Criminal United Kingdom
R v James Ibori
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 1396
Case No: 202302880 B1; 202503373 B2; 202502262 B2
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT SOUTHWARK
His Honour Judge Tomlinson
T20117192
ON AN APPLICATION FROM THE CROWN COURT AT CHESTER
The Honorary Recorder of Chester His Honour Judge Steven Everett DL
T20107763
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 03/11/2026
Before :
LORD JUSTICE POPPLEWELL
MR JUSTICE BRYAN
and
HIS HONOUR JUDGE NICHOLAS DEAN KC
The Recorder of Manchester
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Between :
| REX | Respondent | |
| – and – | ||
| JAMES IBORI REX – and – ARIF PATEL – and – SABINA PATEL |
Appellant Applicant Third Party |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Jonathan Kinnear KC & Michael Newbold (instructed by The Crown Prosecuton Service) for the Respondent in Ibori
James Waddington KC & Robert Dudley (instructed by The Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respndent in Patel & Patel
Kennedy Talbot KC (instructed by CLP Solicitors) for the Appellant Mr Ibori
Martin Evans KC & Ian Whitehurst (instructed by Abbey Solicitors) for the Applicant Arif Patel
James Hines KC (instructed by M&M Solicitors) for the Third Party Sabina Patel
Hearing dates : 23 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on November 3 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
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Lord Justice Popplewell :
Introduction
1. This is the judgment of the Court.
2. These two unrelated cases were heard together because they raise a common issue of law which can be shortly stated. In confiscation proceedings, should the uplift for the change in value of money (‘CVM’) be applied to a criminal benefit comprising a sum in a bank account, or other property, which has been frozen by a restraint order and whose value has not increased, or not increased by as much as the CVM, in the period to which the CVM uplift is applied? In Mr Ibori’s case the applicable CVM uplift provisions are found in s. 74(5) and s. 74(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (‘CJA’) as amended. They were replaced with effect from 24 March 2003 with materially identical provisions in section 80 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (‘POCA 2002’), which are those applicable in Mr Patel’s case.
3. It is common ground that the wording of s. 74(5) CJA and s 80(2) POCA 2002 requires such an uplift, and such an uplift was made by His Honour Judge Tomlinson when making a confiscation order against Mr Ibori in the amount of £101,514,315.21 on 21 July 2023; and by His Honour Judge Everett DL when making a confiscation order against Mr Patel in the amount of £90,503,211.96 on 28 August 2025. The argument advanced on behalf of Mr Ibori is that the provisions must be read down under s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to disapply the CVM uplift as a disproportionate interference with his property rights under Article 1 of Protocol 1 (‘A1P1’) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’), by reference to the principles identified by the Supreme Court in R v Waya [2012] UKSC 51 [2013] 1 A.C. 294. In Mr Patel’s case the same argument arises by application of the proviso inserted into POCA 2002 s. 6(5) in 2015 to reflect the decision in R v Waya. Mr Ibori appeals against the confiscation order on this sole ground by leave of the full court, following a renewed application on grounds which had all been refused by the single judge. In Mr Patel’s case he applies for leave to appeal on this and other grounds following refusal by the single judge.
4. There is also an appeal by Mr Patel’s former wife, Sabina Patel, who married him in 1985 and separated from him in 2016, against aspects of Judge Everett’s ruling dated 19 May 2025 rejecting her application under s. 10A of POCA 2002 that she has a beneficial interest in particular properties treated as belonging to Mr Patel. She appeals in relation to two such properties with leave of the single judge.
The Ibori proceedings
5. Mr Ibori was born on 4 August 1958. In May 1999 he was elected Governor of Delta State in Nigeria, a position that he held, following a re-election, until 2007. From the moment he was elected and throughout his time in office he deliberately and systematically defrauded the people whose interests he had been elected to represent. The proceeds of those frauds were laundered through a complex web of companies and bank accounts worldwide with the assistance, amongst others, of Mr Gohil, a solicitor practising in London who lent the firm’s client account as a vehicle through which the proceeds were channelled. Mr Ibori was extradited from the United Arab Emirates in April 2011 to face charges on two indictments in the Crown Court at Southwark with which he had been charged in May 2010. The first indictment involved a conspiracy, together with his wife, his mistress and others, to defraud the Delta State by the commission of inflated price frauds in relation to the building of a sports track and the supply of vehicles to the State Government. The frauds also involved the diversion of cash from the Delta State treasury to his personal benefit; and continuing to run and to profit from undeclared businesses when such activity by a state governor was prohibited by the Nigerian constitution. The charges included money laundering the proceeds of these frauds, which he invested in expensive properties and other assets in different parts of the world, including an attempt to buy an executive jet for US$20 million.
6. The second indictment concerned the third largest mobile phone service provider in Africa, V Mobile. Delta State owned 18 per cent of the shares in this company and another state, Akwa Ibom State, some 10%. A number of companies expressed interest in acquiring a controlling interest in V Mobile and so both States decided to sell their shares to raise money ostensibly for the benefit of the public. The potential for growth and profit in the Nigerian Telecom market was enormous and so the proposed sale attracted considerable interest. In June 2005, Vodacom, a South African company, joined forces with Virgin and offered $8.05 per share. Shortly afterwards two other companies made offers at slightly lower prices, but still over $7.50 per share. Thus, the water had been tested and the market value of V Mobile effectively established. The appellant and his fellow Governor of the Akwa Ibom State, assisted by Mr Gohil, set up entities named African Development Finance Limited or African Development Fund Inc (“ADF”), whose stated role for a substantial fee was to advise on and negotiate the sale. In fact, ADF gave no advice and negotiated nothing. In May 2006 the sale of the V Mobile shares was completed at a price of $7.60 per share, of which ADF's fee was in excess of $6.50 per share, plus a commission. This enormous fee was then diverted to the intended beneficiaries of the fraud, principally the appellant and his fellow governor. These proceeds too were laundered through numerous companies worldwide.
7. During the course of the police investigation a restraint order was granted in Southwark Crown Court on 2 August 2007, purportedly pursuant to the provisions in POCA 2002. This was in respect of all Mr Ibori’s assets including all bank accounts. It was then realised that the relevant statutory regime was not POCA 2002 but CJA as amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (‘POCA 1995’). Accordingly, a materially identical restraint order was sought and granted in the High Court on 3 June 2008 under CJA and POCA 1995, and the POCA 2002 restraint order then discharged.
8. Following his extradition, Mr Ibori pleaded guilty to a number of counts of conspiracy to defraud, money laundering and other offences on each indictment, and was sentenced on 17 April 2012 to a total of 13 years’ imprisonment. Mr Gohil had been convicted on 2 November 2010 of six counts on the first indictment and pleaded guilty to 6 counts on the second indictment on 6 December 2010. Mr Gohil was sentenced to a total of 11 years’ imprisonment on 8 March and 8 April 2011. Confiscation proceedings were commenced against Mr Ibori and others, including Mr Gohil.
9. The confiscation proceedings had a long and tortuous procedural history. They had not concluded by 28 February 2014 when the restraint order was varied to name a number of Nigerian bank accounts as specifically restrained; nor by December 2016 when Mr Ibori was deported to Nigeria following service of his sentence.
10. Following service of extensive evidence by the prosecution and responses on behalf of Mr Ibori, the effective confiscation hearing eventually took place in January and February 2020 before His Honour Judge Tomlinson, sitting in the Crown Court at Southwark. Mr Ibori had before then successfully sought to have released from the restrained assets substantial sums to fund legal expenses, as permitted under the CJA regime. Mr Ibori was represented by counsel but did not attend or give evidence. There was a hearing with oral submissions of law on 26 and 27 August 2020. There were separate hearings in relation to confiscation proceedings against Mr Gohil and others, which took place in 2021, and the judge sensibly did not wish to make his findings until after those hearings, given the overlapping evidence involved in their respective involvements. On 28 October 2022 the judge gave a detailed 81 page judgment with his findings (‘the October 2022 Judgment’) and invited further submissions on the financial consequences for the order he was being asked to make. Further written submissions were made, and a further oral hearing took place on 20 July 2023. The judge gave a further judgment on disputed issues on 21 July 2023 (‘the July 2023 Judgment’) and made the confiscation order the same day.
11. The confiscation order was in the sum of £101,514,315.21, which was the amount of the criminal benefit found by the judge, and which Mr Ibori had not satisfied him (or indeed tried to satisfy him) he was unable to pay.
12. Mr Ibori appeals against that order with leave of the full court on the limited ground identified above. The point was raised for the first time by his legal representatives at the oral hearing in July 2023. It was not expressly addressed by the Judge in his July 2023 Judgment when applying the CVM uplift in respect of the items the subject matter of this appeal.
13. The point is said to apply to two sets of bank accounts making up his criminal benefit. They are those identified within items 19 and 30 on the schedule of benefits identified by the Financial Investigator Mr Creighton in his final s.73 statement and described more fully below. It is Mr Ibori’s case that the confiscation order figure of £101,514,315.21 accordingly falls to be reduced by some £4.3 million to £97,210,562 if the appeal succeeds. On behalf of the Crown it is contended that the point is a bad one, but even if correct it would only reduce the benefit figure by some £10,000.
The Patel proceedings
14. Arif Patel was born on 6 October 1967. He was involved in the 1990s with running a substantial family business manufacturing socks and textiles from factory and warehouse premises at 107-109 Fletcher Road Preston (‘107-109 Fletcher Road’). The business had been started by his father, but he became ill and Arif Patel became the head of the family directing the running of the business. From 2003 to 2008 he committed a series of frauds, with his brothers Munaf Patel and Faisal Patel, and others, of which he was convicted following a trial before His Honour Judge Everett DL and a jury on 11 April 2023 on five counts: false accounting (Count 1); conspiracy to cheat the public revenue (Counts 2 and 3); conspiracy to sell, offer for sale or distribute goods which bear a sign identical to or likely to be mistaken for a registered trademark (Count 4); and conspiracy to launder money (Count 5).
15. Count 1 involved false documents used to avoid corporation tax of £193,950.60 by purporting to show transfers by way of charitable donations to India whereas approximately £6 million to £7 million of the documented “donations” were not sent to India but diverted to accounts of accomplices. The indictment period was from 24 March 2003 to 4 April 2008.
