A Canadian woman who previously worked as an intern at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons remains in Belgian pre-trial custody in a case that prosecutors describe as suspected espionage for a third country and participation in a criminal organisation. The initial arrest followed security information passed to Belgian military intelligence and searches at a home and a workplace inside the SHAPE site, according to the Associated Press report published on 25 July 2026. On 31 August, Reuters reported that Belgium’s Chamber of Indictments had extended the detention for another month. Those allegations remain allegations: no conviction is established by the public reports. The immediate cross-border question is not whether Belgium may investigate, but whether a Belgian judicial request can reach French witnesses, providers, premises or records, and what happens when the requested material may touch French national-security secrecy or professional privilege. Public reporting has not shown that such a French request has been issued. The analysis must therefore separate confirmed facts from the legal routes that may follow next.
The case is legally important beyond Belgium. A defence file, witness, telecom record, cloud account, bank trail or classified document connected with the alleged conduct may sit in France or involve a French-based person. The cross-border instrument would not automatically be an arrest warrant. It may instead be a European Investigation Order, followed—if a person is sought in France—by a separate European Arrest Warrant. This analysis explains what French counsel should check before a Belgian request reaches a French prosecutor or investigating judge, how national-security classification can change the route, and which safeguards matter if Belgium later seeks surrender. Public reporting does not establish that a French search, European Investigation Order or European Arrest Warrant has been issued in this case; the legal analysis below identifies the consequences if one is requested.
I. Can Belgium obtain evidence from France in the SHAPE espionage case?
A. What a European Investigation Order can actually request from France
The first question is not whether Belgium has a serious allegation. It is what act Belgium wants France to perform. A cross-border criminal file can involve several different acts: taking a witness statement, identifying the subscriber behind an internet address, obtaining an existing telecom record, imaging a device, searching premises, freezing material, or transferring a detained person temporarily for a procedural act. Each act has its own French legal conditions. Calling every request an “evidence request” hides the distinction that determines whether France can recognise and execute it.
For the wider French framework, see the firm’s overview of extradition procedure and safeguards before the French investigating chamber. This article narrows the question to a live Belgian security investigation, classified material and the interaction between evidence cooperation and surrender.
Article 694-15 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the European Investigation Order as the normal channel for many forms of criminal assistance between France and other EU Member States. The provision states: « les demandes d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale entre la France et les autres Etats membres de l’Union européenne se font par l’intermédiaire des décisions d’enquête européenne »
. The rule is not a licence for Belgian investigators to exercise French powers directly. It identifies the judicial channel through which a Belgian authority asks the competent French authority to carry out a defined measure.
Article 694-16 supplies the legal definition. It describes a European Investigation Order as « une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre »
asking another Member State to conduct investigations on its territory within a stated period or to communicate evidence already held. The European Commission’s explanation of taking evidence in another EU country follows the same practical logic: an issuing judicial authority identifies the investigative measure, and the executing state carries it out through its own judicial system.
For a SHAPE-related investigation, the possible French connection should be mapped by object rather than by nationality. A French resident who communicated with the suspect may be a witness. A French telecom operator may hold subscriber or connection data. A French cloud provider or French office may have records, although the location of a server alone does not answer the question of who controls the data or which legal instrument applies. A device transported into France may require a search or seizure, not merely a request for information. A lawyer, journalist, medical professional or company compliance officer may hold material subject to professional secrecy. A document originating at NATO may raise a separate classification or immunity issue.
The order must therefore be precise. Counsel should ask whether the Belgian authority seeks evidence already in French possession, a new interview, a search, a seizure, an account identification, preservation of material, or a technical operation. The period, account, device, address, person, offence and evidentiary purpose should be identifiable. A request framed as “all communications connected with SHAPE” creates a different proportionality problem from a request identifying one account, a defined date range and a stated factual hypothesis. The legal value of the material cannot cure an undefined request.
Article 694-33 is especially useful for understanding the lower-intrusion end of the scale. It lists measures such as obtaining information already held by French authorities, interviewing a witness, suspect or third party, identifying a subscriber linked to a particular telephone number or an individual connected with a particular internet-protocol address, and « toute autre mesure d’enquête non intrusive qui ne porte pas atteinte aux droits ou libertés individuels »
. That list does not mean every digital request is non-intrusive. The relevant question is the operation actually requested and its effect on privacy, defence rights, property and secrecy.
