Administrative United Kingdom

Antonio Seminara v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: EA/50180/26

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

on 30th October, 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE jepson

Between

Antonio Seminara

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms.Lanigan, counsel for Masaud Solicitors.

For the Respondent Ms.Nevers, Home Office Presenting Officer.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Italy, appeals against refusal of a human rights claim on 12th May, 2025. That claim had been made in response to a stage one deportation notice issued 19th July, 2024. The stage two deportation order is also dated 12th May last year. There is also an ‘EUSS’ element to the proceedings. That derives from the Appellant holding settled status in the UK.

BACKGROUND

2. The Appellant describes entering the UK in 1979 or 1980. He claims to have been here continuously since, exercising his Treaty rights. Settled status was granted on 8th October, 2019.

3. On 19th June, 2024 the Appellant was sentenced to a total of fourteen years and six months imprisonment. That was for a series of sexual offences, several of which being committed against children under sixteen.

4. There are two sets of issues to resolve in these proceedings, albeit the competing factors within overlap considerably. Both were considered within the refusal.

5. The first relates to the level of protection the Appellant should be afforded by the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (‘the Regulations’ hereinafter.) The Respondent accepts the Appellant is entitled to the ‘serious grounds’ protection provided by Regulation 27(3.) That was on the basis of having been granted settled status, via recognition of five years’ qualifying residence. Dispute arises as to whether the ‘imperative grounds’ level should apply via Regulation 27(4.) The Respondent submits ten years residence in the exercise of Treaty rights prior to the deportation order has not been demonstrated. Even if found to be so, it is argued the relevant imperative grounds have been established for deportation.

6. Turning to the human rights appeal, there is no dispute the ‘very compelling’ test per Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA’ hereinafter) S.117C(6) must be met over and above the exceptions found at S.117C(4) and (5.) That stems from the length of sentence imposed. The Respondent does not accept either exception (to the extent they are relevant) nor the very compelling threshold has been reached.

Preliminary Matters

7. The appeal was listed before me on 14th August this year. It was adjourned, primarily due to the Appellant needing an interpreter. Ms.Malomo (Home Office presenting officer) appeared for the Respondent on that occasion. I posed a number of questions to the parties, seeking to clarify their respective positions. They will be dealt with in this section, along with similar discussion which took place at the substantive hearing on 30th October.

8. The Respondent was asked the basis on which, per the refusal, residence in this country between May-October 2019 is disputed. Ms.Malomo indicated she was unsure, noting that despite such argued absence indefinite leave to remain had been granted shortly thereafter. Her intention was to argue things in the alternative. By the date of substantive hearing, Ms.Nevers for the Respondent conceded the point. It was accepted settled status had been granted in October 2019. As such, the Respondent would not maintain there had been a period of absence in that year such as to break any qualifying residence calculation.

9. Ms.Nevers confirmed the Respondent’s position more generally. It would be said the Appellant had not established continuous presence, in the exercise of Treaty rights, prior to 2013. The refusal appears to argue that due to the Appellant’s offending behaviour, the period over which offences took place could never count towards any calculation of continuous residence. At the first hearing, Ms.Malomo had suggested that was not to be argued – at least in such absolute terms. A more nuanced approach was to be taken. It would be suggested the offending (including its duration) showed a lack of social integration and strong public interest in removal. That would be said to sufficiently weaken any ties to UK society to the extent the applicable period might be set aside when calculating length of continuous residence. The same would be said about the time spent in custody.

10. The Respondent would, Ms.Nevers confirmed, say that is nevertheless relevant given much of the ten year period prior to the stage two deportation order (12th May, 2025) had either been spent in custody or marked the corresponding period of offending. As such, the Respondent’s position was to be the imperative grounds level of protection does not apply. It remained accepted the serious grounds threshold was met, by virtue of the Appellant having settled status.

11. Ms.Nevers also sought to maintain that the existence of offending was enough whereby time which could otherwise count towards the required ten year period was automatically broken. Although something dealt with in the main body of the judgment, on reflection I do not agree things are that black and white.

12. An earlier version of the Appellant’s skeleton argument asserted he had been in the UK since 1989-90. That is contrary to his statement, in which 1979-80 is claimed. Ms.Lanigan at the first hearing confirmed the earlier dates are correct. Despite what is suggested in the first skeleton, it was accepted the Respondent contests any claim of continuous residence since that period. The skeleton had argued the point was conceded.

13. As the first hearing progressed (no evidence was called,) it became apparent the Appellant’s English was not sufficient. That raised a concern, given his statement had apparently been taken without the assistance of an interpreter. Although not the primary reason for my directing an adjournment, the Appellant’s wife – a witness in the case – also raised a worry she had provided his solicitor with rather more evidence of continuous residence than had been submitted. An example given was bank statements.

14. The appeal was adjourned, reserved to me on the basis I had prepared the case. Directions were made for consideration of wasted costs. I played no part in any determination thereof, it being distinct from the appeal itself. The Appellant was directed to serve any additional evidence by 14th September. As noted, a further bundle was uploaded 11th September.

15. At the second hearing, Ms.Lanigan (who appeared on both occasions) asked that only an updated skeleton (9th September, 2026 – contained in a bundle uploaded 11th September) be considered. Earlier versions had been served, dated 16th April, 2025 and 13th May, 2026.) On a related topic, each of the three witnesses who gave evidence have submitted two statements. As has the Appellant.

16. There was some variation between the witnesses as to whether they wished to adopt both. I had at the first hearing raised concern given what appeared to be comparatively limited English the Appellant had given his first statement (21st April, 2016) in that language. A further statement was later obtained, penned in Italian by the Appellant and then converted to English. It is dated 8th September, 2026. Only the latter was adopted in court. The Appellant’s ex-wife similarly adopted only her later statement (10th September, 2026.) His current wife and daughter confirmed the contents of both of their statements. The later versions largely act as an update from the first. I will therefore use the term ‘statement’ to refer to the more recent edition of each unless there is a need to distinguish between versions.

17. There is no anonymity direction in this appeal. None has been requested. I am, however, conscious that family members of the Appellant who gave evidence and individuals who wrote letters of supports might receive negative attention on publication of this determination. That is a particular concern for the Appellant’s daughter, who has two young children. I will therefore refer to witnesses only by their relation to the Appellant.

18. During her evidence, the Appellant’s wife disputed that many of the victims of the Appellant’s offending had been under sixteen. Mention was made of counsel in the criminal proceedings meeting with the Judge in chambers. As a result of that, the age of the victims had been changed to sixteen or over. The Appellant’s wife believed he had been sentenced on that basis. A request had been made of the Appellant’s immigration solicitor that they contact those who acted in the criminal case for confirmation.

19. In the absence of any witness (though with the Appellant present,) I expressed the view if what had been said was correct that could potentially make a difference to my assessment. It was possible if something had changed during the criminal proceedings whereby the offences had in fact involved victims over sixteen that could be a relevant consideration. Ms.Nevers told me she was in possession of a PNC print. That suggested the offences involved children under sixteen. Perhaps rightly, Ms.Lanigan raised concern at reference to something not in evidence being discussed. In reply, Ms.Nevers explained she would need to seek permission to disclose the print. Doing so without leave apparently contravenes data protection.

20. I asked the parties consider the issue over the lunch break. Ms.Lanigan agreed enquiries would be made of her instructing solicitor. When the hearing resumed, it was accepted the convictions are as set out in the sentencing remarks. That means several of the victims were under sixteen. In the absence of any contrary evidence, I will take what is recorded as said at the Crown Court as accurate.

The Crown Court hearing – His Honour Judge Archer, Preston Crown Court

21. The sentencing remarks are contained in the Respondent’s bundle at page forty-eight. I do not propose to rehearse them entirely here but will provide a summary. I am conscious the victims of the offences retain their right to anonymity. No names will be given in this judgment.

22. The Appellant (defendant) was convicted after trial of eleven sexual offences. They consisted of three counts of sexual assault, two offences of sexual activity with a child under sixteen (no penetration) and six counts of sexual activity with a child under sixteen involving penetration. Two of the penetrative sexual activity offences resulted in seven years custody, consecutive to one another. For two of the sexual assaults, four and two months respectively was imposed – again consecutive. The remaining matters were sentenced concurrently, six years for the other penetrative offences, three years for the non-penetrative activity and four months for a remaining sexual assault. A sexual harm prevention order was imposed. As was the notification requirements for sex offenders.

23. The Appellant had been a chef at a restaurant. All of the victims were employees. Several were children at the time. Behaviour was described as ranging from ‘playfully inappropriate,’ to ruining the lives of two of the victims. Offending began when the Appellant was in his late-40s to early-50s. The span of time over which offences took place is not entirely clear, though within an OASys report (paragraphs 2.1-4 thereof) to which I will turn there is reference to 2015-19. The same document indicates the four victims were between 12 and 16 years of age.

24. The Judge found the Appellant had groomed each victim, typically by giving them gifts. That also included use of social media. One of the victims had suffered severe impact on their mental health. Another remained wary of men, blamed themselves for what happened. One victim became pregnant as a result of the offences. Termination of the pregnancy coincided with their GCSEs. They hid events from others. All victims were required to give evidence. Note was made the Appellant’s account in relation one changed mid-trial, from there having been no sexual activity to intimacy taking place when the victim reached 16 and with their consent.

25. There was acknowledgment of the Appellant’s lack of previous convictions. What was described as limited remorse had been expressed. The Appellant considered himself a victim. The penetrative offences were placed in category 1A of the applicable guideline. That indicated a start point of five years, increased to seven to reflect the aggravating features. Two such sentences were to run consecutively to one another. The non-penetrative sexual activity offences were placed in category 2A, with a start point of three years. The remaining offences (all sexual assaults) were category 3B, typically non-custodial but for the other matters being sentenced. The Judge bore in mind the principle of totality.