16. Counts 2 and 3 reflected carousel VAT frauds pretending to be engaged in the selling and exporting of high value textiles, fabrics and/or yarn (Count 2) and mobile phones and computer chips (Count 3). The VAT fraudulently obtained was £33.4 million and the intended loss on all transactions £90.1 million. The indictment period was 1 June 2004 to 28 February 2006.
17. Count 4 reflected trading in counterfeit branded clothing by importing cheaply made clothing manufactured abroad in China, India, Pakistan and Turkey, and importing it in containers and selling it on. The branded clothing was often concealed in the containers under non branded clothing. Some 39 consignments involving 46 large containers were stopped and found to contain counterfeit to the value of millions of pounds. The indictment period was 1 January 2004 to 3 May 2007.
18. The money laundering charge in Count 5 reflected the monies made from the VAT fraud which were sent to and held in Dubai, and from there in part to shell companies in the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Isles (BVI), and then used to purchase properties in Preston, London, Warrington and Morocco. The indictment period was 1 January 2004 to 4 April 2008.
19. The frauds were carried out through companies including the name Faisaltex, amongst others, including Faisaltex Ltd. These were highly sophisticated offences involving the set-up of various companies and many persons, with significant planning and conducted over a sustained period. Mr Patel’s role was one of leadership and coordination across the multiple fraudulent enterprises. There were also attempts to either conceal/dispose of evidence, and failures to respond to warnings from HMRC. The judge described Count 4 as a “breathtakingly arrogant and dishonest operation”.
20. The indicted conduct ceased in 2008 as a result of police investigations. On 31 August 2010 a restraint order was granted by His Honour Judge George in respect of Mr Patel’s assets, and those in the name of the Faisaltex companies and the BVI and other private companies. At the same time an order was made appointing a management receiver over the assets (‘the MRO’). The MRO remains in place although the identity of the individual receiver has changed from time to time pursuant to variations of the order. The MRO required quarterly reports to be provided to the court, of which there have been 55, the most recent at the date of the confiscation order being that dated 23 June 2025. The management receiver has undertaken extensive investigations, and within the receivership estate are many properties in Preston and elsewhere representing proceeds of crime, many being commercial properties leased or rented and therefore requiring active management. The estimated value of the receivership estate in 2011 was approximately £61 million. Since then some £29 million has been expended in investigating and managing the assets. The receivership costs have been about £17 million. Those costs have regularly been approved by the Court, and Mr Evans KC made clear that he makes no complaint or criticism of the way the management receiver has exercised his powers and duties under the MRO. There has been rental income of some £60 million but the market value of the properties has overall declined or not risen in line with inflation. At the date of the June 2025 report the estimated net value of the receivership estate, after investigation and management costs and fees, was approximately £54.9 million.
21. On 17 June 2011 Mr Patel absconded to Dubai. He did not return for his trial with others which was due to take place in 2013. He claimed that he was unable to return because a civil claim had been brought against him resulting in the confiscation of his passport. At a later contested hearing Judge Everett determined that he had fraudulently procured the civil complaint to be brought against him for this purpose and that he was an absconder for the purposes of POCA 2002.
22. He has remained in the UAE ever since, despite unsuccessful attempts to extradite him. He was ultimately tried and convicted in his absence in 2023 before Judge Everett and a jury. Judge Everett had earlier presided over two lengthy trials of co-conspirators and sentenced a third group of defendants who had pleaded guilty shortly before their trial. Although Mr Patel has not attended or given evidence at his trial or any of the confiscation related hearings before Judge Everett (save for some remote attendance before being declared an absconder), he has instructed counsel who have sought vigorously to defend his interests throughout. Mr Evans frankly and realistically accepted that the long delay in the confiscation order being made could properly be treated as Mr Patel’s fault.
Legal principles
The statutory provisions
23. The CJA, as amended by POCA 1995, differs in a number of respects from POCA 2002, but the differences are not material to the present issue. We will therefore refer to the provisions of POCA 2002 (with reference to the relevantly corresponding provisions of the previous regime in parenthesis).
24. Where a person has been convicted of an offence in the Crown Court (or is committed to the Crown Court for sentence) and the prosecution asks for a confiscation order to be considered, or the court believes that it is appropriate to do so, section 6(4) and (5) of POCA 2002 apply (CJA s. 71(1)). By those subsections:
“(4) The court must proceed as follows (a) it must decide whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle; (b) if it decides that he has a criminal lifestyle it must decide whether he has benefitted from his general criminal conduct; (c) if it decides that he does not have a criminal lifestyle it must decide whether he has benefitted from his particular criminal conduct.
(5) If the court decides under subsection (4)(b) or (c) that the defendant has benefited from the conduct referred to it must (a) decide the recoverable amount, and (b) make an order (a confiscation order) requiring him to pay that amount.
Paragraph (b) applies only if, or to the extent that, it would not be disproportionate to require the defendant to pay the recoverable amount.”
25. That last provision, to which we will refer as the s. 6(5) proportionality proviso, was inserted by the Serious Crime Act 2015 in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in R v Waya which is examined below.
26. Section 7 is concerned with the recoverable amount, and principally lays down that the recoverable amount is the lower of the defendant’s benefit from the criminal conduct concerned or the available amount (CJA s. 71(6)). It is for the prosecution to prove the benefit, and then for the defendant to prove that the available amount is lower (POCA 2002 s. 7(2), R v Barwick [2001] Cr App Rep (S) 129 under the CJA regime), in each case on the balance of probabilities.
27. Section 8 and section 76 address benefit. Section 76 (CJA s 71(4) and (5)) includes the following subsections:
“(4) A person benefits from conduct if he obtains property as a result of or in connection with the conduct.
(5) If a person obtains a pecuniary advantage as a result of or in connection with conduct, he is to be taken to obtain as a result of or in connection with the conduct a sum of money equal to the value of the pecuniary advantage.
(6) References to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained in connection with conduct include references to property or a pecuniary advantage obtained both in that connection and some other.
(7) If a person benefits from conduct his benefit is the value of the property obtained.”
28. Section 9 addresses the available amount (CJA s. 74(1) “realisable property”). By section 9(1):
“(1) For the purposes of deciding the recoverable amount, the available amount is the aggregate of (a) the total of the values (at the time the confiscation order is made) of all the free property then held by the defendant minus the total amount payable in pursuance of obligations which then have priority, and (b) the total of the values (at that time) of all tainted gifts.”
29. Section 10 (CJA s. 72AA) requires certain assumptions to be made in criminal lifestyle cases, unless the defendant shows it to be incorrect or that there would be a serious risk of injustice if the assumption were made. Those provisions do not apply to Mr Patel or Mr Ibori.
30. Section 80 (CJA s.74(5) and (6)) addresses valuation of property and includes the following subsections:
“80 Value of property obtained from conduct
(1) This section applies for the purpose of deciding the value of property obtained by a person as a result of or in connection with his criminal conduct; and the material time is the time the court makes its decision.
(2) …. the value of the property at the material time is the greater of the following—
(a) the value of the property (at the time the person obtained it) adjusted to take account of later changes in the value of money;
(b) the value (at the material time) of the property found under subsection (3).
(3) The property found under this subsection is as follows—
(a) if the person holds the property obtained, the property found under this subsection is that property;
(b) if he holds no part of the property obtained, the property found under this subsection is any property which directly or indirectly represents it in his hands;
(c) if he holds part of the property obtained, the property found under this subsection is that part and any property which directly or indirectly represents the other part in his hands.”
31. We would draw attention to two related aspects of these provisions. First, the essential scheme in both regimes is that the criminal benefit which it is the purpose of the legislation to strip from the criminal is identified as the benefit obtained at the time it is obtained and its value in money’s worth at that date. Secondly, the order depriving him of that benefit is to be in an amount which represents that money’s worth in real terms at the date of the order, if the defendant then has sufficient assets to meet the order. That requires an uplift for inflation unless the criminal property or its identifiable proceeds have been retained and increased in value by a greater amount. Subject to this latter qualification, the uplift is the change in value of money, not the change in value of the kind of assets which comprised the criminal benefit when received. The rationale is that the criminal should be deprived of the criminal benefit if he has ever received it, and the criminal benefit valued in money’s worth when obtained, but that the value should be reflected in terms of the real value at the date of the confiscation order which is when he is being deprived of it. Sections 74(5) and (6) of CJA 1988 and s 80(2) of POCA are designed to ensure that when a confiscation order is made the defendant is obliged to pay (if he has sufficient assets to do so) a sum equivalent in real terms to the value which he obtained at the time of obtaining. This merely reflects the real world existence of inflation and the practical reality that the confiscation order cannot be made at the time the benefit is received, not only because often the benefit will be obtained before the crime is discovered, but also because of the investigations made necessary and frequently complex by the defendant’s criminality and lack of cooperation, and court hearings made necessary by defendants disputing liability. It is not by way of a penalty. It is a necessary incident of a value based scheme in which the relevant value is that of the criminal benefit when received by the defendant but one in which the order depriving the defendant of that benefit will be made at a later date.
32. Under sections 40 and 41 POCA 2002 (CJA ss. 76 and 77) the Court may make a restraint order where there is a real risk that realisable property which could be used for the purposes of satisfying a confiscation order which has been or may be made will be dissipated. These provisions are aimed at making a confiscation order effective by reference to the assets available to meet it when it comes to be made. Under s.48 a management receivership order may be made when a restraint order has been made, in respect of any realisable assets within the scope of the restraint order. An affected person has a right to apply to the court under s. 62 of POCA 2002 for directions as to the exercise or proposed exercise by the receiver of any of their powers. Under s. 49 the receiver has powers of investigation which may reveal criminal benefit which has not previously been identified as well as available assets.