A request for an existing subscriber record is not the same as a request to enter a home and copy every device. A request for an already recorded message is not the same as live interception. A request for a witness interview is not a power to interrogate a suspect without the status, warnings, lawyer access and language safeguards required by the applicable French procedure. A request to preserve data is not automatically a request to disclose it. The French authority must classify the measure correctly before deciding how to execute it.
The French code also shows why necessity and proportionality must be addressed early. Article 694-20, which governs the conditions under which French judicial authorities may issue an order, refers to a measure that is « nécessaire à la constatation, à la poursuite ou au jugement d’une infraction »
, proportionate in relation to the rights of the suspect, accused or convicted person, and capable of being carried out under the Code. For an incoming order, the principal refusal and execution provisions are Articles 694-29 to 694-49, but the same statutory vocabulary is an important warning against treating the European instrument as a blank cheque.
That point matters in an espionage investigation because the most valuable evidence may also be the most sensitive. A Belgian prosecutor may need to establish who accessed a restricted system, who communicated with whom, when a document moved, or whether a person had authority to receive it. The request may reach ordinary evidence—travel records, messages, invoices or witness testimony—or it may seek intelligence material. The fact that the case concerns NATO does not convert every item into a state secret, but neither does the cross-border mechanism erase French classification rules.
The European Investigation Order and a European Arrest Warrant serve different purposes. The first is an evidence instrument. The second is an arrest-and-surrender instrument. An individual can therefore be the subject of evidence requests while remaining outside any surrender procedure. In the present case, the public reports describe detention in Belgium, not a French arrest. Counsel should not infer the existence of a French warrant from the fact that Belgian investigators may later need French evidence.
The distinction also affects the defence timetable. An evidence request can arrive while the person is detained in Belgium and before a charge is finally framed. A French lawyer may need to act for a person, company or professional whose premises or records are targeted even though that person is not the Belgian suspect. The first task is to obtain the exact French act implementing the request, not to debate the entire Belgian narrative in the abstract.
Finally, the instrument does not decide the evidentiary weight of what it obtains. France executes a measure; Belgium remains responsible for the investigation and, subject to Belgian law and applicable EU rules, the use of the evidence in its proceedings. A French challenge may concern recognition, execution, the domestic search or seizure, professional secrecy, or the manner in which the material was transferred. A Belgian challenge may concern the issuing authority, the factual basis, the legality of the investigation or the admissibility of the evidence in the Belgian case. Those are related but distinct questions.
B. Which safeguards apply before French authorities execute a Belgian request?
For an incoming European Investigation Order, the first safeguard is recognition by a French judicial authority. Article 694-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires refusal in specified situations and creates a structured review rather than an automatic handover. The grounds include privilege or immunity, a request involving classified information, certain ne bis in idem situations, a serious conflict with Convention or Charter rights, the absence of French criminality in circumstances where the double-criminality exception does not apply, and a measure that French law does not authorise for the offence in question.
The rights ground is deliberately direct. Article 694-31 refers to « des raisons sérieuses de croire que l’exécution de la mesure d’enquête serait incompatible avec le respect par la France des droits et libertés garantis par la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales et la charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne »
. Counsel should connect that ground to the concrete act requested: the person whose data are sought, the intrusiveness of the measure, the availability of notice or a remedy, the treatment of privileged material, the security of the transfer and the ability to contest the act in the issuing state.
The wording does not make every objection successful. Mutual recognition remains the operating principle of EU judicial cooperation. A French authority will not normally substitute itself for the Belgian judge on the merits of the espionage allegation. The objection must identify a legal defect, a prohibited act, a concrete rights risk, a missing authority, an immunity, or a disproportionate request. A general statement that the case is politically sensitive is weaker than evidence showing that the request seeks classified information outside the issuing authority’s power or that the named person cannot obtain an effective remedy.
National security is the distinctive French issue in the SHAPE scenario. Article 694-34 addresses an order whose execution may harm « des intérêts nationaux essentiels en matière de sécurité »
, endanger an information source, or require the use of information classified under Article 413-9 of the Criminal Code and connected with intelligence activities. In that situation, the Code provides for consultation with the issuing authority and allows the Minister of Justice to refuse recognition or execution. If the Minister does not refuse and the information is classified, Article 694-31’s classification safeguards remain relevant.
