Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Court of Protection (Circuit judges), 30 October 2026, n° [2026] EWCOP 58 (T2)
IMPORTANT NOTICE
This judgment is covered by the terms of an order made pursuant to Practice Direction 4C- Transparency. It may be published on condition that the anonymity of the subjects of the proceedings and their family members must be strictly preserved. Failure to comply with that condition may warrant punishment as a contempt of court.
Case No: Various
Neutral citation number : [2026] EWCOP 58 (T2)
COURT OF PROTECTION
MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005
By Her Honour Judge Hilder
First Avenue House
42-49 High Holborn,
London, WC1V 6NP
Date:30th October 2026
THE LONDON BOROUGH OF BROMLEY
Applicant
and
THE PUBLIC GUARDIAN
Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
Mr. Hoar (instructed by the London Borough of Bromley) for the Applicant
Mr. Day (instructed by the Public Guardian) for the Respondent
The hearing was conducted in public subject to a transparency order made on 10th July 2024. The numbers in square brackets and bold type refer to page numbers of the hearing bundle. The judgment consists of 37 pages and has been signed and dated by the judge.
A. The Issue
1. For each of the people listed in the schedule to this judgment, “the authorised officer for property and affairs deputyship for the London Borough of Bromley” is currently appointed as property and affairs deputy. The issue to be determined is whether the functions of those deputyship appointments have been improperly delegated.
2. For several years now, the London Borough of Bromley (“Bromley”) has arranged for certain practical tasks of deputyship to be undertaken via a contract with Liberata UK. This arrangement came to the attention of the Court in the course of welfare proceedings concerning BJ in case number 14028761. Those welfare proceedings concluded on 10th April 2024 and BJ herself has since died, but proceedings continued in respect of the deputyship issues common to all Bromley appointments with NW 13704510 as the lead case [B48].
B. Matters considered
3. There have been hearings before me on 22nd August 2024, 25th November 2024, 5th February 2025 and 16th May 2025. I have considered all the documents filed for all those hearings, including in particular the following:
a. on behalf of London Borough of Bromley:
i. statements by Zoren Nettey dated 2nd May 2024 [D1], 26th September 2024 [D152], 23rd January 2025 [D417];
ii. statements by Donna Glover dated 31st March 2025 [D434], 7th May 2025 [D438];
iii. position statements by Mr. Hoar dated 20th November 2024, 31st January 2025 and 14th May 2025;
b. on behalf of the Public Guardian:
i. a statement by Sandra Francis dated 16th December 2024 [D403];
ii. position statements by Mr. Day dated 21st November 2024 and 13th May 2025.
4. I heard oral evidence from Donna Glover, Sandra Francis and Maria Meir.
C. Proceedings to date
5. In response to a question asked by District Judge Mullins in the welfare proceedings relating to BJ, on 8th January 2024 Bromley sent an e-mail to the Court which said:
“The legal relationship between the local authority and Liberata is a contractual one; services, which include undertaking the functions required of a “corporate” deputy, are provided by Liberata on behalf of the local authority under the Exchequer Services Contract.”
6. By order made on 7th February 2024 [B1] the District Judge directed Bromley to file a statement which (amongst other things) exhibited the Exchequer Services Contract, any relevant decision of the local authority, and any relevant advice provided to the local authority before it was entered into. The statement was to be filed by 4pm on 28th February 2024 and referred to me on receipt.
7. The required statement was not filed. So, the District Judge made a further order on 10th April 2024 [B5] repeating the requirement for a statement, with an extended timeframe.
8. This time a statement was filed and it was referred to me. On 22nd May 2024 on consideration of the papers I made an order [B11] which recited that
“the London Borough of Bromley relies on Practice Direction 19B paragraph 21 and the OPG Deputy Standards Guidance for Public Authorities but has provided no explanation in law as to why it may be lawful and otherwise appropriate for the functions of deputyship granted to its authorised officer to be discharged through a contractual relationship with a third party.”
Bromley was redesignated as applicant and the Public Guardian was joined as respondent. Directions were given up to a further consideration on the papers. That further consideration led to a hearing being listed on 22nd August 2024.
9. Little progress was made at that hearing. The Public Guardian’s position statement gave a narrative explanation of how the OPG gives effect to its statutory function of supervising deputies pursuant to s58(1)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act, made reference to paragraphs 8.61 and 8.62 of the Code to that Act and to some extracts from Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, but stated that “The Public Guardian does not take any position on the facts of any of the 46 cases under consideration.” In short, there was no engagement with the reality of Bromley’s contractual arrangements.
10. The order made on 22nd August 2024 [B25, recital D] records confirmation given through counsel that the Public Guardian did not intend to take a position of neutrality or asking for guidance, and was willing to file a skeleton argument setting out her position in respect of the lawfulness of the contractual arrangements in issue in these proceedings. On that basis, it did not seem necessary to seek appointment of an amicus curiae. So, further directions provided for Bromley to provide an explanation of each contract said to be relevant to deputyship functions, and a narrative explanation of the route of accountability; to be followed by questions from the Office of the Public Guardian, to be answered on paper; and then a round table meeting.
11. The OPG decided not to ask any questions of Bromley [D376]. The List of Issues [D377] submitted for the next hearing by the Public Guardian’s counsel stated as its first of twelve points simply “There are no factual issues that require further evidence.”
12. The tenor of the hearing on 25th November 2024 is set out at recital D of the order made on that occasion [B31]:
“D. The Court notes that the Office of the Public Guardian has reviewed the files of 6 of the 46 persons for whom the authorised officer of the London Borough of Bromley is appointed as deputy, and found no complaints or irregularities. However, the Court is concerned that the legal issue of delegation has not been adequately addressed. In particular the Court is concerned that:
a. deputyship is a personal appointment (as accepted by the London Borough of Bromley), so the question of delegation needs to be considered through the law of agency, rather than through Administrative/public law as a matter of statutory functions;
b. if, contrary to the Court’s concern, the key considerations are matters of Administrative/public law, the Court of Protection is not the correct court to determine the issue;
c. there is no factual explanation before the Court as to how the functions of deputyship are in practice discharged within the contractual arrangements (ie the London Borough of Bromley asserts that its authorised officer retains decision-making authority but there is no explanation of how/when the authorised officer in fact exercises that authority);
d. as a result of (c), there has been no proper consideration of whether the contractual arrangements amount to delegation within the law of agency and section 19(6) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005;
e. there is no explanation of how the bond/insurance provided by Liberata in favour of the London Borough of Bromley interacts with the responsibilities placed by the Court on the authorised officer of the London Borough of Bromley as appointed deputy;
f. the Public Guardian’s position in the written position statement was that “it is a matter for the court to determine” if the Code has been offended or breached/if the contractual arrangements amount to delegation or outsourcing of functions (which appears to be, in substance, the same concern), thereby leaving the Court without proper argument on the point, notwithstanding the recital at D of the order made on 22nd August 2024;
g. the Public Guardian’s position appears to be (paragraph 94 of the position statement) that the London Borough of Bromley could “ratify” its own acts of delegation.”
13. However, some progress was made – in the acceptance/agreement of both Bromley and the OPG that the officers within Bromley appointed to exercise the functions of deputy do not do so ‘as a public authority’ but through their personal appointment by the Court under 16 Mental Capacity Act 2005. Directions were given for further evidence (including by the deputy as to how functions of deputyship are discharged), and the matter was relisted in February.
14. Meanwhile, the Office of the Public Guardian identified that a number of other public authorities may be operating a system of contractual relationships in respect of deputyship functions, similar to Bromley’s and also raising questions of delegation. An order was made on the papers on 31st December 2024 [B45] providing for the OPG to identify such other authorities in a list, to provide specified information to the authorities on that list, and for any authorities on the list to apply to be joined as party or intervenor. In the event no other local authorities applied to be joined. Although the London Borough of Hounslow attended the next hearing through counsel and solicitor as an observer, it subsequently filed a COP5 Acknowledgment confirming that it did not wish to be joined.
15. Bromley filed a statement by Zoren Nettey, who is a lawyer in the Children and Adults Legal Team of the Chief Executive’s Department of the London Borough of Bromley, not Bromley’s authorised officer for property and affairs deputyships. The Public Guardian filed a statement by Sandra Francis. At the hearing on 5th February 2025 I considered them insufficient to determine the delegation issue. I therefore made an order [B47] requiring a further statement, spelling out that the statement must give “a narrative explanation of how in practice the functions of deputyship are discharged – how decisions are made and by whom, what actions are taken by whom…” It was directed that the statement
“(a) shall be by [Bromley’s] authorised officer for deputyship, or each of them together, or by one on behalf of all of them – not by the solicitor or other person from [Bromley’s] legal department;
(b) may be made jointly with Mr. Simon Rowley, provided that each writer’s role within [Bromley] is clearly set out; and
(c) may, insofar as the witnesses are able, explicitly confirm acceptance of evidence already given in these proceedings by reference to any statement made without the need to repeat those statements in full.”
16. The matter was relisted on 16th May 2025, with the stated intention to “hear evidence from Ms. Sandra Francis (Executive Cased manager, Public Authority Team at OPG) and the maker of the statement [to be filed by Bromley]”. The issues to be decided were defined as follows:
“i. whether the contractual arrangements between [Bromley] and Liberata amount to delegation of functions of deputyship;
ii. if they do, whether such delegation may be authorised, and how.”
D. Law and Guidance
The statutory basis of deputyship
17. Where a person (‘P’) lacks capacity in relation to matters concerning their property and affairs, pursuant to section 16(2) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘the Act’) the Court of Protection may:
a. by making an order, make the decision or decisions on P’s behalf in relation to the matter or matters, or
b. appoint a person (a ‘deputy’) to make decisions on P’s behalf in relation to the matter or matters.
18. Pursuant to section 19(1) of the Act, a deputy appointed by the court must be:
a. an individual who has reached 18, or
b. as respects powers in relation to property and affairs, an individual who has reached 18 or a trust corporation.