The authorities
33. The leading authority on the proportionality of confiscation orders is R v Waya, although the principle had been adverted to in earlier cases (see, for example, the seminal speech of Lord Bingham in R v May [2008] UKHL 28 [2008] 1 AC 1028 at [42]). In R v Waya money had been borrowed and secured by a mortgage fraud, and fully repaid. The decision was that s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 required POCA 2002 to be read down so as to require a confiscation order which was proportionate to the legitimate aims of the legislation; and that a proportionate order was one which confiscated not the money lent (because it had been repaid in full to the victim of the crime) but rather the benefit derived by the defendant from the use of the loan, which was the increase in the value of the property acquired by the loan. This was assessed as the proportion of the appreciation in value which was attributable to the dishonestly obtained mortgage.
34. A number of the principles established by R v Waya were helpfully summarised by Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Burrows JSC giving the judgment of the Supreme Court in R v Andrewes [2022] UKSC 24 [2022] 1 WLR 3878 at [28]:
“In deciding on the correct approach to disproportionality it is helpful to look at a number of past cases albeit that none of them has dealt directly with cv fraud. The most significant is R v Waya [2013] 1 AC 294, which concerned a mortgage loan obtained by fraud, in which the Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe JSC and Hughes LJ, laid down the following points:
(i) Most importantly, prior to the insertion of the proviso in section 6(5), it was accepted that, in order not to infringe article 1 of Protocol 1 (‘A1P1”) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), the confiscation order had to be proportionate to the legislative objective of removing the fruits of crime. Proportionality was laid down as the correct principle to apply in preference to the previous judicial approach to POCA of examining whether, as a matter of discretion, there had been an abuse of process (see paras 18, 21 and 24).
(ii) In a criminal lifestyle case, because of the assumptions as to the criminal source of assets that are required to be made under section 10 of POCA, it will be rare for a confiscation order to be disproportionate (para 25).
(iii) In deciding on the amount of the confiscation order, the criminal is not entitled to set off against the benefit obtained the cost of committing the crime (e g a bribe paid to an official) because that would be to treat the criminal enterprise as if it were a legitimate business (para 26).
(iv) As the focus of a confiscation order is on the value of the benefits obtained, it is irrelevant in assessing the value of the benefits that the benefits are no longer retained, as where money obtained by committing an offence has been spent (para 27).
(v) It would be disproportionate to make a confiscation order where the criminal has wholly restored the benefit to the loser. That would constitute double recovery which would therefore go beyond confiscation and would constitute an unacceptable penalty (paras 28—29).
(vi) There may be other cases of disproportionality analogous to that of goods or money being entirely restored to the loser. An example is where the defendant, by deception, induces someone else to trade with him or to employ him in a manner otherwise lawful and gives full value for goods or services obtained (para 34)……..”
35. Two aspects of these principles require some further comment. The first is that proportionality is not the exercise of a discretion as to what seems to the court fair or just in any particular case, but is more narrowly confined (Andrewes at [35], [37]). The inquiry is whether the order is proportionate to the legitimate legislative purpose of the statutory regime for confiscation of the proceeds of crime. What proportionality here means is that there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed by the state in the deprivation of property as a form of penalty and the legitimate aim sought to be realised by the deprivation (Waya at [12]). That purpose is to ensure that criminals, and especially criminals engaged in serious organised crime, do not profit from their crimes and to send a strong deterrent message that crime does not pay (R v Rezvi [2002] UKHL 1 [2003] 1 AC 1099 at [14]; Waya at [2]; R v Ahmad [2014] UKSC 36 [2015] AC 299 at [38]). Although deterrence is a legitimate aspect of the legislative purpose, it is not its essential purpose, which is to deprive criminals of the pecuniary benefits of criminal activity: Waya at [21].
36. The POCA and CJA regimes do that by depriving the criminal of the value of the criminal benefit they have received and making them pay for that benefit out of any assets which are available at the time of the order, whether the latter are the product of lawful or criminal activity. The description “confiscation” order is therefore something of a misnomer, as has been often observed (see for example per Lord Bingham in his end note in R v May at [48]). A confiscation order is made for a money sum, not as an order for transfer of any property as such. The benefit is not confiscated in specie; rather the criminal is required to pay for the benefit he has received if and to the extent he is able to do so at the time the confiscation order is made. This value based scheme is regarded as proportionate to the legitimate purpose of the legislation because a property based “confiscation” order in the normal sense of that term would be wholly inadequate in the vast majority of cases: it would require the criminal benefit itself or its proceeds to be identifiable and susceptible to confiscation in specie. Most criminal activity renders that impossible. Criminals are often dishonest not only in their criminal activity but in their efforts to conceal and enjoy the fruits of their criminal activity.
37. The second aspect which merits further exposition is the principle expressed in the proposition identified at [28(iv)] of Andrewes, that as the focus of a confiscation order is on the value of the benefit when obtained, it is irrelevant in assessing the value of the benefit that the benefit is no longer retained. As it was put at [55(a)] of Waya:
“Once property has been obtained as a result of or in connection with crime, it remains the defendant’s benefit, whether or not he retains it. This is inherent in the value based scheme for post-conviction confiscation.”
38. It is obvious to see why this is so where the criminal has chosen to dispose of the property. The defendant has received the value of the benefit when obtained, and what the defendant chooses to do with it thereafter should not be treated as diminishing that benefit. The choice may be to use it for criminal purposes, in which case it would be anathema to the purpose of the legislation that the defendant should be in a better position by doing so than if the benefit were retained. The defendant may choose to spend it on other assets which are unidentifiable or which turn out to be unwise investments. He may consume it by lifestyle expenditure. Again, it would be contrary to the legitimate purpose of the legislation that the defendant should be better off in these circumstances than if the benefit were retained. Clearly, where what has happened to the criminal property after it has been obtained is the result of a choice by the criminal, any subsequent diminution in value can properly be attributed to that choice and it would not be disproportionate to the purpose of the legislation to treat the undiminished value of the property when received as the criminal benefit of which the defendant should be stripped. The position was summarised in Waya at [27] as follows:
“Similarly, it can be accepted that the scheme of the Act, and of previous confiscation legislation, is to focus on the value of the defendant’s obtained proceeds of crime, whether retained or not. It is an important part of the scheme that even if the proceeds have been spent, a confiscation order up to the value of the proceeds will follow against legitimately acquired assets to the extent that they are available for realisation.”
39. This is so not merely as a matter of principle but also as a matter of practical necessity, because it will usually be impractical to inquire into dealings by or between criminals. The same rationale underpins the proportionality of other aspects of the regime, for example the principle that the benefit is valued as the gross receipt, not the amount net of expenses, and that joint receipt is valued in the full amount of each of the recipients. At [26] of Waya the Court said:
“It is apparent from the decision in R v May that a legitimate, and proportionate, confiscation order may have one or more of three effects: (a) it may require the defendant to pay the whole of a sum which he has obtained jointly with others; (b) similarly it may require several defendants each to pay a sum which has been obtained, successively, by each of them, as where one defendant pays another for criminal property; (c) it may require a defendant to pay the whole of a sum which he has obtained by crime without enabling him to set off expenses of the crime. These propositions are not difficult to understand. To embark upon an accounting exercise in which the defendant is entitled to set off the cost of committing his crime would be to treat his criminal enterprise as if it were a legitimate business and confiscation a form of business taxation. To treat (for example) a bribe paid to an official to look the other way, whether at home or abroad, as reducing the proceeds of crime would be offensive, as well as frequently impossible of accurate determination. To attempt to inquire into the financial dealings of criminals as between themselves would usually be equally impracticable and would lay the process of confiscation wide open to simple avoidance. Although these propositions involve the possibility of removing from the defendant by way of confiscation order a sum larger than may in fact represent his net proceeds of crime, they are consistent with the statute’s objective and represent proportionate means of achieving it….”
40. However, it is important to emphasise for the purposes of the issue which arises in this case that the principle, that what happens to the criminal benefit after it is obtained is generally immaterial, is not confined to circumstances where any loss or diminution in value of the benefit has been the result of a choice by the criminal. On the contrary, it is well established that where the property representing the criminal benefit obtained is subsequently lost or forfeited without any such choice, the benefit is still generally to be regarded as the value to the criminal when obtained.
41. This is well illustrated by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Smith (David) [2001] UKHL 68 [2002] 1 WLR 54. In that case the defendant had sought to smuggle into the country 1.25 million cigarettes from abroad on a yacht without paying the excise duty. The excise duty was payable when the vessel passed the customs houses at Immingham and Hull, at which points the defendant obtained the pecuniary advantage of the avoided excise duty, which under s. 71(4) of the CJA represented criminal property then obtained. When the vessel had continued on to Goole it was searched by the customs authorities and the cigarettes confiscated. This was held to be irrelevant to the benefit obtained by the avoided excise duty. At [18] Lord Rodger of Earlsferry observed that if the ship had sunk at Goole the defendant would have lost the cigarettes but still have been better off by the amount of the avoided duty. At [23] he said:
“These provisions show that, when considering the measure of the benefit obtained by an offender in terms of section 71(4), the court is concerned simply with the value of the property to him at the time when he obtained it or, if it is greater, at the material time. In particular, where the offender has property representing in his hands the property which he obtained, the value to be considered is the value of the substitute property "but disregarding any charging order". Except, therefore, where the actual property obtained by the offender has subsequently increased in value, the court is simply concerned with its value to the offender "when he obtained it". It therefore makes no difference if, after he obtains it, the property is destroyed or damaged in a fire or is seized by customs officers: for confiscation order purposes the relevant value is still the value of the property to the offender when he obtained it. Subsequent events are to be ignored, in just the same way as any charging order is to be ignored under subsection (6). Such a scheme has the merit of simplicity. If in some circumstances it can operate in a penal or even a draconian manner, then that may not be out of place in a scheme for stripping criminals of the benefits of their crimes. That is a matter for the judgment of the legislature, which has adopted a similar approach in enacting legislation for the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking. In that context the courts have consistently held that "payments" received in connection with drug trafficking mean gross payments rather than net profit and that the "proceeds" of drug trafficking mean the gross sale proceeds, rather than the net profit after deducting the cost of the drug trafficking operation….”