The OASys report – printed 9th July, 2024

26. As with the sentencing remarks, I shall provide only a summary here. The report as with all other documents served by each party have been considered fully.

27. The report notes the Appellant is eligible for conditional release in May 2030, his licence expiry being August 2037. Per paragraph 2.11, the offences were denied, as had been the case at the Crown Court. The Appellant told the author of the report the victims had colluded against him. He accepted two sexual encounters with one of them but said they took place when she was sixteen and with consent. Mention was made of having rebuffed advances from a mother to one of the victims, it being suggested she then put her child up to making allegations out of jealousy.

28. In terms of background, the Appellant described having come to the UK at a fairly young age. He began work as a pot washer, progressed to chef over the forty years that followed. Literacy was achieved in this country, along with a qualification in textiles. A business run with the Appellant’s wife (a restaurant) had been sold prior to his being remanded. The Appellant said he lives from a private pension ; as does his wife.

29. At paragraph 6.12, the Appellant confirmed having family in Italy. He acknowledged being able to cope if returned there. A belief was expressed his wife would join him if deported. Regular trips had been made. His wife and a niece visit the Appellant in prison, though not so either of his two adult children. He reported not wanting them to see him in such surroundings, there being in any event a volatile relationship with one daughter. Things were similarly distant with the Appellant’s son.

30. The report writer noted a lack of friends within the community or membership of social groups (paragraph 7.5.) No mental health problems were reported (10.8) though there was reference to medication taken for type 1 diabetes (13.1.) That has not been raised as a factor in these proceedings.

31. In terms of risk, the report concluded that will remain present as long as the Appellant denies his offending (11.12.) He was described as perceiving himself to be the victim and as such there was no behaviour to address (12.9.) At paragraph 10.6, the report found the Appellant to be a medium risk to children. All other risk factors were deemed low.

HEARING

32. The hearing was recorded. That shall stand as the record of proceedings.

Issues in dispute

33. The parties agree the issues for resolution are as follows:

(i) Whether the Appellant’s conduct presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.

(ii) The period of time over which the Appellant has been continuously resident in the UK, exercising his Treaty rights.

(iii) Based on the above, whether either serious or imperative grounds for deportation exist.

(iv) If either of the exceptions to deportation have been established (albeit it is accepted given the length of sentence that would not be enough whereby the human rights aspect of the appeal might succeed.)

(v) Over and above that, if very compelling circumstances arise.

Evidence and submissions

34. The Appellant appeared remotely from custody. I had at the 14th August hearing canvassed with the Appellant and his wife (who was present) if they wished to attend in person. The Appellant indicated he would not, Ms.Lanigan suggesting that may pose challenges due to his being at a fairly distant prison. For that reason, I saw no reason the witnesses could not equally appear by video. A direction was made if the Appellant changed his mind, the Tribunal should be told within seven days to make arrangements. No request was made.

35. On 30th October, live evidence was called from the Appellant, his wife, ex-wife and daughter. All appeared remotely, as did Ms.Lanigan. The Appellant made use of an interpreter for his evidence, though has some English. He was content for the remainder of the evidence and closing submissions to be delivered without translation. The interpreter remained in court, in the event that changed.

36. Each advocate made closing submissions. Judgment was reserved.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The EEA Regulations

Level of threat posed

37. Per the structure proposed by Ms.Lanigan, I am invited to first consider whether the Appellant poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society (Regulation 27(5)(c). That must be established by the Respondent, on the balance of probabilities, in order for deportation to follow. As part of that consideration, I remind myself any threat need not be imminent. Assessment must be based entirely on the Appellant’s conduct, rather than that of others. I note that, given reliance by Ms.Nevers on views expressed in court by each witness about the Appellant’s convictions. That has potential relevance to other aspects of the appeal but not so for this topic.

38. Regulation 27(5) and (6) –

(5) The public policy and public security requirements of the United Kingdom include restricting rights otherwise conferred by these Regulations in order to protect the fundamental interests of society, and where a relevant decision is taken on grounds of public policy or public security it must also be taken in accordance with the following principles—

(a) the decision must comply with the principle of proportionality;

(b) the decision must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned;

(c) the personal conduct of the person must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society, taking into account past conduct of the person and that the threat does not need to be imminent;

(d) matters isolated from the particulars of the case or which relate to considerations of general prevention do not justify the decision;

(e) a person’s previous criminal convictions do not in themselves justify the decision;

(f) the decision may be taken on preventative grounds, even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction, provided the grounds are specific to the person.

(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.

I will not quote the entire section but the fundamental interests likely to be relevant to this appeal from Schedule 1(7) of the Regulations are –

7. For the purposes of these Regulations, the fundamental interests of society in the United Kingdom include-

b) maintaining public order;

c) preventing social harm;

e) protecting public services;

f) excluding or removing an EEA national or family member of an EEA national with a conviction (including where the conduct of that person is likely to cause, or has in fact caused, public offence) and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the relevant authorities to take such action;

h) combating the effects of persistent offending (particularly in relation to offences, which if taken in isolation, may otherwise be unlikely to meet the requirements of regulation 27);

i) protecting the rights and freedoms of others, particularly from exploitation and trafficking;

j) protecting the public;

k) acting in the best interests of a child (including where doing so entails refusing a child admission to the United Kingdom, or otherwise taking an EEA decision against a child);

I have not ignored the remaining interests listed within Schedule 1, though find they are less applicable.

39. Paragraph 7(e) is included above, on the basis of an argument Ms.Nevers made in her closing. It was suggested a prospect exists if deportation takes place that the Appellant might serve some of his sentence overseas. Public cost would therefore be reduced. Such is based on reference in an ‘additional comments’ box at page fifty of the OASys report, in which it was said the Appellant is likely to be considered for repatriation.

40. Whist I do not ignore the factor, it is one which carries fairly limited weight in my view. Despite what the author of the report said in 2024 there is no sign the Appellant is about to be removed to serve out his sentence in Italy. It might be that is due to these proceedings. However, the point is I do not know. Nor will I speculate absent better information. As a general point, public money would be saved if someone were sent back to their country of origin to complete a sentence. I nevertheless cannot on the evidence before me assess how likely that would be in this appeal.

41. Applying BF[1], the stages to be considered are as follows –

“… The Tribunal had to determine (1) what was the relevant personal conduct of the respondent? Having determined that question, it had to decide (2) whether that conduct represented a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat and, if so, (3) whether that threat affected one of the fundamental interests of society. It also had to stand back and consider (4) whether the deportation of the respondent would be disproportionate in all the circumstances..[2]”

42. Focusing initially on the issue of threat posed, Ms.Nevers via her closing emphasised the serious nature of the offences committed. Citing the sentencing remarks, note was made the Judge had found there were two sides to the Appellant. One was darker, wherein he had systematically groomed young females. Given each was an employee, there was a breach of trust. It was asserted the Appellant remains a serious threat to female children. The OASys report was cited, specifically the Appellant’s continued denials and criticism of the victims. Much the same was argued about the Appellant’s conduct during the criminal proceedings – in the sense of accepting intimacy with only one victim and then only when over sixteen and consenting.

43. In response, Ms.Lanigan also relied on the OASys report, specifically section R11.12 wherein a low risk of re-offending was found to arise. The Appellant is on an enhanced regime, in effect a trusted prisoner.

44. Some balance exists to such submissions. Whilst what Ms.Lanigan said is correct, the report within the same section observed the Appellant was ‘minimally motivated’ to engage given continued denials. Whilst HMP Preston (his then-location) did not offer any rehabilitative programmes, whether at the time they would have been of benefit is perhaps debatable. The Appellant continued to contest his convictions, disputed there was any issue to address. Doubt is raised in the report about what meaningful work could therefore be performed. I also bear in mind at section R10.6 the report author found the Appellant to be a medium risk to children. It is not quite right to say he was assessed as low-risk.

45. Ms.Nevers asked the Appellant about his offending in court. He expressed remorse, said he prays for the victims each night. The Appellant claimed he felt such regret from what he called the first hearing. In his updated statement (8th September, 2026) the Appellant similarly said he was sorry for his actions. He had learnt from his mistakes. When I asked the Appellant if he admitted his guilt, he confirmed that was the case.

46. I do not simply ignore such assertions. It is nevertheless difficult to reconcile claims to have felt a certain way when the criminal proceedings began with the entering of not guilty pleas. Such denials were maintained not only to trial but also thereafter to the Probation Service. Although Ms.Lanigan rightly reminded me an OASys report is not a statement nor has the Appellant contested making comment at sections 11.12 and 12.9 whereby he considered himself the victim.

47. Ms.Nevers characterised the apparent change in attitude towards offending as no more than an attempt to prevent removal from the UK. It is correct to say the Appellant’s wife largely protested his innocence in court. I will discuss that later within the judgment. However, as noted above the question of threat posed must be considered solely through the prism of the Appellant’s behaviour rather than the attitude of others.

48. Although equally relevant to other aspects of the appeal, I acknowledge at page three hundred eighty-seven of the Appellant’s additional bundle a series of qualification certificates. They show a number of courses passed within the prison estate. I bear in mind as noted within the OASys report the Appellant’s initial placement at HMP Preston offered no rehabilitative courses. No information is given as to how long he has been elsewhere. That said, no claim is made to have engaged with programmes designed to address offending behaviour anywhere in custody. There is nothing from the Probation Service providing an update, either as to the Appellant’s current attitude towards his convictions the extent to which rehabilitative work has begun. That is not to say the courses taken have no value. They nevertheless relate to qualifications rather than anything focused on any underlying criminality.

49. As a broad point, I accept someone’s views can change over time. More than two years has elapsed since the OASys report was written. Reminding myself corroboration is not required, I nevertheless have some concern that nothing beyond the Appellant’s word is produced to show more recent acceptance of his actions. I make clear that does not mean I have just swept away what he says on the subject. Any assessment must however, links with concerning attitudes expressed during the criminal proceedings and to probation thereafter. There is no sign anything has been done within the prison estate to address that. I am equally not provided evidence to show the medium risk level found to apply in relation to children has reduced.