This is not an automatic “France can withhold anything marked confidential” rule. Classification must be legally established, and the request must actually concern the protected material or an operation that would endanger the source or security interest identified by the statute. A French counsel should ask which administration holds the document, whether the material has been formally classified, whether a declassification process exists, whether a redacted or alternative record could answer the request, and whether the Belgian request describes the evidence with enough precision to permit that assessment.
There is a practical difference between a NATO document and a French intelligence document. A document created inside an international organisation may be subject to the organisation’s rules, privileges or restrictions. A French authority may also hold a French assessment derived from that material or a classified national source. The legal route for each item must be identified separately. A request that bundles an unclassified visitor log, a French telecom record and a classified intelligence report under one generic heading invites a fragmented response and may expose an avoidable defect in the order.
Article 694-31 also protects privileges and immunities. That provision should prompt an inventory of professional secrecy before any device or account is copied. If a French lawyer, doctor, journalist, business adviser or other protected professional appears in the request, the executing authority must distinguish the privileged material from ordinary evidence. The defence should not wait for a complete forensic extraction before raising the issue. A sealed protocol, targeted review, redaction or return of protected material may be more effective than a later argument that the entire evidence set is contaminated.
Timing is another safeguard, but it must be described accurately. Article 694-35 requires the French magistrate to decide on recognition or execution with the same speed and priority as a similar national procedure and, in principle, no later than thirty days after receiving the order. The official text says « au plus tard trente jours après la réception de la décision d’enquête européenne »
and permits a maximum thirty-day extension where the issuing authority is promptly informed of the reason and estimated delay. This is a decision timetable, not a promise that a complex digital search, declassification process or challenge will be completed within thirty days.
Before execution, the French defence should obtain five documents or confirmations: the European Investigation Order and its annexes; the Belgian offence description and issuing authority; the French recognition or execution decision; the precise domestic measure to be carried out; and any notice, summons or protocol given to the affected person. A translation may be essential even where English is used in the international file. Counsel should record the date of each notification because the useful remedy may depend on whether the complaint concerns the Belgian order, the French implementing act, the search itself, or later use of the evidence.
The classification of the requested person also matters. A witness, third-party account holder, victim, suspect and accused person do not have the same rights or exposure. A person asked to provide information voluntarily may be in a different position from a person subjected to a search or compelled interview. If the request is actually being used to give a person an indictment or to obtain their observations on an accusation rather than to gather evidence, the instrument may be wrongly labelled.
The Court of Cassation made that boundary concrete in Crim., 4 November 2025, appeal no. 22-82.952. It held that an order cannot be used simply to notify a person of an indictment. The Court stated: « une décision d’enquête européenne ne peut avoir pour objet de voir notifier à une personne une ordonnance de mise en accusation la concernant »
. It also rejected the attempt to relabel an interview whose sole purpose was to obtain observations on the indictment as an evidence-gathering act. The lesson for the SHAPE file is functional: read the requested act and its purpose, not only the title placed on the form.
If a Belgian request seeks a French search, the defence should prepare a focused objection rather than a political memorandum. Identify the premises, the devices, the dates, the relevant accounts, the link to the alleged offence and the less intrusive alternative. If it seeks a witness interview, identify the witness status, the risk of self-incrimination, the need for an interpreter and the permitted presence of counsel. If it seeks a document from a French administration, determine whether it is classified, whether it can be declassified, and whether a non-sensitive summary or redacted version can answer the evidentiary question.
Where the request is recognised, counsel should still supervise execution. The French act should be carried out by the competent authority and according to the applicable French safeguards. The inventory, hash values, seals, chain of custody, translation, transmission record and any limitation imposed on the use of the material should be preserved. An objection that is not documented at the time of the search may become harder to prove when the Belgian court later receives a translated copy of the file.
The central point is therefore narrower than “Can Belgium investigate in France?” Belgium can ask France for defined judicial assistance, but France does not become a passive storage location. The order, the requested measure, the French execution route, classification status, privilege and available remedy must all be separated. That separation is where a French defence can add value without pretending that the French court will decide whether the Belgian espionage allegation is true.
