingdom
Victoria Rixon v Emily Barley & Ors
Neutral citation number: [2026] EWHC 2821 (KB)
Case No: KB-2025-001034
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 06/11/2026
Before:
DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC
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Between:
| VICTORIA RIXON | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| EMILY BARLEY [1] HEATHER HEATH-ALTON [2] ELIZABETH SMITH [3] |
Defendants |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Robert Sheridan (instructed by Enigma Solicitors) for the Claimant
Emily Barley appeared in person for the Defendants
Hearing date: 13 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on 6 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
DHCJ GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC:
Introduction
1. This is an application by the Defendants for this libel claim to be struck out on the basis that the Claimant’s pleaded case is in breach of the rules governing libel claims and that the claim is an abuse of the court’s process.
Factual Background
2. The context for these proceedings lies in the tragic death of a baby boy, Giles Cooper-Hall, who died at Derriford Hospital in Plymouth on 28 October 2021, about 16 hours after he was born. An inquest into Giles Cooper-Hall’s death was held on 1 February 2024. Assistant coroner Louise Wiltshire gave a narrative verdict which was highly critical of the care that the mother and baby received at the hospital and in particular the medical team’s failure to follow the care plan for the mother’s labour, which resulted in a lack of proper monitoring of mother and child. The coroner concluded that these failures contributed to the boy’s death. The outcome of the inquest was reported in the local and national media in the context of the wider public debate about maternity safety.
3. The Claimant worked as a midwife at Derriford Hospital in October 2021 and was part of the medical team involved in providing care for Giles Cooper-Hall. The Claimant’s pleaded case is that while she did provide antenatal care to Giles Cooper-Hall, she had not provided such care for at least 10 hours prior to his death, as she had handed over responsibility for his care to other midwives. The Claimant also pleads that she was not required to attend the inquest into the baby’s death and that no adverse findings were made against her. For the purpose of the present applications, I must proceed on the basis that the Claimant’s case is to be taken at its highest and is true.
4. The Claimant and the Defendants are all campaigners on maternity safety issues. In February 2024, shortly after the inquest, the Claimant, Ms Heath-Alton, the Second Defendant, and Ms Smith, the Third Defendant, (alongside a fourth co-founder, Amanda Burle), co-founded a women’s support organisation, the With Woman Movement, which campaigns on maternity safety issues.
5. In March 2024, Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith parted ways with the Claimant and the With Woman Movement and went on to co-found their own organisation, the Maternity Movement. Ms Heath-Alton is a practicing midwife, and Ms Smith is a retired midwife.
6. In January 2023, Emily Barley, the First Defendant, co-founded the Maternity Safety Alliance (‘MSA’), an organisation involving families whose children died in maternity care, which is campaigning for a statutory public inquiry on maternity services. Ms Barley began campaigning on these issues following the death of her daughter Beatrice, during labour at full term.
7. The libel claims in this case relate to publications on social media by the Defendants in March and April 2024, within one or two months of the inquest into the death of Giles Cooper-Hall.
Nomenclature
8. Unfortunately, the Claimant’s pleadings and written argument keep changing how the Defendants are referred to. The Claim Form lists Ms Barley, Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith as First, Second and Third Defendant respectively. However, in the Particulars of Claim, the attributions have been swapped around: Ms Heath-Alton is D1, Ms Smith D2 and Ms Barley D3. In his Skeleton Argument for this hearing, however, Mr Sheridan has reverted to the nomenclature of the Claim Form. This is a recipe for confusion. To avoid introducing this muddle into my judgment I will refer to the Defendants throughout by their surnames, making substitutions so far as necessary where I am referring to the Claimant’s pleaded case.
The First Publication
9. On 30 March 2024, Ms Barley published the following statement on X on behalf of the Maternity Safety Alliance:
“We’ve been asked if we are supporting the campaign by the With Woman Movement set up by a group of midwives. The answer is no.