42. This decision was approved in Waya at [33] in the following terms:
“[33] In R v Smith the defendant had evaded the payment of duty on imported cigarettes by smuggling them past the customs post. The decision in the case was that the pecuniary advantage thus (admittedly) obtained had not retrospectively been undone by the subsequent seizure of the cigarettes. That was plainly correct. Lord Rodger held, at para 23, that the subsequent seizure of the cigarettes was in like case to subsequent loss of or damage to goods obtained in the course of crime; such loss or damage would not affect the propriety of a confiscation order – consider for example the case of a burglar who hides the householder’s goods in the open air so that they are ruined by the weather or stolen by someone else. The House was not, however, considering the case in which the criminal property obtained has been restored to its owner undamaged. On the contrary, Smith was agreed to have obtained the pecuniary advantage of avoiding payment of the duty, at any rate temporarily….”
43. The confiscation in that case, and cases where the property is lost or destroyed fortuitously without any choice by the criminal as in the posited examples of the sinking of the ship at Goole or destruction by fire or the theft of property from a burglar, were not treated as involving any contravention of the principle of proportionality notwithstanding Lord Rodger’s description of the principle as capable of operating in some circumstances as penal or draconian.
44. This principle was applied in R v Islam [2009] UKHL 30 [2009] AC 1076 and R v Kakkad [2015] EWCA Crim 385 where drugs had been seized and forfeited.
45. We take the rationale for the proportionality of depriving the criminal of the benefit when obtained notwithstanding subsequent seizure, confiscation or destruction, to be two fold. First, where the seizure, confiscation or destruction is the result of the criminal activity in question, as it will be in the case of drugs or firearms, the criminal should not be in a better position if the normal consequences of his criminal activity being discovered have eventuated than if he had managed to conceal them. This is all the result of his criminal activity. Secondly, insofar as loss or damage is attributable to the ordinary vicissitudes of life, such as the sinking ship posited in Smith or the fire, theft by another, posited in Waya, the criminal has still had the benefit obtained for the period prior to such loss or destruction, even if short; and if the normal vicissitudes of life have stopped him enjoying the benefit of his crimes thereafter it is not disproportionate to make him pay the value of the benefit when he obtained it because a criminal, like anyone else, has to bear the ordinary risks of loss or damage thereafter. This is not merely applicable where the criminal milieu gives rise to the loss (typified by the saying “there is no honour amongst thieves”) but applies equally however the loss or damage fortuitously occurs.
46. In Andrewes at [35] the Court said that the proportionality proviso now found in s. 6(5) of POCA 2002 is principally designed to avoid penalising the defendant by double recovery. The narrow category of cases in which it has been applied are to be explained as examples of where such double recovery occurs in practice because the criminal benefit or its equivalent has been restored to or conferred on the victim. That was the position in Waya because the fraudulently obtained loan was repaid to the lender and was always bound to be repaid because it was fully secured. That was equally the case in relation to the remuneration in Andrewes, because the employer who was dishonestly deceived by the fraudulent cv had received the benefit of services from the defendant of a value commensurate with the remuneration paid. Restoration of criminal benefit to the victim is something which it is the policy of the law to encourage, so that it is not difficult to see why it should be regarded as disproportionate to penalise a defendant who has done so by making a confiscation order against them. Similar considerations do not apply where the defendant has transferred the benefit elsewhere or it is simply lost or destroyed. In other cases, such as R v Harvey (Jack) [2015] UKSC 73 [2017] AC 105 the proviso has been applied to VAT where the benefit is valued gross of VAT but the VAT or its equivalent has been paid to HMRC. Similar policy considerations apply to such cases.
Conclusions on the CVM issue
47. In the light of these principles, we consider that there is nothing disproportionate in applying the CVM uplift to assets subject to a restraint order merely because they have not increased in value by as much as the CVM, or at all, when restrained. That is for a number of reasons, some of which overlap.
48. First, it is simply a result of the value based scheme in which the benefit is to be valued in money’s worth at the time it is obtained, but the order for its confiscation cannot, for reasons of practicality, be made until later; and that the order when made should reflect the real value of the benefit when it was obtained.
49. Secondly, such a result can properly be regarded as the result of the choice or choices made by a defendant, in a number of different ways. It will usually be the case that there is a period of time between the obtaining of the criminal property and the imposition of a restraint order, which will only arise after an investigation. In that period the defendant will have had the criminal benefit and the opportunity to enjoy it and do what he wants with it. That is his choice, and there is no reason not to apply the CVM uplift to that period in the same way as one would if he had spent it or invested it or used it differently. That applies equally to the period after the imposition of the restraint order. The form the property takes at the time of the restraint order will be the result of the choice of the defendant to put or keep it in that form. If the property frozen is in a form which involves no subsequent increase in value by reference to capital or revenue, or does so only to an extent less than inflation, that too is a result of the choice by the defendant. That is the form in which the defendant has chosen to put the criminal benefit with a view to concealing it and/or using it for their enjoyment and benefit. If, for example, that is in a non interest bearing current account at the time it is frozen, that is all part of the defendant’s choice as to how best to conceal and/or enjoy the proceeds of crime. The defendant may be deprived of any continuing choice thereafter by the operation of the restraint order, but given the proper objective of a restraint order to preserve available assets where there is a risk of dissipation there is nothing unjust or disproportionate about that. Indeed, the imposition of the restraint order itself, and its effect, can properly be regarded as the result of the defendant’s choice to engage in criminal activity, receive a criminal benefit and behave in a way which gives rise to a risk of dissipation of assets which in the absence of an order would defeat the statutory purpose of depriving him of the value of the criminal benefit when obtained.
50. Yet further, the effect of the restraint order on the assets restrained can itself be regarded as a choice by the defendant because he could and should disclose the existence of his proceeds of crime and agree to their return at the earliest opportunity. The defendant can prevent a restraint order from having the effect of causing the criminal property to grow at less than the rate of inflation by coming clean, identifying his criminal benefit and agreeing to return it, such that no restraint order is necessary or justified. It promotes the legitimate objective of the legislation that he should be encouraged to do so at the earliest opportunity, and deterred from seeking to frustrate the legislative purpose by seeking to conceal his assets, and obstruct and delay the confiscation process, as so often occurs.
51. Thirdly, the restraint order is itself the result of the criminal activity in question, in the same way as is seizure or confiscation of drugs or firearms. R v Smith, as approved in Waya, confirms that there is nothing disproportionate in the confiscation order being the value of the benefit before seizure or destruction.
52. Fourthly, where the restrained assets are not in the form of money in bank accounts (or strictly speaking choses in action) whether the value of such property keeps pace with inflation, measured by application of the Consumer Price Index (‘CPI’) as the change in value of money, is simply an aspect of the vicissitudes of life in which CPI will be greater or less than the movement in value of assets, such as for example a shop in Preston, which differ from the basket of goods and services on which CPI is measured.
53. Fifthly, the application of the CVM uplift to property the subject matter of a restraint order is not analogous to the limited and narrow exceptions which the authorities have recognised as within the s. 6(5) proportionality proviso. It does not involve double recovery or restoration to the victim, or anything analogous to it. In Waya at [29] and [32] the circumstances in which it would be disproportionate to make the confiscation order were described as involving an additional “fine”. That is not an apt description of the application of the CVM uplift merely because assets are restrained.
54. Mr Talbot KC, in his submissions on behalf of Mr Ibori, relied on three aspects of the recent amendments to POCA 2002 by the Crime and Policing Act 2026, two of which came into force on 29 June 2026, and the third of which has not been brought into force. He referred to these as assisting in identifying the “direction of travel” in relation to proportionality.
55. The first of these is the addition of a new subsection 7(8) which provides
“(8) But in a case where-
(a) The person-
(i) intended to have only a limited power to control or dispose of all or part of the property,
(ii) held the property temporarily, or
(iii) is treated as obtaining the property as a result of section 84(3) [a new subsection dealing with obtaining property by keeping it], and
(b) the court believes that the amount found under subsection (7) in relation to the property would produce a result which would be unjust,
the court may reduce that amount to such an amount (including zero) as the court believes is just.”
56. This amendment does not apply to Mr Ibori’s appeal or Mr Patel’s application, which fall to be addressed in accordance with the law at the time of the confiscation orders; and in Mr Ibori’s case there was no equivalent amendment to the CJA regime. But even if it did, it would not affect our analysis of the applicable principles or our conclusion. We have some doubts whether it could apply to the effect of a restraint order: that would not bring it within (ii) or (iii) and we doubt whether the intention referred to in (i) is anything other than the intention of transferor/transferee at the time the benefit is obtained. But even assuming that it would now apply to the effect of a restraint order, it does not treat the fact that property is held only temporarily or that the defendant’s power of control or disposal is limited as ipso facto making it unjust to include it in the benefit, and there are many instances where it would obviously not be unjust to do so. What it does is to introduce a discretion in such cases. This has no bearing on proportionality which is addressed at s. 6(5) and which, if it applies, mandates a reduction in the confiscation order. Moreover, there is nothing unjust in the application of the CVM uplift in this case for all the reasons we have given.
57. The second amendment relied upon is to section 80 of POCA 2002. By the amendments, s. 80(2) is qualified by the introductory words “Except where subsection (3A) or (3B) applies”. Those new subsections provide:
“(3A) Where the person no longer holds the property obtained because it has been sold, the value of the property at the material time is the greater of the following—
(a) the proceeds of the sale, adjusted to take account of later changes in the value of money;
(b) the value (immediately before the sale) of the property, adjusted to take account of later changes in the value of money.
(3B) Where the person no longer holds the property obtained because it has been destroyed by virtue of a court order under section 51(2)(e) or section 67AA (orders for destruction of crypto assets), the value of the property at the material time is the market value of the property as set out in the court order, adjusted to take account of later changes in the value of money.”
58. This provision has no application to the issue which we have to decide, not only because we are concerned with the law in force when the confiscation orders were made, but also in Mr Ibori’s case because there is no amendment to the CJA and in his case we are concerned with money paid into bank accounts which is not property which is sold under (3A) or destroyed under (3B). But in any event these new provisions do not undermine the principles we have identified in relation to applying the CVM to restrained assets or affect our conclusion. Subsection (3B) confirms the position established in the authorities that destruction of criminal property by a court order does not mean that it ceases to be treated as a criminal benefit. It is inconsistent with the case advanced by Mr Talbot and Mr Evans because it expressly recognises that a CVM uplift should be applied despite the fact that the defendant will not have had any ability to use the benefit or its proceeds over the period to which CVM is applied. Subsection (3A) does recognise that some modification is to be made to how property received in non-monetary form is to be valued when it has been sold. But it too recognises that CVM uplift is to be applied to that value. It provides no support for an argument that CVM should not be applied to a period during which the property is the subject matter of a restraint order.
