Cabinet Kohen Avocats · Paris 16ᵉ
Voislav Torden’s Finland War-Crimes Appeal: What the Failed Extradition to Ukraine Means for France

Maître Hassan KOHEN intervient en urgence, du commissariat à la cour d'assises. Première analyse stratégique : 80 € TTC, réponse personnelle sous 24 heures.

100 % confidentiel · Secret professionnel · Sans engagement

Article généré par une intelligence artificielle, selon un processus conçu et contrôlé par le cabinet

Source : Cour de cassation – Base Open Data « Judilibre » & « Légifrance ».

Barreau de Paris Garde à vue, instruction, assises Fiche CNB avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Voislav Torden’s Finland War-Crimes Appeal: What the Failed Extradition to Ukraine Means for France

Parler à un avocat 06 89 11 34 45

On 31 August 2026, Finland’s Helsinki Court of Appeal reduced Voislav Torden’s life sentence to twelve years and six months after finding him guilty of three war crimes committed in eastern Ukraine in 2014. The judgment is the latest turn in a case that began with a failed extradition request, not with a Finnish investigation. Finland’s Supreme Court had previously prevented Torden’s transfer to Ukraine because of concerns about prison conditions and the prospect of a fair trial. Finnish prosecutors then pursued the allegations at home.

The French connection is not incidental. Torden entered Finland from Russia in 2023 and was detained at Helsinki Airport shortly before a flight to Nice. He never reached France, and no French prosecution against him follows from the Finnish proceedings. Yet the route raises a practical question for anyone wanted for international crimes: what happens when the requested country cannot lawfully surrender a suspect, but another European state may encounter that person in transit or after settlement?

From a French procedural standpoint, the answer is neither automatic surrender nor automatic immunity. France would separate the ordinary extradition inquiry from the exceptional jurisdiction provided for international crimes. It would examine the requesting State’s documents, the dual-criminality requirement, detention and trial safeguards, and the precise French connection. The Torden case shows why that distinction matters: a failed transfer can move the centre of gravity of accountability, but it does not by itself create French jurisdiction or bind French courts to Finland’s conclusions.

I. Why Finland could try Voislav Torden after the extradition to Ukraine failed

A. What the Helsinki appeal judgment actually changed

The underlying allegations concern the Rusich armed group and fighting in the Luhansk region in September 2014. Prosecutors alleged that the unit used a Ukrainian flag in an ambush, opened fire on Ukrainian soldiers, and later mistreated wounded personnel. They also alleged that images of a dead soldier were taken and circulated in a manner intended to humiliate. Torden, who had previously used the name Yan Petrovsky, denied taking part in combat operations and said that his role in the region involved propaganda and recruitment videos.

The factual account must be kept separate from the legal result. The Helsinki District Court convicted Torden in March 2025 and imposed life imprisonment for four war crimes. The appeal court did not simply confirm or erase that judgment. It found that three war-crime convictions remained established, while the evidence did not prove to the required standard that Torden personally shot wounded soldiers or that he bore superior responsibility for ordering the killings. The sentence was therefore reduced to twelve years and six months. The current report by Le Parisien records that distinction between the surviving convictions and the unproven part of the prosecution case.

The procedural history is equally important. Torden was not tried in Finland because Ukraine chose Finland as a forum. He was found there after travelling from Russia, and Finnish authorities identified an earlier name, a Schengen entry restriction and an EU sanctions listing. He was detained at Helsinki Airport before travelling onwards to Nice. The Associated Press account of the opening of the trial described the airport arrest, the Ukrainian arrest warrant and the decision of Finnish prosecutors to investigate rather than release the matter into a legal vacuum.

The fact that Nice was the intended destination does not make France a party to the Finnish case. It does, however, show how international criminal cases are often discovered: a suspect may be located through border controls, an alias, a sanctions record, a residence application or an onward flight. None of those facts, taken alone, proves a war crime. Each can determine which State has the first lawful opportunity to secure evidence, preserve the person’s presence and decide whether a transfer is possible.

The Finnish appeal therefore changed the immediate criminal consequence, but not the basic lesson of the case. The failure to extradite Torden to Ukraine did not end the allegation. It forced Finnish institutions to answer a different question: whether Finland could lawfully investigate and judge conduct committed in a foreign armed conflict by a foreign national. The answer was yes under Finnish law, subject to the evidence and the ordinary guarantees of a criminal trial. That is a domestic prosecution of an international crime, not a disguised extradition.