50. At 10.4 of the OASys report, it is said a pre-sentence report (prepared for the Crown Court proceedings) assessed the Appellant as a high risk to children. The later OASys report found that to be mitigated by a number of factors. The offences were of some age. They occurred within a specific locus – the Appellant’s restaurant – which closed in 2019. Stringent licence conditions would be imposed on release, coupled with police supervision via the being subject to notification requirements for life as a sex offender. The Judge also imposed a sexual harm prevention order. That places a restriction on contact with any child under sixteen unless police or social services permission is given. The implication is those elements when combined reduced things from high risk, though only to a medium level. It cannot be said in my view, notwithstanding what was argued in court, that the Probation Service considered the Appellant to pose a low risk to children.

51. The Appellant makes reference in his statement to a close bond with his daughter’s two children. They have not visited him, believing per what was said in court their grandfather is working overseas. Telephone contact has nevertheless been maintained. That potentially places the Appellant in breach of the sexual harm prevention order. I remind myself this is not a criminal court. Nevertheless, the issue has some relevance.

52. It is clear from the Crown Court sentencing remarks the terms of the order were explained in detail. Towards the end of R11.12 of the OASys report, the author indicates one of the licence conditions on release would be no contact with anyone under eighteen. Via section 6.2, the Appellant said he was not in contact with his grandchildren. I appreciate things can change but that stands in contrast to what is now said about seemingly regular communication. At section 6.12 the Appellant acknowledged he would need social services’ permission before that took place. Nothing shows consent has been obtained or even sought.

53. When existence of the above restriction was put to the Appellant in court, he raised a belief it did not apply to family members. Nor was the Appellant aware he had to share the fact of contact with either his offender manager or social services. As with other aspects of the report, the sections set out above are not among those where the Appellant claims he misunderstood what was being discussed due to language barriers. It has not been claimed the Appellant was unable to follow the sentencing remarks at the Crown Court for that or any other reason.

54. As part of her evidence, the Appellant’s wife said she helped facilitate calls to the Appellant’s grandchildren if with them. Her view was similar to that of the Appellant, that surely communication by telephone was acceptable. It was observed the childrens’ mother gives permission. The grandchildren miss the Appellant. The Appellant’s daughter (who is not the child of his current wife) said much the same. She was aware of a prohibition on living with children but did not know contact was forbidden.

55. In her statement, the Appellant’s wife referred to having a grandchild of their own. Although said to be an important part of family life, it was not said the Appellant has any present contact with the child (who is three from prison.) No statement is provided from their parents or another adult child the wife has.

56. It is important to make plain the question of contact with children does not of itself determine the issue of whether a sufficiently serious threat exists (or any other.) It is nevertheless a source of concern. I find it hard to accept the Appellant was unaware of the terms of the sexual harm prevention order (or misunderstood them.) The sentencing remarks were entirely clear. As was later discussion with the writer of the OASys report, wherein the Appellant acknowledged he needed social services permission before communication could happen. Despite that, calls have taken place without any apparent leave to do so being sought. What seems apparent from the Appellant’s wife and daughter is that they were not told of the ban on contact. It is not suggested the Appellant has lied to his family about that. Equally, they do not seem to be fully aware of the position.

57. The Appellant has maintained contact with children which may amount to breach of a court order. No criminal charges have arisen from that. It is, however, a relevant factor. One that arguably does not necessarily sit well with claims of remorse and the earlier assessment of the Appellant posing a medium risk to children.

58. When considering the question of threat, I must take into account the Appellant’s circumstances prior to the offences committed. Although something addressed in far more detail later in the determination, I am satisfied both that the Appellant as claimed entered the UK in 1979 and remained thereafter. There is no suggestion of offending outside of the matters for which custody is currently being served. Whilst in this country, the Appellant married twice, had two children and operated a business. Those elements have potential relevance when assessing the level of threat posed. They are, however, outweighed entirely in my view by the offences committed. Again, that is a subject to which I will return in relation to other issues in the appeal.

59. The Respondent has in my judgment established on the balance of probabilities that a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat exists. In reaching that conclusion, I have borne in mind every positive factor Ms.Lanigan raised on the Appellant’s behalf. They carry some weight. It is nevertheless overcome by the extreme seriousness of the offences along with what can be described at best an extremely mixed attitude towards events. I do not entirely discount claims the Appellant is now sorry for his actions. He said that in his statement, confirming the same in court. It was not therefore raised for the first time during the hearing. On the other hand, the comments made to the author of the OASys report (albeit two years ago) are a concern. As is possible contravention of the sexual harm prevention order by contacting the Appellant’s grandchildren.

60. I do not accept the Appellant was unaware he could not do so. Though a less central point, there is at least some suggestion the Appellant’s family members have not been told the full extent of such order. He was assessed in 2024 as being a medium risk to children. Nothing is drawn to my attention to show that has changed, be it via further review from the Probation Service or rehabilitative work completed.

61. It was argued the stance taken by the Appellant’s wife in particular translates into an increased risk of re-offending. In effect, Ms.Nevers suggested because the wife appears in denials about the extent and nature of offending less by way of protective measures would exist on release. I approach that with some care. Any views adopted by the Appellant’s wife do not have to reflect his own. It does not, in any event, necessarily follow that just because the Appellant’s wife disputes what seem fairly central aspects of his offending he would be more like to commit further crimes in future.

62. There is some balance to that, however. Even if one places much less weight – as I do – on the opinions espoused by the Appellant’s wife, there remains admitted contact with the grandchildren. Recognising the possibility the ex-wife and daughter might not necessarily have known the extent of the sexual harm prevention order imposed, what seems clear in my view is the Appellant did so. It was explained to him by the sentencing Judge. He confirmed being aware of a prohibition on child contact via the OASys report. Per what was said in court, neither the Appellant’s wife nor ex-wife appear to have any concerns about him speaking to his grandchildren. That was notwithstanding it being put to them by Ms.Nevers that an effective ban on such communication is currently in place. Their views remained the same even in the face of that. The issue perhaps matters less in relation to the ex-wife, with whom the Appellant has more limited contact. That said, the grandchildren are hers. They are not related to the Appellant’s wife.

63. I do not directly criticise the stance taken by any witness presented in court. They were, after all, expressing what are no doubt genuine opinions about whether the Appellant represents a threat to children. To that, they are entitled. However, it cannot be said the Appellant would be released to a family unit that would necessarily assist him in adhering to the terms of the sexual harm prevention order. Even if they have facilitated breaches thereof unwittingly (and that is debatable, particularly in relation to the wife) thus far, I find the Appellant knew he was likely contravening the order. I must consider that alongside the medium risk found to exist in relation to children as set out in the OASys report. That is the most recent assessment available.

64. In reply, Ms.Lanigan relied on the locus of offending – the restaurant – now no longer existing. Note was made the OASys report otherwise found the Appellant to be a low-risk of offending. I am asked to take into account evidence of family support on release. There is no dispute the Appellant’s wife has a settled address, to which he will return. The marriage continues. Subject to earlier comment around the extent of relationships with his adult children, the Appellant does have other relatives in the UK. They may act to some extent as protective factors. He will also be subject to fairly extensive scrutiny, by virtue of the sexual harm prevention order, licence conditions and lifetime placement on the sex offenders register.

65. Those factors are all relevant. I have borne them in mind. It may be closing the restaurant reduces the level of future risk. Putting things bluntly, there might be less access to younger females as a result. That is, however, balanced by possible of the sexual harm prevention order from custody. The situation is aggravated, though only to a limited extent, by the view given in court around child contact by family members. The Appellant is likely to be subject to fairly extensive scrutiny on release. That nevertheless can only go so far in establishing a reduced risk of further offending. Notwithstanding any positive effect such elements have, my view remains the same.

Does the threat posed affect a fundamental interest of society?

66. Having made that finding, I must move to assess whether the threat affects one of the fundamental interests of society. I am satisfied that is the case. Given the severity of offences and level of risk found to arise (albeit two years ago) the prevention of social harm is entirely relevant. As is, given the nature of the offences, protecting others from exploitation. It is clear from the sentencing remarks the offences contained such element, via breach of trust. Public protection is also applicable. Although a much less central aspect, post-conviction contact with children could be argued to fall within acting in the best interests of a child – in this case the Appellant’s grandchildren. The threat posed would in my judgment affect each of those fundamental interests.

Proportionality

67. When assessing proportionality, Regulation 27(6) must be taken into account –

(6) Before taking a relevant decision on the grounds of public policy and public security in relation to a person (“P”) who is resident in the United Kingdom, the decision maker must take account of considerations such as the age, state of health, family and economic situation of P, P’s length of residence in the United Kingdom, P’s social and cultural integration into the United Kingdom and the extent of P’s links with P’s country of origin.

The applicable factors are equally applicable to several other aspects of the appeal. I have dealt with each issue in the case individually, though no do propose to repeat at length that about to be discussed. Any comments in the following paragraphs should therefore be taken to apply equally throughout the determination.

68. The Appellant is in his sixties. Not a young man but nor particularly elderly. His statement makes no reference to any health problems. There is reference to diabetes in the OASys report but that is not cited in the skeleton argument. As to economic position, the evidence appears mixed. Per the Appellant’s statement, the restaurant he and his wife owned closed in 2019. At 5.6 of the OASys report, the Appellant referred to being in receipt of a private pension. It was said he and his wife cope well financially.

69. The evidence given in court on the subject was slightly unclear. During cross-examination, the Appellant initially suggested he receives only a state pension. When the above comment from the report was put my note is the Appellant denied having spoken of a private pension. He then repeated he had one, albeit did not know much about it. Even if I am mistaken in that, at no point has it been claimed the Appellant would be destitute on return.