19. Pursuant to section 19(2) of the Act, the court may appoint an individual by appointing the holder for the time being of a specified office or position. By appointing the holder of an office, there can be continuity of deputyship functions when the individual human being holding that office changes. All that is required is for there to be clarity at all times as to what the office is (named in the appointment order) and who is holding it (not named in the appointment order.)[1]
20. Sometimes P does not have any family member or friend willing and suitable to act as deputy, and their estate is relatively straightforward and modest. In such circumstances, appointment of a professional deputy is likely to be disproportionately expensive, and local authorities can provide a valuable service by seeking or agreeing to the appointment of one of their employees as an office-holder deputy. To maintain consistency across public authorities (who may give different job titles to equivalent roles) and because job descriptors in public bodies are prone to change, Senior Judge Lush approved the use of the description “authorised officer of [named local authority]”; and that practice has been adopted ever since.
21. Framing this in the terms of the Act, the “authorised officer” of a local authority may be appointed as an individual office-holder deputy, pursuant to section 19(1) and (2). Such understanding of how a local authority may be involved in deputyship is reflected in the language of Practice Direction 19B, which makes provision as to costs: paragraphs 2 and 6 both refer to “office holders in public authorities appointed to act as deputy.”
22. Nothing in section 19, or anywhere else in the Act, creates any concept of “corporate” deputyship. The term is meaningless and misleading.
Deputyship as a form of agency
23. Deputyship is unequivocally a form of agency. Pursuant to section 19(6) of the Act, a deputy “is to be treated as P’s agent in relation to anything done or decided by him within the scope of his appointment and in accordance with this Part.” The deputy is the agent. The Court of Protection, exercising its jurisdiction on behalf of P, is the principal.
24. As a general principle of the law of agency[2], an agent may not delegate his authority in whole or in part except with the express or implied authority of the principal: delegatus non potest delegare. This maxim is founded in the fiduciary nature of the appointment as agent.
25. I sought to reach with counsel a common understanding of the ordinary language meaning of delegation. After some discussion, the parties agreed as definition “the act of giving duties, powers, tasks or responsibilities to others.”
26. As with all generalities, the maxim of non-delegation is just a starting point. There are refinements which need to be taken into account when applying it to real world practices. Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency makes the following points, albeit not specific to deputyship:
a. the authority of the principal is implied[3] (except where the act done is purely ministerial and does not involve confidence or discretion):
i. where the principal knows and accepts, at the time of the agent’s appointment, that the agent intends to delegate the authority;
ii. where the authority conferred is of such a nature as to necessitate its execution wholly or in part by means of a sub-agent;
iii. where the employment of a sub-agent is justified by the usage of the particular trade or business in which the agent is employed, provided that such usage is not unreasonable, and not inconsistent with the express terms of the agent’s authority;
iv. where in the course of the agent’s employment unforeseen circumstances arise which render it necessary for the agent to employ a sub-agent;
v. where, from the conduct of the principal or the principal and the agent, it may reasonably be presumed to have been intended that the agent should have power to employ a sub-agent;
b. large organisations: “Plainly, where a principal appoints a company as agent, it must be envisaged that at least the company’s directors, and probably its employees, will carry out the tasks requested. A principal’s appointment as agent of other corporations or even of unincorporated employers known to have large numbers of employees will often also carry an implication that employee sub-agents may be used.”[4]
c. ministerial acts: “an agent may delegate the performance of purely ministerial or ancillary acts unless there are statutory or other provisions against it or evidence of usage not permitting this; and in general other, non-fiduciary functions of persons who have agency powers may be performed vicariously in accordance with normal contractual principles. This is not delegation.”[5]
27. When considering these helpful textbook explanations in the specific context of deputyship, particular factors need to be borne in mind:
a. large organisations: there are statutory limitations as to who may be appointed as deputy. The Court of Protection cannot appoint ‘a company’ as deputy. However, it may appoint a trust corporation or an individual within a large organisation. So, the textbook reference quoted at (b) above may be understood as explaining why it is acceptable, for example, that a solicitor deputy arranges for certain tasks of their deputyship to be carried out by lower-grade fee earners within the legal practice. It is to be noted that thetextbook explanation explicitly contemplates the usage of “employee” sub-agents, ie within the ‘large organisation’, not a contractual third-party.
b. ministerial acts: the textbook explanation explicitly limits vicarious performance of agency tasks in accordance with contractual principles, to those tasks which are non-fiduciary.
28. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice sets out the duty not to delegate in the following terms:
“8.61 A deputy may seek professional or expert advice (for example, investment advice from a financial adviser or a second medical opinion from a doctor). But they cannot give their decision-making responsibilities to someone else. In certain circumstances, the court will authorise the delegation of specific tasks (for example, appointing a discretionary investment manager for the conduct of investment business).
8.62 In certain circumstances, deputies may have limited powers to delegate (for example, through necessity or unforeseen circumstances, or for specific tasks which the court would not have expected the deputy to attend to personably). But deputies cannot usually delegate any decisions that rely on their discretion. If the deputy is the Director of Adult Social Services in England or Director of Social Services in Wales, or a solicitor, they can delegate specific tasks to other staff. But the deputy is still responsible for any actions or decisions taken and can therefore be held accountable for errors that are made.”
29. It is to be noted that paragraph 8.62 explicitly addresses the context of local authority deputyships – ‘Director of Adult Social Services’ and ‘Director of Social Services’ being two examples of who may be the “authorised officer” of a local authority. The ‘delegation’ it envisages is ‘to other staff’. There is no contemplation of contractual third parties.
Ratification
30. An agent may be expressly authorised to delegate or may have implied authority to do so in certain circumstances, or – after the event – the agent’s act may be ratified.[6] In each scenario, the authorisation is by the principal. Therefore, in the context of deputyship, ratification is a matter for the Court of Protection. An agent cannot ‘ratify’ its own acts.
31. I remind myself of the explanation of ratification by the Court of Protection set out by Lieven J (as she then was) in Andrew James Riddle v. Public Guardian [2021] EWCOP 38:
“30. Although the MCA 2005 does not expressly provide that the court can ratify past acts of a deputy, s19(4) does provide that “a deputy is to be treated as P’s agent in relation to anything done or decided by him within the scope of his appointment and in accordance with this Part.” This provision when read in conjunction with s15(c) MCA 2005 provides the court with jurisdiction to ratify past acts of a deputy.
31. In the context, the law of agency generally provides that an act done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority, may rank as the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him (Suncorp Insurance and Finance Co Ltd v. Milano Assicurazioni SpA [1993] 2 Lloyds’s Rep 225; Yona International Ltd v. La Reunion Francaise Societe Anonyme d’Assuarances et de Reassurances [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 84, 103, 106). In this context, the doctrine of ratification presupposes that the principal could validly have done the act at the time that it was done and the relevant act was voidable rather than void.
32. The court’s practice demonstrated the application of the doctrine of ratification to LPA cases and deputyship cases alike. Examples of this (where reported) included: Re PP [2015] EWCOP 93; Re GM [2013] EWHC 2966 (COP); and WP (deceased) and EP [2015] EWCOP 84.
33. In applying the common law doctrine of ratification in this context, the court in making the decision on behalf of P will ultimately be guided by the best interests of P having regard to all the circumstances surrounding the relevant act.
34. In the case of ratification in the context of LPAs, the court’s powers pursuant to s23(3) MCA 2005 are unrestricted and, unlike the statutory power to relieve trustees from beaches of trust, are not confirmed to cases where the donee has acted “honesty and reasonably”; a qualification set out in s61 of the Trustee Act 1925. Given the similar nature and scope of the function of donees and deputies in the context of the MCA 2005, the same approach ought to be adopted when approaching the issue of ratification in cases concerning deputyship.”
32. So, ratification by the Court of Protection of actions taken by a deputy outside their authority is a ‘best interests’ decision, to be taken in accordance with the principles of section1 of the Act and the requirements of section 4 of the Act.
Guidance published by the Office of the Public Guardian
33. The OPG Practice Note for Public Authority Deputies, published 13th February 2023, includes the following material provisions:
a. Standard 1: Deputyship obligations, 1f Adhering to fiduciary duties: You must not delegate your discretionary decision making responsibilities to anyone else although you can seek expert or professional advice.
b. Standard 3: Interactions with P: All deputies must engage with P in an appropriate manner taking into account P’s individual circumstances. For Public Authority deputies, evidence from reports provided by social workers will suffice to meet the requirements of this standard.
c. Standard 8: Additional obligations, 8d Informing OPG of concerns about other deputies, Best practice in relation to effective internal office processes and organisation for Public Authority deputies
You should establish clear governance between the named deputy and staff delegated to carry out the day-to-day functions of the role.
You should maintain a record of all staff with delegated authority to carry out tasks by the deputy, including a list of signatories.
You should demonstrate sufficient senior internal supervision of the overall deputyship process.
Where decision making is delegated, you should make sure that the criteria for decision making requiring the authorisation of the deputy are clearly defined and understood.
You should make sure that documented agreements of accountability are in place for any duties performed by staff outside the Public Authority (outsourced). You should carry out appropriate oversight and monitoring and demonstrate that the named deputy remains fully accountable for decisions taken about P.
…..
34. An earlier Practice Note SD12, updated 31st August 2017, addressed specifically “public authority deputyship responsibilities” in the following terms:
“Delegation of duties outside the public authority is not permitted, and caution should be taken when contracting with or referring vulnerable clients to external deputyship providers.
….
Where the named deputy is the director of adult services or anther public authority officer, they may delegate duties to other public authority staff, but remain accountable for actions and decisions in relation to those clients.
Duties cannot be delegated to organisations outside the public authority.”
E. The contractual relationship
35. In summary, the evidence before the Court [D153 – 154] is that:
a. Liberata UK Ltd is a subsidiary of Outsourcing Inc. (a Japanese company);
b. the London Borough of Bromley’s Exchequer Services entered into an agreement with Liberata UK on 21st January 2011 “in connection with the provision of Exchequer Services”;
c. an executive decision was taken on 16th July 2014 “authorising the outsourcing of appointeeship and deputyship services of the Council”;
d. the services provided by the Council’s appointeeship and deputyship team were then “transferred to Liberata on 5 January 2015.”
The 2011 agreement
36. The Exchequer Services Contract is far wider than deputyship matters. The 2011 agreement [D60] has 59 clauses over 164 pages, plus fifteen schedules. The London Borough of Bromley is referred to as the “Authority” and Liberata UK Limited is referred to as the “Service Provider”. The first recital sets out that “The Service Provider holds itself out as an expert in providing outsourced business processing solutions and re-engineering services to organisations of the same or similar size as the Authority.”