The distinction is particularly important in a case involving an alleged commander or unit leader. International-crimes litigation often contains several possible forms of responsibility: direct perpetration, participation in a common operation, ordering, aiding or superior responsibility. An extradition request may present them together in broad terms, while a trial court must identify the precise conduct proved beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal judgment illustrates that a court may sustain liability for participation and reject a separate theory of personal shooting or superior command. France would be required to make the same separation if a comparable file arrived in Paris.

The Finnish judgment also has to be read without converting an ongoing appeal route into a final international precedent. A further challenge may be available under Finnish procedure, and the exact effect of any later decision will depend on its scope. The point for French readers is narrower and more durable: the forum that prosecutes is not necessarily the forum that first received the extradition request, and the reasons for refusing surrender can become the reason for domestic judicial action.

B. Why a refusal based on prison conditions does not create a safe harbour

Extradition is a cooperation mechanism, not a declaration that the requesting State’s accusation is true. A court or government may refuse to surrender a person because the receiving prison, the anticipated proceedings, the penalty or the procedural guarantees create a prohibited risk. That decision does not acquit the person of the underlying allegations. It only prevents one particular transfer on the information and assurances available at that time.

This separation is visible in Torden’s case. Finland’s Supreme Court, as reported by Finnish and international media, treated the risk in Ukraine’s detention system and the fair-trial concerns as barriers to extradition. The subsequent Finnish trial did not contradict that reasoning. It respected the protection decision by keeping the prosecution in Finland, where Finnish courts could control the proceedings, evidence, defence rights and conditions of imprisonment. A State can refuse to send a suspect abroad while still deciding that the allegations must be tested before its own courts.

That model is not a rule that every refusal requires a domestic trial. The receiving State must still possess a jurisdictional basis, a prosecuting authority, admissible evidence and a fair process. It may decide that the proof is insufficient, that the conduct is outside its jurisdiction or that another forum is better placed. But human-rights barriers to surrender should not be confused with a positive finding that no State may prosecute. The practical consequence is a change of forum, not a disappearance of the case.

For France, the lesson also limits the effect of a Finnish decision. If a person later enters France, French authorities would not be able to execute Ukraine’s request simply by pointing to the fact that Finland once refused surrender. They would have to receive and assess the French request under French law and any applicable treaty. Conversely, France could not assume that a Finnish refusal automatically gives it authority to prosecute. A French prosecutor would need to identify a French jurisdictional gateway and satisfy its statutory conditions.

This is where the existing French–Ukraine extradition analysis on prison assurances and political motive remains useful as a pillar for the present article: the earlier France–Ukraine procedure analysis explains the separate control exercised by French institutions. The Torden angle is narrower. It asks what a refusal followed by a domestic conviction means for the next European State, rather than repeating the litigation of a French extradition case.

The principle also matters for victims and witnesses. If a case is stranded between a request for surrender and a refusal, evidence may deteriorate, witnesses may move, and digital records may disappear. A responsible response is not to circulate a name as if an alert were a conviction. It is to preserve the source material, identify the alleged act and location, map the chain of custody, record the identity documents and aliases, and present the information to the competent prosecuting authority. The more a case depends on events from 2014, the more important this disciplined work becomes.

Nor does a sanctions listing replace a criminal case. Torden’s earlier name appearing on an EU sanctions list helped Finnish authorities identify him, according to public reporting, but a sanctions designation is not a judgment for a war crime. Sanctions may justify financial restrictions or assist identification; they do not prove the actus reus, the mental element, the status of victims or the accused’s role in a unit. A French file would need to keep those questions distinct.

The same caution applies to Interpol material. A Red Notice or diffusion can help locate a person, but it is not a French arrest warrant and does not decide extradition. France would still need a lawful basis for arrest, a valid request and the judicial and governmental stages required by French procedure. The existence of a public news story, an alias or a foreign warrant cannot bypass those safeguards. That is why the Torden story is relevant beyond its facts: it places border detection, human-rights review and domestic accountability in one sequence, without collapsing them into one decision.

The French system can also be asked to protect the integrity of a case that another State cannot safely try. Evidence from Ukraine may include military records, satellite or geolocation material, medical reports, witness statements, social-media files and photographs. Each category raises separate authentication questions. A military chain of command may be disputed; a translation may alter a key phrase; an image may be genuine but not identify the person who took it; a digital file may show presence without showing participation. Domestic jurisdiction can provide a stable trial forum, but it does not lower the proof threshold.

