Family United Kingdom

The Mother v The Local Authority & Ors

Official source

Neutral citation: [2026] EWFC 305 (B)

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT CHESTER & CREWE

ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF DJ MITCHELL

BEFORE HHJ HESFORD

BETWEEN:

THE MOTHER

Appellant

-and-

THE LOCAL AUTHORITY

1st Respondent

-and-

THE FATHER

2nd Respondent

-and-

THE CHILD

(BY HER CHILDREN’S GUARDIAN)

3rd Respondent

______________________________

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT REFUSING PERMISSION TO APPEAL

22 OCTOBER 2026

______________________________

Representation

The Appellant Mother appeared in person

The Local Authority was represented by Ms Clarke

No other party appeared or was represented

Pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction and/or rule 12.73 FPR 2010, the child, parents, siblings and wider family members shall not be identified. The names of the child, parents, siblings and any person likely to identify them have been anonymised. Any person publishing this judgment must preserve that anonymity.

1. This is my judgment on the mother's application for an oral reconsideration of my decision dated 6 October 2026 refusing permission to appeal. I will refer to the child as “John” for the purposes of this judgment, but that is not his real name.

2. I have considered the mother's written application, together with the appeal notice, the grounds of appeal, the skeleton argument, the transcript of the judgment of District Judge Mitchell delivered on 20 May 2026 and the order refusing permission to appeal. I have also considered the mother’s emailed request to reconsider the permission and she has had the opportunity to address me both orally and with further written submissions.

3. The mother submits that an important distinction requires clarification. She points out that whilst she consented to the making of the care order, she did not consent to the making of the placement order and opposed the local authority's plan for adoption. That is correct and was indeed expressly recognised in the order refusing permission to appeal.

4. I have therefore reconsidered the matter on the basis most favourable to the mother, namely that her proposed appeal is directed to the decision to make the placement order and approve the plan for adoption rather than to the making of the care order.

5. The test on an application for permission to appeal is a well-established one. Permission may only be granted where an appeal would have a real prospect of success or where there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

6. I have approached the mother's application with care. I recognise the significance of the decisions made about John's future and the strength of the mother's feelings about the outcome. It is clear from her application that she wishes the court to take account of the progress she says she has made and continues to make.

7. Having reconsidered all the material before me, I am nevertheless not satisfied that the proposed appeal has a real prospect of success.

8. The judgment of District Judge Mitchell demonstrates a careful consideration of the evidence, the professional assessments, the parties' positions and John's welfare needs. The judge identified the realistic options available, namely long-term foster care and adoption, and carried out a detailed welfare and proportionality evaluation before reaching her conclusions.

9. The central argument advanced on behalf of the mother at the final hearing was that John should remain in foster care whilst she undertook further work and demonstrated sustained change with a view to caring for him in the future. That argument was fully before the judge and was specifically addressed in the judgment. The mother was present throughout and represented by experienced counsel.

10. The judgment shows that the judge took account of the positive steps which the mother had begun to take. The judge referred to the mother's engagement with domestic abuse and parenting work, the recent hair strand testing and the evidence relating to her relationship with the father. The judge expressly acknowledged those developments and commended the mother for them.

11. The judge then considered those matters in the wider context of the history of the case, the professional evidence and, importantly, John's welfare timescales. Having done so, she concluded that John could not wait for changes which, whilst encouraging, remained recent and would require sustained demonstration over a considerably longer period.

12. Whether another judge might have placed different weight on particular factors is not the question for an appeal court. The question is whether there is an arguable basis for saying that the decision reached was wrong. Having reviewed the transcript carefully, I am unable to identify such a basis.

13. The mother's application also refers to changes which she says have occurred since the final hearing and to the further work she has undertaken. I have no doubt that those matters are important to her and that she wishes the court to take account of the progress she believes she has made.

14. However, the function of an appeal court is to consider whether the decision under challenge was wrong on the evidence available to the judge at the time it was made. The question for me is not whether circumstances may have developed since May 2026 but whether there is an arguable basis for concluding that the decision reached by District Judge Mitchell was wrong when it was made.

15. Having carefully reviewed the grounds relied upon by the mother and the transcript of the judgment, I am unable to identify any arguable error of law, procedural irregularity, failure to consider relevant evidence or any conclusion that was not properly open to the judge on the evidence before her.

16. The matters relied upon by the mother were matters of which the judge was aware. They formed part of the case advanced on her behalf and were considered within the judge's welfare evaluation. The fact that the judge ultimately reached a different conclusion to that sought by the mother does not, without more, provide a basis for appellate intervention.

17. Read fairly and as a whole, the judgment demonstrates a careful balancing of John's welfare needs, the positive features relied upon by the mother and the concerns identified by the professional evidence. The judge explained why she concluded that adoption, rather than long-term foster care, was the outcome required by John's welfare throughout his life.

18. I have also considered whether there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.

19. I recognise the significance of the decision for the mother and the importance which she understandably attaches to the issues she raises. However, those issues were fully explored before the trial judge and were addressed in the judgment. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is any other compelling reason for permission to be granted.

20. Accordingly, having reconsidered the matter and taking full account of the clarification provided by the mother regarding her opposition to adoption, I remain satisfied that the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success and that there is no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.

21. I appreciate that this outcome will be disappointing for the mother. Nothing in this judgment should be taken as a criticism of the efforts she says she has made since the final hearing. The issue before me is a limited one, namely whether there is an arguable basis for challenging the decision reached by the trial judge. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that there is not.

22. Permission to appeal is therefore refused. The application is dismissed. I also remain of the view that the appeal is totally without merit.

HHJ Hesford

22 October 2026

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our family law attorney in Paris.


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