70. The issues of social integration and extent of ties to the country of origin overlap to an extent. Part of the Respondent’s case is that insufficient evidence exists to show continuous qualifying residence prior to 2013. No period before then is conceded. Though some time is involved either way, there is an argument to say less by way of societal links might have developed over thirteen years compared to forty-seven (if one accepts arrival in 1979.)

71. I will therefore start with the that subject. It has bearing both on the issue of proportionality but also the level of protection the Appellant should be afforded under the Regulations. The latter will be dealt with separately, though any discussion here applies equally to it.

72. Without rehearsing unnecessarily large tracts of each statement provided, the Appellant sets out a timeline of employment and addresses. Some detail was given as to each. He has two children, in their thirties/forties respectively, to his ex-wife. Both are British. The Appellant’s daughter has two children, in their teens, who again are British citizens. From 1981-1990, there was a relationship with his now ex-wife. The Appellant met his current wife in 1991. They married in 2003, remain together to date. Both the wife and ex-wife give similar chronologies in their statements. As does the Appellant’s daughter.

73. All maintain he has been in the UK since 1979, though in fairness all but his ex-wife would be logically unable to comment on at least some of the relevant period. I make that observation bearing in the Appellant did not meet his current wife until 1991, his daughter having been born not long before that. Any assertions each makes about the period prior must therefore be based on what they have been told. I do, that said, accept they would be able to comment on the Appellant’s presence since the early 1990s. The ex-wife is in a position to do so for most of the previous decade, though accepted in court contact since the marriage ended has been much less frequent.

74. A number of letters of support have been submitted. They are more focused on the question of character, though do refer to periods over which each has known the Appellant. Such letters are spread across the initial bundle provided by the Appellant (uploaded to MyHMCTS 21st April this year) and supplemental papers uploaded 11th September. I bear each in mind, though they refer only to the period of continuous residence – 2013 onwards – which the Respondent accepts.

75. Ms.Lanigan in her closing pointed to consistent accounts given between the Appellant and each witness. No discrepancies had been identified by the Respondent. That is correct. Some weight is therefore applied.

76. A fairly significant amount of documentary evidence has been supplied. It is intended to show continuous presence, specifically exercise of Treaty rights. In assessing that, I remind myself it can be more difficult to obtain documents the further back in time one goes. During her evidence, the Appellant’s wife mentioned losing material due to water damage when moving house. That had not been mentioned in her statement, though nor did Ms.Nevers directly challenge such claim. Whether accurate or not, I can fairly take into account documents might be lost as time moves on. Some of the disputed period being discussed is several decades ago, well before widespread digitisation of records.

77. From page ninety-eight of the Appellant’s supplemental bundle are national insurance records. They begin with a letter from the Department of Work and Pensions dated 15th May, 2025. It confirms thirty years of qualifying contributions to April 2024. A schedule of payments is included. Ms.Nevers put to the Appellant that the period 1991-2003 appears to show no such payments being made. That is not entirely correct, 2001 and 2002 refer to some contributions albeit of a different class. Notation at the right -hand column of the schedule says “payment not needed” for those two years. I nevertheless take the point that it appears none were made for some time. The corresponding note for those years says “too late to pay.” No information is given to explain exactly what that means.

78. When asked in court, the Appellant said he was unable to explain the apparent gap. He denied having ever been out of work or absent from the UK. His wife dealt with all financial matters. On a question from myself, the Appellant did not know if he was employed or self-employed.

79. During her evidence, the Appellant’s wife confirmed that whilst she provided information and sent out pay cheques, reliance had been placed on a financial advisor throughout. They told her the tax and national insurance payments to be made. It was accepted the Appellant is on what was described as the next level down from a full state pension. Ms.Nevers argued that show full national insurance contributions were not made.

80. Things are made less clear by a letter (page four hundred sixty-four) from the Appellant’s financial advisor. It gives a state pension forecast, suggests the Appellant would receive the full amount. Quite how that fits with him, via his wife’s evidence, getting less is a mystery. It was said during her evidence after the couple opened a second itineration of the restaurant at different premises in 1992 the Appellant went from an employee to being director of a limited company. That appears to coincide with the seemingly missing insurance payments, though I am careful not to read too much into that.

81. The picture is somewhat confusing in my view. There do appear to be periods where no national insurance was paid. That could detract from claims of being in work or self-employment throughout. Then again, absent external information as to how national insurance contributions are paid or even required I refrain from engaging in what would be guesswork. Particularly so given suggestion via a financial advisor – whose ability to comment has not been challenged. I bear in mind mention in the DWP letter of thirty years-worth of contributions would only take things back to 1994. It cannot assist with the period before then. However, 1994 onwards covers a period in which the Respondent suggests no contributions were paid at all.

82. What can be said at the very least is evidence exists to show payments from 1980-1993 and then 2001 to 2019. Even if one were to give some weight to the Respondent’s interpretation of the evidence, a degree of support still exists for the Appellant’s account of being present throughout.

83. At page three hundred ninety-five onwards is a large number of photographs. They depict the Appellant at what may be various stages of life. Without purporting to peg the images to a particular year, his changing appearance seems to show pictures taken over a lengthy period. However, with some exceptions there is little context to the photographs. They could have been taken in the UK but absent identified backgrounds could equally be somewhere else. Within the images are social media posts relating to the Appellant’s restaurant. He is pictured, the time span being 2011 to 2022 albeit not every one of those year.

84. Also provided are newspaper articles about the establishment from 2020 and 2022. They refer to the Appellant as operating the business. Similar material is included from pages ninety-seven onwards of the Respondent’s bundle. The articles date from December 2011, March 20212. A separate piece (Page ninety-nine) reports the Appellant foiled a burglary in June 2013.

85. Bank statements have been submitted. From page one hundred thirty-six is a HSBC account solely in the Appellant’s name. The statements cover April 2017 to November 2025. They show only interest being added, no activity otherwise. In any event, the period covered encompasses that where the Respondent accepts presence and exercise of Treaty rights. The same applies to a joint account (page one hundred seventy,) albeit that displays frequent withdrawals and deposits. As it does to a letter from Barclays (page one hundred fourteen, 26th February, 2020) indicating an account was opened that year.

86. Perhaps more supportive is a HSBC letter dated 19th May, 2025 (page one hundred twenty-six.) It confirms the joint account has existed since September 1997. An element of weight has been given to that, albeit I recognise simply having an account does not mean either it was in use of that Treaty rights were necessarily being exercised at the time. As a matter of practicality, it may be more difficult to obtain bank statements as one goes further back in time.

87. As discussed at the start of the determination, the Respondent had previously asserted the Appellant left the UK for part of 2019. Given that is no longer pursued, I will not address what is said in the statements (which cross-reference the bank records) about overseas travel in the applicable period. Nor will I dwell at any real length on documents from the 2013 onwards. The Respondent concedes exercise of Treaty rights thereafter.

88. Several further documents are produced. There is a letter dated 15th June, 2025 from Burnley council (page one hundred seventeen.) It confirms the Appellant was registered for council tax at a specified address from April 2009 to June 2020. Attached to it are the applicable records. A certificate of incorporation – presumably for the restaurant – is at page on hundred eighteen, dating from June 2004. A GP’s letter (page three hundred eighty-four) speaks of being registered with their practice from January 1997 to October 2024. A similar email from a company called Simply Health (page four hundred sixty-two) refers to membership from August 2005 to May 2024. At page one hundred five is confirmation from a dentist of appointments spanning 1999 to 2024. Similar appointments are listed for the Appellant’s wife at page one hundred thirty-five.

89. Particular reliance was placed by Ms.Lanigan in her closing on a document at page one hundred twenty-seven. Headed ‘registration of Italians resident abroad,’ it notes the Appellant entered the UK in November 1979. The document is dated 7th August, 2033. During her evidence, the Appellant’s wife explained whenever Italian citizens living overseas have a change of circumstances – in this instance, getting married around 2003 – the UK consulate had to be informed. An amended register document was then issued.

90. Ms.Lanigan made the point it would have been an act of considerable foresight to obtain such material over twenty years before needed for deportation proceedings. Note was made no attack was mounted against the document. There is some force in that. At the very least, the register shows arrival in 1979 as claimed. It is accompanied by an application dated 5th August, 1991 (page four hundred sixty,) whereby the Appellant sought to vote in Palmero elections from overseas. No concern was raised about that either. Whilst even together the two documents could not in my view establish continuous residence they do offer some support to the overall timeline presented.

91. Ms.Nevers argued all documents presented establish little outside of the accepted period of residence. Although not put to the Appellant or any witness (meaning I apply less weight,) it was observed the certificate of incorporation is dated long after the Appellant says his restaurant opened in 1992. Much of the material was said to do little in terms of showing the exercise of Treaty rights. I generally accept it is possible someone could be present in the UK without doing so. Some of the evidence – such as the bank statements – might be argued to offer more support for presence than anything else. I do, that said, acknowledge that showing one is in this country can equally go some way towards establishing the exercise of rights. The evidence must be considered in the round.

92. The primary point Ms.Nevers made is that if doubts arise as to the national insurance payments made, it could be difficult to find such exercise was taking place for the length of time claimed. Whilst acknowledging the argument, I am nonetheless satisfied the Appellant has been in the UK and in exercise of his Treaty rights since roughly 1980. The evidence around national insurance payments is mixed, though as discussed care has been taken not to guess in the absence of external information. In saying that, I remind myself it is the Appellant who much establish length of qualifying residence. The Respondent need prove nothing in that regard. Much of the other material presented is more recent and in part covers times where the Respondent concedes residence. Any concern there must, however, be balanced by the possibility as one goes further back in time it is progressively more difficult to obtain records.