59. The provision relied on which is introduced into POCA 2002 by the 2026 Act but not brought into force is that enacted in s. 6(3)(d). This is not applicable to the confiscation orders made in this case and is not even something which has any weight as indicating a “direction of travel” given that the government has currently determined not to bring it into force. But again, if it were in force and applicable to Mr Ibori’s or Mr Patel’s case it would not assist their argument on the CVM issue. It adds to s 7(4) of POCA 2002 four circumstances in which property is prohibited from being treated as part of criminal benefit. These are where it is restored to the victim or another entitled to it; handed over to an appropriate officer; seized under a statutory power and not yet released; or paid in compensation to the victim of the crime. These are intended to ensure that where criminal property has been given up to the state or to victims, it should not be paid twice, as is stated in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill at para 1137-8. This reflects the rationale for the s. 6(5) proviso and its application explained in the authorities to which we have referred. It would moderate the principles established in the case law only to the limited extent of preventing goods seized under statutory authority, and retained, being for that period treated as a criminal benefit (although if destroyed by a subsequent court order they are then treated as criminal benefit under s. 80(3B)). However, this has no bearing on the CVM issue and does nothing to undermine the principles which we have identified as applicable to it in the context of restrained assets, or to our conclusions.
The Ibori appeal
The relevant bank accounts
60. Item 19 comprised 14 bank accounts in Nigeria holding proceeds of the frauds. Only 4 of these are identified by the appellant as affected by the point in issue. It is common ground that the CVM uplift in relation to these is £10,265.17. It was said that each of these were non-interest bearing accounts. It was, however, wholly unclear from the evidence (i) whether and when these had been effectively frozen by a local restraint order, which would have been necessary to prevent Mr Ibori from in fact using the accounts and (ii) the period to which the CVM uplift had applied. As to the first, given that the bank accounts were only identified as specific assets by a variation to the restraint order in 2014, it seems more probable than not that there was no effective restraint prior to that time, and that Mr Ibori had the use of the accounts for many years after the fraud. In any event, he will have chosen to keep this part of his proceeds of crime in this form for what he perceived to be good reasons linked to enabling him to enjoy the fruits of his crime.
61. Item 30 was treated in Mr Talbot’s submissions as including seven bank accounts which were amongst those of nine investment companies. The Crown contended that the money in the nine accounts represented, in part, the proceeds of the V Mobile fraud which formed the subject matter of the second indictment. These were accounts variously in Liechtenstein, Hong Kong, Austria and Nigeria under different company names. The total in the seven accounts identified was £12,499,234.80. However, it is apparent on the evidence that these were not part of the criminal benefit valued by the Crown or the Court, nor part of the amount which made up the total sum in which the confiscation order was made against Mr Ibori. Nor were the sums referred to the subject of any CVM uplift which was applied.
62. The relevant criminal benefit in item 30 was identified as sums paid into three bank accounts at Access Bank in Nigeria in the name of ADF in 2006. The total of these was converted to £ sterling at the date of receipt and CVM uplift applied to them from that date. The seven accounts identified by Mr Talbot were some of those into which the Crown had managed to trace payments made some significant time later as a result of complex and circuitous money laundering. They formed no part of the criminal benefit upon which the order was made or to which CVM was applied in reaching the total amount of the confiscation order. Since the statutory scheme is to value criminal benefit when obtained, which is what the confiscation order quite properly did for item 30 by identifying the value of the benefit when first received and applying CVM to that, Mr Ibori’s reliance on different accounts at a subsequent stage of the money laundering is misconceived. The CVM proportionality point would not have applied to these sums even had it been a good one.
Disposal of Mr Ibori’s appeal
63. We agree, as was common ground, that the CJA regime, like the POCA 2002 regime, is subject to the proportionality principles identified in Waya and now reflected in the s. 6(5) proviso, which is coterminous in its application and effect: see Andrewes at [38].
64. Mr Talbot advanced four points in support of his argument on the appeal, namely that (1) the CVM uplift involved requiring Mr Ibori to pay an artificially inflated sum which does not go with the grain of the legislation; (2) this case is analogous to the restoration cases found in the authorities; (3) if Mr Ibori has to pay the figure uplifted for CVM he will have to do so from other assets; and (4) since the bank accounts were restrained he did not have the use of them. Ultimately, his submission was that it was Mr Ibori’s lack of choice or control over the accounts, of which the restraint order deprived him, and inability to use the money to increase its value, which made it disproportionate to apply to them a CVM uplift which he was prevented from obtaining. It involved penalising Mr Ibori for something he did not obtain and which the restraint order prevented him from obtaining. It accordingly operated as a double recovery or an additional fine rather than removal of a benefit he received.
65. For the reasons we have set out above, there is nothing about the effect of the restraint order operating in this way which renders the application of the CVM uplift disproportionate. In summary:
(1) it is inherent in the value based scheme, which values the benefit at the date it is obtained and uplifts for CVM as a necessary part of a scheme under which confiscation orders are only made later and should reflect the real present day value at the date of the making of the order of its monetary value when obtained; and
(2) it was the result of Mr Ibori’s choices in all the ways identified above, including the fact that the very lengthy delay in this case was entirely Mr Ibori’s fault in his persistent resistance to the making of the order; the effect of the restraint order on the Nigerian bank accounts could have been entirely avoided had he accepted they were criminal proceeds and agreed to transfer them to the Crown at the outset; and
(3) the restraint order was itself simply the consequence of his criminal conduct and the risk of his seeking to defeat the confiscation process; and
(4) the application of CVM does not involve a fine or anything analogous to double recovery in the sense used in the narrow class of cases to which the proportionality proviso has been held to apply; and
(5) the fact that Mr Ibori will have to meet the sum uplifted by CVM from other assets is irrelevant: the confiscation order was made on the basis that he did not seek to discharge the burden of showing he did not have such available assets, and it is inherent in the value based scheme of the legislation that he should pay for the criminal benefit obtained, out of available assets whether themselves criminal or legitimate, whether or not he retained the benefit at all, let alone its full CVM uplifted value.
66. For these reasons Mr Ibori’s appeal is dismissed.
The Arif Patel Application
Initial Ruling on Confiscation/benefit on 03 December 2024
67. On 3 December 2024, the Judge ruled that Mr Patel had benefited from the general criminal conduct (limited to the indictment period March 2003-May 2008) in the sum of £52,793,179.09, before any adjustment was made to reflect the change in value of money.
68. The judge explained the various reasons for the lengthy delay in the proceedings. He had already ruled that Mr Patel had voluntarily left the jurisdiction in summer of 2011 after his bail had been extended to allow him to do so. He had then voluntarily remained outside the UK and engineered circumstances to make it appear that he was being prevented from returning from the UAE for his trial. The prosecution had quite properly, but ultimately unsuccessfully, sought to extradite him from Dubai. After Mr Patel’s trial and conviction he fought the confiscation proceedings vigorously.
69. Before the judge it was not in issue that Mr Patel had derived benefit from the criminal conduct of £193,950.60 (Count 1) and £33,400,000 (Counts 2 and 3). There was an issue in relation to Count 4 concerning the conspiracy to sell or offer for sale goods with false trademarks between 1 January 2004 and 3 May 2007, and the Judge ruled that the Applicant had benefitted in relation to that in the sum of £19,195,228.49. The total benefit obtained was £52,793,179.09 before any adjustment to reflect the change in value of money.
Final ruling on Confiscation/benefit 28 August 2025
70. The judge stated that he had considered the oral submissions on behalf of Mr Patel and a number of documents. Mr Patel did not give evidence.
71. The judge applied the CVM uplift to the benefit figure of £52,793,179.09 with the result that it became £90,503,211.96. In addition to the criminal benefit identified, the Crown contended that there were further identifiable assets available to meet a confiscation order. These further identified assets (misleadingly termed “the hidden assets”) were in the form of additional Dubai properties and additional Turkish commercial interests totalling £14,823,812.40. To a substantial extent, there was a dispute as to whether these were to be treated as Mr Patel’s assets. The judge did not consider it necessary to resolve these disputes. He concluded, based on his lengthy prior involvement in, and significant knowledge of, the case, and his familiarity with all the evidence in the documents provided by the parties, that Mr Patel had received a very significant amount of money apart from that identified by the management receiver and within the latter’s control. He concluded that Mr Patel would not have departed to Dubai in 2011, three years after the frauds were discovered and a year after the restraint order, had he not been confident he would have sufficient assets there to enable him and his family to continue to enjoy their lavish lifestyle. The judge determined that Mr Patel must have had many millions of pounds apart from what was caught by the MRO, and in the 14 years since he had moved he would have been able to generate well in excess of £30-£40 million from that money. Accordingly, he had available assets which were at the very least equal to the criminal benefit of £90,503,211.96. The judge stated that it was proportionate to make Mr Patel pay the full amount and rejected Mr Evans’ submissions to the contrary.
Disposal of Arif Patel’s application on ground 1: CVM issue
72. On behalf of Mr Patel, Mr Evans adopted the arguments of Mr Talbot and advanced additional arguments which we would summarise as follows. First he suggested that the judge fell into error in addressing proportionality as applicable to the benefit figure whereas it is properly to be applied to the confiscation order amount at the final stage under s. 6(5). We agree that the proportionality question applies to the recoverable amount ordered under section 6, but the judge made no error and the point is one of form not substance. The judge said in terms that reducing the indexation of the benefit would be wrong in law and that ordering payment of the full amount including the CVM uplift was proportionate. In a case like this in which the available assets are sufficient to meet the benefit figure (subject to Mr Patel’s second ground to which we will come) it is the benefit figure which determines the recoverable amount; and it is the CVM uplift to that benefit figure which is relied on as making the confiscation order disproportionate in this case. To seek to distinguish between the proportionality of the benefit figure and the proportionality of the recoverable amount is to draw a distinction without a difference.