The 2014 documents
37. A document entitled “Outsourcing of Financial Assessment Teams & Appointeeship & Deputyship Team” [D134] and dated 16th July 2014, which I shall refer to as ‘the Outsourcing document’, explains the ‘reason’ for its existence as follows:
“As part of the 2014/15 Budget process all areas of expenditure have been scrutinised by officers with a view to delivering services in a more efficient and effective way, particularly given the significant funding gap identified in the four year financial forecast. This has included looking at the option of outsourcing services where appropriate.”
38. The Outsourcing document variously refers to “outsourcing” and “transferring” services, apparently using the terms synonymously.
39. The first recommendation of the Outsourcing document is that
“The Executive is asked to (a) agree the transfer of services and endorse the transfer of the Council’s Financial Assessment Teams and Appointeeship & Deputyship Team to Liberata which will generate savings in a full year of £121k pa.”
40. In a ‘Commentary’ section, the Outsourcing document explains the ‘Appointeeship/Deputyship Team (A&D) as follows [D137]:
“3.13 When service users become mentally incapacitated in some way, they will need assistance in managing their property and affairs. Sufficient support is often provided by the family, friends or care workers, but when nobody is willing, able or suitable to take on the role, the Borough’s Appointee and Deputyship Team may take on the work either by way of Court of Protection Deputyship or Appointeeship. Court of Protection Deputyship is the wider management of Service User’s property and financial affairs. This authority is given, on application, by the Court of Protection under the Mental Health Act 2007 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
3.14 There are currently 5.58 ftes looking after the financial affairs of service users who are unable to manage their own financial affairs. The Executive Director of Education, Care and Health Services is appointed by the Court of Protection to make decisions for someone who is unable to do so on their own. The administrative duties associated with this work are carried out by the Appointeeship and Deputyship team, allowing us to charge for services they receive from us, which in the past might have had to be written off.”[7]
41. Notably, there is nothing in the Outsourcing document which gives any consideration to the meaning and effect of deputyship authority conferred by the Court of Protection. There is no recognition of the personal and fiduciary nature of the appointment. The section headed “Legal Considerations” does not address any question of delegating deputyship authority.
42. The Outsourcing document does set out [D140] an expectation that “The TUPE Regulations will preserve/protect the terms and conditions of these 22 employees transferring to Liberata, which means that their contracts of employment will remain the same including continuity of service.” However, there is no consideration of any implications for the discharge of deputyship functions from the expectation that transferred employees will no longer be part of the appointed deputy’s organisation.
The 2020 documents
43. The next document in time is the Contract Particulars & Conditions of Contract document [D262], which states its commencement date as 1st April 2020. Its initial term is 8 years but it may be extended by the Council up to a maximum total further period of 4 years. It has 53 clauses over 63 pages, and 15 schedules. Clause 23 specifies that the Service Provider will provide professional indemnity insurance with a limit of indemnity of not less than £6 million in relation to any one claim or £8 million in relation to any series of claims in aggregate per Contract Year.
44. Schedule 1M to the Contract Particulars is entitled “Appointee and Deputyship Services Specification” [D229]. It bears no date but, according to Mr. Nettey’s second statement, it was dated 2nd July 2020. The definitions section identifies ‘Council’ as ‘The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Bromley’, which is obviously not the same as the office-holder appointed as deputy. There is no definition of either ‘Service Provider’ or ‘the Appointee and Deputyship Service.’
45. The Specification document begins (after definitions) with a ‘Service Overview’ [D232]. The opening paragraphs of that overview state as follows:
“Where the Court of Protection or the Department for Work and Pensions appoints the Director of Adult Social Care to act as the Deputy or Appointee, administration of the financial affairs of those Service Users will be conducted by the Director of Adult Social Care. Named officers employed by the Service Provider will assist the Council to provide this Appointee and Deputyship Service, subject to, and in accordance with, the Service Requirements set out below.
….
All cases managed by the Appointee and Deputyship Service will have an allocated Care Manager or Review Officer approved by the Council who will be able to provide advice to the Service Provider if required. The Service Provider will support and work with the Council’s Care Management staff to manage an individual’s finances and assets only. This will not include accompanying clients to appointments or carrying out other personal support tasks.”
46. By reference to the definitions in the 2011 contract and the Specification document:
a. the second sentence of this opening paragraph means that named officers employed by Liberata UK will assist the London Borough of Bromley to provide deputyship services; and
b. the first sentence of the next-quoted paragraph means that all cases for which Liberata UK provides contracted services will have a named individual approved by London Borough of Bromley to provide advice to Liberata UK.
47. It is not clear whether the Bromley-approved individual for each case is intended to be an employee of Bromley or of Liberata. By implication, I understand the intention to be that this individual is a Liberata employee, otherwise there would be no need to stipulate that Bromley approves them. (In oral evidence from Ms. Francis for the OPG, she confirmed that this understanding is correct and she knows that “because I interact with them.”) However, it is then unclear what the rest of that sentence imports: that Liberata’s named Care Manager/Review Officer ‘provides advice’ to Liberata? What is meant by ‘advice’, and how does that relate to the appointed deputy giving instructions and making ‘best interest’ decisions?
48. Later in the Specifications document:
a. [D238- D240] the services to be provided by Liberata UK are listed as follows:
a) review and present Applications that meet the Council’s criteria for Appointee or Deputyship to the A&D referral meeting and if successful make an application to either the DWP or Court of Protection;
b) management of the application to the Court…
c) management of the financial affairs for Deputyship clients including the receipt of income due, the payment of Client contributions, payment of bills and expenses, investment of savings where appropriate and any other functions permitted/required as set out in the Court order;
d) provide a Protection of Property Service in order to safeguard individuals valuables and secure their home;
e) administer the payment of personal allowances;
f) assist in the sale of homes by obtaining valuations from estate agents, overseeing the marketing of the house and reviewing any offers received;
g) receive referrals for Community Funerals and if necessary carry out a property search to establish whether to accept the referral;
h) arrange funerals in cases where no one else is available or willing to do so and if necessary administer the estate.
b. [D241- D242] the following tasks are required to be completed by Liberata UK “in an accurate and timely manner”:
a) respond to queries from Clients and their representatives relating to Appointee and Deputyship related account matters;
b) complete and submit Applications to either the DWP for appointees or the Court of Protection for deputyships;
c) ensure the correct benefits or allowances are claimed for Clients with the DWP being informed of any changes in circumstances;
d) open and maintain individual bank accounts for Service users;
e) set up direct debits or standing orders to pay bills and expenses and ensure that other payments are made as and when they are due;
f) repay overpayment of any benefits when legally required to do so;
g) reconcile Clients’ Bank Accounts(s) with prompt investigation of any discrepancies;
h) follow agreed closure procedures for Clients who either no longer require the service or who die, and
i) arrange a visit where there is a need to ensure the protection of an individual’s valuable and house. (The visit must be undertaken by at least two members of staff one of which can be a Council Care Manager if appropriate.)
49. In all of that, reference to decision-making is notably absent. However it is envisaged that Liberata UK is ‘managing’ all the ‘functions permitted/required as set out in the Court order.’ And specifically, it is envisaged at (a) that Liberata has at least some direct engagement with the person for whom a deputy is appointed / their representatives.
50. Setting up direct debits or standing orders sound like ministerial tasks but who is deciding what such arrangements need to be made? Who is deciding whether or not it is in the best interests of P to make other, irregular payments? Who is making any decision, for example, about whether to accept any of the ‘offers received’ in a sale of property after they have been ‘reviewed’ by Liberata? Who is deciding whether to ‘accept the referral’ for a Community Funeral after Liberata has received it and carried out any necessary property search?
51. The Specifications document continues, with further provisions which may shed light on those questions. In particular, it spells out the following notable requirements:
a. under the heading ‘Council duties’:
• ADF003 [D244] The Council in conjunction with the Service Provider will make the decision on whether to accept the Applications presented.
• ADF006 [D245] Completed Court of Protection forms are signed by the Council’s Solicitor;
• ADF007 [D245] The Council’s Legal Team will finalise the sale of the house and provide the Service Provider with a signed completion statement.
b. under the heading ‘Service Provider duties’:
• ADF016 [D246] The Service Provider will submit the signed forms to the Court.
• ADF018 [D247] The Service Provider will update [computer systems] when the Court Order has been received and visit the Client to confirm the Court Order has been granted.
• ADF030 [D248] The Service Provider shall carry out a review of each Client’s finances and investments.
• ADF031 [D249] The Service Provider shall prepare and submit a report or account to the Public Guardian as directed by the OPG.
• ADF033 [D249] The Service Provider shall obtain valuations from Estate agents in accordance with Council guidance and market the property.
• ADF034 [D249] The Service Provider will ensure any offer accepted is at least 95% of the asking price unless the Authorised Officer gives approval to accept a lower offer.
c. under the heading ‘Provision of Monitoring Information’:
• PMI001 [D258] The Service Provider shall provide the Authorised Officer with the following management information:
a) A Position Statement in a pre-agreed format;
b) The performance against the KPIs shown at Appendix 1;
c) Reports from [the computer system] as requested by the Authorised Officer.
d. under the heading ‘Liability’:
i. LIA001 [D260] The Service Provider shall accept liability in respect of any loss or damage to the property real or personal of the Council’s Appointee and Deputyship Clients suffered or incurred as a direct result of any breach of this Contract or any negligent act or omission, misconduct or non-fraudulent misrepresentation by the Service Provider, its officers, agents employees, sub-contractors or any other person acting on behalf of the Service Provider. In cases where the Service Provider is partially responsible for any such losses, any liability of the Service Provider shall be proportionate to and apportioned to reflect the extent of the Service provider’s responsibility.
52. For the first time there is mention of here of decision-making locus – under the heading of ‘Council duties’ at ADF003. However, the decision ‘whether to accept the Applications presented’ must necessarily be a decision which pre-dates any deputyship appointment, and so this provision sheds no light on how deputyship functions are exercised once they have been granted. Other provisions relate to functions once there is a deputyship appointment. Notably, there is no mention of the deputy considering, still less ‘owning’, the report to the OPG. There is mention of ‘Authorised Officer’ but that term is undefined. In respect of sale of property, the Authorised Officer appears only to be consulted if a threshold is not met. There is no recognition of fiduciary obligations.