93. The three witnesses and the Appellant himself serve in my view to sufficiently bridge that gap. Each was cross-examined about their knowledge of the Appellant’s presence. Despite being tested, nothing was identified by Ms.Nevers in her closing to show inconsistency. Between them, the witness supplement the entirety of the timeline the Appellant describes. Without applying excessive weight, given his ex-wife on her testimony has relatively little to do with the Appellant since their relationship ended I see no reason why she would be likely to lie or exaggerate for him. That has at least some significance, in that the ex-wife can comment on the earlier period for which more limited documentary evidence is available.

94. Qualifying residence since 1980 has therefore been established.

95. In terms of ties to both the UK and country of origin, although there have been periodic returns to Italy for vacations the Appellant asserts any links there are all but gone. He points to having left Italy at twenty (not too far into adulthood,) being resident in the UK since. In court, the Appellant said he had not been back since his mother died six or seven years ago. Several siblings remain, with whom telephone contact is maintained. No property is owned in Italy. The Appellant speaks Italian, described having done so when working in the restaurant kitchens with other nationals of that country. They tended to watch Italian television whilst doing so. Ms.Nevers cited those elements as evidence of continuing engagement with Italian culture.

96. The Respondent relies on 6.12 of the OASys report, whereby the Appellant is described as saying he could cope if returned to Italy. The presence of family there was cited as a reason for that. He is also said to have suggested his wife would join him. In court, the Appellant denied having made either comment. Absence of an interpreter was argued to be the cause of any misunderstanding. Those topics will be considered in a later part of the determination.

97. In terms of ties to Italy, whether the Appellant told a probation officer he could back or not, it seems some links remain. Forty-seven years is, I accept, a long time. The Appellant was born in Italy, spent his formative years there. He continues to speak Italian as a primary language, claiming in court to understand English at “10%.” Though the restaurant closed seven years ago, the picture painted is one in which at least some staff there were also Italian. The Appellant’s wife holds a passport for the country, albeit is also a British citizen. Per evidence given in court, she has family members in Italy. As does the Appellant’s ex-wife, though given what seems fairly limited contact since the marriage ended that is perhaps less of a factor.

98. I take into account what seems to have been fairly regular returns to Italy, though ending with the Appellant’s arrest in 2019. However, as Ms.Lanigan perhaps rightly observed there is a difference between taking a vacation somewhere and being resident. That carries a degree of force, though equally this is not a case where the Appellant has claimed a lack of return since departing several decades ago. Via family connections, time spent in Italy comparatively recently and associating with Italian employees at the restaurant some ties have been maintained. It would not in my view be an alien environment. The Appellant has not argued his family – be it in the UK or Italy – would be unwilling or unable to support him were he removed.

99. That leaves social and cultural integration in this country. I have addressed many of the competing factors in earlier parts of the determination. There is no need to rehearse that said at unnecessary length.

100. As discussed, I am satisfied the Appellant has been in the UK since 1979. He has exercised his treaty rights throughout. There is a long history of work, coupled with qualifications gained whilst in custody. The Appellant has enhanced status in prison, though good behaviour in such environment can only count for so much. He is married, has adult children and three grandchildren. From what is said in her statement, the Appellant maintains good if relatively infrequent relations with his ex-wife. Nothing indicates the commission of offences prior to 2015. The letters of support already mentioned come from a variety of former employees and other members of the community. All speak well of the Appellant.

101. Ms.Nevers expressed some concern about such letters. She noted all pre-date the custodial sentence imposed. That means none can have been prepared for these proceedings. Doubt was raised as to whether the authors of each document know their thoughts are being presented to the Tribunal. When asked in court, the Appellant said he did not know. There is no contact with any of those who wrote letters, only family members.

102. The Appellant’s wife was cross-examined on the topic. She confirmed having asked each letter writer if their views might be used before the Tribunal. Some surprise was voiced the documents are not more recently dated. Updated versions had been obtained. If so, they are not in the Appellant’s bundles. That is despite the Appellant’s wife referring in her evidence to a lengthy conference with a solicitor ensuring everything had been submitted. Contact is maintained with those who produced letters, though they do not communicate with the Appellant. That was put down to his being in custody. It was accepted none of them were asked to attend court. The prospect had never been raised by anyone.

103. Much as with other aspects of the appeal, the letters are of mixed value. They do speak well of the Appellant, something which could have greater significance in relation to females who were in his employ. Each confirms they had no concerns about the Appellant’s behaviour. Despite what the Appellant’s wife said in her evidence, however, each letter is quite old. That does not have to mean their authors now have different opinions but nor can I simply assume their views remain the same. I do not just discount the suggestion in court each had been asked if their letters could be used here. Equally, little else shows that to be the case. I bear in mind the letters appear to pre-date (with one possible exception – letter from Dr.KA 20th May, 2024) both conviction and sentence at the Crown Court.

104. The absence of witnesses is potentially relevant, though I find it less so than other factors. As a matter of practicality, I can fairly observe only so many witnesses can be called in an appeal. One might say doing so would have addressed the Respondent’s concern about the letter writers not knowing their views were being used in deportation proceedings. Whilst correct, it is right to say prior to the hearing doubt about when the letters were created had not been raised. The Appellant therefore had no real opportunity to address the point.

105. I have already considered at some length the factors which balance more positive elements listed presented. Without rehearsing the topic excessively, the offences committed were extremely serious ; as befits a sentence of over fourteen years. The Judge imposed sentences for each offence that were typically above the starting point specified by the Sentencing Council. Criminality occurred over a span of years. It involved vulnerable children and a considerable breach of trust. The Appellant continued to protest his innocence when interviewed by the Probation Service. He sought to blame the victims, portray any sexual activity as either having never happened or being entirely consensual.

106. As before, I acknowledge claims of a changed attitude in both the Appellant’s statement and before me in court. That is not simply ignored but equally nothing is produced from Probation to show engagement with rehabilitate work or a change in stance expressed to them. Albeit two years old, the most recent assessment of risk deemed the Appellant a medium-level threat to children. Little demonstrates that has changed. Some concern must I find arise from potential breach of the sexual harm prevention order via contact with the grandchildren. I reject claims the Appellant did not know he was prohibited from doing so.

107. Much was made in court about the attitude taken by the Appellant’s wife in particular around both the offences and communication with the grandchildren. Both the Appellant’s ex-wife and daughter indicated in court they have no concerns about child contact. I do, that said, acknowledge the daughter when asked she felt ‘not the best’ about her father’s convictions. Less weight is applied to such view from the ex-wife. It was clear from her live evidence she has no knowledge of prohibitions under which the Appellant is placed. On the other hand, the witness did also strongly express the view her ex-husband is not a paedophile. Each retained their view he was not a danger to children even when told of the prohibitions in place.

108. Returning to the Appellant’s wife, again without endlessly repeating that already said her opinion was made clear in court – the victims had all been over sixteen, that any sexuality activity was consensual. The witness portrayed the Appellant’s conduct as little more than infidelity, something potentially encouraged by the victims. She described things as a mid-life crisis at one point. I make plain none of that is intended to criticise the Appellant’s wife. I recognise she is entitled to her views.

109. Ms.Nevers argued such opinions do little to assist the Appellant. The implication is family members have, whether knowingly or not, facilitated breach of a court order. Both the Appellant’s wife and ex-wife from their live evidence seemed convinced he is not a child sex offender. Without overstating the point, that may link with the Appellant’s earlier protestations of innocence. However, whether that has any real bearing on the extent of links to the community is debatable. Thee fact at least some family members have opinions which do not fit with the verdict of the Crown Court does not necessarily show the Appellant lacks ties to this country.

110. Questions were asked in court about comment in the OASys report that the Appellant has a ‘volatile’ relationship with his daughter (paragraph 6.12.) She denied that during cross-examination, said things were typical of such a familial relationship. When asked, the Appellant claimed there was a very close bond. It may be some tension exists between the respective assertions made, there being an arguable difference between closeness and something deemed more typical.

111. The Appellant accepted contact with his daughter is relatively sporadic. She has commitments, especially to work, so does not answer the phone particularly often. Her evidence was telephone calls take place a couple of times per week. At the time of the OASys report, the only visitors to the Appellant were his wife and an un-named niece. Nothing has been produced from the latter. The daughter said in court she visits a few times per year. Concern was expressed in her statement about the cost of visiting Italy were the Appellant removed. That was characterised as being difficult, though not necessarily impossible.

112. In the OASys report (6.12,) the Appellant is said to have told probation he had a distant relationship with both adult children. He referred to his daughter as always wanting money which strained their relationship. I take care with the point. It was not put to any witness in court. Nor, however, unlike other parts of the OASys report was the accuracy of such comments challenged. It is, I accept, possible relationships can change. The report was two years ago. On the other hand, nowhere in the daughter’s statement is anything said about past dispute with her father. Whilst bearing in mind an OASys report is not a formal statement, the Appellant’s position as of 2024 seemed to be there was little by way of a relationship with either of his children.

113. The daughter via her statement asserted the Appellant’s removal would have substantial emotional impact on her. I acknowledge even if contact at present is largely limited to calls, there is a clear difference between someone being incarcerated in the UK and removed to another country. That remains the case even if Italy is comparatively nearby. Whilst no information is given about the daughter’s means, she has two young children. Some financial strain might be encountered visiting Italy, even if the children might not be permitted to see their grandfather.

114. Worry was raised is the wife and daughter’s statements about loss of contact with the Appellant’s grandchildren. The difficulty with such argument is at present communication is not permitted. It is difficult to see for that reason how even if he was permitted to remain in the UK any would necesarily take place. I appreciate in saying that the sexual harm prevention order permits contact where social services or the police consent. I cannot, however, speculate as to the future. Perhaps particularly so given my finding the Appellant knew he was not supposed to speak to children at all yet continued to do so.

115. It is right to say the Appellant’s wife has stuck by him, despite the criminal convictions. No dispute is raised she visits the Appellant regularly and maintains contact by telephone. I see no reason why that will not continue. It may indicate a relationship of some depth. What equally seems clear is that even if the relationship with the daughter may have been overstated to an extent, she remains supportive of the Appellant. Whether others who wrote letters of support do so is more debatable, given the concerns discussed earlier in the determination. I do not, however, entirely discount the fact at least at the time the criminal allegations were made several people were willing to vouch for the Appellant’s character. More generally, I recognise as a long-term restauranteur he was part of the local community. That equally has some value.