II. Can Belgium seek surrender from France, and which defence arguments matter?
A. Could a Belgian European Arrest Warrant lead to surrender from France?
The current public reports place the suspect in Belgian custody. They do not report a French arrest or a Belgian European Arrest Warrant directed at France. A European Arrest Warrant becomes relevant only if Belgium seeks the arrest and surrender of a person found in France, or if a later procedural development requires a second state to locate and hand over that person. It is important not to confuse that hypothetical route with the evidence request described in Part I.
Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure defines the instrument as « une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne »
for the arrest and surrender of a wanted person, either for prosecution or for execution of a custodial sentence or security measure. It is a judicial cooperation instrument, not an administrative deportation order and not, by itself, an Interpol Red Notice. A police alert may help locate a person, but the French court must still identify the legal surrender instrument and the information supporting it.
The threshold is not unlimited. Under Article 695-12, the facts must be punishable under the issuing state’s law by at least one year of imprisonment for prosecution, or a sentence of at least four months where a conviction has already been imposed. The wording is « une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à un an »
for the prosecution route and a four-month threshold after conviction. A Belgian allegation described in news coverage still has to be translated into the exact offence, legal penalty and procedural purpose set out in the warrant.
The form also matters. Article 695-13 requires the warrant to state the person’s identity and nationality, the issuing judicial authority, the judgment or arrest decision, the legal nature and qualification of the offence, the date, place and circumstances of the conduct, the person’s alleged participation, and the sentence imposed or available penalty. This information is not paperwork at the edge of the case. It is what permits the French authority to verify identity, scope, double criminality where applicable, speciality and the relevant refusal grounds.
For a person located in France, the procedure begins quickly. Article 695-27 requires a person arrested under a European Arrest Warrant to be brought before the territorially competent Prosecutor General within forty-eight hours. The person must be informed of the warrant and its contents in a language they understand, told about the right to counsel in France, and informed that they may request counsel in the issuing state as well. The text requires the information to be recorded in the official record, and it allows the lawyer to consult the file and communicate freely with the wanted person.
The exact language is worth preserving in the record: the Prosecutor General must inform the person « dans une langue qu’elle comprend »
and tell the person that they may be assisted by « un avocat de son choix »
. An English-language international file does not automatically prove that the person understood a French notification, a Belgian offence description or the consequences of consent. If interpretation is incomplete, counsel should identify the missing passage and the decision affected by it.
After the first presentation, the investigating chamber of the competent Court of Appeal handles the surrender procedure. Article 695-30 states that the chamber verifies identity and records the person’s statements; the public prosecutor and the wanted person are heard, with counsel and an interpreter where necessary. Article 695-31 then distinguishes consent from opposition. Consent must be explained to the person, and the Code describes both consent to surrender and waiver of speciality as irrevocable decisions once maintained in the prescribed procedure.
A recent decision is a useful procedural warning. In Crim., 29 July 2026, appeal no. 26-84.072, the Court of Cassation held that the hearing required by Article 695-30 « ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise »
, making that formality preliminary to the debate. The Court’s point is practical: the first hearing is not the Belgian trial. Counsel should preserve the immediate procedural objections and prepare the substantive surrender debate for the correct stage.
If information is missing, the French chamber can request additional information under Article 695-33. The provision allows the authority to ask the issuing state for the information necessary to decide on surrender, with a maximum ten-day period for receipt stated in the text. A warrant that does not identify the alleged conduct, the issuing decision, the person’s role or the relevant penalty should not be treated as an invitation to fill in the Belgian file after arrest. The defence should identify the gap and ask the chamber to use the statutory mechanism rather than rely on press reports or informal assurances.
The decision on surrender also has a prescribed timetable. When the person does not consent, Article 695-31 provides a decision within twenty days of the appearance, subject to the statutory exceptions. That decision can be challenged by a cassation appeal under the conditions referred to in the Code. The short timetable changes the preparation method: the defence should have the warrant, translation, Belgian arrest or judgment decision, identity documents, residence evidence, medical evidence where relevant and prior European cooperation decisions ready before the first audience.
The French court does not decide guilt in Belgium. It examines whether the surrender conditions and refusal grounds are satisfied, whether the warrant identifies the person and alleged acts, and whether the required rights and guarantees exist. A persuasive defence therefore separates the merits file from the surrender file. The merits file may contain exculpatory communications, employment records and an explanation of the SHAPE role. The surrender file must connect those facts to identity, legal qualification, speciality, double criminality, fundamental rights, procedure and the exact remedy requested in France.