F. The evidence as to how it works in practice
53. I found it difficult to form an understanding about how the contractual arrangements work in practice. My overall impression is that, after the implementation of the arrangements with Liberata, the people who were previously directly employed by Bromley to do deputyship work carried on going to the same workplace, doing the same tasks, with the same employment terms and conditions, and nobody directly involved in Bromley deputyships considered that anything significant had changed.
54. This reality was apparent in the evidence as to who is “the authorised officer for property and affairs deputyship for the London Borough of Bromley” ie the individual who holds the deputyship appointment:
a. in his first statement (May 2024) Zoren Nettey [26] stated that “the local authority’s authorised officers are as follows: Ami Soper, Christopher Loft, Katie Hodges and Monica de Lozar Granado”;
b. in his last statement (January 2025) Mr. Nettey stated [D422] that “…the Director of Adult Social Care is authorised to exercise the functions of the Deputy. The named officers employed by the Service Provider, Liberata, assist the Director in providing the Deputyship service. The named officers employed by Liberata are Ami Soper, Christopher Loft and Katie Hodges; the Appointee and Deputyship team (‘A&D’)”
c. the Director of Adult Social Care is Donna Glover. In her first statement (March 2025), she states that “As Director of Adult Social Care, I am authorised to exercise the functions of deputy….”
55. As a matter of fact, I find that:
a. the authorised officer for property and affairs deputyships for the London Borough of Bromley is its Director of Adult Social Care. This seems to be the final position of both that Director herself (Donna Glover) and Zoren Nettey. When such authorised officer is appointed as deputy, it is not a ‘corporate’ appointment. It is an officeholder appointment. Donna Glover is the current holder of the relevant office.
b. Ami Soper, Christopher Loft and Katie Hodges are not employees of the London Borough of Bromley. There is nothing that looks like a ‘deputyship department’ within the legal entity which is the London Borough of Bromley.
56. Clearly (as outlined in paragraphs 22(b) and 26(a) above), Bromley’s Director of Adult Social Care is not expected to undertake every task of every deputyship personally, but I found it difficult to extract any clear explanation of how her deputyship functions are actually performed:
a. Donna Glover’s March 2025 statement [D434]: “The Council has contracted out the functions related to administering deputyships to Liberata. The named individuals within Liberata are as named at paragraph 2 of the witness statement of Zoren Nettey dated 23rd January 2025.”
b. Donna Glover’s May 2025 statement [D438-439] gives a somewhat different account:
“3. Currently, as the statutory Director of Adult Social Care, I am authorised to act as the Deputy on behalf of [Bromley] in these proceedings. Within the council the deputyship functions are discharged on an operational basis by several teams including the Adults Social Care service within my directorate and our Exchequer Services (an internal department of the Council), in collaboration with the council’s commissioned service provider Liberata. …..
…
6. The Assistant Director for Adult Social Care with delegated responsibility for deputyship cases is Nicola Gage, who reports to me. The Assistant Director is responsible for the oversight of the social workers who are allocated to support deputyship clients.
7. With respect to financial issues, the council’s Exchequer Team is manged by Simon Rowley, Exchequer Manager. He is responsible for monitoring part of the Liberata contract, which includes the appointeeship and deputy functions they have been commissioned to provide on behalf of the council.
8. The individuals responsible within Liberata’s A&D Team… are [Ami Soper, Christopher Loft and Katie Hodges].”
57. So how does the work of deputyship actually get done?
a. in her first statement, Donna Glover describes two teams [D435]:
(1) “The Appointeeship and Deputyship (A&D) Team” is “the team within Liberata which manages the Appointeeship and Deputyship functions on behalf of the Council.” This team is “managed by Meenu Sharma, who is the Operations Manager.”
(2) “The Council’s Exchequer Team is managed by Simon Rowley, who is responsible for monitoring part of the Liberata contract, which includes the A&D function.”
These two teams work together as follows [D435]:
“3. Pre-application:
Before an application is made for a deputyship order, a qualified social worker will complete a Mental Capacity assessment to assure ourselves that the person lacks capacity to make a relevant decision. Wherever possible, family members are included in this process. Where it has been established a person lacks mental capacity to manage their financial affairs, and where there are no other arrangements in place, the Council will consider taking on the case as either an Appointeeship or a Deputyship. Cases are referred to an Appointeeship and Deputyship panel, who review the merits of the application. The panel consist of three social care managers and the Exchequer Manager. A member of the A&D Team attends and takes note of decisions made at panel. Once it has been agreed at panel that a deputyship is required, the A&D team will prepare the application.
4. Application
Applications are drafted by the A&D team, with input from [Bromley] professionals, such as social workers and our legal team. The A&D team manage the process from the point of application, until such time as an order is receiving (sic) confirming our appointment.
5. As deputy, all final decisions are made or approved by me. The A&D team are not engaged to make decisions. When a deputyship order comes in, the A&D team will work with the Exchequer Team, Adult Social Care and the Legal Team, particularly when decisions need to be made or where legal advice is sought.
6. As an example, if the person owns a property, and the court allows the deputy to dispose of the property, I make the final decision as to whether the property should be sold. The A&D team are responsible for ensuring all court fees are paid when they arise, and all returns are completed within the deadline given by the OPG.
7. The Exchequer Team and the A&D Team have monthly service review meetings. These provide the opportunity to discuss any issues affecting service delivery, and to discuss complex cases. As part of the service review process, Liberata teams submit performance stats which are measured against KPI’s (sic) within the contract. Where there are performance issues, these will be discussed at service review and solutions discussed. The A&D Team are currently meeting 100% of their KPI targets.”
b. More detail is given in Donna Glover’s second statement [D438]:
“9. When a deputyship order is made, our Adult Social Care service will work with the Exchequer Team, Liberata and the council’s Legal Team, particularly when decisions need to be made or where legal advice is sought.
10. Decisions on day to day spend is (sic) managed through social workers in my service, which includes setting personal allowances and assessing one-off spends. Social workers are best placed to understand the circumstances of the individual and both their job role and professional registration requires them to advocate in their best interest.
11. The A&D Team within Liberata are not engaged to make decisions and are responsible for operational aspects such as for instance assessing affordability when a request comes in for funds. They may on occasion refuse spend on financial grounds that P does not have sufficient funds, so their remit is limited.
12. The A&D team conduct an annual review, and if as a result of that review they have concerns, they will raise those with Adult Social Care. By way of an example, they may consider that the level of personal allowance being provided to P is no longer sustainable, so they will alert the responsible Adult Social Care team. Social care staff will then, in conjunction with P and P’s support staff, agree a new level of personal allowance.
13. The A&D team are monitored by the Exchequer Team which includes monthly service review meetings. The A&D Team also provide monthly stats and updates which are reviewed and discussed in the monthly service review meetings. In addition to this, the team uses software specifically designed to help manage appointeeship and deputyship cases. This software is called Caspar, and the Exchequer Team have access to the software to help with monitoring the A&D Team as well as producing reports.
14. The council has a formal escalation process, which the A&D team can and do use to escalate concerns they may have or to expedite a decision that needs to be made. There are four levels of escalation. The first escalation is always to the team leader of the relevant team (usually Social Care team in my service). The second escalation is the Head of Service for the social care team. The third escalation is to the Exchequer Manager. The fourth escalation is to Assistant Directors in both Exchequer Services and in Adult Social Care.
15. Decisions for larger items of expenditure, such as renovations to property to help with mobility issues, do not tend to be needed. We do have a process in place to allow larger spend, which is to send all referrals (once affordability is determined) to the Director of Adult Social Care to make a final decision. However, I understand that we cannot find any examples of where it has been needed. This illustrates that, at least in recent years, decisions about large or ‘capital’ expenditure have been very rare.
16. Examples of key decisions are those relating to the sale of property or changes to policy. The following cases ….
17. For context, only three property sales have been initiated over the past 2 years, and large spend on adaptations to housing to allow a person to live there are not generally seen as there are other funds, such as the Disabled Facilities Grant, available to pay for these.”
58. The examples offered in paragraph 16 of Ms. Glover’s second statement are of five cases:
a. RS 12815758 [D441] :
“18.. …It was agreed on 19th February 2024 by the Assistant Director of Exchequer Services to market the property. As per normal practice, three local estate agents were approached by the A&D team to provide a valuation and to ascertain their fees. Once received, the A&D team completed a best value calculation and forwarded the results to ADES. It was the responsibility of the Assistant Director for Exchequer Services to determine that the agent with the higher valuation was to be engaged.
19. Once an offer was received, the decision about whether or not to accept the offer again was the responsibility of the Assistant Director for Exchequer Services and not the A&D Team. In this case the Assistance Director made the decision to accept an offer on the property on 16 January 2025.The A&D Team provided a case summary and liaised with our Legal Services who assisted with the sale and contracts were exchanged in April 2025.
Legal dispute
20. With this case, there was an additional thread which involved a key decision made by the Director of Adult Social Care at the time. P’s brother put in a claim that P’s property belongs (sic) to him and engaged Irwin Mitchell solicitors to help him pursue the claim. Legal advice was sought, including external legal services, and the Director for Adult Social Care at that time agreed to defend the claim….. it was agreed, following legal advice, by the Assistant Director for Exchequer Services that the net proceeds from the sale of the property would be placed in an escrow account pending the outcome of the dispute.”
b. PM 20000902201 [D442] : “the decision to sell was made on 21 September 2023 by the Assistant Director for Exchequer Services, within the Council.”
c. EV 2000902201 [D443]: “Part of our internal council procedures for cases where P has multiple bank accounts is to consolidate those accounts, and then invest any surplus as needed. The decision to close existing bank accounts is made by the Assistant Director of Exchequer Services or their deputy – the Exchequer Manager. In this case, P had bank accounts with Barclays Bank and HSBC. It was agreed by the Assistant Director on 7 March 2025 that these accounts needed to be closed in order to consolidate P’s savings.”
d. OJ 12223825 [D443]: “P is a younger adult with mental health problems. LBB have held Deputyship for this client since May 2013. A social worker in the Mental Health Team reviewed the request for funds and submitted a formal request to the A&D Team to provide £190 for a day trip. Once the request was submitted, the A&D team assessed the request to ensure there were sufficient funds. Funds were released to the client once the A&D team established that P had sufficient funds to enable this spend. But the decision that this increase in funds would be approved subject to sufficient funds was made by a social worker with the council for whom I am responsible.”
e. KK 1423590401 [D444]: “P required a new bed, because the bed they were using was beginning to show its age. The social worker in my Service assessed the request for a new bed and assisted with the purchase, which included delivery and set up. A request was then sent to the A&D team, who again assessed affordability before committing to the spend. Funds were released as a result and P received a new bed.”