Baby Giles Cooper-Hall died at just 16 hours old in October 2021, following failures in the care he and his mum Ruth received during labour at Derriford Hospital. An inquest in February this year found that a series of missed opportunities contributed to his death.
One of the midwives involved in his care has gone on to co-found the With Woman Movement, and to our knowledge has not been honest about her role in Giles’s death.
This midwife failed to follow local and national guidance and her actions meant critical monitoring of Giles’s wellbeing just did not happen, contributing to the delay in his delivery and ultimately his death.
This year, this midwife further compounded the harm she caused by not attending Giles’ inquest, denying his mums Ruth and Allison important answers about how and why their son died. Just days after the inquest concluded, she launched her new campaign.
As an alliance of people affected by failings in maternity care, we are open to working with almost anyone who shares our goals of safe maternity care and a statutory public inquiry. However, we draw the line at a group of people led by a midwife who has behaved in this way, and who seemingly continues to avoid being honest and accountable.
We thank Ruth and Allison Cooper-Hall for sharing theirs and Giles’s story with us, and hope that anyone reading this will respect their grief, trauma, and need for space. We all hold baby Giles in our hearts, and think of the life he should and would be living now if he and Ruth had been looked after properly.”
The Second Publication
10. On or around 19 April 2024, Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith published a statement on X on the Maternity Movement account @SaferMaternity. This publication contained the following words complained of in the Particulars of Claim:
“….we are just are horrified (sic) to read about the death of baby Giles and the awful position that his mums Ruth and Alison faced and are still facing. It must have been devastating to learn that the person being held responsible has so openly proclaimed to have started a maternity safety group.”
11. Ms Heath-Alton also published the words complained of on her personal LinkedIn account and Ms Barley published the words complained of on her personal X account.
The Proceedings
12. On 26 March 2025, the Claimant issued claims for libel seeking damages of up to £30,000. The Claim Form was served in July 2025, along with the Particulars of Claim.
13. On 17 July 2025, the Defendants acknowledged service and on the same day sent letters to the Claimant’s solicitors expressing their concern that the Particulars of Claim were insufficiently particularised on reference, serious harm and damages. On 28 July 2025, the Claimant’s solicitor wrote back denying that the pleading was deficient and stating that the Defendants would have to apply to the court if they wanted further particulars.
14. On 1 August 2025, the Defendants served their Defences. Each of the Defences pleads that the Claimant’s pleaded case on reference, serious harm and damage is insufficiently particularised. The Defence of Ms Barley, for example, starts with the following:
“1. The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim are deficient in multiple respects. In particular, they fail to properly plead:
a. Reference: The claimant was not named in the statement complained of. The particulars of claim merely assert, without explanation, that the statement was understood to refer to her. The defendant understands that shortly after publication the claimant publicly identified herself as the midwife referred to in the statement. This act forms a central link in the chain of reference but the claimant has not pleaded how reference could reasonably have been understood without this self identification the defendant therefore requires strict proof of reference.
b. Serious harm: the particulars provide no factual basis for how the statement caused or was likely to cause serious harm to the claimant's reputation as required by Section 1 of the defamation Act 2013. The Defendant therefore requires strict proof of serious harm.
c. Damages: the claimant asserts a claim for £30,000 without providing any explanation, evidence, or basis for that figure. The defendant therefore requires strict proof of any loss or damages.”
15. On 19 August 2025, the Defendants wrote to the Claimant reiterating their concerns regarding the Claimant’s pleaded case and stating that unless the claims were withdrawn within seven days, they intended to apply for strike out and/or summary judgment. The Claimant’s solicitors ignored the Defendants’ letters – the Claimant’s next letter dated 16 September 2025 focuses exclusively on the Claimant’s proposal for a determination of meaning on the papers. On 28 September 2025, the Defendants issued these applications for strike out and/or summary judgment. On 1 May 2026, the Claimant finally responded to these applications in a witness statement.