73. Mr Evans further argued that there were a number of “atypical” aspects of the restraint order and MRO which rendered the CVM uplift disproportionate. The three which he emphasised were (i) that Mr Patel had not enjoyed the benefits of the property portfolio since 2010; (ii) the rental income had increased in line with inflation and so including the rental income and an uplift for CVM involves double counting or double recovery; and (iii) the profits had been absorbed by the management receivership. Neither individually nor cumulatively do these support a conclusion that the CVM uplift is disproportionate in Mr Patel’s case. As to the first, Mr Patel’s lack of control over the assets subject to the restraint order is irrelevant for all the reasons which we have explained above, and which apply equally to Mr Patel as they do to Mr Ibori. The suggestion that applying the CVM uplift to the rents involves double counting is misplaced. The CVM uplift has been applied to the rents from the time of their receipt. The fact that prior to that time they had risen in line with rents generally in the area (not CPI) does not involve any element of double counting or double recovery. Nor is there any merit in the third aspect, namely how the value of the assets has fared in the hands of the management receiver. Absent any justified criticism of the conduct of the receivership by the management receiver as acting in excess of his powers or in breach of his obligations, which Mr Evans disavowed, the fact that the receivership estate is worth less than the CVM uplift is the result of a combination of what has happened in the market to the price of properties in which Mr Patel chose to invest his proceeds of crime; and costs and fees properly incurred in the receivership. All could have been avoided, and indeed any CVM uplift avoided, had Mr Patel accepted at the outset his criminality, disclosed his criminal benefits and agreed to forfeit them. Had he done so, no restraint order or management receivership order would have been required. Instead, the fact that both orders have remained in place for some 15 years is the natural consequence of his criminality and of his choice to seek to conceal his assets and resist their confiscation. The CVM uplift is only as great as it is because the delay in Mr Patel’s trial, and in the making of the confiscation order, is his own fault.
74. On this ground we grant leave, but for the reasons we have given we dismiss the appeal on such ground.
Mr Patel Application Ground 2: available assets
75. Like the single judge before us, we do not consider Ground 2 to be arguable, for the reasons given by the single judge, which we gratefully adopt, and which were as follows:-
4. It is then said that the judge’s conclusion that the applicant had sufficient available assets to meet such an order was irrational and contrary to the evidence. I do not consider that arguable either.
5. There were, as found, identified assets in the UK and Turkey of just over £74 million. But the judge was clearly entitled to conclude that a fraudster such as AP would operate behind a screen of hidden assets. The judge gave sufficient reasons for holding that “many, many millions” would have ended up under his control in the UAE; and, further, that since absconding and departing for the UAE in 2011 he would have been able to generate well in excess of £30 million in the interim period. I conclude that the judge was, on the evidence, entitled to infer that the available amount was such as to meet the benefit figure.
6. I do not consider that this conclusion is undermined by the fact that the receiver had not himself identified assets in excess of the £74 million. Clearly the applicant was not going to cooperate with the receiver (indeed, I gather that the applicant procured the receiver’s arrest when he went to the UAE). In any event, the burden was not on the receiver to prove available assets exceeded the benefit, it was for the applicant to prove they did not; s.7 (2). The applicant failed to do so.
7. It is also complained that the judge evinced “strong antipathy” towards the applicant. Given the circumstances, and given what the trials had revealed, I would not be particularly surprised if he did. That does not mean that the judge’s approach to calculation of the available amount was vitiated.
76. We would only add the following. The judge had a very detailed knowledge of the case, and of Mr Patel and the conduct of his affairs prior to 2008, which involved widespread money laundering of huge sums into companies and properties in many jurisdictions. As such he was very well placed to assess that Mr Patel had sufficient funds to meet the whole of the benefit figure, the relevant burden of proof being on him to establish on the balance of probabilities that he didn’t. The total of identified assets held by the Applicant is £74,949,980.40 (albeit it was disputed as to whether up to about £14 million of the assets were in truth those of Mr Patel). The determination of whether such assets were those of Mr Patel was a matter for the judge on the evidence before him.
77. There is a strong inference to the effect that Mr Patel holds further, unidentified assets. The management receiver has no confidence that the full extent of the Applicant’s resources has been identified, and Mr Patel appears to have been able to live in very comfortable circumstances in the UAE for 15 years without identified means of support or access to the funds frozen and identified by the management Receiver. In this regard, the Judge was entitled to conclude that by the time he absconded to the UAE in 2011 he would have had many millions of truly hidden assets which together with any subsequently earned income and assets would have grown in the intervening years to be equivalent to at least the difference between the receipt value and CVM uplifted value, whether or not they included the approximately £14 million of mischaracterised “hidden assets” in the UAE relied on by the prosecution. Mr Evans’ arguments also ignore the fact that (a) available assets include legitimate assets, and (b) Mr Patel must have substantial assets other than those identified by the management receiver to maintain his and his family’s comfortable lifestyle in UAE for the last 14 years.
Mr Patel’s application: disposal
78. We accordingly refuse leave to appeal on renewed Ground 2, and as the appeal on Ground 1 has been dismissed, Mr Patel’s application fails.
Sabina Patel’s appeal
79. Sabina Patel was not prosecuted as a co-accused. When interviewed by the police, she provided a prepared statement (signed on 3 April 2008) in which she stated as follows:
“I Sabina Patel of 100 Sharoe Green Lane, Fulwood, Preston PR2 8HL make this statement to the investigatory offices from Lancashire Constabulary and HM Revenue and Customs and thereafter reserve my right to remain silent. I deny the allegations of conspiracy to sell or distribute goods which bear a sign likely to be mistaken for a registered trademark and cheat the revenue. I have not entered into any agreements with anyone in relation to the above and have no knowledge of any dealings by any company. I believe I have signed a company secretary forms (sic) many years ago. I am a housewife with children and I have not been involved with any dealings as far as I am concerned. I do not want to say anything further at this moment in time.”
80. It will be seen that in such statement, and by her own evidence, given as early as 2008, at the end of the indictment period, and by reference to events “many years ago”, Sabina Patel distanced herself from any involvement in the business of Faisaltex Ltd, still less that she had discharged the duties of a director thereof, or even been an employee thereof.
81. At the outset of Mr James Hines KC’s oral submissions on behalf of Sabina Patel, he properly, and realistically, conceded that it was not intended by Mr Patel or Sabina Patel that she would perform any of the functions of a director of Faisaltex Ltd, and that Sabina Patel was not an employee of Faisaltex Ltd. This is well borne out in the evidence. It is also to be borne in mind that Mr Patel and his wife Sabina Patel were the only two directors of Faisaltex Ltd.
82. When the POCA proceedings against Mr Patel commenced, Sabina Patel, as an Interested Party, made an application under section 10A of POCA. It was submitted on her behalf that she had a significant beneficial interest in various properties which the prosecution had asserted should be available to satisfy the Confiscation Order to be made against Mr Patel, namely:
(1) a beneficial interest in the former matrimonial home 3 Sharoe Green Park, Fulwood, Preston;
(2) a 50% beneficial interest in the company assets owned and held by Faisaltex Ltd and Faisal Investments Ltd, used by Mr Patel for fraud between June 2004 and December 2007 (she was a 50% shareholder in the companies); the application was limited to properties bought and completely paid for by the companies prior to the indictment period;
(3) a 25% beneficial interest in company premises at 107 – 109 Fletcher Road. This was registered in the names of Sabina Patel, Faisal Patel and Bibi Patel (Arif’s mother) in 1995/6; and Faisal’s wife’s name had been added to the registered title in 2000;
(4) 5 & 6 Cheapside, Preston (‘5 & 6 Cheapside’), the sole asset of the Faisaltex Ltd Directors Pension Scheme (the ‘Scheme’), purchased in June 2001 and with the final instalment of the monthly repayment of the mortgage made in June 2003.
83. In her statement dated 11 November 2024, Sabina Patel also made claim to shareholdings in the companies which she asserted had been incorporated and properties purchased (with rental income obtained) prior to the indictment period.
84. The Judge heard evidence and submissions concerning this application on 31 March and 1 April 2025. Sabina Patel, accompanied by one of her sons, attended on both days of the hearing. She did not give oral evidence (which was her choice). The application was opposed.
Section 10A determination on 19 May 2025
85. In making his determination, the Judge said that he had considered the submissions made on behalf of the Prosecution and Sabina Patel over the two days, and had sight of the relevant documentation provided in the POCA proceedings, namely:
(1) the Prosecutor’s Statement of information under section 16 (6A) of POCA dated 7 February 2025 with 18 Appendices;
(2) the signed statement of Sabina Patel dated 11 November 2024 asserting her beneficial rights in various properties;
(3) the written submissions on behalf of the Prosecution (dated 25 March 2025);
(4) an undated Schedule of issues between the parties;
(5) Sabina Patel’s prepared statement signed 3 April 2008 (set out above);
(6) a response to the section 16 (6A) statement by Third Party’s Counsel dated 10 March 2025 and a bullet point note by Third Party’s Counsel dated 28 March 2025.
86. It was not in issue that, on paper, Sabina Patel appeared to have some interest in each of the assets concerned. However, the intention of Mr Patel and Sabina Patel at the time Sabina Patel had acquired and retained those purported interests was identified as a crucially important consideration for the Court.
87. In his Ruling on 19 May 2025 the Judge stated as follows in relation to Sabina Patel’s failure to give evidence:
“Sabina Patel chose not to take the opportunity to give evidence to assist in this regard. Even though the burden of proving that she was not entitled to the beneficial interests, which she was claiming, rested on the prosecution, I believe that I am entitled to take into account her obvious reluctance to give evidence. I am sure that she did not want to give evidence because she could not have faced up to cross-examination about the hard detail which was missing from her written statement in these proceedings. I am quite sure that she would not have been able to give any evidence as to how she apparently came into ownership of these beneficial interests.”
88. The Judge again referred to his extensive experience in the case and his assessment of Mr Patel’s character, before concluding:
“Consequently, I am quite sure that Arif Patel will stop at nothing, in terms of fraud and perverting the course of justice, to achieve his dishonest ends. If the claim by Sabina Patel had succeeded there was the potential for him receiving up to £12 million because I’m quite sure that if, subsequently, Sabina Patel had physically received the monies which she was claiming, they would have made their way back to Arif Patel.”
