Administrative United Kingdom

LYNX UK TRUST COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY (R on the application of) v NATURAL ENGLAND

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2761 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2025-LON-004729

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 30 October 2026

Before:

MS JUSTICE OBI DBE

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between:

The King
on the application of
LYNX UK TRUST COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY
Claimant
– and –
NATURAL ENGLAND Defendant
– and –
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS Interested Party

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Mr Richard Turney KC and Ms Margherita Cornaglia (instructed by Richard Buxton Solicitors) for the Claimant

Mr Paul Luckhurst and Mr Will Bordell (instructed by Natural England Legal Services) for the Defendant

Mr Ned Westaway and Mr Jonathan Welch (instructed by The Government Legal Department) for the Interested Party

Hearing dates: 14 and 15 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

Ms Justice Obi DBE:

Introduction

1. This is a rolled-up hearing of a challenge arising from an application to Natural England for a licence under section 16 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (“WCA”) to release three Eurasian lynx (“lynx”) into the wild in Kielder Forest, Northumberland. The lynx is a large wild cat. It was a native species but has been extinct in the United Kingdom for more than 1300 years.

2. The Claimant, Lynx UK Trust Community Interest Company, is a not-for-profit organisation which promotes the conservation and reintroduction of lynx to the United Kingdom. The case for reintroduction is that lynx would contribute to biodiversity and nature recovery by restoring the ecological role of a native apex predator including through its effects on deer populations. The Defendant, Natural England, is a non-departmental public body established by the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006 (“NERCA”). Its general purpose under section 2 of NERCA is to ensure that the natural environment is conserved, enhanced, and managed for the benefit of present and future generations with the aim of contributing to sustainable development. The Interested Party, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (“Secretary of State”), is responsible for the relevant government policy on species reintroduction and has power under section 8 of the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (“DWAA”) to modify the Schedule of animals to which that Act applies. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (“Defra”) is the government department for which the Secretary of State is responsible.

3. The Court is not concerned with the environmental merits of reintroducing lynx to the United Kingdom, or with the merits of the Claimant’s particular proposal. The issues are confined to the relationship between the DWAA and the WCA and the lawfulness of Natural England's decision not to proceed to a substantive assessment of an application for the trial release of three lynx into Kielder Forest.

4. The claim is advanced on two grounds:

i. Ground 1 – on a proper construction of the legislation, the DWAA does not prohibit the release of lynx pursuant to a licence granted under the WCA.

ii. Ground 2 (in the alternative) – even if further authorisation were required under the DWAA, that is not a lawful reason for Natural England to refuse to determine the Claimant’s application for a licence under the WCA.

5. The relief sought by the Claimant is:

i. a declaration that the release of lynx pursuant to a licence granted under the WCA would not be unlawful under the DWAA; and/or

ii. an order requiring Natural England to determine an application to release lynx notwithstanding any further authorisation required under the DWAA.

Outcome

6. For the reasons which follow, I grant permission on Ground 1 but dismiss that ground on its merits. I refuse permission on Ground 2 because the challenge was not brought promptly and, in any event, was commenced outside the time permitted by CPR 54.5. Had permission been granted, I would have dismissed Ground 2 on its merits. The claim therefore fails.

Background

7. The background circumstances may be summarised as follows.

8. The Claimant has pursued the possibility of a reintroduction of lynx for a number of years. Discussions with Natural England began in 2015. The potential difficulty presented by the DWAA for a proposed release of lynx was identified at that stage in correspondence between Defra and the Claimant’s then legal representatives, including the effect of the statutory definition of “keeper” after an animal ceased to be in the keeper’s possession.

9. In July 2017, the Claimant applied for a licence to release six lynx into Kielder Forest as part of a 5-year trial to test the suitability of the species for a full reintroduction. In a letter, dated 27 September 2017, the then-Secretary of State reserved the decision to himself and directed Natural England to provide advice. Natural England carried out a detailed technical assessment. It concluded that the application did not meet the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) guidelines and that further work would be required. In particular, Natural England advised that the proposal lacked the necessary depth and rigour for it to be confident that it would succeed in its purpose, and that approval should not be given. On 30 November 2018, the Secretary of State accepted that advice and refused the application based on deficiencies identified in that particular proposal, including matters relating to funding and organisational resilience, ecological assessment, engagement with landowners and the local community, and monitoring arrangements. Natural England’s advice was published in December 2018.

10. Based on the IUCN guidelines, Defra published a code and good practice guidance (“Defra Guidance”) for conservation translocations in England entitled “Reintroductions and other conservation translocations: code and guidance for England”. The Defra Guidance was first published in May 2021 and updated in July 2024. It states as follows under the sub-heading “Dangerous wild animals: the law”:

“The [DWAA] may be relevant for some species of animal as listed in the Act. If an animal is licensed under the [DWAA], it would be an offence to release that animal. The list of species includes a small number of former native English mammal species, plus our only venomous snake, the adder (Vipera berus).”