59. As to how visits are made to Ps, the written evidence was contradictory:
a. Zoren Nettey’s account [D423] is that “this function is undertaken by named officers within Liberata on behalf of the authorised officer. An annual client visit is conducted by Liberata named officers…”
b. Donna Glover’s first account [D437] is that “an annual client visit is made to persons on behalf of whom the Council has been appointed deputy by the case manager who reports to me. In addition I oversee social care staff who are responsible for managing the care needs of our deputyship clients, who conduct visits as and when required, particularly when a review of their care needs to be undertaken.”
(Who is “the case manager”, and in which organisation do they sit? The terminology seems to reflect the ‘Service Overview’ of the Specifications documents, suggesting that “the case manager” sits within Liberata (see paragraphs 43 and 45 above.) Again, that conclusion appears to be supported by the context – the deputy’s oversight of ‘social care staff’ is ‘in addition’.)
c. However, Ms. Glover’s later account [D444] is that “Social workers and staff within my Service are responsible for managing the care needs of our deputyship clients, and who conduct visits as and when required, particularly when a review of their care needs to be undertaken. In addition, there is an annual client visit by the social worker.”
60. A conclusion is offered by Ms. Glover in the final paragraph of her second statement [D445] as follows:
“the overarching principle is that Liberata are commissioned to carry out the financial administrative function of deputyships while the council remains responsible for decision-making. The work required to ensure that decision making is sound and in the best interests of each individual is undertaken by staff in the social care service that I am directly responsible for and through delegation to my Assistant Directors and the council’s Exchequer Service in line with existing governance arrangements within the council to manage a broad range of functions.”
61. In her oral evidence Ms Glover gave further details as follows:
a. re. holiday expenditure: at the outset of a deputyship, a ‘normal’ level of expenditure is established with the social worker, Exchequer services and Liberata. For any holiday expenditure outside that baseline, “Liberata colleagues would raise back with the social worker, to say this is outside normal, can we make a best interests decision?” She clarified that the social worker would decide, with “several layers of escalation” upwards via the social worker’s manager, to Nicola Gage, and ultimately to Ms. Glover herself. She agreed with Mr. Day that this is ‘like a wedding cake’, but “it’s important to note that I’m still responsible. I have governance in the department to assure myself its overseen and the officers I appoint are capable of making those decisions.”
b. re. her own decision-making: Ms. Glover has been in post since 2024, and in that time there has been “no decision I’ve made personally”.
c. re. expenditure disputes: Ms. Glover was asked how a dispute would be resolved, for example if P wanted to go on holiday to Mexico. Ms Glover “would expect that to escalate beyond the social worker, depending on the significance of the trip” but “the best interests decision always sits within my service…Liberata only advises on availability of funds.” If Liberata were to say that there were insufficient finds for a trip to Mexico, Ms. Glover expects that there “would then be a dialogue with the social worker about [P’s] desire and how we might work to make it possible, for example with a period of saving up.” When I explained to Ms. Glover that I could not recall ever having been told by a social worker that they had anything to do with decisions about [P’s] money, she assured me that this is “not reflective of what happens in Bromley. Communication is free-flowing. Each has their role to play.”
d. re. functions of Liberata: asked to describe Liberata’s functions, Ms. Glover said “Liberata perform administrative functions to ensure bills are paid, excess funds are receiving a good rate of interest, banking/administration/making payments.” She did not know what happened before the contract with Liberata. When asked if Liberata makes decisions involving discretion, Ms. Glover referred back to her earlier description of a baseline of ‘normal’ – “I’m assured that outside that baseline, Liberata don’t inappropriately fetter their discretion. The increasing rates of utility bills – that would be reasonably a discretionary decision but I see small examples like a day trip of £190 going back to the social worker to decide if it is in [P’s] best interest.”
e. re. ‘case manager’: I asked Ms. Glover who is the ‘case manager’. She said it would be “the member of the social work service undertaking a review”. If P had no appointed social worker “it would still be a member of the social work team. At one point in the year, a worker is appointed to make a review.” The output of the review is recorded on “the main recording system – the casefile system.”
62. Taken as whole, Bromley’s evidence is that, across the full cohort of deputyships held:
a. very few decisions are made by the appointed deputy directly;
b. sometimes decisions are made by an Assistant Director within the same organisation as the deputy;
c. otherwise, social workers within the same organisation ‘make request’ to Liberata (a different organisation).
G. The evidence from the Office of the Public Guardian
63. Sandra Francis is an Executive Case Manager for the Office of the Public Guardian, working in the Public Authorities team with a caseload of local authorities, including Bromley. As set out in her first statement [D406], the OPG commissioned a routine assurance visit to the London Borough of Bromley in December 2023. As part of the process, a meeting took place between the OPG Public Authority team, an OPG Visitor, Simon Rowley of Bromley’s Exchequer Services, “the manager and some of their case workers”.
64. The written report which followed had a question [D407] (which I presume to be standard for such reports) asking:
“Does the Deputy contract out, delegate or outsource any deputyship duties or functions?”
The answer given is:
“No. Liberata is contracted to act on behalf of LBB. They delegate some functions within the team.”
65. That answer is perplexing. The ‘no’ is immediately followed by a description of Liberata being ‘contracted’, which logically means that the first part of the answer should have been ‘yes’. The last sentence of the answer is incomprehensible – to whom does ‘they’ refer, what is being ‘delegated’ by whom, and what ‘team’ is referenced? When asked about that in oral evidence Ms. Francis explained that the report is “not given in its entirety” but she confirmed that there was no follow-up asking for more detail about what was delegated. On the basis of the evidence before me, I can only infer that the writer of the report did not understand the question or appreciate its significance.
66. Nonetheless, Ms. Francis’ statement goes on to give high praise to the management of Bromley deputyships [D407]:
“4. The Deputyship Team at Bromley were found to have robust processes in place to ensure that they are complying with and following the deputy standards. They were found to be fully adhering to all standards, with particular praise given to their regular reconciliations and the fact they clearly knew their clients and were actively involved in their affairs. This is fairly unusual for a deputyship team to accomplish consistently, and Bromley are seen to be one of our best performing deputyship teams nationwide.
5. It was evident to me that they have an array of different knowledge with backgrounds in benefits, finances and social work. They provide an effective and essential service to the Ps who are vulnerable with no friends/family members to help them with management of their property and finances. The care providers all commented on how easy it was to contact the team and that they were responsive to requests for more funds etc. The withdrawal of this quality level of service would, in my opinion, be of detriment to the most vulnerable clients they serve in the community.”
67. This account demonstrates complete absence of any recognition that Liberata UK is a third party organisation. It uses the pronoun “they” – as in “they have an array of different knowledge”, “They provide an effective an essential service” – without any distinction between persons employed by the local authority and persons employed by Liberata. Reference to “The Deputyship Team at Bromley” demonstrates that Ms. Francis for the OPG saw no significant dividing line. In her oral evidence she confirmed that. To her, they were all “one and the same.”
68. Ms. Francis’s statement goes on to address the issue of delegation specifically:
a. [D408] “The use of Liberata has not been seen as a delegation, but rather a partnership. They clearly work together and Simon ultimately has the last say on decisions that are made.”
b. [D410] “25. Delegation is referred to in OPG’s Deputy Standards; Practice Note SD12 and the MCA Code of Practice. Taking into consideration this guidance (extracts below) it is the OPG’s view that Bromley are acting in accordance with these guidelines.
26. The court appointed deputy for Bromley delegates day-to-day administrative duties to other staff (Liberata) but maintains accountability for actions and decisions in relation to P. It is the OPG’s view that the deputy has not delegated their discretionary decision-making responsibilities to Liberata.
27. Following a review by Bromley many of the council’s functions including deputyships were moved under Liberata. The staff from Bromley responsible for the day-to-day management of the deputyship cases were TUPE across to Liberata and continue to work in the same way they did before undertaking administrative duties on behalf of the deputy and are still located within Bromley’s premises.
28. The duties carried out by Liberata appear to be in no way different to those OPG see carried out by council administrative staff across all public authority deputyship teams. It is rare for the court appointed deputy to be involved in day-to-day management, therefore OPG struggle to see what the difference is with the way Liberata pick up these tasks for the Court appointed deputy at Bromley.”
69. This statement does not address the contractual relationship between Bromley and Liberata. It considers Liberata to be “other staff” of the London Borough of Bromley when (arguably, the whole) point of the contractual arrangements is that they are not. It fails to see beyond physical location, to legal location. It does not address how ‘accountability’ is maintained. It seems to consider deputyship as a public authority function, rather than a court appointment with fiduciary obligations.
70. After the statement of position set out above, Ms. Francis’s statement sets out in full both the OPG documents cited above (paragraphs 32 and 33), makes reference to the MCA Code of Practice, and then gives something of a survey of the deputyship landscape as the OPG sees it. Although that survey is quite lengthy, I set it out here in full because it seems to me key to understanding both how the situation being considered in these proceedings has arisen, and what needs to follow:
“38. If the view of the court is the partnership between Bromley and Liberata cannot continue this will have far reaching consequences across the entire public authority deputyship market, not just for Bromley. In the current financial climate, more and more public authorities are being forced to undertake a review of the services they offer, which often include deputyship functions. Working in partnership with a service provider such as Liberata enables councils to maintain deputyship services in-house for some of the country’s more vulnerable people, otherwise the only alternative would be to refer these cases to a panel deputy which is costly for P and not sustainable as panel deputies reach the point of saturation.
39. In addition to Bromley’s partnership with Liberata, OPG as part of wider consideration looked into the history of public authorities using service providers and identified 2 further authorities (referred to as A and B below) currently working in partnership with a service provider.