89. The Judge ruled that the application must fail except in relation to the property which comprised the matrimonial home. The Judge declared that Sabina Patel was entitled to and should receive the relevant 50% beneficial interest in the outstanding equity of any sale of 3 Sharoe Green Park, Fulwood, Preston. The Judge also stated that he was satisfied that the corporate veil in this case in relation to the Faisaltex companies, including Faisaltex Ltd had been completely torn away.
90. Sabina Patel’s appeal relates only to the judge’s determination regarding her interest in the properties at (c) and (d) above, namely 107 – 109 Fletcher Road and 5 & 6 Cheapside.
Sabina Patel’s Grounds of Appeal
91. The Grounds of Appeal following the leave granted by the single judge are as follows:
(1) Ground 1: in relation to 107-109 Fletcher Road
The judge wrongly determined that Sabina Patel was not the 25% beneficial owner of 107-109 Fletcher Road, Preston and that it was 100% owned by Mr Patel. The property is jointly owned by Sabina Patel and other members of the family. Sabina Patel has declared on her tax return some rental income from the property since before the indictment period.
(2) Ground 2: in relation to 5 & 6 Cheapside
The judge wrongly determined that Mr Patel was the beneficial owner of 5 & 6 Cheapside , and that Sabina Patel was not a true and lawful beneficiary of the Scheme and therefore not entitled to 50% of the equity in the property. There was no evidence that the relevant transactions were intended to be a sham.
(3) Ground 3: adverse inference
The judge wrongly drew an adverse inference in relation to Sabina Patel not giving oral evidence. Alternatively, the judge placed too much weight on the absence of oral evidence having regard to the issues in the application.
92. The prosecution have lodged a Respondent’s Notice and Grounds of Opposition in relation to Sabina Patel’s Grounds of Appeal. They submit as follows in relation to Grounds 1 and 2.
(1) The judge made no legal errors. He was acting well within the evidential framework in making his factual findings which are unimpeachable.
(2) Mr Patel’s modus operandi was to use the names of other persons or corporate entities to achieve his objectives. The judge found that Mr Patel had used Sabina Patel (his then wife) to remove assets from the scope of the Confiscation order which was subsequently made against him. It was common ground that Sabina Patel did nothing at all to comply with any duties as a director of Faisaltex Ltd. She had made it plain that she had no knowledge of, nor any participation in, any business dealings by any company.
(3) The Prosecution case was that the Land Registry registration of ownership of 107-109 Fletcher Road was a sham.
(4) Sabina Patel does not appeal against the findings in relation to her shareholding. She has accepted the decision in respect of company assets owned and held by Faisaltex Ltd and Faisal Investments Ltd.
(5) The modest amount of rental income declared by Sabina Patel does little to rebut the strong inference that she was not intended to be an owner but merely a recipient of whatever money Mr Patel chose to allow her. The Scheme was another vehicle used by Mr Patel to acquire and retain assets.
(6) The Court is entitled to consider the effect on the company finances of the mixing or polluting of assets from legitimate and illegitimate sources.
93. In relation to Ground 3, the prosecution point out that at no point in his judgment did the judge assert that he was drawing an adverse inference against Sabina Patel. Rather he stated that she “chose not to take the opportunity to give evidence to assist in this regard”. It was a case of a party choosing not to give evidence to displace the view that the judge formed based upon the evidence that he had already heard.
94. Before turning to Grounds 1 and 2, and the particular properties, 107-109 Fletcher Road and 5 & 6 Cheapside, there are certain overarching points of application to all the grounds that are advanced which need to be borne well in mind.
(1) It is not suggested that the judge erred in law in applying the relevant principles when finding that Sabina Patel had no interest in the assets. Accordingly, the attack must be, and is, an attack on the factual findings made by the judge and the inferences he drew therefrom.
(2) That is not an auspicious start as a basis of challenge in circumstances where, as already noted, the judge had a very detailed knowledge of the case, and of Mr Patel, and was very well placed to make the findings of fact that he did. The facts of which he was sure, included the following:
(a) Sabina Patel and indeed the wives of Munaf and Faisal Patel, together with Mr Patel’s mother Bibi, would never have been allowed to actually own or control any part of the Faisal group or its properties;
(b) as such none of them could have believed or intended that they had an ownership interest in the properties (most obviously in relation to 107-109 Fletcher Road);
(c) a number of the companies were set up with nominal directorships given by Mr Patel or, separately, his brother Munaf and separately, his brother Faisal, with their respective wives as co-shareholders. Other than for fraudulent reasons there was no logical or legitimate reason to set up a series of different companies;
(d) Mr Patel, as well as being a cunning and dishonest man, was a conceited and self-important individual who did not have a clear grasp of company law, but who wanted to appear important in his own community and wanted to be seen as head of a large group of companies – purely for his own self-gratification and self-importance.
(3) The written evidence from Sabina Patel was limited, and at a high level of generality. It did not descend to provide any explanation, still less any justification, as to why Sabina Patel had an interest in either of the properties, in circumstances where, had there been an explanation, she ought to have been in a position to provide such explanation. That she did not do so is striking, and was rightly treated as significant by the judge when assessing such evidence.
(4) Sabina Patel chose not to give oral evidence on oath (and face cross-examination) when given every opportunity to do so at a time when the judge had fairly indicated how he saw matters based on the other evidence available. Not only did this mean that Sabina Patel had not adduced any evidence to displace the view that the judge had formed based upon the evidence that he had already heard, but the judge was entitled to conclude in such circumstances, as he did, that Sabina Patel did not want to give evidence because she could not have faced up to cross-examination about the hard details which were missing from her written statement, and that she would not have been able to give any evidence as to how she apparently came into beneficial ownership of these assets.
(5) The judge found that Mr Patel had used Sabina Patel to remove assets from the scope of the Confiscation order which was subsequently made against him. It was common ground that she did nothing at all to comply with her duties as a director of Faisaltex Ltd. She made it plain that she had no knowledge of nor any participation in any business dealings by any company.
95. The central submission made by the prosecution (which found favour with the judge) was that the transactions resulting in Sabina Patel having a documented interest in both 107-109 Fletcher Road and 5-6 Cheapside were “sham” transactions in what is known as the Snook sense, after the case of Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, in which Diplock LJ considered the concept of a “sham” in the context of a civil case concerning an operation for refinancing HP agreements. In that case Diplock LJ stated at page 802:-
" … it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved
in the use of this popular and pejorative word. I apprehend that, if it has any
meaning in law, it means acts done or documents executed by the parties
to the 'sham' which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the
court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any)
which the parties intended to create. "
Ground 1: 107 – 109 Fletcher Road
96. We consider that the judge was entitled to treat the evidence as proving, on the balance of probabilities, that Sabina Patel was not intended by either herself or Mr Patel (or indeed any other members of the family registered as owners, who we observe have made no claim to ownership) to have the rights of a beneficial owner and the registration document(s) were therefore a sham in the Snook sense. Such a conclusion is supported by any number of matters.
(1) Mr Patel was in charge of the business, and it could properly be inferred that the registration was made in the family names at his direction.
(2) These were working factory and warehouse premises from which the sock/textile business was being carried out. It would therefore be highly inconvenient for the ownership to be that of family members who were not involved in, and knew nothing of, the business and were not intended to be involved in any way (as Sabina Patel confirms she was not). If genuinely owners they would have to be involved in, and give informed approval to, decisions affecting the value of the property including, for example, alterations, repairs and secured financing. This is no doubt what the judge meant by saying there was no logic to it.
(3) The judge’s assessment of Mr Patel as someone who would not have allowed family members to have any real power as a result of ownership rights supports this, and is in turn supported by the fact that:
(a) Sabina Patel’s name was used as a sham as a director of Faisaltex Ltd from 1990; and as a shareholder of Faisaltex Ltd, as found in findings which have not been the subject of any appeal;
(b) the substantial repairs to the premises on four occasions costing over £75,000 were arranged and paid for by Faisaltex Ltd without any reference to the family members as owners;
(c) the family members’ supposed interest in the property was not insured: the property was not insured in their names but under Faisaltex names; this included a fictitious company name Faisaltex Properties Ltd;
(d) the fact that Sabina Patel had been allowed to retain a modest amount of rental income (not, as we understand it, a regular income of a full one third and then one quarter of the rental income) does not begin to rebut the strong inference that she was not intended to be an owner but rather is an illustration of Mr Patel allowing her some money which was explained to HMRC as so derived;
(e) the facts and matters surrounding the pension scheme arrangement in relation to 5 & 6 Cheapside (as addressed below) further support the inference that her supposed interest was not a genuine one.
(4) The fact that the registration pre-dated the indictment period does not mean that Mr Patel’s modus operandi in terms of family control was any different. It was common practice for Mr Patel to use the names of family members on documents in relation to matters in which those family members had no interest. For example, Mr Patel had used Sabina Patel’s name as a sham director of Faisaltex Ltd since 1990. There was also evidence of the use of Sabina Patel in relation to matters of dubious probity, for example the pension scheme in relation to 5 & 6 Cheapside (as addressed below).
(5) The single judge posited the question as to what Mr Patel’s motive was in using family members on the register in 1995/2000. The answer to this is most probably to enable him to distance himself from this as an asset of his or Faisaltex Ltd’s in the event of anyone seeking to enforce a debt or claim against him/it as their asset (which was entirely consistent with his modus operandi generally). Whilst the single judge floated this as a possible legitimate motive in the event of insolvency, unless it was genuinely Mr Patel’s intention that it should be the family’s asset and not his/Faisaltex Ltd’s (contrary to the other evidence we have identified), this is not a motive which prevents it being a sham. Putting assets in one’s wife’s name which are not in reality intended to be hers to enjoy but intended to remain subject to the husband’s control, and for his beneficial use and enjoyment, for the purpose of defeating creditors, is a sham.
(6) Tellingly, and as Mr Waddington KC pointed out in his oral submissions, the other three family members, who were listed on the registered title of 107 – 109 Fletcher Road, were served with section 18A POCA notices, and none of them responded to claim any interest in 107 – 109 Fletcher Road, which is indicative of them seeking to distance themselves from any such suggestion, and is inconsistent with Sabina Patel’s stance.