116. The Appellant has a son. He is described as suffering from mental health problems, currently lives in supported accommodation. A photograph of a phone screen, showing a text message dating from December 2021, is produced (page four hundred fifty-nine, Appellant’s second bundle.) The contents suggest it was from to the Appellant from his son. Affection was expressed therein. No reply is shown. Per his witness statement, the son is aware of his father’s imprisonment having seen media about it. That is said to have affected him greatly. The implication is things would be worse were the Appellant removed. Much as in relation to the Appellant’s daughter, whilst 6.2 of the OASys report suggests things were just as strained with the son I recognise things can sometimes change over time. It is, however, right to say as recently as 2024 there appeared to be a limited relationship.

117. In court, the Appellant said he speaks to his son roughly once a month. He voiced sadness at having ‘ruined his life’ (the translated phrase used.) Support at the son’s accommodation consists of checks every two weeks. Whilst appreciating there is only so much interaction the Appellant can achieve with anyone from custody (and perhaps even less if there are mental health issues,) there is comparatively limited evidence to show a strong relationship existed before sentence was passed. Contact since has been even on the Appellant’s account comparatively little.

118. That has perhaps more relevance to other aspects of the appeal, though some applicability to the question of links to the UK. There is no doubt the Appellant has adult children in this country. No challenge has been made to claims he was involved in their upbringing. Greater debate arises as to the strength of ties that remain in place now. I accept some remain. There is, however, greater doubt as to their extent – particularly in relation to the son.

119. By way of conclusion to this part of the judgment, the Respondent has established on the balance of probabilities the Appellant’s conduct represents a genuine, presents and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society. Perhaps most relevant among such interests is the need to prevent social harm, protect the public. I am equally persuaded the decision to deport is proportionate. Whilst factors exist in the Appellant’s favour – not least of which the length of time spent in the UK and some evidence of integration – in my view some ties to Italy remain. The Appellant is an older man but not especially elderly. He claims no substantive health issues. Any integration is I find outweighed by the negative impact of serious, protracted offending. Within that is what I consider to be a mixed attitude towards the crimes committed. Although I have discussed the view taken by some of the witnesses towards the Appellant’s criminality, that has played no part in the conclusions reached on this topic. I have focused entirely on the Appellant’s conduct.

Level of protection

120. The next question to determine is level of protection which should be afforded to the Appellant. The Respondent accepts the ‘serious grounds’ threshold is met. As set out at the start of the determination, it is not however conceded either that the Appellant has remained in the UK since 1979 exercising his Treaty rights. Also contested is whether the period of offending and time spent thereafter in custody might count towards any such calculation. I have in part addressed some of those issues previously in the determination. Repetition will be avoided where possible, though some rehearsal of earlier matters is inevitable in an appeal such as this. As set out at the start of the determination, the Respondent’s position is that the Appellant is entitled only to serious grounds protection. Continuous presence in exercise of Treaty rights is conceded only from 2013.

121. I have already concluded the Appellant was present in the UK since 1979, exercising his Treaty rights thereafter.

122. Dealing with the period over which offences took place, the OASys report (paragraph 2.4) suggests a span of July 2015 to March 2019. Nowhere in the papers is a specific date range for the charges given, including the sentencing remarks. I raise that because the Respondent’s review (paragraph 6) suggests the offences began in 2009. That seems based on comment at sentencing that the Appellant was in his late forties-early fifties at the relevant time. I am careful not to engage in guesswork but the earliest year mentioned either at the Crown Court or in the OASys report is 2015. I have taken that to be correct, it being the closest to a timeline available.

123. It is agreed between the parties the Appellant was arrested in 2019. His trial and sentence followed in June 2024. The stage two deportation order was issued in May 2025. The Respondent argues that if one goes back ten years from there (the threshold by which the highest level of protection applies), for much of the time the Appellant was either committing offences, on bail for them or a serving prisoner. The submission is made those events weaken any integration with UK society such that the ten-year period 2015-25 cannot be taken into account. The behaviour displayed is argued to break any other continuous period which may have otherwise existed beforehand. Given per Ms.Nevers the Respondent accepts presence from 2013 but for the criminal proceedings the imperative grounds threshold would otherwise have been met by 2025.

124. The applicable authority is AA[3] –

Decisions of the CJEU have made clear that the ten-year residence provision in Article 28(3) is not to be interpreted or applied literally or mechanically. It is not just a question of arithmetic. The factors specified in Article 28(1) are relevant. Where the individual in question has been subjected to a period of imprisonment that may break integrative links previously forged with the host Member State; to decide whether that is so it is necessary to conduct an overall assessment of the situation at the time of the relevant decision: see Land Baden-Wurtemburg v Tsakouridis (Case C-145/09) [2011] 2 CMLR 11 [33], B and Vomero [2019] QB 126 [72]-[75]. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Viscu [2019] EWCA Civ 1052 [44] Flaux LJ identified the following points as established by the European jurisprudence:

"…(i) that the degree of protection against expulsion to which a Union national resident in another member state is entitled under the Directive is dependent upon the degree of integration of that individual in the member state; (ii) that, in general, a custodial sentence is indicative of a rejection of societal values and thus of a severing of integrative links with the member state but (iii) that the extent to which there is such a severing of integrative links will depend upon an overall assessment of the individual's situation at the time of the expulsion decision."[4]

From schedule 1 of the Regulations –

4. Little weight is to be attached to the integration of an EEA national or the family member of an EEA national within the United Kingdom if the alleged integrating links were formed at or around the same time as-

a) the commission of a criminal offence;

b) an act otherwise affecting the fundamental interests of society;

c) the EEA national or family member of an EEA national was in custody.

125. Also from AA –

I would add some words about the intermediate period between AA's arrest and sentence (February 2016 to June 2018). In my view it is arguable that the Judge should have attached little weight to any integrative links formed during this 28-month period also. This was a time when AA was no longer offending and was at liberty; but throughout this period he was subject to criminal proceedings and stringent bail conditions. More significantly perhaps, it appears that the delay was largely due to the fact that AA was falsely denying his guilt of the offences involving V. His was not a technical, legal defence. AA's case, rejected by the jury, was that the touching of V and the creation of images of her were all innocent and not sexually motivated. It could perhaps be said that this period, or parts of it, fell at "around the same time as" the offending or the imprisonment so that paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 applied directly. Whether or not that is so, it would seem incongruous to attach more than "little weight" to any integrative links formed under those circumstances[5].

I include the last quote to address an argument made by Ms.Lanigan. It was suggested during closing submissions the fact the Appellant had not offended during what seems a relatively lengthy period between arrest and sentence weighs positively in his favour. The circumstances largely echo those in AA. As in that case, the Appellant here denied the offences. He took the case to trial. Whether and to what extent there were bail conditions is unknown. However, even if none were imposed to argue the Appellant demonstrated integrative links with the community by refraining from further offences seems to me, with respect, a fairly weak submission. He did no more than behave as might be expected of anyone facing criminal proceedings. In making that observation, I bear in mind the ties primarily relied on by the Appellant (discussed later in the determination) are said to have formed before any offending took place.

126. A cautious approach has been taken in relation to the passage cited above from schedule 1, paragraph 4 of the Regulations. Whilst recognising as a general point the commission of criminal offences and imposition of a custodial sentence can weaken integrative links, the schedule talks of ties formed at the same time. In this appeal, the elements relied on by the Appellant – such as family, work, lengthy of stay in the UK – were all in place long before any crime was committed. Given my acceptance the Appellant has been in this country as long as claimed, there can be no dispute prior to the period in which offences took place (roughly 2015-19,) he led a blameless life.

127. In addressing the issue, Ms.Nevers argued the offending was so serious that any integration established beforehand is simply swept away. Sufficiently so that any period of continuous, qualifying residence stopped once the offences took place. Reliance was placed on the breach of trust involved in each offence, its systematic nature. Note was also made of comments made in the OASys report asserting innocence and what was deemed non-genuine expressions of remorse in court. I have discussed all of those elements earlier in the determination. The observations made apply equally to this topic.

128. By way of response, Ms.Lanigan relied on the length of time spent in the UK. The Appellant was said to have built up the strongest of community ties during prior to his offending. That encompasses both familial relationships and aspects such as operating a viable business for a long period. Vomero was cited[6], specifically that the degree of protection which should be afforded depends on the extent of integrative links. Sufficient such ties are said to exist here that the offences did not interrupt the ten-year period required for imperative grounds to be required. It is suggested the Appellant’s immersion within UK society could not be more powerful.

129. There is some force in that. I also accept the point made by Ms.Lanigan that whilst only limited weight can be given to any positive ties established (or even maintained) during a period of offending that does not mean there can be none. That has been factored into my conclusions. Nothing raised is, however, enough ultimately to persuade me that the extremely serious offending shown does anything other than press ‘pause’ on any period of qualifying residence. Without endlessly repeating that already said, the nature, duration and scope of offences is simply too serious to reach any other conclusion.

130. That means Regulation 27(3) applies –

(3) A relevant decision may not be taken in respect of a person with a right of permanent residence under regulation 15 except on serious grounds of public policy and public security.

131. The Appellant’s skeleton argument contends that even should that be the case such grounds do not exist. That is based on the threshold being a stringent one. It is said the Respondent has not shown the Appellant to be a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. Ms.Lanigan maintained that submission in her closing.

132. I have largely addressed the applicable, competing elements through the course of this determination. Also addressed was the basis for my finding the Appellant constitutes genuine, sufficiently serious and present threat. Having done so, I will only revisit the topic briefly here.