11. On 30 May 2022, the Claimant submitted a revised proposal, in draft form, for a smaller three-year trial involving the release of three lynx (two females and one male) in Kielder Forest (“the 2022 application”). The application was accompanied by a detailed Project Plan setting out the proposed arrangements for the trial introduction. The Claimant indicated that further material remained to be submitted and sought engagement with Natural England before completing its submission. The 2022 application was for a temporary pilot intended to generate evidence which might inform any future proposal for permanent reintroduction. The wild lynx would be captured in Sweden and transported to the United Kingdom. They would initially be held in purpose-built enclosures for quarantine and acclimatisation before a monitored “soft release”, after which they would no longer be confined to the enclosures but would remain subject to post-release tracking, veterinary oversight, and arrangements for recapture where necessary.The 2022 application also provided that the Claimant would be responsible for the health and welfare of the released lynx and their progeny throughout the trial.

12. The legal issue relating to the impact of the DWAA then assumed particular significance. Lynx are among the animals regulated by the DWAA. The proposed project therefore raised the question of the relationship between that Act and the licensing regime for release under section 16 of the WCA. Disclosed communications reveal discussions both internally at Natural England and with Defra as to both the effect of the DWAA and whether there was any prospect of ministerial support to amend it. On 21 June 2022, a Defra official recorded that "[t]he steer is that [Natural England] can't issue a licence because of DWAA so we just need to tell applicant that. it’ll be a mess but that’ll be for Defra to sort out (sic)" and that the "clear steer is that as there is no legal route for release Ministers don't need to be involved". Natural England's Dr Heydon expressed the view that such an approach created a legal risk but that if the Secretary of State did not intend to change the law in the near future that would justify not determining the application. The Secretary of State subsequently confirmed she had “no plan to make any substantive amendments to the DWAA at this time”.

13. On 1 July 2022, Natural England wrote a letter informing the Claimant that it would not proceed to a full assessment of the 2022 application. Its position was that a licence under the WCA would not avoid the need to comply with the DWAA and that, while that impediment remained, there was no reasonably foreseeable prospect of the proposed release lawfully proceeding. It also considered that a substantive assessment would require significant resources and, absent any realistic prospect of lawful implementation, risked becoming out of date before it could serve its purpose. The letter was sent following consultation with Defra.

14. The Claimant sought, through further engagement with Natural England and Defra, to find a way to resolve the issue. However, Natural England's position did not change. On 6 November 2023, Natural England expressly confirmed that it would not assess applications for lynx release while the identified legal constraints remained and that it regarded the 2022 application as a closed matter. On 9 July 2024, the Claimant wrote to the newly appointed Secretary of State seeking support for the project but despite a follow-up, the matter did not progress further.

15. There were developments in 2025, but the overall position did not alter. The Claimant renewed its engagement with Natural England following a newspaper article in June 2025 which reported that the Chair of Natural England was “enthusiastic about reintroducing lynx to Britain” and would be "absolutely delighted" if it could be achieved during his term. There was further correspondence from the Claimant, but Natural England did not respond. On 19 September 2025, Natural England reaffirmed that it would not undertake a comprehensive assessment of a re-submitted draft or formal application unless advised by Defra that release would be lawful under the DWAA, if licensed under the WCA.

16. During approximately the same period (2025-2026), Defra was considering aspects of species reintroduction policy. Material concerning that process, including a Ministerial Submission dated 15 July 2025 and further material from October 2025 and January 2026, was disclosed following an application for specific disclosure (see procedural history below). The parties differ as to the relevance of that material. Mr Turney KC, on behalf of the Claimant, submits that it should have been disclosed earlier in accordance with the duty of candour, because it demonstrated continuing consideration within Defra of species-reintroduction policy and the effect of the DWAA at a time when the Claimant was being told that Natural England would not assess an application while the perceived legislative impediment remained. Mr Westaway, on behalf of the Secretary of State, disputes both the suggested failure of candour and the relevance of the material to the grounds of challenge (“the disclosure issue”). I return briefly to that issue below.

Procedural History

17. On 11 November 2025, the Claimant sent a pre-action protocol letter to Natural England. In its response, dated 28 November 2025, Natural England maintained its position. On 4 December 2025, the Claimant sought confirmation that Natural England would not consider a new application unless the DWAA regime changed. Natural England replied on 8 December 2025, stating that it had “nothing further to add”.

18. The Claimant filed its claim for judicial review on 17 December 2025. By an order dated 3 March 2026, Lang J adjourned the application for permission to a rolled-up hearing, directing that, if permission were granted, the Court should proceed immediately to determine the claim. She considered that the grounds were arguable but that the claim might be time-barred, and that the issue of delay should be determined after oral submissions in the case as a whole. She also determined that the proceedings were an Aarhus Convention claim and made a costs-capping order in respect of the liabilities of each party.

19. Following that order, Natural England and the Secretary of State filed and served Detailed Grounds of Resistance. Natural England also filed witness statements from Dr Stuart Otway and Dr Matthew Heydon.