(7) The finding in relation to Sabina Patel’s interest in the matrimonial home does not assist her because that was recognised as something arising under family law matrimonial rights rather than common law property interests.
(8) All the above matters made it more likely than not that Sabina Patel’s registered interest as co-owner was a sham. There might, if one were viewing matters in the abstract, be potential genuine possibilities of family bounty or equalising of family wealth or estate planning etc, which the single judge mentioned as possibilities, but matters were not being viewed in the abstract, but on the particular facts of the present case as known to the judge and identified above, in the light of which such possibilities were unlikely.
(9) Sabina Patel’s failure to give evidence, or any explanation for her being given a genuine interest, in circumstances where the facts positively begged for the giving of such evidence, meant that she had not rebutted the inference properly made on the balance of probabilities, which is in accordance with the principles set out in R v Forte [2020] EWCA Crim 1455[2021] 4 WLR 26at [16]-[17].
Ground 2: 5 & 6 Cheapside
97. We are in no doubt whatsoever that the judge was right to determine that Mr Patel was the beneficial owner of 5 & 6 Cheapside, and that Sabina Patel was not a true and lawful beneficiary of the Scheme and was not entitled to 50% of the equity in the property.
98. The first point to note (which of itself is fatal to Sabina Patel’s claimed beneficial interest) is that, as we have already noted, and as Mr Hines rightly conceded, it was not intended by Mr Patel or Sabina Patel that Sabina Patel would perform any of the functions of a director of Faisaltex Ltd, and Sabina Patel was not an employee of Faisaltex Ltd. In such circumstances Sabina Patel cannot have been the genuine beneficiary of any “Directors Pension Scheme” – in no true sense was she a director or an employee entitled to any benefits under any such scheme.
99. Secondly, the document on which Sabina Patel places so much reliance, and which was exhibited to her statement, namely the Land Registry Register of Title, does not assist her. A Land Registry register of title entry simply records the legal interest; it says nothing about beneficial interests and does not evidence any such beneficial interest. The natural reading of the entry is in any event that Sabina Patel is registered in her capacity as a trustee, and not on the basis that she has any beneficial interest, the entry in the Proprietorship Register in relation to the Title Absolute, providing, “SABINA AFIF PATEL … the trustees of the Faisaltex Limited Director’s Pension Scheme”. It is also an (unexplained) oddity that Eagle Place Trustees Limited (‘Eagle’), who are averred on Sabina Patel’s behalf to be the original professional trustees of the Scheme, do not appear on the Title Register.
100. Thirdly, the Scheme itself does not bear examination, and even on the basis of the material available does not itself support Sabina Patel’s case that she is a beneficiary thereunder, or is entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside.
(1) Mr Hines relied on a minute of a board meeting of Eagle dated 18 July 2001 authorising Eagle’s signature of a loan agreement with Royal Bank of Scotland (‘RBS’) for a mortgage on 5 & 6 Cheapside. Apart from the Eagle minutes relied on, and the subsequent minutes when James Hay Pension Trustees Ltd took over and the outstanding element of the RBS loan was made the subject of a fresh loan agreement, there is a curious document dated 17 July 2001 which is signed by Sabina Patel supposedly as company secretary of Eagle, certifying a minute of the Eagle Board authorising her to sign the loan agreement with RBS on behalf of Eagle. The date the document bears (17 July) is the same date as the date on the Loan Agreement. The Eagle Minute is signed the following day. Quite apart from there being no evidence, or explanation, as to why Sabina Patel should be signing for Eagle, there is nothing here that evidences her as having any beneficial interest in the property against which the loan is being advanced,
(2) The Loan Agreement itself, which is dated 17 July 2001, is stated to be between The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (the lender) and “(1) EAGLE PLACE TRUSTEES LIMITED; (2) ARIF UMARJI PATEL; (3) SABINA ARIF PATEL; (as trustees for the time being of the Trust, together the “Borrowers” and each a “Borrower”). The Trust is defined as “The Faisaltex Limited Directors Pension Scheme”. At Clause 8.1 the Borrowers each represent and warrant that “(a) the Trust has been validly established by means of the Trust Deed and is authorised to carry on its affairs as presently conducted and the Borrowers are properly appointed as the trustees of the Trust and have power to hold and deal with the property and assets of the Trust.” This is all consistent with Sabina Patel being a trustee, and with the property being a trust asset. Oddly (given the terms of the previous document) the Loan Agreement is not signed by Sabina Patel on behalf of Eagle, although she signs on her own behalf (as a trustee of the Trust). There is nothing in the Loan Agreement that supports the suggestion that Sabina Patel holds any beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside. In this regard, and contrary to Mr Hines’ submission before us, it is not supported by the fact that Sabina Patel is a borrower. The same is true of Eagle, and it is not suggested that Eagle has any beneficial interest. In any event it is clear that each of Mr Patel, Sabina Patel and Eagle are borrowing as trustees, and not as beneficial owners of what is a pension trust asset.
(3) The Definitive Trust Deed has never been produced, but an Interim Deed dated 27 September 2001 was identified by the Crown from the served evidence shortly before the appeal hearing (the “Interim Deed”). It is inconsistent with Sabina Patel being a beneficiary under the Trust or having any beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside.
(a) The Interim Deed states that it is “establishing THE FAISALTEX LIMITED SMALL SELF ADMINSTERED SCHEME” the words “SMALL SELF” having been struck through and replaced with the handwritten words “DIRECTORS’ PENSION” and initialled with the initials of Mr Patel and Sabina Patel. The document is signed on behalf of Faisaltex Limited by Mr Patel, by Sabina Patel and by Eagle (by two directors thereof).
(b) By their initials, and by their signatures, each of Mr Patel and Sabina Patel purport to have been aware of the Interim Deed’s terms.
(c) In terms of who the Interim Trust Deed is stated to be between, it is stated as being between (1) Faisaltex Limited described as the “Principal Employer” (the only genuine director of which on the judge’s findings is Mr Patel) and (2) ARIF UMARJI PATEL and SABINA ARIF PATEL … and EAGLE PLACE TRUSTEES LIMITED (the “Pensioneer Trustee” ,,, (together the “Trustees”). The Interim Deed is therefore consistent with Sabina Patel being a trustee (and nothing else).
(d) The terms of the Trust Deed are inconsistent with Sabina Patel being a beneficiary under the Scheme in circumstances where Recital 1 provides, “The Principal Employer has determined to establish a trust fund to be known as [and then the same alteration is made to the title of the scheme as per above, again initialled by the Applicant and Sabina Patel] (the “Scheme”) for the purpose of providing pensions on retirement at a specified age and other benefits for and in respect of such of the employees of the Principal Employer as may become members (“Member(s)”) of the Scheme.” Sabina Patel is not an employee of Faisaltex Limited, and as such she cannot be (and is not) a beneficiary under the Scheme. Accordingly, she cannot have benefitted as a beneficiary of the Scheme whether in relation to the Trust asset 5 & 6 Cheapside, or otherwise, and as such cannot have any beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside.
(4) It appears that the purpose of the Scheme was to obtain tax relief for Faisaltex Limited’s contributions (which were made by funding the mortgage repayments). In this regard Recital 2 provides that, “The Principal Employer and the Trustee intend the Scheme to be capable of approval as an exempt-approved scheme in accordance with Chapter I of Part XIV of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, including any statutory modification or re-enactment ay any regulations made under it for the time being in force (the “1988 Act”) and that it should be operated in conformity with the requirements of Chapter I of Part IV of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 including any statutory modification or re-enactment and any regulation made under it for the time being in force (the “1993 Act”).” Given that Mr Patel was the sole genuine director of Faisaltex Ltd and, on the judge’s findings, the corporate veil between him and Faisaltex Ltd is to be ignored, and that he would never have intended her to have any beneficial interest in any property, which she could not in any event properly have under the terms of the Scheme, there must be real doubt, to put it at its lowest, as to whether the Scheme was genuinely such a scheme, or intended to operate as such a scheme, rather than simply a device for Mr Patel to obtain a tax advantage in transferring value from his company to a property intended to be his. However, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to make any findings in this regard. We would only note that Count 1 on the indictment was a charge of false accounting in relation to falsified documents purporting to show that the Faisaltex Charitable Trust had made charitable donations, when the payments were made to individuals and not to charities. It was the Crown’s case that similar fraudulent devices permeated Mr Patel’s dealings with all the Faisaltex Group companies, connected charities, and wider corporate structures.
101. There is some further evidence that 5 & 6 Cheapside was not 100% beneficially owned by the Scheme, and held as such by the Trustees. In this regard a schedule of transactions for bank account number 10237916, identified as the Scheme account, which was exhibited to Sabina Patel’s statement, has written upon it in manuscript (in an unknown hand) in relation to the property, “66% owned Pension Scheme 34% owned F-TEX LTD”, which suggests that the property is only 66% owned by the Scheme, the remaining 34% being owned by Faisaltex Ltd.
102. In the above circumstances, the judge was clearly right to determine that, on the balance of probabilities, it was not the intention of Mr Patel or Sabina Patel that she would have a beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside. Indeed, on the evidence addressed above, Sabina Patel was not even within the class of beneficiaries under the Scheme, and as such she can have had no beneficial interest in 5 & 6 Cheapside. The reality, as was the evidence of the investigator Christopher Rudd, both in his statement and when giving evidence, and as was accepted by the judge, is that 5 & 6 Cheapside is beneficially owned by Mr Patel. Ground 2 is accordingly dismissed.
103. We can deal with Ground 3 in short order as we do not consider it to be of any merit. At no point in his judgment did the judge assert that he was drawing an adverse inference against Sabina Patel. Rather he stated that she “chose not to take the opportunity to give evidence to assist in this regard”. It was a case of a party choosing not to give evidence to displace the view that the judge had formed based upon the evidence that he had already heard, in circumstances where, if there was relevant evidence to be given by way of riposte, Sabina Patel was in a position to do so, but chose not to do so. The approach of the judge was entirely in accordance with the approach identified in R v Forte, supra.
104. Sabina Patel’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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