133. Applying Straszewski[7], an evaluation must be made of future risk and what the consequences of that might be[8]. The latter would plainly be serious in my view, be it offending of the sort shown in 2015-19 or possible breach of the sexual harm prevention order. As discussed, the Appellant has shown at least some inclination to break the terms of such order. That has relevance to future risk, though does not automatically mean it or other protective measures in place on release would be broken. As has been made clear several times in this judgment, I am careful not to apply to much weight to potential breaches thus far. Also relevant is the mixed attitude demonstrated towards the criminal convictions and underlying conduct involved. The underlying offences – sexual abuse of children – are plainly very serious. Particularly so in this instance, given the length of sentence imposed. Their relative age can only do so much in mitigating that aspect.

134. Bearing all of that in mind there are in my judgment serious public policy and security grounds for removal in this appeal. Deportation of the Appellant is justified on that basis. That means the EUSS limb of the appeal is dismissed.

135. In the interests of covering all aspects of the appeal, had I found the offending did not interrupt any period of residence in exercise of Treaty rights, I would not have concluded imperative grounds for removal exist. Whilst the considerable seriousness of offending (and resultant attitudes thereof) are powerful features in establishing such grounds arise, per LG and CC[9] it is more debatable whether the threat posed by the Appellant to the public – specifically children – is serious enough that the extremely high threshold needed is met. As noted in Tsakouridis[10], the imperative grounds test is considerably more onerous than the middle tier protection. Exceptional circumstances must apply. Whilst it may be the facts of this appeal approach that level, they do not in my view exceed it.

The Domestic Regime

Exceptions to reportation

136. Per AA[11], separate consideration must be made of the human rights aspect of the appeal. I have done so, though the underlying factors are much the same as that already set out. There is no argument even if found to apply the two exceptions to deportation would not result in the appeal being allowed. Very compelling circumstances above and beyond them must be established.

137. Before considering the two exceptions, I will address the factors set out in S.117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (NIAA.) Although his statement had suggested a greater proficiency, the Appellant asserted in court any command of English is comparatively limited. He referred to communicating with his wife in that language, though she accepted being also being proficient in Italian. That stands in contrast to the skeleton argument, which asserts there is fluency in English.

138. The Appellant describes a lengthy work history. Whether in receipt of a private pension or not, no suggestion is made of reliance on public funds. That stands in his stead, though of itself cannot (nor any ability to speak English) determine the appeal. Per my findings, the Appellant has been in the UK lawfully since 1979. His familial relationships were established during such period. The same can be said for any private life amassed.

139. There is a clear public interest in the removal of offenders. Such interest is strong in this appeal due to the level of offending involved. It is asserted in the Appellant’s skeleton argument a low risk of re-offending has been found. I find that is not entirely accurate, for the reasons already set out. Any factors argued in the same document to mitigate against further offending remain in my view mixed. I reach that conclusion given the views expressed in court around child contact and those from the OASys report about innocence. The existence of licence conditions, the sexual harm prevention order and being subject to notification requirements can only do so much to balance against such concerns. That is not to say, however, no circumstances can exist whereby the appeal might succeed on human rights grounds.

Exception One – S.117C(4) NIAA

140. The stage two letter disputes presence in the UK for the majority of the Appellant’s life. Given my finding as to qualifying presence since 1979, that part of the exception has been met.

141. As to social integration, much the same arguments deployed in relation to the first limb of the appeal are repeated within the decision letter. Reliance is placed on the serious of offending and (though further evidence has been served since) lack of material showing community ties.

142. I will not repeat that set out above at great length. The competing factors have been addressed in detail. Briefly, the Appellant has spent a considerable time in the UK. Much of that involved his being a productive, positive member of society. That was via both the restaurant, earlier work history and the establishment of family ties[12]. No offending occurred prior to 2015, by which the Appellant had been present for nearly forty years. I take into account the letters of support. Though some doubt exists as to whether they are aware of being utilised in deportation proceedings, it seems clear from their contents the respective authors were willing to speak positively the Appellant’s character despite the allegations made against him.

143. All of that has been taken into account. As with earlier parts of the appeal, however, any positive features are overcome by the seriousness and extent of offending. That includes the fact of multiple victims, sexually abused in some instances over a period of years. Subject to earlier discussion about nuances within the evidence, there remains some concern as to the Appellant’s view of his convictions. That links to issues around contacting children in possible contravention of the sexual harm prevention order.

144. When taken together, the extreme seriousness of offending means it cannot be said the Appellant is socially integrated. The arguments which fall in his favour have some strength. It is ultimately not enough to redress the balance.

145. I will nevertheless consider the question of obstacles to re-integration on return to Italy. The decision letter referred to the presence of family there, some indication of financial independence as signs integration sufficient barriers do not exist.

146. The Appellant’s skeleton relied on an absence of family or private life in Italy, absence of support networks and length of absence. The latter is, given my conclusion around time spent in the UK, accepted. It carries some weight. Though there were several returns to Italy up to 2019, Ms.Lanigan is right to observe a difference exists between relatively short spans of time spent somewhere and living there. On the other hand, without unduly going over that already considered there is some evidence of retained ties. The Appellant on what was said in court associated with Italian citizens at his restaurant. His wife and ex-wife have ties to that country through family.

147. Whilst in the UK for several decades, the Appellant was born and became an adult in his home nation. It cannot in my view be considered an entirely unfamiliar environment. Some cultural knowledge will I find likely have been retained. I recognise the point that the Appellant was a young adult on leaving Italy. Whilst accepted, he had nevertheless progressed beyond childhood by that point. No language barrier has been identified. From needing an interpreter in court and claims to understand English at a “10%” level, it seems the Appellant remains fluent in Italian.

148. As to family ties in Italy, even on the Appellant’s account some remain. No challenge has been made to the suggestion contact with them is comparatively limited. It is not, however, asserted any rift exists with relatives overseas. Though care is taken not to overstate the point, they are relatively close relations – siblings. Both the Appellant’s wife and ex-wife also have family in Italy. That may be less relevant in relation to the latter, given the length of time since the marriage ended. Perhaps more so as regards the Appellant’s wife. No claim has been made they or any other family member would be unwilling to assist him on return.

149. Per the OASys report, the Appellant indicated he would be able to cope if sent back to Italy. In making that observation, I recognise via his evidence in court the Appellant denied having said that to the report writer. He suggested misunderstanding arose between an ability to adapt to life in Italy and what was believed to be completing a form listing emergency contacts. Whilst I do not ignore such claim, it might be difficult to reconcile filling in a document with what appears to have been a verbal discussion with a probation officer.

150. There is perhaps the more board point made about lack of overall understanding. I bear that in mind, along with the need for an interpreter in court. The appeal was adjourned on a previous occasion for lack thereof. It may, I accept, be difficult to find comparative lack of English as a potentially negative balancing factor in the appeal and at the same time hold the Appellant understood everything discussed during the OASys report process. Then again, no challenge to the report contents had been made prior to the hearing. That lends at least some credence to the suggestion what was said through the OASys report about ability to cope in Italy may have been accurately recorded.

151. Even if I am wrong and limited family ties remain in Italy, the Appellant has a long work history. Additional qualifications have been achieved in custody. That may mean he is in a better position than some to find employment. No argument has been made that the fact of convictions for child sex offences would be a barrier to re-integration overseas. In the absence of submissions on the point, I cannot engage in what would be speculation. Nothing has been argued as to lack of available state support in Italy. That is not to say I have assumed such exists but nor does the Appellant claim he would be destitute on return. I similarly make no assumptions about support from family in the UK, though an income exists by way of either a state and possibly a private pension on top of that.

152. Given those factors, it is difficult to see how the very significant threshold can be met. Length of absence is a strong element in the Appellant’s favour. I accept entirely relatively significant obstacles to re-integration would arise. They are, however, mitigated by the aspects discussed above such that the required level has not been established.

153. Exception one is not therefore satisfied.

Exception two – S117C(5) NIAA

154. Both of the Appellant’s children are adults. That means they cannot be considered under this exception. What remains is the relationship between the Appellant and his wife. The skeleton argument did not explicitly refer to exception two (nor one) though does list among factors deemed relevant to any ‘balance sheet’ assessment impact on immediate family members. I shall take that to include the Appellant’s wife.

155. Although disputed in the decision letter, Ms.Malomo (presenting officer at the earlier hearing before me) conceded the Appellant’s wife is a British citizen. No challenge was made in court or otherwise to the existence of a genuine and subsisting relationship. The question therefore to determine is whether removal would be unduly harsh, both as to whether the Appellant’s wife remained in the UK without him or moved to Italy. Each must be established for the exception to be met.

156. At 6.12 of the OASys report, the Appellant is said to have suggested his wife would go with him were he required to leave the UK. As with an earlier point, the Appellant denied having said as much in court. He again referred to the language barrier. That is not implausible per se, though as before misunderstanding is something raised for the first time in court. It is also right to note per evidence given in court the Appellant’s wife said he did not mean to make such comment. That is not quite the same as claims of misunderstanding. I do, that, said, recognise both the Appellant and his wife in their statements indicated deportation would result in their being separated. That bolsters what the Appellant says on the topic.

157. Assuming for a moment that is correct, I will begin with the ‘stay’ scenario. Much per an issue discussed earlier in the judgment, I appreciate a difference exists between someone being in prison domestically and their removal to another country. Even given the length of sentence imposed, the Appellant’s current location is likely less permanent than deportation. Telephone calls could continue in either situation, though in-person contact would inevitably be reduced. Some weight has been given to the marital relationship itself. The Appellant’s wife has stuck by him, despite his offending behaviour. That speaks to an extent of perhaps deeper than typical emotional ties. As might the marriage having been in place for more than thirty years.

158. There are some balancing elements. It seems clear the Appellant’s wife has at least some ability to visit Italy were he to leave and she remained. There have been previous trips. I make no assumptions about her means but financial barriers to travel have not been raised as a concern. That means some physical contact with the Appellant could be maintained. As could calls. No suggestion is made the marriage would be over were the Appellant overseas.