16. At no point since the Defendants first raised these issues in July 2025, or since they issued the present applications in September 2025, has the Claimant proposed any amendments to her Particulars of Claim or made any application for permission to amend her Particulars of Claim. At the hearing before me, Mr Sheridan defended the pleading (which is his own) on the basis that it was compliant with the rules regarding the pleading of libel claims. However, the Claimant’s witness statement in effect admits the insufficiency of her pleading by identifying those missing facts that support her case on reference and serious harm. In these circumstances, the Claimant should have sought permission to make amendments to her case in the usual way and those amendments would then have been the focus of this hearing.
Legal Principles
Striking out of a claim
17. CPR 3.4(2) sets out the grounds on which a court may strike out a statement of case, which so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court—
(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;
(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;
(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order; ……..”
18. In this case the argument has focussed primarily on CPR 3.4(2)(c), namely whether the Claimant has complied with the rules relating to the pleading of libel cases concerning reference, serious harm and damage.
19. While the court has the power to strike out a claim on the basis that the claim has been insufficiently pleaded, the correct approach is to give a party the opportunity to amend their pleaded case if they have a realistic prospect of addressing the deficiency through amendments. As Tugendhat J put it in in Kim v Park [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB) at [40]:
“where the court holds that there is a defect in a pleading, it is normal for the court to refrain from striking out that pleading unless the court has given the party concerned an opportunity of putting right the defect, provided that there is reason to believe that he will be in a position to put the defect right”.
20. This principle was recently endorsed and applied by Steyn J in Bridgen v Hancock [2024] EWHC 623 (KB); [2024] EMLR 8. That case was also concerned with a libel claim relating to a post on social media where the claimant’s pleaded case on reference was held to be inadequate. In that case, Steyn J struck out the relevant paragraphs of the pleading and granted the claimant permission to re-amend.
Identification or reference
21. It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published “ of and concerning “ the claimant: E. Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] A.C. 20 , Lord Loreburn, p.24; Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] A.C. 116 , Viscount Simon LC, pp.118-119. It is therefore necessary for the claimant to plead the facts relied on for the case that the words would have been understood to refer to her.
22. In Dyson Technology Ltd v Channel Four Television Corporation [2023] EWCA Civ884; [2023] 4 W.L.R. 67(“Dyson”), Dingemans and Warby LJJ explained, at [34]-[35], that a claimant may be proved to be the person identified or referred to in a statement in two main ways:
i) Ordinary reference: “The first way is if the claimant is named or identified in the statement or where the words used are such as would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the claimant to believe that he was the person referred to…”
ii) Reference innuendo: “The second way is where a claimant is identified or referred to by particular facts known to individuals. This has been called in the textbooks ‘reference innuendo’ …”
23. As Nicklin J observed in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 at [96]:
”Understanding the law relating to reference must start with the appreciation of the fundamental principle that the test is objective. The question is whether the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader (if necessary, attributing knowledge of particular extrinsic facts) would understand the words to refer to the claimant: Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1239 , 1243B, 1245B, per Lord Reid; 1261E-F per Lord Guest; and 1264A per Lord Donovan. In assessing this, the Court adopts the same approach as to the determination of meaning: 1245G per Lord Reid.”
24. The pleading requirements for reference are addressed in Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th ed. 2022), §28-025, under the heading “ Averment of reference to the claimant”, in a very clear and helpful passage:
“It is an essential part of the claimant’s case to show that he is the person referred to by the defamatory words. Accordingly, where it is not absolutely clear on the face of the words that they refer to the claimant, e.g. where he is described by his initial letters, or by a fictitious name, or by the name of somebody else, or where he is not mentioned at all, the claimant should make clear in his particulars of claim the basis on which he claims to have been identified as the subject of the words complained of. He should set out the connecting facts which establish the link between himself and the words used, and he should make plain his case as to the existence of any persons who in fact linked him with the words by reason of their knowledge of those connecting facts, although such a case may be based on inference. These matters are material facts which must be pleaded. If the claimant does not plead such facts sufficiently, his claim will be struck out.”