20. On 15 September 2026, the Claimant applied for specific disclosure of unredacted versions of documents which had previously been disclosed in redacted form by Defra in response to an Environmental Information Regulations request made by a newspaper. On 25 September 2026, the Secretary of State provided the documents in unredacted form (save for personal contact details). The application for specific disclosure therefore did not require determination. However, as stated in paragraph 16 above, a dispute remained as to the relevance of that material.

Legal Framework

21. Emphasis in the extracts set out below has been added.

The Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976

22. The DWAA is an Act “to regulate the keeping of certain kinds of dangerous wild animals”. Section 1(1) provides that, subject to section 5, “no person shall keepany dangerous wild animal except under the authority of a licence” granted by a local authority in accordance with the Act.

23. An application for a licence must identify the species and number of animals proposed to be kept and “the premises where any animal concerned will normally be held”: paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 1(2).

24. Section 1(3) provides that a local authority cannot grant a licence unless satisfied that granting it would not be contrary to the public interest on grounds of safety, nuisance or otherwise; that the applicant is a suitable person; and that any animal concerned will, at all times, while being kept “only under the authority of the licence – (i) be held in accommodation which secures that the animal will not escape”.

25. Section 1(4) provides that, save where the circumstances are in the authority's opinion exceptional, the applicant must be a person who “both owns and possesses, or proposes both to own and to possess” the animal. Under section 1(5), the premises where the animal will normally be held must be inspected by an authorised veterinary surgeon or veterinary practitioner, whose report is to contain information enabling the authority to decide whether the animal “may suitably be held there”.

26. Section 1(6) prescribes conditions which must be included in a licence. They include conditions “that, while any animal concerned is being kept only under the authority of the licence” (paragraph (a) of section 1(6)), it is kept only by the person or persons specified in the licence (sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (a)); that it “shall normally be held at such premises as are specified in the licence” (sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph (a)); and that it “shall not be moved from those premises or shall only be moved from them in such circumstances as are specified in the licence” (sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph (a)). The licensee must also hold appropriate insurance. Paragraph (d) of section 1(6) requires such other conditions as the local authority considers necessary or desirable to secure the objects specified in paragraphs (c) to (f) of section 1(3).

27. Section 2(5) makes it an offence to contravene section 1(1). Section 2(6) provides that where a condition of a licence is contravened or not complied with, the licensee and any other person entitled to keep the animal under the licence who was primarily responsible for the contravention or failure are, subject to the “all reasonable precautions” and “due diligence” defence in section 2(7), guilty of an offence.

28. Section 5 provides exemptions from the Act in specified circumstances. They include, by section 5(1), a dangerous wild animal kept in “a zoo within the meaning of the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 for which a licence is in force (or is not for the time being required) under that Act”.

29. Section 6 provides that a person guilty of an offence under any provision of the Act is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

30. Section 7 contains the Act’s interpretation provisions, including the definition of “keeper”. Section 7(1) defines a “keeper” for the purposes of the Act:

“a person is a keeper of an animal if he has it in his possession; and if at any time an animal ceases to be in the possession of a person, any person who immediately before that time was a keeper thereof … continues to be a keeper of the animal until another person becomes a keeper thereof”.

31. Section 7(2) makes provision for specified circumstances in which a person is not the keeper for the purposes of the Act, which includes where they take possession of an animal to prevent damage or to restore it to its owner.

32. “Dangerous wild animals” are those specified in the Schedule. The Schedule includes cats of the genus Felidae and expressly includes the lynx. Section 8 provides a power to modify the Schedule by statutory instrument.

The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981

33. Part I of the WCA makes provision for the protection of wildlife. Section 14(1) provides, so far as material, that if any person releases or allows to escape into the wild any animal which:

“(a) is of a kind which is not ordinarily residentin and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain in a wild state; or

(b) is included in Part I, IA or IB of Schedule 9,

[that person] shall be guilty of an offence.”

34. Lynx is not included in Schedule 9. It falls within section 14(1)(a) as an animal which is not ordinarily resident in Great Britain in a wild state.

35. Section 16 creates a licensing regime under which conduct which would otherwise be prohibited by section 14 may be authorised. By section 16(4)(c), section 14 does not apply to anything done under and in accordance with the terms of a licence granted by the appropriate authority. Section 16(5) provides that such a licence may, among other things, be general or specific, may be granted to persons of a class or to a particular person, may be subject to specified conditions, and may be modified or revoked by the appropriate authority.

36. For these purposes the appropriate authority is the Secretary of State pursuant to section 16(9)(e). The relevant licensing function is exercised by Natural England pursuant to arrangements made under section 78 of NERCA.

International instruments

37. The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 1979 (“the Bern Convention”) concerns the conservation of wild flora and fauna and their natural habitats. Lynx is listed in Appendix III as a protected fauna species. Article 11(2)(a) provides that contracting parties undertake:

“to encourage the reintroduction of native species of wild flora and fauna … provided that a study is first made in light of the experiences of other Contracting Parties to establish that such reintroduction would be effective and acceptable.”