159. It is not said the Appellant’s wife is financially supported by him. He voiced the belief in court his state pension is paid to the Prison Service. Even if so, no claims are made that the wife faces destitution without her husband making a financial contribution. I am not told others have had to provide financial help during the Appellant’s custodial sentence to make up any shortfall. As he indicted in the OASys report, the couple were able to cope on their income. Nothing in the evidence demonstrates that will change.

160. I cannot in those circumstances be satisfied undue harshness would flow from the ‘stay’ scenario. That is not to say there would be no upset or impact caused. More than that must be established, however. While recognising the continued loyalty of the Appellant’s wife notwithstanding his criminal convictions, that is not enough to persuade me sufficient impact would result. Nor is the length of the marriage.

161. The ‘go’ scenario is perhaps more nuanced. The Respondent relies on the Appellant’s wife speaking Italian, holding dual nationality and the presence of family members. Those elements have some force. Italy is not an unfamiliar environment. Integration might be more straightforward compared to some as a result. The Appellant’s presence may also assist in that regard, along with his siblings equally being present. No health issues are raised.

162. Set against that are a number of factors. In court, the Appellant’s wife spoke of her entire life being in the UK. Her family is here, which per the statement includes two adult children and a grandchild aged three. Close bonds are described. This is where her parents are buried. There has never been any desire to live overseas, albeit the prospect had been discussed with the Appellant due to these proceedings. Though a dual passport holder, the wife was born in this country and has lived here her entire life. She owns a property.

163. Although perhaps arguable on both sides, I am not persuaded on the evidence presented it would be unduly harsh were the Appellant’s wife to accompany him to Italy. Her life having always been in this country. Without being unkind, a certain age has been reached meaning many decades have passed in the UK. I accept through that and close family here it is the centre of the wife’s life. Balanced against that is a greater ability to adapt than many through dual nationality and understanding of language. Although never having lived in Italy, the Appellant’s wife has the elements considered at some familiarity with the country and its culture. The presence of family there plays a part in that. Whilst there is evidence to show positive relationships with relatives in the UK, none are characterised as going beyond that one might consider typical. The Appellant’s wife is not relied on for care of any relative, be it adult or child. No claim is made her absence would have a significant impact – beyond what could be considered normal in such circumstances – on the best interests of the latter. Nothing would seemingly prevent return to the UK for visits or maintenance of communication.

164. That is not to say there would be no barriers to relocation. The issue is finely-balanced. I am not, however, persuaded the obstacles shown would reach the required level of undue harshness. Exception two is not met.

Very compelling Circumstances

165. Even if either exception was found to apply, the Appellant must also by virtue of the sentence imposed demonstrate very compelling circumstances exist. Ms.Lanigan relied on much the same points as made in relation to other parts of the appeal. Emphasis was placed on the extent of ties established in the UK, it being suggested removal would be an unjustifiable interference with the rights of both the Appellant and his family.

166. I have addressed at considerable length many of those elements. I will rehearse that said only briefly as a result, though bear in mind consideration of the human rights limb of the appeal is distinct from any others. Weight is given to the considerable period spent in this country. The Appellant has over forty (or more) years created a life here. His work is taken into account. A positive contribution was made to society prior to the offences which began in 2015. During the same period, a family grew around him. All of that has value, even allowing as I must for the detrimental effect the serious criminality which followed represents.

167. I have set out the likely effect of removal on the Appellant’s wife. Some would result, though as discussed not to the extent exception two to deportation is met. That does not automatically mean very compelling circumstances cannot derive from the point but nor is there enough here to satisfy me of that.

168. Nothing indicates the marriage would be over in any scenario presented. Some scope exists for the Appellant’s wife to visit Italy should she remain here. Contact could be maintained. No financial difficulty has been cited as likely to arise. Alternatively, I find any barrier moving to Italy might represent would not be sufficient whereby the appeal could succeed. The applicable factors have already been discussed at length. They apply equally to this topic. There is greater familiarity with Italian culture, language than might often be the case. Some family are present in that country. Corresponding ties exist to this country. They are not, however, such that the required threshold is met. Whilst per her evidence in court the Appellant’s wife made clear she will not leave the UK, that is a matter of choice. Her husband’s departure would not require that.

169. As to the adult children involved, no statements are provided from those of the Appellant’s wife. Both he and his wife suggested in their statements the Appellant has been a stepfather to each. If so, one might wonder why they have not given at least letters of support. I am not clearly told of ongoing contact from prison or what effect the Appellant’s absence might have upon them.

170. Turning to the Appellant’s own children, they are equally adults. I am asked to take into account the mental health problems suffered by the son. Some weight has been given to that, though it appears from the evidence given in court he remains in a stable, protective environment. There is no medical evidence presented at the extent of his health issues. Corroboration is not a requirement but equally little information exists as to, for example, prognosis.

171. No challenge is made to claims of ongoing contact from prison. I recognise as with other elements of the appeal a difference exists between having a father in custody for a finite period of time and the perhaps more open-ended prospect of him being overseas. It may be travel by the son to Italy is less possible than for other relatives due to his health. Telephone contact could, however, likely continue. No suggestion is made that removal would mean the end of all communication.

172. The extent to which a relationship existed prior to the Appellant going into custody is less clear. That has relevance, given assertions in his statement the deportation will be detrimental to the son’s mental health. Even if some impact flowed from that, other family members – including the Appellant’s ex-wife – would remain in the UK. This is not a case where the son would be left alone. Continuing medical support is not contingent on the Appellant’s presence. One text message is produced showing contact in the past. That does not have to mean communication was quite that limited, though equally nothing else is produced on the topic.

173. For both the son and Appellant’s daughter, some doubt arose from the OASys report about the degree to which ties existed at the time. The evidence given in court around the latter was mixed. At one point, the Appellant agreed with description in the report that things with his daughter were volatile. His reply was ‘very’ (as translated.) In making that observation, I recognise when asked to expand the Appellant described things as being akin to friends, a typical father-daughter bond. I also appreciate the other witnesses disputed any suggestion of volatility. There is nevertheless reference in the OASys report to things being strained.

174. That applied also to the son. Some contact takes place with the daughter, though to a lesser degree than the Appellant’s wife. That may, as said in court, be due to commitments such as work. I acknowledge the daughter’s evidence that travel to Italy might be financially difficult.

175. I see no reason to doubt the Appellant’s children care about him. His removal would cause upset. That, however, is an expected by-product of deportation.. On the evidence presented, I cannot be satisfied the relationships which exist go beyond that typical between a parent and their adult children. It is difficult to see how, as a result, very compelling circumstances arise.

176. On a related note, though letters of support are provided no-one within the community suggests the Appellant’s absence would have a particularly detrimental effect on them. Any friendships developed appear fairly typical. They could perhaps be maintained at a distance. As the Appellant accepted in court, none of those who wrote supportive letters has spoken to him since the prison sentence began.

177. That leaves the Appellant’s grand children. As discussed above, there is little evidence relating to the grandchild of the Appellant’s wife. Both say in their statements a close bond exists. There remains a question why, if so, their parents have not provided evidence. The Appellant did not claim in court or otherwise he has maintained contact with that child. The subject was not mentioned at all. It appear communication has been limited to the two children of his daughter.

178. Without rehearsing again that said in detail, such contact raises a number of concerns. The sexual harm prevention order means calls from the prison to any child should not be taking place without social services consent. That will remain the case on release. Whilst I have not just assumed a request for contact to occur would necessarily be refused it cannot be taken as read that would be permitted. As things stand, there is no evidence to show such request has been made. That means it is possible any calls currently made to the grandchildren will end. Given the Appellant is not due for release for some years, ties to them would if so perhaps fade.

179. Even if one were to put that element aside, it has not been argued the Appellant’s support was or would be required in future for the grandchildren to remain in a stable, safe environment. The evidence is they are with their mother. No reason exists to show that will change if the Appellant departs. Aside from telephone calls, he has been absent from their lives for over two years. That is some proportion of their lives given the ages involved. I am not told either child has directly suffered as a result, though accept that may be partly due to believing their grandfather is working overseas.

180. The same level of contact, if it is ever permitted, could be maintained from Italy. Given the story told to the grandchildren, from their perspective little would seemingly change if the Appellant actually was in another country. As with other family members, I do nevertheless acknowledge the reality could be different were the Appellant removed to Italy. It is asserted in the Appellant’s statement his grandchildren cannot wait to see him again. Even if so, that goes back to the doubts around whether contact would be permitted. The indication from the OASys report is it may not be.

181. I have borne in mind the best interests of each child mentioned in these proceedings. That has significant, though not necessarily determinative value. It seems clear in my view that were the Appellant removed his grandchildren would continue with their lives. Whilst some upset may result, as with adult relatives that is likely to be no more than what one would typically except. Nothing reaching very compelling circumstances has been shown. This is not a case where, for example, the Appellant claims to have been a father figure to any child. His involvement with them is portrayed as no more than that of an average grandfather. That carries some weight but not enough that the appeal might succeed under this heading.

182. I am not persuaded the high threshold required by which very compelling circumstances arise has been satisfied. That is so even if one takes all of the above elements together. The public interest in removal is extremely powerful, given the seriousness of offences committed.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

Signed Date 1st November, 2026

Fttj JEPSON

First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson

Notes

[1] [2009] EWCA Civ 923.

[2] Ibid, paragraph 3.

[3] [2024] EWCA Civ 14.

[4] Ibid., paragraph 13.

[5] Op.Cit., paragraph 51.

[6] [2019] UKSC 35.

[7] [2015] EWCA Civ 1245.

[8] Ibid., paragraph 25.

[9] [2009] UKIAT 24.

[10] C-145/90.

[11] Op.Cit.

[12] Subject to earlier discussion as to the extent of some of those, for example in relation to the daughter and son.

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.


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