25. Likewise, Duncan and Neill (5th ed. 2020) states at §7.04:
“Where identification depends on extrinsic facts these extrinsic facts must be pleaded because they form part of the cause of action.”
Serious harm
26. By s.1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, “a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant”. The “serious harm” requirement was considered by the Supreme Court in Lachaux v Independent Print [2019] UKSC 27, where the Supreme Court held that it was no longer sufficient for a claimant to rely on the inherent tendency of the defamatory words and that under s.1(1) a claimant had to establish, as a matter of fact, that publication of a statement had caused serious harm, or was likely to cause serious harm.
27. Lord Sumption described the correct approach to serious harm at [14] of his judgment, stating that whether the publication of the statement has caused or is likely to cause serious reputational harm is a matter of fact, "which can be established only by reference to the impact which the statement is shown actually to have had. It depends on a combination of the inherent tendency of the words and their actual impact on those to whom they were communicated”.
28. Paragraph 4.2(3) of Practice Direction 53B provides as follows:
“The claimant must set out in the particulars of claim….the facts and matters relied upon in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 1 of the defamation Act 2013 that the publication of the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant, or, in the case of a body that trades for profit, that it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.”
Analysis and Conclusions on the Strike Out
The First Publication – Reference
29. At paragraph 7 of the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant pleads publication by Ms Barley of the First Publication.
30. At paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant pleads as follows:
“8. The Claimant contacted [Ms Barley] on the same day in order to set out her case that [Ms Barley] must be mistaken as to the identity of the midwife. [Ms Barley] replied, denying that this was the case and contending that the coroner ‘specifically called out your actions’.
9. In the premises, the words referred and were understood to refer to the Claimant.”
31. The Claimant’s pleading at paragraph 8 applies the wrong legal test to the question of reference. The pleading set out above states only that Ms Barley understood her post on X to refer to the Claimant. But the test on reference is objective and does not depend on what the author of the publication understood or intended. The test is whether readers of the publication would reasonably understand it to refer to her. This is because libel is concerned with whether the Claimant’s reputation has been damaged in the eyes of other people. The Claimant’s pleading on reference is wrong in law.
32. Secondly, the Claimant is not named in the post, neither is she identified in any other specific way. Mr Sheridan submitted that as this was a case of ordinary reference there was no need for him to plead any specific facts in support of reference. The test for ordinary reference is whether the words used are such as would reasonably lead a person acquainted with the Claimant to understand that the words referred to her. There has been some discussion in the authorities about what degree of knowledge about a claimant is to be imputed to a hypothetical reader acquainted with that claimant. In Dyson, the Court of Appeal held that such things as a person’s name and appearance would be part of that general knowledge. In Bridgen v Hancock, the parties accepted that the Claimant’s status as an MP would be part of that general knowledge, but Steyn J held that the Claimant’s speeches in the House of Commons and a very recent withdrawal by the party of his whip would not be known to the hypothetical reader acquainted with him.
33. The Claimant has set out in her witness statement in response to this application the facts that she says would identify her to persons acquainted with her, namely that she is the only person who was both a midwife at Derriford Hospital at the time that baby Giles Cooper-Hall died and was also a co-founder of the With Woman Movement. The question therefore is whether knowledge of these facts should reasonably be imputed to the hypothetical reader acquainted with her.
34. What Dyson and Bridgen v Hancock appear to show is that the knowledge to be imputed to the hypothetical reader acquainted with the claimant is of a very general kind which almost anyone familiar with that person would be expected to know. But if a claimant wants to rely, for the purpose of reference, on knowledge of particular facts going beyond that very general knowledge, those facts must be pleaded as part of their case on reference.
35. Adopting this approach, I accept that a person acquainted with the Claimant would be likely to know that she was a midwife, but I don’t accept that they would know which specific hospital (Derriford) she worked at. I think it is very unlikely that they would know that the Claimant was one of the nursing team involved in the care of Giles Cooper-Hall in October 2021. It should be noted that the Claimant did not attend the inquest and she was not named in the narrative verdict (which didn’t refer to anyone by name), so her name did not attract publicity in that context.