40. Public Authority A – the Deputy is the Council’s Chief Financial Officer. Deputyship functions are delegated through a service level agreement with X who are the support services for the public authority. This SLA has been in place since 2011 with X providing other support within the authority such as finance, HR, IT etc. The X team are based in the council’s premises and share the same IT network, overseen by the council’s information governance team.
41. Day-to-day decisions are undertaken by case officers. Large expenditure is discussed weekly between the team and managers at best interests meetings. The court appointed deputy maintains overall accountability of cases and responsibility for signing all legal documents.
42. OPG conducted an assurance visit in 2020 and the visitor made the following comments regarding the partnership with X “The Manager of the Appointee & Court Deputy Team assured me that this had no negative impact on clients and they view the Team as part f the Council still.” The evidence during the client and the Deputy visits supported this view.
43. Public Authority B – Following a review, the Councils appointee and deputyship service were moved under Y back in 2016. The team carrying out the day-to-day deputyship administrative tasks remain the same as they were TUPE across to Y and continue to work in the same way as they did before undertaking administrative duties of (sic) behalf of the court appointed deputy and are still located within the Council’s premises. Referrals and direction still come from the council / deputy and Y after instruction conduct the administration work of the referrals. The deputy maintains overall accountability.
Background to delegation / outsourcing
44. Back in 2014, OPG were notified by a certain public authority* that they intended to delegate services to a service provider. The deputy would retain all current responsibilities and would continue to sign off applications and reports and oversee and maintain responsibility for all money held. Only the day-to-day to (sic) delivery of the service was being delegated along with the existing admin staff who was administering who were TUPE to the service provider. At the time OPG directed the public authority to speak to the Court. The Technical Specialist Team at the court advised that, as long as the named deputy remained within the public authority there was no need to inform the court of the change. It was confirmed that the deputy would remain responsible and accountable for all the decisions, including the day-today best interest decisions made by the service provider in conjunction with social workers. The court advised the only time they needed to be informed is if there was a conflict or issue.
(*This council referred to here have since brought deputyship services back in-house in 2020.)
45. Similarly, another public authority* for many years delegated administrative deputyship functions to a service provider. The existing admin staff continued to administer the deputyship cases having been TUPE across to the service provider. The deputy remained within the council and maintained overall accountability. Initially orders reflected the partnership working along the lines of Council, working in partnership with service provider is appointed deputy for…. Over the years the council changed who they worked in partnership with and sought advice from the Court regarding updating orders. The Court Appointed Officer back in 2015 advised the council by e-mail that it was not necessary to reflect the partnership working in the order if the deputy remained within the council the order just need (sic) to reflect the council. ‘I can confirm that the court is of the view that the orders should simply appoint the authorised officer from public authority as deputy. I don’t see the need to refer to the partnership organisation at all. The senior officer at the council is ultimately responsible for all acts in relations to the deputyship on behalf of the council, notwithstanding that many of the responsibilities are delegated elsewhere. This would be the case whether the services were delivered in partnership, or not.’ This corresponded with advice given in the case of the public authority mentioned under paragraph 44.
(*Again this council have since brought deputyship services back in-house in 2024.)
46. In 2015 OPG’s Head of Practice, Policy and Compliance at the time drafted a letter to be sent to public authorities in line with Legal advice and guidance from the court referred to in paragraphs 44 and 45 who were considering delegating deputyship functions. It reads as follows:-
Any outsourcing arrangements should take into account the responsibility of the deputy as an agent for the person they are appointed (Section 19(6) of the mental Capacity Act), and the legal duties this confers, and have regard to the Copde of Practice paras 8.55 to 8.67. We would in particular draw your attention to paragraph 8.61 of the Code of Practice, which prohibits a deputy from delegating decision-making responsibilities. If the local authority remains the named deputy, it is possible to make arrangements for others to carry out specific tasks, but the local authority remain ultimately responsible for decisions made under that deputyship and the arrangements put in place should clearly reflect that. If the service is to be provided in its entirety by another agency then in our view it would be necessary for the local authority to make applications to the Court of Protection to stand down as deputy. In that case you would need to demonstrate to the Court that it is in the individual’s best interests for an alternative deputy to be appointed, and that deputy would need to satisfy the Court that they have appropriate arrangements in place, eg professional indemnity insurance and the financial stability to satisfy our security bond provider.
47. In 2016, OPG published practice note SD12: Public Authority Deputyship Responsibilities to remind public authority deputies them (sic) of their legal obligations and duty of care when appointed as deputy. It highlights that delegation of duties outside of the public authority is not permitted and that caution should be taken when contracting with or referring venerable (sic) clients to external deputyship providers.
48. During 2016, a number of public authorities contacted OPG about service reviews being undertaken within their authorities and what this might mean for the future of their deputyship services. At the time many were considering various options that would allow them to continue to offer a service (this continues to date). OPG started to review the various models of delegation / outsourcing authorities were considering. OPG started to work on a toolkit to be issued to public authorities to use who were considering outsourcing their deputyships, promoting effective and sustainable deputyship management, however, whilst a draft toolkit was developed this was never finalised and published.”
71. In so far as this account considers that appointment of a professional deputy from the Public Guardian’s panel is the only alternative to the current “arrangement” between Bromley and Liberata, I do not agree (see below). In so far as the OPG supports continuation of this current “arrangement” because there may be “far reaching consequences” otherwise, I do not agree that this is an appropriate basis for the position being taken. The underlying wish to preserve deputyship provision for vulnerable persons is laudable, and shared by the Court, but statutory requirements cannot be rewritten or disregarded on the basis of good intentions.
72. In the course of the final hearing, I invited the Public Guardian to identify Public Authority A and B, so that the Court could conduct any internal investigations considered to be appropriate. That invitation was not taken up.
73. In so far as Ms. Francis’s statement refers to “advice” from the Court, I invited the Public Guardian to provide further details. The OPG subsequently filed
a. a letter from Mouchel dated 18th March 2015 to a named Court Authorised Officer which begins “Thank you for advising me… Mouchel was asking for deputyship appointment orders which referred to a local authority “in partnership with Mouchel” to “change” so as to name a different partnership organisation. It explains “by way of some background” that “historically the Master of the Court of Protection [in September 2003] agreed that all Orders should be in the in the name of a responsible Officer of [the local authority] in partnership with…”
b. an e-mail from the Authorised Court Officer timed at 15.46 on 31st March 2015 indicating willingness to “make a bulk order” and confirming that “I don’t see the need to refer to partnership organisation at all… notwithstanding that many of the responsibilities are delegated elsewhere.”
74. From Ms. Francis’s oral evidence I further note in particular:
a. her confirmation that the OPG is not receiving in its supervisory capacity “any feedback from social workers”;
b. her confirmation that the OPG had “not appreciated any difference” between the London Borough of Bromley and Liberata “up to this point”. When asked about the relevance of it, she said “it’s a case of the same people doing the same job but being paid by someone else” and she accepted that it was fair to say that the OPG “has not previously understood the significance of being different legal persons”;
c. her acceptance that “tasks given to Liberata are delegated”.
75. I also heard oral evidence from Maria Meir, who is the Operations Delivery Manager for the OPG, with responsibility for the Public Authority team. She is Sandra Francis’s team manager, and has been with the OPG since 2009. Her evidence was that:
a. her role is “quite senior” but she does not have any legal qualification;
b. the legal distinction between Bromley and Liberata “doesn’t make a difference” in her eyes, because “we’re looking at P being safeguarded. We’re checking administrators are doing it in line with deputyship standards whilst ensuring oversight.” She confirmed that her first consideration of the legal distinction was “today”;
c. in light of these proceedings, she agreed that the OPG Visitor “will ask to see evidence, to speak to people doing the day-to-day role, ask for evidence of how a decision was made.”
d. when asked by Mr Day “has the attitude of the Court changed?”, she replied “I would say yes.” When asked how, she explained “now we don’t generally get orders which say ‘working in partnership’”;
e. she agreed with Mr. Day that she considered the London Borough of Bromley to be “working in partnership with” Liberata.
H. The positions of the parties
76. At all stages of these proceedings there has been very substantial agreement between the parties – to the extent that, notwithstanding an early direction for sequential position statements, the legal representatives of the parties agreed between themselves that “this is unnecessary.” [Mr. Hoar’s ps 20/11/24 paragraph 2] Whether a reflection or a cause, this illustrates the difficulty I have found in addressing the issue in this matter. By the time of the third position statements, sequential filing was acknowledged by Mr. Hoar [para 10] to have been helpful.
The Applicant (London Borough of Bromley)
77. Position statement 20/11/24: Mr Hoar sets out Bromley’s overview in the following terms:
“4. … In sum, the agreement is an outsourcing agreement made after a procurement process by a decision of [Bromley] authorising the outsourcing appointeeship and deputy services of LBB…..
6. … routine tasks and administrative work associated with managing the individual’s finances and assets are outsourced by agreement, the Director and LBB Council remain responsible for all decisions made. This is not a delegation…
10. … LBB’s position is that it has not delegated decisions to a service provider and that it has acted properly by doing no more than outsourcing functions over which it has supervision. …”
78. There are then 4 paragraphs making brief reference to caselaw: Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2014] AC 537, Hopkins v. Akramy & Ors [2020] QB 564, Myton v. Woods (1980) 79 LGR 28, Armes v. Nottinghamshire County Council [2018] AC 355, James v. Hertsmere BC [2020] EWCA Civ 489 and Stoke-on-Trent v. B&Q Retail Ltd [1984] Ch 1. The focus is on public authority statutory duties, rather than court-appointed deputyship. This is followed by 5 paragraphs on “Sufficiency of supervision and insurance for deputies and service providers” including the assertion that
“where a local authority outsources functions but retains decision-making capacity, the local authority will continue to owe the duty of care to P (albeit that the LA could itself sue or join to proceedings a commercial service if it may have caused or contributed to the LA’s breach of duty); and this will remain the case where decision-making is unlawfully delegated but ratified by an LA.”
79. Unequivocally (at para 20), “LBB’s position is that it has not delegated any functions; and that, to the extent that it may have done, its office-holder has ratified those decisions.”
80. More encouragingly (at para 22), it is accepted that “the Court may wish to provide directions and/or guidance to LBB (and other local authorities) about the dividing line between the management of P’s affairs that can properly be outsourced and the decisions about his or her best interests that cannot be.”