38. The Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 was adopted at Rio de Janeiro. Article 9 provides that:

“as far as possible and as appropriate […] [a]dopt measures for the recovery and rehabilitation of threatened species and for their reintroduction into their natural habitats under appropriate conditions”.

39. At European level, provisions concerning reintroduction are contained in Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (“the Habitats Directive”). Article 22(a) provides:

"In implementing the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall:

(a) study the desirability of re-introducing species in Annex IV that are native to their territory where this might contribute to their conservation, provided that an investigation, also taking into account experience in other Member States or elsewhere, has established that such re-introduction contributes effectively to re-establishing these species at a favourable conservation status and provided that they are re-introduced only after proper consultation of the public concerned;"

Issues

40. The agreed issues are as follows:

Ground 1

i. On its proper construction, does the DWAA prohibit the release of lynx into the wild where that release is authorised by a licence granted under section 16(4)(c) of the WCA?

ii. If so, have the relevant provisions of the DWAA been impliedly repealed by sections 14 and 16 of the WCA insofar as they apply to a release authorised under section 16?

Ground 2

iii. Was Ground 2 brought out of time?

iv. If the DWAA prohibits the proposed release notwithstanding a licence under the WCA, did Natural England act lawfully in declining to undertake a full assessment and determination of the Claimant's 2022 application?

Analysis

41. For clarity, this judgment determines only those matters necessary to resolve the pleaded grounds and the issues identified for determination; it does not seek to address every argument raised orally or in writing.

Ground 1

General submissions

42. Although Natural England and the Secretary of State contend that the claim was brought out of time, they invited the Court to determine Ground 1 because it raises a pure question of statutory construction capable of authoritative determination on the agreed facts. I accept that Ground 1 should be determined notwithstanding the delay issue.

43. The Claimant advances two alternative arguments. Mr Turney KC's principal submission is that, properly construed, the DWAA does not prohibit the release of lynx pursuant to a licence granted under section 16 of the WCA. He submits that release and escape are different concepts, and that the DWAA regulates the keeping of dangerous wild animals, whereas the WCA creates a statutory regime under which release into the wild may be authorised. On that footing, the proposed release falls outside the prohibition relied upon by Natural England. He further submits that the proposed trial would not involve any abandonment of responsibility for the animals following release. Mr Turney KC also relies upon the principle that the DWAA is a statute that is “always speaking” (see e.g. Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27) and therefore capable of being applied to modern species-reintroduction projects. In the alternative, Mr Turney KC submits that, if Natural England's construction of the DWAA is correct, conduct authorised under the WCA would nonetheless constitute a criminal offence under the DWAA. He contends that the resulting inconsistency engages principles of implied repeal.

44. Mr Luckhurst, on behalf of Natural England, and Mr Westaway, on behalf of the Secretary of State submit that the Claimant's construction cannot be reconciled with the language and structure of the DWAA. In particular, they rely upon the continuing keepership under section 7(1) and contend that the DWAA and the WCA regulate different matters and are capable of operating alongside one another. They submit that the Claimant’s implied repeal argument should be rejected because the statutory schemes are neither inconsistent nor irreconcilable. Both rely on the strong presumption against implied repeal, Parliament’s decision not to amend or repeal the DWAA when enacting the WCA, and the existence of express exemptions within the DWAA itself. They further submit that any change to the inclusion of lynx within the DWAA regime must be addressed through the statutory mechanism for amending the Schedule.

The statutory schemes

45. In South Kesteven DC v Mackie [2000] 1 WLR 1461, the Court of Appeal observed that, prior to the DWAA, there was no statutory control over the keeping of dangerous wild animals. The Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925 regulated the exhibition and training of performing animals but not the distinct public safety concerns or the specific risks associated with dangerous wild animals. The DWAA was enacted to fill that gap.

46. The DWAA establishes a licensing regime governing the keeping of dangerous wild animals with the dual purpose of animal welfare and public safety. Lynx is expressly included within the Schedule to the Act. Subject to specified exceptions, no person may keep such an animal without a licence. The Act regulates who may keep such animals, where they may be kept, the conditions under which they may be kept, the premises at which they may be kept and the circumstances in which they may be moved. Breach of the statutory requirements may constitute a criminal offence.

47. The WCA serves a different purpose. Section 14 prohibits the release into the wild of specified animals, including animals not ordinarily resident in Great Britain in a wild state. Section 16 empowers the appropriate authority to grant licences authorising conduct which would otherwise contravene that provision.

48. The present dispute concerns the relationship between those statutory schemes. There is no dispute between the parties that the proposed release of lynx into Kielder Forest requires a licence under the WCA. The question is whether such a licence is sufficient to authorise the release of lynx into the wild, or whether the requirements imposed by the DWAA continue to apply notwithstanding the grant of a licence under the WCA.

Construction: text, context and purpose

49. Ground 1 raises a question of statutory construction. The starting point is the language Parliament has used, read in its statutory context and in light of the purpose and scheme of the legislation: see R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3 at [29]; R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28 at [41]. The relevant principles are not in dispute.