36. As to the Claimant’s role with the With Woman Movement, this organisation was founded in March 2024, just a month or two before the publications sued upon. It was an organisation in its infancy which I think would have been known principally to a relatively small number of people with a specific interest in maternity safety issues. I don’t therefore consider that the Claimant’s role as a co-founder of that organisation would be known to a hypothetical acquaintance at the time of the publications complained of in March and April 2024.
37. For these reasons, I consider that this case falls into the second category of reference innuendo and that knowledge of those connecting facts by readers of the publications complained of needed to be specifically pleaded.
The Second Publication – Reference
38. At paragraph 10 of her Particulars of Claim, the Claimant pleads the publication by Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith of the Second Publication.
39. Paragraph 11 then pleads the following in relation to reference:
“11. The words referred to and were understood to refer to the claimant by reason of the initial reference to a social media post by the claimant.”
40. However, the pleading does not set out the terms of the social media post to which it refers. Nor does the pleading set out any other facts and matters knowledge of which would reasonably have enabled persons acquainted with the Claimant to identify her. The connecting facts necessary for the Defendants to understand the basis on which the Claimant’s case on reference is put are entirely absent. This pleading is insufficiently particularised and it falls to be struck out on that basis.
41. The Claimant has again belatedly addressed these points in her witness statement. She states that in an earlier part of the same post the Defendant referred to “the other founder of the With Woman Movement” and that she was the only other founder along with Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith. She submits that on that basis she would have been identifiable to people who knew those facts. These are facts which the Claimant could and should have pleaded.
The First and Second Publications – Serious Harm
42. At paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Particulars of Claim the Claimant sets out her pleaded meaning in respect of the First and second Publications.
43. At paragraph 15, the Claimant pleads as follows in relation to serious harm:
“15. The said statements are self-evidently extremely grave and have caused and or are likely to cause serious harm to the claimant's reputation.”
44. The first point to make is that paragraph 4.2(3) of PD 53B requires that serious harm must be pleaded separately for each publication complained of. It is not permissible for the claimant to take two different publications and to plead particulars of serious harm in a composite way for the two publications. In Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB) the Claimant had pleaded a composite case of alleged serious harm to publication arising from a number of different publications. Nicklin J held that this approach was impermissible at [71]:
“In a case involving individual and discrete publications, this method of pleading is to be deprecated and should not be adopted. It fails to set out a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which the claimant relies and fails to comply with CPR 53B PD §4.2(3), which requires a claimant to set out separate particulars of serious harm for each publication relied upon. That is necessary because each publication is a separate cause of action…”
45. Secondly, the Claimant is required to plead the facts and matters that show that the publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm. Instead, what has been done here is simply to assert the existence of serious harm without pleading those facts and matters, save only for a fleeting reference to the gravity of the allegations. While the gravity of allegations is a factor that a claimant will usually rely on as part of any pleading on serious harm, on its own it is insufficient. This pleading does not comply with paragraph 4.2(3) of Practice Direction 53B and it should be struck out.
46. In her witness statement in response to the application, the claimant refers to a number of matters that she relies on in relation to serious harm. These are her role as a maternity campaigner, which she says is harmed by the publications. She also asserts that the defendants as founders of maternity safety campaigns are viewed as authoritative voices within the online maternity safety community. She then provides some figures about the number of followers of the various accounts on X. All of these things are facts and matters that the Claimant could and should have pleaded as part of her case on serious harm.
The First and Second Publications – Damage
47. Paragraph 4.2(d) of Practice Direction 53B states that “the Claimant must set out in the particulars of claim full details of the facts and matters on which the claimant relies in support of the claim for damages. A claimant who seeks aggravated or exemplary damages must provide the information specified in Rule 16.4(1)(c).”
48. The Claimant’s plea on damages for both publications is at paragraph 16 of her Particulars of Claim, as follows:
“16. Further, in consequence of the publication, the claimant has suffered considerable distress and embarrassment.”