The separation also prevents a common error: treating an evidence request as an arrest warrant or treating a Red Notice as a completed European Arrest Warrant. A Belgian authority can seek a witness interview or French telecom record without asking France to arrest anyone. Conversely, a warrant for surrender does not automatically authorise Belgian investigators to search every French account linked to the person. Each measure requires its own legal basis, scope and safeguards.
B. Which French objections can stop, narrow, or delay a Belgian surrender?
The first category is mandatory refusal. Article 695-22 requires refusal in defined circumstances, including amnesty for conduct that could be prosecuted in France, a final decision for the same facts in the situations specified by the text, the person’s age below thirteen at the time of the conduct, and a warrant issued for a discriminatory purpose or carrying a discriminatory risk. These grounds are not slogans. They require the defence to match the evidence to the wording of the article and to the specific acts in the warrant.
Double criminality is a separate question. Article 695-23 allows refusal where the conduct described in the warrant is not an offence under French law. The article also removes that check for a defined list of serious categories where the issuing-state penalty reaches at least three years. The cross-reference to Article 694-32 includes participation in a criminal organisation, terrorism, cybercrime, weapons trafficking and other categories. A Belgian reference to “espionage” or “criminal organisation” should not be treated as self-proving: the defence must read the factual conduct, the Belgian legal label, the available penalty and the precise category invoked.
The absence of a French label identical to the Belgian offence is not enough on its own to win an objection. The French court examines the conduct and the statutory conditions, not only the translation of the offence name. At the same time, a vague or overbroad description can prevent the court from carrying out the required analysis. The remedy may be refusal, a request for additional information, or a narrower decision depending on the defect and the procedural stage.
Article 695-24 lists optional refusal grounds. They include French proceedings for the same facts, a French decision not to prosecute or to end proceedings, the possibility of executing a custodial sentence in France for a French national or person with the relevant residence connection, conduct committed wholly or partly in France, limits on France’s ability to prosecute conduct committed outside its territory, a final third-state decision, and prescription in circumstances covered by the provision. The word “may” matters: the existence of one factual link to France does not mechanically end the surrender analysis.
A conviction in absentia requires a separate check. Article 695-22-1 allows refusal of a warrant issued to enforce a sentence where the person did not appear in person, unless the issuing state shows one of the guarantees listed in the article. Those include timely information about the trial, defence by an authorised lawyer, an express decision not to contest after service of the judgment, or service of the judgment and information about a retrial remedy after surrender. A person facing a Belgian warrant based on a default conviction should obtain the summons, service proof, mandate to counsel and retrial information instead of relying on the word “in absentia” alone.
Fundamental-rights objections must be individualized. The fact that a case concerns national security, NATO or espionage does not itself establish a violation. The defence should document the risk said to arise from surrender: a specific and evidenced risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, a real inability to obtain a fair hearing, an inability to challenge the evidence, a concrete political or discriminatory purpose, or a procedural defect that cannot be cured by information or assurances. The French court’s role is not to conduct a general audit of Belgian criminal justice, but serious and supported rights concerns remain relevant to the surrender decision.
Speciality operates after surrender but should be protected before consent is given. Article 695-18 provides that, after a person has been surrendered to France under a European Arrest Warrant, the person cannot ordinarily be prosecuted, convicted or detained for an earlier and different act without one of the listed exceptions. The core phrase is « autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure »
. In the mirror situation—surrender from France to Belgium—the European framework and the surrender decision likewise make the exact authorised conduct decisive.
In Crim., 10 February 2026, appeal no. 25-87.769, the Court of Cassation applied the speciality principle to a person surrendered to France. It held that a person who had not waived speciality could not be placed under judicial supervision for a different offence before consent was obtained, unless the restrictive measure was legally justified by another charge already included in the warrant. The Court required the jurisdiction to verify speciality and, where necessary, obtain the surrender decision from the executing authorities. The short quotation that captures the operational rule is: « une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité »
remains protected against an unlisted charge.
The practical consequence is not that speciality defeats every later development. It is that counsel must compare the warrant, the decision authorising surrender and the charges later pursued. If the Belgian investigation evolves from access to a classified document to alleged participation in a different criminal organisation, the defence should ask whether the new conduct was within the original warrant, whether consent was given, whether the executing state approved an extension, and whether the requested measure is an arrest, a prosecution, a conviction or a restriction on liberty.