50. Mr Turney KC acknowledges that the DWAA and the WCA perform different functions. The DWAA contains no express prohibition upon release. Instead, it repeatedly refers to possession, keeping and escape. Mr Turney KC relies in particular upon the distinction between escape and deliberate release, together with the language of sections 1(3)(c) and 1(6)(a), which refer to an animal being kept "only under the authority of the licence". Mr Turney KC submits that those provisions recognise that an animal may cease to be kept pursuant to a licence granted under the DWAA and may thereafter be dealt with under another statutory regime. On that analysis, the grant of a licence under section 16 of the WCA provides the necessary legal authority for release and marks the point at which the DWAA regime ceases to apply. In other words, the DWAA regulates the period during which the animal is kept in captivity, whilst the WCA regulates the subsequent release stage.

51. There is some force in aspects of that submission.Mr Turney KC relied on British Association for Shooting and Conservation v Natural England [2026] EWHC 1812 (Admin) (“BASC”) in which Ritchie J distinguished between release and escape when analysing section 14 of the WCA and Gateway Professional Services (Management) Ltd v Kingston upon Hull City Council[2004] EWHC 195 (Admin) which concerned the meaning of “escape” in environmental protection legislation relating to controlled waste. In my view, BASC supports the uncontroversial proposition that, in the language of the WCA, release and escape are distinct concepts. Gateway offers little assistance given its very different statutory context. However, I accept that a deliberate release is not naturally described as an escape. That conclusion follows principally from the language of the WCA itself, which refers separately to release and escape. There is likewise force in the argument that the word "only" in sections 1(3)(c) and 1(6)(a) of the DWAA must be given meaningful effect.

52. In my judgment, however, neither point addresses what is ultimately the central provision for present purposes, namely section 7(1). Release and escape are distinct concepts and the WCA establishes a statutory regime under which a release may be authorised. The critical issue is the consequence which the DWAA attaches to the cessation of possession. Parliament addressed that question expressly in section 7(1). Rather than providing that keepership comes to an end when possession ceases, Parliament provided that a person who has ceased to possess an animal remains a keeper until another person becomes a keeper. Significantly, the provision is not expressed by reference to the reason why possession has ceased. It is not confined to escape. Nor is it limited to involuntary loss of possession.

53. That conclusion provides the answer to the Claimant's reliance upon sections 1(3)(c) and 1(6)(a). I accept that the word "only" must be given substantive effect. However, those provisions are concerned with the circumstances in which an animal is kept under the authority of a licence granted pursuant to the DWAA and with the conditions governing the keeping of the animals under that licence. They do not purport to define when statutory keepership comes to an end. Still less do they provide that an authorisation granted under another statutory regime displaces the consequence which section 7(1) expressly attaches to the cessation of possession. Mr Turney KC's construction requires the word "only" to qualify section 7(1) by implication. In my view there is no proper basis, in the language of the Act, for reading it in that way.

54. Mr Turney KC submitted that the DWAA contains no express offence of "release" and that it is therefore difficult to identify the criminal conduct which, on Natural England's interpretation, is said to occur upon release. In my judgment, the absence of an express offence does not materially assist. The issue is not whether Parliament created a specific offence of release, but whether keepership and the obligations associated with it continue notwithstanding release. For the reasons already given, I conclude that they do.

55. The wider structure of the DWAA reinforces that conclusion. The DWAA repeatedly proceeds upon the basis of identified keepers, continuing responsibility, specified premises, secure accommodation and criminal sanctions. Parliament also identified specific circumstances in which those requirements would not apply. Section 5 creates a series of carefully defined exemptions, including for licensed zoos. The structure of the Act is therefore one in which the statutory regime applies unless Parliament has expressly provided otherwise. That broader statutory context sits comfortably with a construction under which keepership continues notwithstanding the cessation of possession, and uneasily with one under which the statutory regime simply falls away upon release.

56. This interpretation is also consistent with the subsequent legislative treatment of the DWAA. Under section 8, Parliament conferred a power to modify the Schedule by statutory instrument. That power was exercised by the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 (Modification) (No. 2) Order 2007. The Explanatory Memorandum to that Order explained that the amendments were intended to "limit the species specified to those that may present a genuine threat to the public" and described the DWAA as a "public safety measure" directed to ensuring that dangerous wild animals are kept in circumstances which create no risk to the public. Whilst the Explanatory Memorandum cannot alter the meaning of the Act, it is consistent with the view that the Schedule continues to identify those species which Parliament considers should remain subject to the DWAA regime unless and until they are removed through the statutory mechanism provided by section 8.

57. Nor does the scheme of the WCA lead to a different conclusion. The Claimant's argument ultimately depends upon the proposition that the two statutes operate sequentially, with the DWAA governing the period before release and the WCA governing the position thereafter. I do not consider that the statutory schemes establish such a handover. The statutes, as I have already stated, address different matters. The two regimes are not co-extensive. The adder provides a useful example. It is included in the Schedule to the DWAA but, as a native species ordinarily resident in Great Britain, does not fall within section 14(1) of the WCA. The fact that Parliament chose to regulate some species under the DWAA without bringing them within the scope of section 14 further supports the conclusion that the two Acts address different concerns and are capable of operating alongside one another. Nothing in sections 14 or 16 of the WCA states that a licence granted under that regime disapplies the DWAA, terminates keepership under section 7(1), or creates an exception to a regime which Parliament has expressly chosen to apply to lynx. A licence under the WCA may be necessary to authorise a release which would otherwise be prohibited. It does not follow that such a licence is sufficient to remove obligations imposed by the DWAA.