49. This is an unusually sparse pleading. Ordinarily a claimant will plead a range of facts and matters to demonstrate the damage caused by a defamatory publication, some of which may overlap with the matters relied on to establish serious harm. Typically this will include such things as the serious nature of the defamatory allegation, the scale of publication, republication by third parties, whether the allegation was harmful to the claimant’s career or reputation in a particular sector, if the claimant has been subjected to public criticism as result of the publication, if the claimant has been shunned or avoided, any matters giving rise to a claim for aggravated damages (claims for exemplary damages being extremely rare), as well as hurt, embarrassment and distress.
50. In general terms, paragraph 4.2(d) of PD 53B does not require a claimant to plead any specific facts or matters in support of their claim for damages. What paragraph 4.2(d) is saying, in my view, is that if a Claimant wants to rely on specific facts and matters as part of their claim for damages, then those facts and matters must be pleaded. The same paragraph also refers to CPR 16.4(1)(c), which provides that if aggravated or exemplary damages are sought in a claim, this should be pleaded and the basis for claiming them should be set out. This rule applies to libel cases as it does to other civil claims where such damages are available. The purpose of all these requirements is to enable a defendant, from the outset, to understand what type of damages are being claimed and the rationale for the sum claimed in damages.
51. Unless it is the Claimant’s position that she does not wish to rely on any such facts and matters in support of her claim for damages (which seems unlikely), the Claimant could and should have pleaded those matters. Her failure to do again demonstrates that her Particulars of Claim are insufficiently particularised. I will address at the end of this judgment how I propose to deal with these failures, having first considered the Defendants’ abuse of process argument.
Abuse of Process
52. The Defendants argue that the Claimant’s conduct amounts to an abuse of the court’s process. This argument has two limbs. First, they argue that the way the Claimant has conducted this litigation is an abuse of process. Secondly, they argue that the way the Claimant has publicised these proceedings is an abuse. They further submit that these two abuses are related – they say the Claimant has neglected to litigate this case properly while devoting her energies to publicising this case on social media.
53. These arguments do not fit into any of the well-known, established categories of abuse of process (such as res judicata or issue estoppel), but the court has a broad discretion to strike out a claim for abuse in a wide variety of circumstances, with each case turning on its own facts.
54. In this case, the Defendants rely upon the following matters relating to her conduct of the claim which they submit cumulatively amount to an abuse of the court’s process:
(1) The Claimant issued the Claim Form only days before the expiry of limitation and served it close to the expiry of the four month service period.
(2) The Claimant has failed to comply with the Pre-Action Protocol for Media and Communication Claims, depriving the Defendants of a meaningful opportunity to respond before proceedings commenced.
(3) The Claimant has filed defective Particulars of Claim containing bare assertions and has refused to provide coherent particulars when requested, contrary to the pleading standards in CPR 16.4 and CPR PD 53B.
(4) Reasonable procedural enquiries (including requests for clarification of whether she is litigating under a CFA and whether she has ATE insurance) have been met with silence.
(5) The Claimant issued a defective application for determination of meaning.
(6) The Claimant failed to respond to the Defendants’ note addressing the meaning application and seeking listing of the strike out application first.
55. I don’t consider that any of these complaints are sufficiently serious whether individually or collectively to amount to an abuse of the Court’s process. The most serious, in my view, are the Claimant’s failure to plead a proper case on reference, serious harm and damage and her protracted failure to engage with the Defendants’ criticisms of that case, but I will deal with this separately below. The other matters are facets of the Claimant’s conduct which do not meet the threshold for abuse. Delay in issuing within the limitation period is not a breach of any rule. The Claimant was not under any legal obligation to respond to queries about her funding arrangements. Any deficiency with her application for a determination on meaning can be dealt with on its merits at the relevant time.
