Miscellaneous United Kingdom

TEN v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Official source

Appeal No. UA-2026-000146-PIP

RULE 14 ORDER: It is prohibited for any person to disclose or publish any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant in these proceedings. Failure to comply with this order may amount to contempt of court and could lead to a fine, imprisonment or other sanction.

This order does not prevent the use of any information or documents by any court or tribunal within subsequent proceedings in this case.

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER

Between:

TEN

Appellant

– v –

The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Respondent

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Butler

Decided on consideration of the papers

Representation:

Appellant: In person

Respondent: Ms S. Hennessy, Decision Making and Appeals, DWP

On appeal from:

Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Tribunal Case No: SC002/25/00384

Tribunal: Judge L. Gardner-Browne, Mrs R. Ferguson and Dr V. Conrad

Tribunal Venue: Nottingham

Decision Date: 04 November 2025

DECISION

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law. I SET ASIDE its decision under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and REMIT the case to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a differently constituted tribunal under section 12(2)(b)(i) of that Act.

DIRECTIONS

A. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to consider afresh at an oral hearing.

B. The new Tribunal should not involve any of the panel members previously involved in considering this appeal on 04 November 2025.

C. The new Tribunal must not take account of circumstances that did not apply at the relevant date of the Secretary of State’s entitlement decision. Later evidence can be considered as long as it relates to the circumstances at the time of that decision: see R(DLA) 2/01 and R(DLA) 3/01.

D. If the parties have any further written evidence to put before the Tribunal, this should be sent to the relevant HMCTS regional tribunal office within one month of the issue of this decision.

E. The Tribunal hearing the remitted appeal is not bound in any way by the decision of the previous First-tier Tribunal.

F. Copies of this decision, the permission to appeal decision and the written submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State (dated 16 June 2026) and the Appellant (dated 20 July 2026) shall be added to the bundle to be placed before the First-tier Tribunal hearing the remitted appeal.

These Directions may be supplemented by later directions by a tribunal judge, registrar, or case worker, in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. I have made an anonymity order in this case, of my own motion. The initials “TEN” have been chosen at random and do not have any connection to the actual name of the Appellant.

Factual background

2. TEN was awarded personal independence payment (“PIP”) in 2023, from 14 January 2022 to 31 January 2025. She was awarded 8 points for daily living activities (1.b, 4.b, 6.b and 9.b) and no points for mobility activities by a First-tier Tribunal, which set aside a decision by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions dated 04 May 2022. The FTT awarded TEN the PIP daily living component at the standard rate for a period of 3 years.

3. On 14 May 2024, TEN contacted the Department for Work and Pensions (“DWP”) which administers benefit on behalf of the Secretary of State. TEN contacted DWP about her PIP award, which led to DWP carrying out a review of it. TEN provided an award review form (AR1). On 01 February 2025, DWP decided that TEN continued to score the same 8 points for daily living activities and no points for mobility ones. This was a supersession decision (which means a decision changing an existing decision), which DWP made on the basis that TEN’s circumstances had changed. DWP decided TEN remained entitled to the PIP daily living component at the standard rate, now running from 01 February 2025 to 31 January 2028. TEN asked DWP to reconsider its decision, but on 23 May 2025, DWP maintained its position.

4. On 31 May 2025, TEN lodged an appeal with the First-tier Tribunal. Her appeal was determined by a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) on 04 November 2025 on the basis of the papers. The FTT decided to award TEN descriptor 1.b (2 points), 4.b (2 points), 6.b (2 points) and 9.c (4 points), giving her a total of 10 points for daily living activities. The FTT decided TEN scored no points for mobility activities. As the threshold for an award of either component at the enhanced rate is 12 points, the FTT confirmed DWP’s decision and refused TEN’s appeal.

The Upper Tribunal decision granting permission to appeal

5. On 03 May 2026, I granted TEN permission to appeal. I decided the following appeal grounds were arguable with a realistic prospect of success.

6. Planning and following a journey (mobility activity 1): it was arguable the FTT failed to distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar journeys. TEN had argued that she was unable to follow the route of unfamiliar journeys. It was arguable the FTT had not separated out TEN’s ability to follow the route of an unfamiliar journey from her ability to follow the route of familiar ones. The FTT’s reasoning at paragraph 33 of the Statement of Reasons also potentially conflated the test of planning the route of a journey with following it.