81. The Court was asked (at para 27) to find that “the deputy may ratify all improperly delegated decisions without the need to review them” and (at para 28) to conclude proceedings.
82. Position statement 31/1/25: at this point Bromley acknowledged (para 18) that “deputyships are personal appointments, not the appointment of a public body to discharge as a corporate entity.” Otherwise (para 21) “LBB maintains its position is that it has not delegated decisions to Liberata” and its earlier submissions.
83. Position statement 14/5/25: recognises [para 11(4)] that “decisions” should not be delegated. The position taken is that they have not been. The decision-tree is summarised: “Day-to-day decisions about payment plans and the authorisation of relatively small sums for trips are made by social workers managed by the Deputy for whom she is responsible. Decisions of more consequence are made by the senior manager under the Deputy and the Deputy has a personal involvement in the most serious decisions.” Liberata’s role [para 11(5)] “is limited to the administration of payments, including (as any bank would) declining requests for payment when there are insufficient funds.”
84. Two alternative positions are set out:
a. [para 12] “if there are breaches of the Deputy’s authority, they are ‘so trivial and nugatory that the authority can safely proceed without remedial action’, as Lord Hailsham LC put it in London & Clydesdale Estates v. Aberdeen DC [1980] 1 WLR 182.”
b. [para 13] “if the system by (sic) which the office holder, Ms. Glover, and her predecessor has applied … does not comply with the Code and the statutory guidance (despite the latter envisaging senior office holders being appointed), it is open to the Court to ratify the decisions that were made.”
85. The second alternative position is then somewhat undermined by the following statement [para 14]: “Were the Court to decide that LBB’s scheme for the decision-making of those under the direction of the Deputy was in breach of the Code, it is thus open to the Deputy to ratify those decisions and for the Court to recognise that she may do so.”
86. Finally [para 15], “what matters and what is in accordance with that appointment is that she has a robust system by which decisions are made by staff under her direction for whom she is accountable; and that that system ensures that she is able to review and oversee such decisions where it is necessary. LBB’s evidence is that that is the case and the OPG’s evidence and position provides the strongest support for its position.”
87. In his oral submissions Mr. Hoar:
a. addressed my question as to the meaning of ‘they’ (see para 67 above) by explaining that “a decision-maker may rely on quite perfunctory information to make the decision. The people doing the tasks may have better information but they don’t make the decision” – with apology for it having taken so long to get to the point of that being the evidence before the Court;
b. accepted that arranging for payment of utility bills or payments within a budget is a ministerial act, but refusing a request because of insufficient funds is not;
c. withdrew any suggestion that the Deputy can ratify any delegated decision;
d. concluded that ‘this contractual arrangement works very well’: decisions are made by social workers, and Liberata undertakes ministerial acts.
The Public Guardian
88. Position statement 21/11/24: paragraphs 41 – 56 address “The Position of Local Authorities” and “Delegation of Statutory Powers – Key Principles of Public Law”. Reference is made to the Local Government Act 1972 s101 and 10 cases are cited. (It is not helpful to dwell any further on this since it has subsequently been accepted that the issue in these proceedings concerns the officeholder appointment of a deputy, rather than public law duties of a local authority.)
89. The position taken by the OPG was explained as follows:
a. [para 59A] “It now appears [that] LB Bromley outsource services to Liberata UK Limited by way of contractual agreement.” (italicisation added)
b. [para 59C] “It now appears That ‘routine tasks and administrative work associated with managing an individual’s finances and assets are delegated” (italicisation in the original)
c. [para 59D] “The authorised officer under the regime “retains the decision making responsibility” (italicisation in the original)
d. [para 62] “The OPG has taken a sample of the cases and fully audited 6 of the cases and has found:-
1. There are no irregularities…
2. There has been no complaints….
3. The system of the service provision is effective and functions well.”
e. [para 69] “A. There is no evidence to support the contention that LBL (sic) are delegating their deputyship powers to the company/ies. B. The evidence would suggest that albeit some of the more perfunctory tasks are outsourced the major exercise of decision making is made by the Appointed Officer within the Borough. C. … this is not delegation.”
f. [para 72] “The OPG does not challenge or gainsay the evidence or the factual matrix.”
90. Notwithstanding the earlier agreement set out at paragraph 10 above, under the heading “Is this delegation or outsourcing of functions?” the position taken is [para 85] that “This again is a matter for the Court.” The OPG’s “provisional view” is said to be [para 86] that “this is more akin to the outsourcing of many of the day to day functions but the ultimate decision making is conducted by the local authority.” If the Court were to find improper delegation, it suggested [para 94] that the Court “could direct that any delegated decisions that offend the delegation could be retrospectively ratified by the London Borough of Bromley.”
91. Position statement for hearing on 5th February 2025 (undated): this document is very short and bears the name of different counsel. In conclusion [para 11], “the PG maintains its position as set out in the previously filed position statement.”
92. Position statement 13/5/25: there is some diversion [para 54 – 55] into ‘Conflict of Interest’ and [para 56] into ‘Delegation of Statutory Powers’, which does not take these proceedings any further. The ‘Primary Submissions’ include [para 57] that “The Public Guardian does not take any position on the facts of any of the 46 cases under consideration” and [para 63] that “The Public Guardian …invites the Court to ‘give guidance’ on the issue raised in these applications as to the delegation of functions in particular when delegation is out with the authority of the Court appointed deputy.” The OPG “does not detract or demure from” its earlier position [para 70], and the “overall conclusion” [para 73] is that “if the Court accepts the evidence as filed, the threshold for a finding of improper delegation under the Act and Guidance is not met.”
93. In his oral submissions, Mr. Day acknowledged that the OPG had “not appreciated the consequence and impact of this arrangement.” He explained that “my task was to find the ‘wedding cake’”. The position now was that “on the facts, we don’t see that this falls into the pool of delegation.”
I. Determination
Preliminary observations
94. The parties’ appreciation of the issue central to these proceedings has developed over the course of the proceedings. My overriding impression is that both parties have considered throughout that the contractual arrangements under scrutiny “work”, in the sense that the estates of all Ps are being managed without issues or complaints arising; and therefore, they have responded to the issue raised by the District Judge with a shared attitude that questions as to whether the arrangements meet legal requirements are intrusive and unhelpful. At the February 2025 hearing, I was obliged to spell out that the Court’s purpose was not to castigate anyone, but to ensure that deputyship functions are being exercised lawfully in accordance with Ps’ best interests.
95. Regrettably, and unusually, I am concerned that the Court has not been given the well-informed, focussed submissions of law that it would usually expect, despite assurances and active objection to appointment of an amicus. Arguments which are clearly wrong, such as that the deputy could ratify her own delegations, have persisted for far too long. Obtaining evidence of what actually happens in Bromley once a deputyship appointment has been made has taken repeated directions. The evidence from the Office of the Public Guardian was that the person with supervisory responsibility for the deputyships in question only appreciated a difference between the entities of Bromley and Liberata on the occasion of the third hearing. None of this is satisfactory. It has made the Court’s task considerably more difficult.
Outsourcing/delegation – defining the terms
96. There has been some lack of clarity in these proceedings as to the terms “delegation” and “outsourcing”. Often, the terms have been used interchangeably. For the purposes of my determinations, it may be helpful to spell out the usage of the Court in the context of deputyship:
a. “delegation”, as the parties agreed it to mean (para 25 above), is the act of giving duties, powers, tasks or responsibilities to others. This delegation may be an acceptable way of the authorised officer of a local authority discharging functions of deputyship, if the delegation is within the bounds of the summary set out in paragraphs 26 and 27 above. In particular, it may be an acceptable way of the authorised officer of a local authority discharging functions of deputyship:
i. if the ‘others’ are within the local authority; or
ii. if the delegated tasks are ministerial acts or non-fiduciary functions performed vicariously in accordance with normal contractual principles;
b. “outsourcing” is a business practice whereby an organisation hires a third-party external provider to perform tasks, handle operations or deliver services that would normally be done by internal employees.
97. It is clear that the contractual arrangements under consideration in these proceedings are an example of a public authority outsourcing many of its tasks, operations or services. The issue to be determined in these proceedings is whether, in so far as the contractual agreement purports to include deputyship, this “outsourcing” is permissible.
98. There is another way in which the term “outsourcing” has been used before the Court of Protection on other occasions. Sometimes a local authority has ceased to provide deputyship services itself. Instead, it has “outsourced” deputyship entirely to a third-party organisation. When that happens, an application is made to the Court of Protection to discharge any existing appointments of the local authority’s authorised officer and to make new appointments of an individual or (if appropriate) officeholder of the third-party. This is not what the current proceedings are about. At no point has there been any suggestion that any individual or office holder of Liberata should be appointed as replacement deputy. It may be that this could be an alternative approach adopted by Bromley. I have not been asked to consider the possibility.
Are the tasks assigned to Liberata within permitted delegation?
99. The “outsourcing” of the services and tasks set out in the Specifications document (para 48(a) and (b) above) amounts to the London Borough of Bromley purporting to give at least some tasks which arise on appointment of its authorised officer as deputy to a third party. In my judgment, authority to do that cannot be implied from the making of the deputyship appointment:
a. until the District Judge in these proceedings asked his question, the Court did not know anything about these contractual arrangements; only on the handing down of this judgment has the Court reached a settled position on it. The principal did not know or accept at the time of making the deputyship appointments that the authorised officer of the London Borough of Bromley intended to delegate the tasks set out in the Specifications document;
b. there is nothing in the nature of deputyship authority which necessitates its execution wholly or partly by means of the current contractual arrangements;
c. there is no justification from the particular business of local authorities – plenty of local authorities provide deputyship services without equivalent arrangements;
d. there are no unforeseen circumstances to be considered;
e. there is no reasonable basis to presume authority from conduct.
100. As to that last point, it is necessary to address the Public Guardian’s account of seeking “advice” from court staff. The communications referred to are regrettable. At best, they may be explained as lingering remnants from pre-Mental Capacity Act practices. For the avoidance of doubt, neither “the Court” nor any of its staff has any standing to give “advice”. That was the case in 2014 and in 2015, just as it is the case now. Nothing that any member of the Technical Specialist Team, or any “Court Appointed Officer”[8], may have said or written in an e-mail has any determinative authority on issues of delegation or how a public authority discharges the functions of deputyship. The OPG should have understood that in 2014 and 2015, and should be clear about it now. Like every other court, the Court of Protection speaks through judgments and orders, with a clear appeal structure.