56. In addition, the Defendants argue that the way the Claimant has “sought to litigate through social media” amounts to an abuse of the Court’s process. In particular, they criticise her for republishing the statement complained of and exaggerating its meaning by claiming she has been called a ‘baby killer’; publishing court documents and reference numbers; encouraging public commentary on these proceedings and publishing documents she claims are evidence in the case but which are not included in her Particulars of Claim.
57. The Defendants’ account of the Claimant’s conduct is an accurate one – the Claimant has provided a running commentary on this case through social media. This has included, on a number of occasions, referring to facts or matters that are relevant to this claim e.g. events at Derriford Hospital when the baby died, which have not been pleaded. There is no doubt that the Claimant’s approach has resulted in this case getting vastly more publicity than the relatively modest number of publications sued upon. The Defendants’ evidence shows that they have found the Claimant’s approach both stressful and distressing.
58. The problem with the Defendants’ abuse of process argument is that it clashes with the principles of open justice and freedom of expression. The seminal case establishing the open justice principle in this jurisdiction is Scott v Scott [1912] AC 417. It was a case that related to the publication, by a party to proceedings and her solicitor, of a transcript of a hearing which had been heard in private. It may therefore be said that cases involving a party’s desire to speak out about their case, whether on social media or otherwise, is a paradigm situation where the open justice principle applies. In general terms, litigants are free to say what they like about the cases in which they are involved. Such speech engages the principle of open justice at common law and the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The right to freedom of expression includes the right to publish not only information and ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also those that offend, shock and disturb other people: Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 at [49]. Parties to litigation and the public generally must tolerate and endure this, as part of the price to be paid for an open justice system that can command public confidence.
59. When I put these points to Ms Barley in the course of argument, she responded by submitting that the real abuse here lay in the Claimant both failing properly to engage with the litigation e.g. by not pleading her case properly and not correcting the deficiencies when pointed out, while simultaneously publicising the case on social media. I accept that this is a fair characterisation of what has happened here, but the combination of these factors does not amount to an abuse of process. As to the pleading failures, I will grant the appropriate relief in this judgment and I can consider the Claimant’s conduct in this case generally on the question of costs. But I cannot factor in her social media posts when she has a right to publish freely about her case.
60. For these reasons, I cannot accept that the Claimant’s conduct in this case amounts to an abuse of the court’s process. The Claimant will however have to take care as this claim progresses not to breach the rules that restrict the use of the Defendants’ disclosed documents and witness statements before they are deployed in open court. There are of course other risks about speaking out on social media and to the extent that the Claimant exaggerates her case that will be a potentially fruitful area of cross-examination. But the trial process is not going to be compromised by this publicity.
Conclusion
61. For the reasons given above, I have rejected the Defendants’ argument that this libel claim should be struck out as an abuse of the court’s process. I have, however, agreed with the Defendants’ submission that significant parts of the Claimant’s pleaded case do not comply with the rules on the pleading of reference, serious harm and damage. Accordingly, I will strike out the following paragraphs of the Particulars of Claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c): paragraph 8, 9, 10, 11, 15 and 16.
62. Had it not been for the Claimant’s witness statement dated 1 May 2026 responding to the Defendants’ applications, which for the first time set out her factual case on reference and serious harm, it is likely that I would have granted the Defendants judgment on the claim. However, the Claimant’s witness statement persuades me that she may yet have a viable case on serious harm, reference and damage, if the relevant facts are properly pleaded. In these circumstances and having regard to Kim v Park and Bridgen v Hancock, I consider that the appropriate course is to give the Claimant one last chance to prepare a proper pleading.
63. The Claimant is not out of the woods yet. She will need to apply for permission to make amendments on reference, serious harm and damage to replace the pleading that I have struck out. The burden will be on her to persuade the Court that each of the proposed amendments has a realistic prospect of success. If the Court is not so persuaded, that will be the end of the claim for one or both publications, as reference and serious harm are essential elements of any libel claim. If the Court is so persuaded, the claim will proceed and the Defendants will have the opportunity to make consequential amendments to their Defences.
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).