7. The FTT considered a problematic journey TEN had given evidence about in terms of whether she could do it safely but not whether she could complete it to an acceptable standard. The FTT found TEN did not experience overwhelming psychological distress but had arguably not explained why. TEN’s partner had given written evidence about her needing repeated directions, including for familiar journeys and panicking when she took the wrong turn. The FTT had not explained what it made of this evidence.

8. The FTT also found at paragraph 34 of the Statement of Reasons that TEN could use public transport, including the bus and went shopping twice a week. It was not clear what the FTT had based this on, since TEN’s questionnaire in 2022 stated she shopped twice a week but most of the time ordered shopping to be delivered to her. TEN had not written that she went out to shop twice a week. The PA4 PIP assessment completed on 21 April 2022 stated TEN reported all her food shopping was ordered online and delivered. The healthcare professional had also recorded that TEN was learning to drive and that, if she had to go out, she would use a bus but only twice a month. TEN had not been asked to take part in a new PA4 assessment in 2024, so it was unclear which evidence the FTT used to base its finding that TEN went out twice a week. This may indicate it made a perverse or irrational factual finding (meaning one no reasonable FTT could have made on the evidence before it).

9. Explaining adequately why it decided TEN’s appeal on the papers: In DT v SSWP (UC) [2019] UKUT 268 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal explained that the duty to hold an oral hearing is a strong one. It explained that rules 2 and 27 confirm that to justify deciding an appeal on the papers, the FTT must acknowledge both that it has considered both whether the parties have consented (or not objected) to a decision being made without a hearing and that it can fairly decide the appeal without holding one. It must also explain why.

10. It was arguable that while the FTT mentioned rules 2 and 27 and that it decided it could determine TEN’s appeal on the papers, it had not explained why. This might represent an error of law.

The parties’ submissions

11. Ms Hennessy represents the Secretary of State in the appeal to the Upper Tribunal. She has provided helpful written submissions dated 16 June 2026. Ms Hennessy supports the appeal on the basis the FTT has made material errors of law, summarised below, and invites me to remit it to a new Tribunal to decide.

12. Explaining its decision to proceed on the papers: Ms Hennessy observes that the FTT wrote the following when explaining its decision to proceed on the papers:

“The matter was considered by the Tribunal on 04/11/2025 on the papers alone. As no party had objected to the matter being decided without a hearing and, having considered the appeal bundle and the requirements of rules 2 and 27 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was able to decide the case in this way…”

13. Ms Hennessy submits that the FTT simply mentioned rules 2 and 27, without applying the correct test, explained in DT v SSWP (see citation at paragraph 9 above). The FTT needed to explain why it decided it could deal with TEN’s appeal fairly and justly by determining it on the papers. Ms Hennessy submits the FTT failed to do so and this represents a material error of law.

14. Adequacy of factual findings and reasoning for the FTT’s decision about planning and following a journey (PIP mobility activity 1): Ms Hennessy observes that the FTT found at paragraph 18 of the Statement of Reasons that TEN’s main disabling condition was autism. The FTT acknowledged TEN had reported difficulties in following directions when driving. Ms Hennessy refers to paragraph 34 of the Statement of Reasons, where the FTT wrote:

“The Tribunal had to take a holistic approach to [claimant’s] ability to carry out this activity. Evidence indicates that [claimant] is able to use public transport, including the bus, and she goes shopping twice a week…”

15. Ms Hennessy submits it is unclear what evidence the FTT used to make this finding. TEN did not refer to using public transport or going shopping twice a week in her award review form dated 10 June 2024. In her earlier PIP2 questionnaire dated 10 February 2022, TEN had stated:

“I shop twice a week. Most of the time I order shopping to be delivered to me because the thought of going out is overwhelming. Going to the shop down the road can also be overwhelming so my partner will go for me.”

16. Ms Hennessy points out that the PA4 report completed on 21 April 2022 recorded that TEN reported all her food shopping was ordered online and delivered. The autistic spectrum disorder assessment for TEN, completed on 17 August 2021 stated:

“For food shopping she is able to go herself, two days a week however if the shops are busy, it can get quite overwhelming for her therefore she likes to go at a time when it’s quiet.” [page 51 of FTT bundle]

17. Ms Hennessy observes that the FTT appeared to make its factual finding based on the fact TEN had told the healthcare professional in 2022 that if she had to go out she would use a bus, but this was only twice a month. The FTT acknowledged TEN had passed her driving test since she was awarded PIP in 2022 but did not consider or explain how this change in her circumstances might have impacted the journeys TEN made regularly, or which method of transport she used.