101. If authority to delegate tasks via the current contractual arrangements is not implied, is it an instance of permitted delegation with a large organisation? Clearly not. Liberata UK is a separate organisation to the London Borough of Bromley. Even if the individual employees were at one time employees of the local authority, they ceased to be when they TUPE transferred. Neither the familiarity of their faces, nor their physical presence in a Bromley office, can change that. Unfortunately, both of these factors seem to have clouded everyone’s understanding of the contractual arrangements.
102. I do not suggest that any persons involved had anything less than positive intention to promote the interests of Ps but the admitted ‘struggle’ on the part of the body with statutory responsibility for oversight of deputies to see any significance in contractual arrangements between two different bodies is, frankly, cause for dismay. (In making that observation, I make a distinction between the OPG as the statutory body and Ms. Francis herself – I acknowledge that she is but one part of that body and I accept, as she confirmed in oral evidence, that these issues are really ‘beyond her position’.)
103. The remaining possibility is that Liberata’s involvement is limited to ministerial acts. In my judgment, the Specifications document suggests that it could be but the evidence gives rise to real concern, in respect of anything other than the biggest of decisions with Bromley’s deputyship cohort (eg sale of property), either that it is not in fact being understood that way or that proper best interests decisions are simply not being made.
104. The final position of both parties is that there is a decision-making pathway entirely within the Deputy’s organisation. The analysis is welcome but I am not satisfied that the evidence supports it:
a. Ms. Glover’s first statement (paragraph 56(a) above) appears to me internally contradictory. At the very least, it lacks an explanation of how the work of the teams together translates into a decision by Ms. Glover. Sale of property is sufficiently infrequent that referral to the Director of Adult Social Care may be feasible, but what of smaller ‘best interests’ decisions?
b. only in Ms. Glover’s second statement (paragraph 56(b) above) was it suggested that social workers make the day-to-day decisions, including “setting personal allowances and assessing one-off spends”, as distinct from making a request to Liberata;
c. even so, the description of social workers as decision-makers is immediately undermined by recognition that the Liberata team “may on occasion refuse spend on financial grounds.” Who then is making the best interest decision?
i. when a social worker requests funds, the implication is that the social worker considers that the requested expenditure would be ‘a good thing’ for P. If that request is refused on the basis of P having insufficient funds, the implication is that the social worker had not considered affordability. If that is the end of the matter, P does not receive whatever the expenditure would have funded because of a decision as to affordability by the Liberata employee.
ii. it was only in her oral evidence that Ms. Glover suggested that there would in fact be ‘dialogue’ to explore how the requested expenditure may be possible (para 60(c) above.) No evidence has been provided to demonstrate that such dialogue actually happens, or how the decision is ultimately made.
iii. in so far as Mr. Hoar portrays [2nd ps para 8 and orally] Liberata’s refusal of a social worker request as “no more a ‘decision’ than is the decision of a bank to decline a transaction for the same reason”, I disagree. It was not suggested that there would only be refusal if funds were non-existent, which is how a bank declines a transaction. (If Mr. Hoar is seeking to suggest that, then the social worker’s ‘request’ seems yet further away from a best interest decision.) The implication of “affordability” is a discretionary judgment of expenditure within overall funds – not what a bank does, and here located with Liberata staff not the social worker.
d. as to who conducts deputyship visits, Bromley’s evidence is very unclear (paragraph 58 above) but the OPG supervision team has only met Liberata employees, not social workers.
105. In short, I do not accept that the ‘conclusion’ of Ms. Glover’s written evidence (paragraph 59 above) reflects the rest of the evidence or the reality of what actually has been happening. Rather, in my judgment, it reflects an understanding of deputyship which has only been reached during and through these proceedings. I have no basis for being satisfied that this understanding has yet become manifest ‘at the coal face’. It appears to me that Mr Day was both accurate and revealing in his submission that it was his task “to find the wedding cake.”
106. So, in my judgment the tasks assigned to Liberata could be permitted delegation as ‘ministerial acts’ but I am not satisfied that arrangements on the ground are actually happening that way. There is scope for ‘mission creep’, and no evidence of robust decision-making structures to avoid that, or of sufficiently detailed reporting and oversight to enable proper supervision of that.
Where next?
107. It is not the role of the Court to tell either the deputy or the Office of the Public Guardian how to discharge their functions lawfully. However, neither may the Court conclude the issue in these proceedings without setting out what it requires to be satisfied that Liberata is performing only ministerial acts. In my judgment the following matters are missing from the evidence currently available to me and need to be addressed:
a. for each P for whom the authorised officer of London Borough of Bromley is appointed as deputy, there should be:
i. a clear record of who the social worker is;
ii. a clear record of who the Case Manager/Review Officer in Liberata is;
iii. a clear process for ensuring that each of them knows who the other is, and how to make contact.
b. for decisions being made on a delegated basis within the London Borough of Bromley (ie by Bromley social workers, their managers and above), there should be:
i. broad criteria for what decisions can be made at each level, clearly available to all;
ii. explicit exposition of the escalation path, clearly available to all;
iii. a process for formal recording of how and when decisions have been made and by whom, including when a ‘request’ for funds has been ‘rejected’ by Liberata on the basis of insufficient funds and the ‘dialogue’ afterwards.
c. in respect of Liberata’s tasks, there should be:
i. clear understanding that any ‘advice’ given is part of being consulted by the decision-maker, as distinct from being the decision;
ii. clear understanding that reference to “any other functions permitted/required as set out in the Court order” in the Specifications document (see paragraph 48 above) is limited to functions permitted/required within the scope of ministerial acts, not decision-making;
iii. clear understanding that Liberata’s direct engagement with Ps or their representatives is limited to ‘queries and matters’ within the scope of ministerial acts, not decision-making;
iv. no arrangement whereby ministerial acts relating to property sale are undertaken simply on the basis that a generic threshold (% of asking price) has been met – acceptance of an offer to purchase is a best interests decision, not a ministerial act.
d. supervision of each of the matters (a) – (c) via the annual report to the Office of the Public Guardian.
108. It seems to me that none of these requirements is disproportionate to the estates typical of local authority deputyship appointments.
109. The appropriate way forward is for Bromley to address requirements (a)(iii), (b) and (c) in written documents to be submitted to the Office of the Public Guardian (on a cohort-wide basis, rather than for each individual P) within three months of this judgment being handed down. Once the Office of the Public Guardian has confirmed her acceptance that the documents meet the requirements, these can then be used to inform supervision. The annual report for each P should include information sufficient to satisfy requirement (a) and the records sufficient to satisfy requirement (b)(iii). If any issues arise whereby the Public Guardian identifies that Liberata’s actions have exceeded the bounds of ministerial acts, then further application to the Court may be required.
J. CONCLUSION
110. The Court recognises that local authorities have an important role to play in providing deputyship services, and also that local authorities have other important roles and significant budgetary constraints. Where the Office of the Public Guardian is so positive in its assessment that the subjects of deputyship are receiving an excellent service, it is right for the Court to be cautious about ‘ruining a good thing’ by excessive proceduralism. Nonetheless, statutory requirements must be upheld. Deputyship is a fiduciary relationship, and fiduciary obligations apply.
111. After detailed consideration, I am satisfied that the contractual arrangements between Bromley and Liberata UK are capable of operating as permitted delegation of ministerial acts. However, I am not satisfied that this has always been understood or manifested. I have therefore identified four ‘requirements’ which need to be addressed going forwards. Clarificatory documents must be developed and submitted to the Office of the Public Guardian. Annual reports must provide the required information and records, and supervision must consider whether all the requirements have been met. On that basis, new applications may be made if and when necessary but these proceedings can now stand concluded.
112. I invite the parties to submit a draft order to give effect to this judgment.
HHJ Hilder
SCHEDULE
| Court Reference | Initials |
| 13533926 | AF |
| 13080870 | AS |
| 13695992 | BC |
| 13304015 | BF |
| 14028761 | BJ |
| 1370488T | CL |
| 1155000T | CM |
| 13322914 | CS |
| 1193521T | DF |
| 12551142 | DG |
| 11962420 | DH |
| 1373008T | DW |
| 13630915 | ED |
| 14091339 | FC |
| 11425527 | FR |
| 13699238 | GS |
| 1330137T | GW |
| 12149887 | HS |
| 13826297 | JC |
| 13703835 | JH |
| 1183358T | JH |
| 1349229T | JS |
| 13348456 | JS |
| 14072140 | JW |
| 13789340 | KW |
| 14036922 | LL |
| 13850631 | MB |
| 12269950 | MD |
| 13094480 | MF |
| 13493983 | MG |
| 13703582 | MR |
| 12873980 | NK |
| 13704510 | NW |
| 12223825 | OJ |
| 12953384 | PC |
| 12816807 | PF |
| 13728754 | PJ |
| 13868150 | PL |
| 13609049 | RG |
| 14039730 | RG |
| 12815758 | RS |
| 13894323 | RW |
| 12978746 | SQ |
| 12813781 | SS |
| 13586627 | VH |
Notes
[1] Where the office is held in an organisation other than local government, the standard terms of the officeholder appointment include provisions requiring the holder of the office at the date of appointment and each successive holder of the office to notify the Public Guardian forthwith if they cease to hold the post, so that the Office of the Public Guardian can take appropriate steps to satisfy itself as to suitability of the successor and make an application to the Court of Protection if necessary. Where the office is held in a public authority, the Court relies on that public authority to have ensured suitability. (Further consideration of officeholder deputyship may be found in Re SH [2018] EWCOP 21.)
[2] See Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency 5-001
[3] Ibid 5-001(2) and (3)
[4] Ibid 5-002
[5] Ibid 5-003
[6] Ibid 5-004
[7] ‘ftes’ stands for ‘full-time-equivalent staff’.
[8] It is assumed that this is intended to be a reference to ‘Authorised Court Officers’, a role which was introduced by the Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2011 (SI 2011/2753) with effect from 12th December 2011. This role is held by civil servants who have been authorised by the Senior Judge or the President so to act. The authorisation enables them to exercise the jurisdiction of the court, limited in accordance with a Practice Direction effectively to strictly defined, non-contentious property and affairs applications.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).
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