58. Mr Turney KC submitted that this conclusion may have implications extending beyond the proposed reintroduction of lynx. In particular, he relied on Natural England’s undated draft internal guidance concerning the translocation of adders, which notes that wild-living adders are sometimes moved and released as part of conservation or mitigation exercises and that the legal position under the DWAA has not been authoritatively determined. He submitted that, if Natural England’s interpretation is correct, statutory amendment might be required before certain conservation translocations of adders could lawfully proceed. I do not consider that point assists in resolving the issue before the Court. The question remains one of statutory construction. It is not necessary to express any view on the position of adders as the issue before the Court concerns the proposed release of lynx.

59. The statutory purpose reinforces the conclusion I have reached based on the text and context of the DWAA. The dual objective of animal welfare and public safety is reflected throughout the licensing, inspection and enforcement provisions of the Act. A construction under which deliberate release immediately terminates keepership and thereby brings the statutory regime to an end would be at odds with the wider structure of the Act. By contrast, a construction under which keepership continues unless and until Parliament provides otherwise gives coherent effect to the language of section 7(1), fits the structure of the Act and allows both statutory regimes to operate according to their terms. I do not overlook the practical character of the 2022 application, nor the extensive arrangements proposed by the Claimant for monitoring, tracking, veterinary supervision and recapture. Those matters may be highly relevant to the merits of any application for a licence under the WCA and to the assessment of risk. They do not, however, determine the meaning of the legislation.

60. None of the international instruments materially assist the Claimant. They demonstrate that the reintroduction of native species is regarded internationally as a potentially legitimate conservation measure and, in some circumstances, as a desirable one. To that extent they provide part of the wider legislative and policy background against which the WCA was enacted. They do not, however, alter the meaning of the language Parliament chose to enact in the DWAA. Nor do they require the Court to construe the domestic legislation as creating an exception which its language does not contain. In relation to the Habitats Directive, the principle of EU law supremacy no longer applies and there is no obligation to construe the DWAA and the WCA so as to achieve conformity. Even if those instruments support a statutory regime under which species reintroduction may be considered and authorised, they do not assist in answering the specific question whether keepership under section 7(1) ceases upon a deliberate release authorised under section 16 of the WCA.

61. Nor do I consider that the "always speaking" principle materially advances the Claimant's case. That principle permits statutory language to be applied to circumstances not foreseen at the time of enactment. It does not permit the Court to depart from the meaning of language whose effect remains clear when read in its statutory context. The fact that Parliament in 1976 may not have had modern species-reintroduction projects specifically in mind does not justify reading the Act as containing an exception which Parliament did not enact.

62. Standing back and considering the statutory scheme as a whole, I am unable to accept the Claimant's primary construction. The central difficulty is not that the proposed release would result in release rather than escape. It is that Parliament expressly addressed the consequence of possession ceasing in section 7(1) and repeatedly proceeds on the basis of continuing keepership, continuing responsibility and identified keepers. Nothing in sections 14 or 16 of the WCA displaces that consequence. The DWAA and the WCA are capable of operating concurrently according to their respective terms and the more natural conclusion is that Parliament intended them to do so.

63. For those reasons, I reject the Claimant's primary construction.

Implied repeal

64. The Claimant advances an alternative argument in respect of Ground 1 based upon the principle of implied repeal. Mr Turney KC submits that if the DWAA would otherwise prohibit a release authorised under section 16 of the WCA, the two statutory schemes are irreconcilable. He invites the Court to conclude that Parliament cannot have intended the WCA to create a licensing regime for releases which remain criminal under the DWAA. In those circumstances, he argues that the WCA impliedly repeals the DWAA to the extent necessary to give effect to the statutory scheme established by the WCA. I do not accept these submissions.

65. The legal principles are well established. Implied repeal arises only where the provisions of a later statute are so inconsistent with those of an earlier statute that the two cannot stand together. As Laws LJ explained in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council[2013] 1 AC 413, the doctrine applies where successive enactments are "irreducibly inconsistent". The presumption against implied repeal is correspondingly strong: see H v Lord Advocate at [30].

66. It is material that Parliament made express provision in section 73 and Schedule 17 of the WCA for the repeal and amendment of existing enactments. The DWAA was not among them. Whilst not determinative, that omission sits comfortably with the conclusion that Parliament did not intend the WCA to displace any part of the DWAA. It is not sufficient to demonstrate inconvenience or practical difficulty arising from the interaction of two statutory schemes. As the Court of Appeal explained in R (O'Byrne) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2002] HLR 30 at [65], inconsistency sufficient to found implied repeal is not established merely because the combined operation of two enactments may produce anomalies.