18. Ms Hennessy submits that the FTT did correctly understand that it had to carry out a holistic assessment of TEN’s ability to plan and follow a journey using a range of different methods of transport. She submits that on reading the Statement of Reasons, however, it is unclear whether the FTT considered TEN’s ability to carry out mobility activity 1 at the date of DWP’s decision on 01 February 2025.

19. Ms Hennessy submits that while the FTT considered TEN’s reported difficulties when driving unfamiliar journeys did not prevent her planning and following journeys safely, the FTT does not appear to have considered whether TEN could complete them to an acceptable standard. This is required by regulation 4(2A)(b) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013.

20. Ms Hennessy highlights that in the case of CPIP/638/2016, the Upper Tribunal held:

“15. “Even if the claimant misses turn offs, there is no evidence that the claimant cannot get back onto his route afterwards. I do not accept that missing turn offs is capable in itself of placing a person within descriptor 1d because it does not mean that a person cannot follow an unfamiliar route to an acceptable standard.”

21. Ms Hennessy submits that with this in mind, while the FTT acknowledged TEN’s account of ending up in the wrong lane at a roundabout (paragraph 33 of Statement of Reasons), it did not make any clear findings about whether TEN was able to return to her route after making a mistake without requiring assistance from her partner or another person. Nor did it make findings about whether she could thereby follow the route of her journey to an acceptable standard.

22. Ms Hennessy observes that the FTT concluded the journey TEN described where she ended up in the wrong lane of the roundabout was: “…understandably stressful but did not amount to [claimant] experiencing overwhelming psychological distress as a result of her medical conditions”. Ms Hennessy submits that the FTT failed to make any findings about the panic TEN reported experiencing during this journey and did not clearly explain why this did not amount to overwhelming psychological distress. Nor did the FTT make findings of fact about whether TEN experienced overwhelming psychological distress on other journeys, whether familiar or unfamiliar, and what level of panic she might experience on taking a wrong turn without her partner’s presence and support.

23. Ms Hennessy submits that apart from the unfamiliar journey the FTT considered at paragraph 33 of the Statement of Reasons, its reasoning does not clearly separate out TEN’s ability to follow the route of an unfamiliar journey from her ability to follow the route of a familiar one. Ms Hennessy also points out that the FTT acknowledged TEN’s evidence was that she required her partner to be with her to direct her even on familiar journeys and her partner also reported this (paragraph 31 of Statement of Reasons). Ms Hennessy submits that this reflects the evidence from TEN’s partner that:

“when [claimant] drives me for work, I have to repeat directions as she forgets especially in a new area but can happen even in areas She’s driven multiple times befor[e]. When she takes the wrong turn she starts to panic.” [Addition C, page 2]

24. Ms Hennessy submits that the FTT has failed to explain what it made of this evidence. In its reasons at paragraph 32 of the Statement of Reasons, the FTT determined TEN could use a satellite navigation (“sat nav”) system rather than requiring her partner to accompany her. Ms Hennessy points out that at paragraph 35 of the Statement of Reasons, the FTT impliedly concluded that TEN did not actually require assistance from her partner.

25. Ms Hennessy submits, however, that the Statement of Reasons does not contain any factual findings supporting the FTT’s assertion that TEN could use a sat nav system to follow the routes of journeys. The FTT did not, for example, make factual findings about whether TEN had tried to use that type of system before and whether she experienced difficulties when doing so. Ms Hennessy makes the observation that the FTT does not appear to have given due consideration to the evidence from TEN’s partner that he has to repeat directions as she forgets (given a sat nav system would generally not repeat a forgotten direction). Nor did the FTT consider the evidence from TEN that her partner has to give her short directions otherwise she forgets them and drives the wrong way. Ms Hennessy submits that the FTT did not appear to consider whether a generally available sat nav system would realistically be able to provide, and repeat at appropriate intervals, the short directions TEN requires to follow the route of a journey.

26. Ms Hennessy submits that this represents a material error of law; the FTT failed to consider the evidence holistically and provide adequate reasons, supported by proper factual findings, to decide that TEN scored mobility descriptor 1.a. She argues that the Statement of Reasons does not refer to any familiar journeys TEN was able to complete successfully on an unaccompanied basis, and the FTT has not engaged with the evidence TEN and her partner gave of following and remembering directions, which were relevant to the application of regulation 4(2A) of the Social Security (Personal Independence Payment) Regulations 2013.

27. Having seen the submissions made on behalf of the Secretary of State, TEN indicates she agrees that the FTT made errors of law in relation to PIP Mobility activity 1 (planning and following a journey).