Consent deserves particular caution. Article 695-31 makes consent to surrender irrevocable in the statutory procedure and separately addresses waiver of speciality. A person may have strong reasons to cooperate with Belgian investigators, but the legal effects of consent should be assessed after receiving the warrant, its translation, the Belgian counsel’s advice and the likely evidentiary consequences. A quick statement at the first hearing can remove procedural arguments that would have mattered later. The first hearing should be used to protect comprehension, identity, counsel and the decision whether consent is genuinely informed.
There may also be a residence or sentence-enforcement argument under Article 695-24 where the warrant seeks execution of a sentence rather than prosecution. French nationality alone does not answer every question, and residence must be evidenced rather than asserted. Relevant records can include tax residence, employment, family life, housing, health care, schooling and the continuity of the connection with France. The analysis is different for a person merely suspected and detained in Belgium before trial. Counsel should not import a sentence-enforcement ground into a prosecution warrant without checking the instrument’s purpose.
A French defence should coordinate the surrender file with the Belgian merits file in five steps. First, obtain the complete warrant or certified transmission, not only a Schengen alert or press summary. Second, create a conduct table matching each factual allegation to the date, place, person, device and legal qualification. Third, collect proof for the relevant refusal ground, including identity, residence, prior judgments, service of process, medical evidence or rights-risk material. Fourth, keep a separate privilege and classification schedule for the French evidence request. Fifth, ask Belgian counsel to challenge the issuing-side legality and French counsel to challenge the French execution or surrender decision.
The two procedures can run in parallel. A French objection to an evidence request does not automatically suspend a Belgian detention decision. A successful French objection to surrender does not necessarily prevent Belgium from seeking evidence from France through a properly framed order. The defence should therefore state the remedy sought with precision: refusal of recognition, refusal of a particular measure, exclusion or return of privileged material, a request for additional information, release pending the surrender decision, refusal of surrender, adjournment for a missing guarantee, or enforcement of speciality after surrender.
For the SHAPE case, the most distinctive issue is likely to be the boundary between ordinary proof and protected intelligence. A French counsel should not promise that France will block every request because NATO is involved. The stronger approach is to identify the exact material, its holder, classification status, source risk, domestic authority, requested use and available alternative. If Belgium wants evidence that can be obtained from a French witness or an ordinary provider record, the order may proceed quickly. If it seeks French intelligence material or protected professional communications, Articles 694-31 and 694-34 provide a more focused legal framework for resistance.
The same discipline applies to a European Arrest Warrant. The fact that an allegation is serious does not remove the need for a complete warrant, an intelligible translation, a lawful issuing decision, a hearing with counsel and interpreter, and a reasoned review of refusal grounds. The fact that the allegation is politically sensitive does not replace evidence. A French court can protect the surrender process without deciding the Belgian case, and a defence can protect the Belgian merits file without confusing it with the French surrender hearing.
Conclusion
The detention of a former SHAPE intern in Belgium is a fast-moving allegation, not a judgment. Its cross-border significance lies in the evidence that may sit outside Belgium and in the possibility—still hypothetical on the public record—of a later request to France. The correct legal sequence is to identify the act sought, locate the evidence or person, classify the French measure, verify the European Investigation Order, and preserve the appropriate remedy in the issuing and executing states.
For French counsel, the immediate checklist is practical:
- obtain the Belgian order, annexes, offence description and translation;
- separate an evidence request from an arrest-and-surrender request;
- map devices, accounts, witnesses, premises and professional secrets in France;
- test precision, necessity, proportionality, privilege, classification and the available French remedy;
- if a European Arrest Warrant appears, protect language rights, counsel, informed consent, refusal grounds and speciality from the first hearing.
Articles 694-15, 694-16, 694-20, 694-31, 694-33, 694-34 and 694-35 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, together with Articles 695-11, 695-12, 695-13, 695-18, 695-22, 695-22-1, 695-23, 695-24, 695-27, 695-30, 695-31 and 695-33, provide the statutory framework. The recent Court of Cassation decisions in appeals nos. 22-82.952, 25-87.769 and 26-84.072 show why the label on a European instrument, the contents of the surrender decision and the order of the French hearing can determine the next step. The defence should move from the documents, not from the headlines.