67. A licence granted under section 16 of the WCA authorises conduct which would otherwise contravene section 14. It does not purport to confer a general immunity from the requirements of other legislation. Nor do I consider that the principle of doubtful penalisation assists the Claimant. A licence granted under section 16 removes criminal liability under section 14 of the WCA. It does not follow that Parliament thereby intended to disapply separate statutory obligations arising under different legislation. Nothing in sections 14 or 16 states that the grant of such a licence terminates keepership for the purposes of section 7(1) of the DWAA, disapplies the obligations imposed by that Act, or creates an exception to its licensing regime. The Claimant's argument therefore depends upon identifying an inconsistency which the legislation itself does not express.

68. Nor do I consider that any such inconsistency arises in substance. A species may fall within the scope of both statutory regimes without either contradicting the other. The fact that compliance with one statutory regime does not, without more, relieve obligations imposed by another falls well short of the irreducible inconsistency required by Thoburn.

69. Mr Turney KC also relies upon the Bern Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Habitats Directive. Those instruments do not establish the necessary inconsistency between the DWAA and the WCA. They support, at most, the desirability of considering species introduction in appropriate circumstances. They do not create the irreducible inconsistency necessary to found an argument based on implied repeal.

70. Standing back, the Claimant's implied repeal argument depends upon treating the grant of a licence under the WCA as carrying consequences which the legislation itself does not state. In my judgment, Parliament intended the two statutory regimes to operate concurrently according to their respective terms. The language of sections 1 and 7 of the DWAA does not cease to apply because a release has been authorised under section 16 of the WCA. The high threshold required for implied repeal is not met. I therefore reject the Claimant's alternative construction.

Conclusion

71. For those reasons I reject Ground 1. Properly construed, the DWAA continues to apply to lynx as a scheduled dangerous wild animal. I am unable to accept either the Claimant's primary submission that the Act ceases to apply upon deliberate release pursuant to a licence under section 16 of the WCA, or its alternative submission that the relevant provisions have been impliedly repealed by the later enactment of the WCA.

Ground 2

General submissions

72. Ground 2 concerns Natural England's decision not to undertake a full assessment of the Claimant's 2022 application because it considered that the proposed release could not lawfully proceed in light of the requirements of the DWAA. Mr Luckhurst and Mr Westaway submit that this challenge is out of time because the decision now challenged was communicated on 1 July 2022. They further submit that, in any event, the challenge is without substantive merit.

73. Mr Turney KC characterises Ground 2 as a challenge to Natural England's continuing refusal to determine the Claimant's 2022 application. In those circumstances, he submits that it would be artificial to require the Claimant to submit a fresh application merely to obtain the same response. He also submits that Ground 2, like Ground 1, turns upon a question of statutory interpretation, as to whether Natural England was entitled to decline to assess the 2022 application.

Timeliness

74. Judicial review claims must be started promptly and, in any event, not later than 3 months after the grounds for making the claim first arose. As the authorities make clear, time runs from the date the decision under challenge was made and is not ordinarily extended by subsequent correspondence which merely explains, maintains or defends an earlier position. The issue is not when Natural England's reasoning was expressed in its fullest form, nor when discussions between the parties finally came to an end. A claimant cannot ordinarily postpone the running of time by seeking reconsideration of a decision, inviting a public authority to change its position, or obtaining further explanation of a position already adopted.

75. The substance of the challenge advanced under Ground 2 is that Natural England unlawfully declined to undertake a substantive assessment of the Claimant's 2022 application. That position had plainly crystallised by 1 July 2022. As the background chronology records, Natural England informed the Claimant on that date that it would not proceed to a full assessment. It also explained that a substantive assessment would require significant resources and might need to be repeated if circumstances later changed. By that stage, the Claimant knew the operative decision, knew the basis upon which it had been taken, and was in a position to advance each of the complaints now relied upon under Ground 2. If, as the Claimant contends, Natural England had unlawfully fettered its discretion, taken into account an irrelevant consideration, or failed to undertake the assessment required by sections 14 and 16 WCA 1981, those complaints were fully available once the 1 July 2022 position had been communicated.

76. The parties continued to discuss the perceived legislative impediment and the Claimant sought through further engagement with both Natural England and Defra to persuade the relevant authorities to adopt a different view. However, as the chronology demonstrates, Natural England's essential position did not change. Properly analysed, those later communications elaborated upon, reaffirmed and maintained the position already adopted in July 2022. They did not replace it, reopen it for reconsideration, or generate a fresh cause of complaint.

77. In reaching that conclusion I bear in mind that the Court should focus upon substance rather than form. The fact that a public authority continues to correspond with an affected party, explains its reasoning in greater detail, or declines invitations to change its position does not ordinarily restart time, and did not do so in this case. I conclude that time began to run no later than 1 July 2022. Measured from that date, Ground 2 was neither prompt nor brought within the period prescribed by CPR 54.5. Mr Turney KC submitted that Ground 2, like Ground 1, raises a question of statutory interpretation. I accept that Ground 2 involves legal questions. However, that does not provide a sufficient reason to overlook the substantial delay in bringing the challenge.