28. TEN repeats, however, arguments she raised when seeking permission to appeal about whether the FTT made a material error of law in relation to PIP daily living activity 2 (taking nutrition). TEN argues that an error of law here would be material because she was awarded 10 points without scoring any points for that activity and if she were awarded an additional 4 points for requiring prompting, it would give her 14 points and an award of the daily living component at the enhanced rate.

Why there was no oral hearing of this appeal

29. Neither party requested an oral hearing of this appeal. I took their preferences into account. I decided the interests of justice did not require an oral hearing. The parties are agreed that the FTT made material errors of law in relation to the PIP activity of planning and following a journey. It is not necessary to have an oral hearing in order to determine that issue. Holding an oral hearing is not required to resolve matters and would simply delay determining TEN’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal. It was therefore proportionate to determine the appeal on the papers, as I have done.

My decision

30. At the permission stage, I only needed to be persuaded that it was arguable with a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success that the FTT had made an error of law in a way that was material. At this substantive stage, I need to be satisfied that the FTT made one or more errors of law that were material.

31. I am satisfied that the FTT made material errors of law in relation to the appeal grounds addressed at paragraphs 12 to 26 above. I accept Ms Hennessy’s submissions about those matters. The FTT failed adequately to explain why it was fair and just to determine the appeal without a hearing. In relation to mobility activity 1, it made material factual findings without identifying an adequate evidential basis for them, failed to apply all aspects of regulation 4(2A), and failed to engage adequately with what appeared to be relevant evidence from TEN and her partner. The FTT’s reasons do not enable TEN to understand why that evidence was rejected or why descriptor 1.a was selected. Those failures amount to material errors of law.

32. The FTT’s failure adequately to explain why it was fair and just to determine the appeal without a hearing was material because, had an oral hearing been held, the FTT would have had the opportunity to receive and assess oral evidence relevant to TEN’s entitlement to PIP, both in relation to daily living and mobility matters. The FTT’s errors of law in relation to mobility activity 1 were material because, had they not been made, it might have awarded TEN points under that activity, and she might consequently have qualified for the mobility component of PIP.

33. While TEN has repeated the ground she sought permission to appeal on about taking nutrition, the Secretary of State has not yet commented on it. I recognise that TEN feels strongly about her appeal ground regarding taking nutrition. However, I do not need to resolve it in order to decide the FTT made material errors of law in relation to TEN’s appeal. If I were to address it, it would be necessary, for reasons of fairness, to invite the Secretary of State to comment on it. That would delay determination of TEN’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal, even though it is unnecessary to resolve that ground in order to dispose of the appeal.

34. Applying the overriding objective in rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, I consider it is proportionate to decide TEN’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis of the errors of law that the Secretary of State has addressed, at least one of which (regarding planning and following a journey) TEN agrees with.

35. I emphasise that this does not prevent TEN from arguing her position with the next First-tier Tribunal that considers her appeal. See below, where I remit her appeal to a new First-tier Tribunal to decide.

Conclusion, including disposal

36. Having decided the FTT’s decision involved material errors of law, it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the Tribunal’s decision dated 04 November 2025 under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. The effect of setting aside the FTT’s decision is that the Secretary of State’s decision of 1 February 2025 remains the decision under appeal.

37. Section 12(2)(b) of that Act requires me to either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration or to remake the decision.

38. Ms Hennessy invited me to remit the appeal to a new First-tier Tribunal. TEN has not argued for any other approach. I am satisfied that I should remit this appeal for determination by a new Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal is best placed to evaluate the evidence, including using its medical and disability expertise, and to make appropriate findings of fact.

39. I therefore remit TEN’s appeal for rehearing before a new First-tier Tribunal. The new Tribunal will make a fresh decision on TEN’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 1 February 2025. In doing so, it will determine her entitlement to PIP and, if it concludes that TEN’s award should have been superseded, but with effect from an earlier date, the correct effective date of that decision. This may require it to consider whether any relevant change occurred on or after 14 May 2024, when TEN contacted DWP to report a change in the way her conditions affected her.

40. It is open to TEN to raise with the next First-tier Tribunal all the arguments she has raised with the Upper Tribunal about whether she should be awarded points for requiring prompting to take nutrition.

41. Although I have set aside the FTT’s decision dated 04 November 2025, I do not make any findings, or express any view, about the correct rate of TEN’s entitlement or the date from which any different award should take effect. Those matters are for the new Tribunal.

Judith Butler

Upper Tribunal Judge

Authorised for issue: 25 October 2026

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