78. I therefore refuse permission on Ground 2 on timeliness grounds alone. That conclusion is sufficient to dispose of Ground 2. However,as the merits were fully argued, and in deference to the written and oral submissions that were made, I shall explain why I would in any event have rejected the ground on its substantive merits.

Merits

79. Mr Turney KC submits that the compatibility of the proposal with the DWAA was not a matter for Natural England to determine and that it therefore unlawfully declined to perform its own statutory functions under sections 14 and 16 of the WCA. It is said that Natural England failed to undertake the assessment required by the statutory scheme and took into account an irrelevant consideration. I do not accept those submissions.

80. Sections 16(4) and 16(5) of the WCA provide the appropriate authority with the power to grant a licence, which may be subject to compliance with any specified conditions and may be modified or revoked at any time.That confers a broad discretion as to whether a licence should be granted and permits the authority to take into account considerations rationally connected with the exercise of that discretion. It is important to identify precisely what Natural England did, and did not, decide. It did not purport to determine an application under the DWAA. Nor did it purport to exercise functions entrusted by Parliament to a local authority under that regime. The decision under challenge was a decision concerning the exercise of its own powers under the WCA. The question is therefore whether it was entitled, in deciding how to exercise those powers, to take account of its conclusion that the proposed release could not lawfully proceed because of the continuing operation of the DWAA. In my judgment, it was.

81. For the reasons given under Ground 1, I have already concluded that the legal obstacle identified by Natural England existed as a matter of law. The Claimant's argument proceeds on the basis that Natural England was required to assess the application as though that obstacle did not exist. I do not accept that proposition. A public authority exercising a statutory discretion is ordinarily entitled to take account of the legal feasibility of the activity which the application seeks to authorise. Indeed, it would have been artificial for Natural England to proceed on the footing that the proposal could lawfully be implemented if it had reached the contrary legal conclusion. Recognition of an existing legal obstacle is not the same thing as exercising another body's statutory functions.

82. The authorities relied upon by the Claimant do not require a different conclusion. R v (Morge) v Hampshire County Council[2011] UKSC 2; [2011] 1 WLR 268 and Gateshead MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment[1995] Env LR 37 demonstrate that decision-makers may proceed on the basis that other statutory regimes exist and will operate according to their terms. Neither authority required a decision-maker to disregard the existence of another statutory regime or to proceed on the basis that legal constraints arising under that regime could be ignored. They do not require a public authority to disregard what it reasonably understands to be an existing legal obstacle when deciding whether and how to exercise its own functions.

83. The authorities concerning the frustration of statutory purpose and the withholding or delay of decisions do not assist the Claimant. Natural England did not decline to consider the application altogether. It considered the application sufficiently to conclude that, because of what it regarded as a legal impediment arising under the DWAA, a full merits assessment would not be worthwhile. For the reasons already given, that conclusion was open to it. Moreover, the position adopted by Natural England was rational. On Natural England's understanding of the law, the proposed release could not lawfully be implemented. In those circumstances, it was entitled to conclude that determining the 2022 application would serve no useful purpose. A decision-maker is not required to ignore what it understands to be an existing legal impediment and conduct a detailed assessment on the assumption that the impediment may later disappear.

84. That brings me to the resource considerations relied upon by Natural England. The evidence demonstrates that a full assessment of the application would have required a substantial commitment of specialist expertise and public resources. Those matters were not collateral or irrelevant considerations. They went directly to whether it was appropriate to undertake a detailed assessment exercise in circumstances where Natural England considered that the proposal could not lawfully proceed. Once it had reached that conclusion, it was entitled to regard the expenditure of further resources as serving no practical purpose.

85. Standing back, Ground 2 rests on the premise that Natural England was required to assess the application without regard to the legal consequences of a successful application. For the reasons I have given, that premise is wrong. Once it is recognised that Natural England could properly take account of the effect of the DWAA, the challenge to its decision not to proceed further with the application cannot succeed. It follows that Ground 2 fails.

Conclusion

86. I therefore conclude that Ground 2 is out of time. Permission is refused on Ground 2. In any event, I would reject the ground on its merits as the decision under challenge involved no unlawful fettering of discretion, no failure to exercise statutory functions and no error of public law.

87. I return to the disclosure issue. It is unnecessary for me to resolve the duty of candour dispute. I have taken the disclosed material into account. Having done so, I am satisfied that it does not affect the issues which fall for determination in these proceedings or the conclusions I have reached on either ground.

88. The claim is dismissed.

Acknowledgments and Consequentials

89. The Court was provided with extensive authorities and carefully prepared bundles. Those materials were of considerable assistance in resolving the issues before the Court. I am grateful to counsel for their detailed written and oral submissions and to the parties’ solicitors for their assistance in the presentation of this case.

90. The parties should seek to agree an order reflecting the terms of this judgment and the applicable costs limits.

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