In that sense, the Finnish model is both powerful and modest. It demonstrates that a State can prevent an unsafe extradition and conduct a war-crimes trial. It does not establish that every European State must do the same, that every Ukrainian request is unsafe, or that a suspect travelling toward France acquires a French legal status. Those conclusions must be drawn from the law of the State where the person is found and the exact record before its courts.

II. What a Torden-style case would trigger if France encountered the suspect

A. Could France prosecute a foreign suspect for war crimes committed in Ukraine?

French law has a specific jurisdictional route for international crimes. The starting point is Article 461-1 of the French Criminal Code, which defines war crimes by reference to offences committed during and in connection with an armed conflict, in violation of the laws and customs of war or applicable international conventions. The text uses the phrases “en relation avec ce conflit” and “en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre”. Those are not labels for any violent act committed in a conflict zone. The prosecution must connect the conduct to the conflict and identify the protected legal rule said to have been breached.

The substantive classification would then depend on the alleged conduct. Article 461-2 of the Criminal Code covers intentional attacks on life or physical or psychological integrity, as well as kidnapping and unlawful confinement, when committed against a person protected by the law of armed conflict. The article expressly refers to “Sont passibles des aggravations de peines prévues à l’article 462-1”. If the evidence concerns cruel treatment of wounded soldiers, Article 461-4 and Article 461-5 may also become relevant, depending on the precise facts. Article 461-5 addresses “traitements humiliants et dégradants” that seriously harm the physical or psychological integrity of persons on the opposing side.

The key jurisdictional provision, in force at the date of this analysis, is Article 689-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. It permits French courts, outside the provisions specifically implementing the Rome Statute, to prosecute and try a person suspected of having committed abroad a genocide, crime against humanity or war crime. The statute says that the person must have a habitual residence in France, defined by a sufficient connecting link. It also requires a request from the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor and provides that no international or national jurisdiction must be seeking the person’s surrender or extradition in the circumstances described by the text.

The statutory language matters. Article 689-11 says that a person “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises” and requires a “résidence habituelle” on French territory. A short stop at Charles de Gaulle Airport, a planned flight to Nice or a hotel booking would not automatically establish habitual residence. The link is assessed through factors such as the expected duration of presence, the reasons for it, the intention to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional connections. A suspect who merely transits France may instead raise an ordinary extradition and arrest question, not the full universal-jurisdiction route for war crimes.

This distinction prevents a common analytical error. France may be physically able to arrest a person without being legally entitled to prosecute the foreign conflict. Physical presence is a starting fact. Jurisdiction requires the statutory link, the competent prosecuting authority, the applicable classification and a file capable of being investigated. The National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s role is not a formality that a private party can replace by naming an offence in a complaint. Victims, witnesses and counsel may bring information and supporting evidence, but the prosecution must satisfy the conditions of the Code.

Article 689-11 also contains a complementarity safeguard. The prosecutor must establish that the International Criminal Court is not pursuing the person and verify the position of any other competent international jurisdiction. The text further addresses requests by another State for surrender or extradition. If Ukraine has made an active request, that request becomes part of the French jurisdictional analysis. A refusal by Finland does not tell French authorities whether the request remains legally operative, has been withdrawn, has changed, or can be answered with guarantees. Those questions must be documented before France chooses between transfer and domestic proceedings.

The French case would therefore be built around a precise theory of responsibility. If the allegation is that the suspect personally attacked protected soldiers, the evidence must identify the act and the person. If the allegation is participation in a unit, the prosecution must explain the form of participation and the relevant mental element. If it is superior responsibility, the file must address effective authority and control, knowledge or reason to know, and the measures allegedly omitted. The fact that a person belonged to a notorious group may help explain the context, but group membership cannot substitute for proof of the charged conduct.

For an international audience, this is the practical difference between a news-led alert and a French criminal file. Open-source footage can indicate that a unit operated at a location, but investigators must establish dates, provenance and continuity. A witness can describe a person’s role, but the statement requires translation, reliability assessment and protection. A sanctions entry can identify an alias, but identity evidence must bridge the alias to the defendant. The French court would decide the criminal charge from the complete record, not from the headline that brought the case to public attention.

The article 689-11 route is also time-sensitive. The version currently applicable in September 2026 is scheduled for repeal from 1 January 2029 under the recodification referred to on the official Légifrance page. A lawyer assessing a new arrival must therefore verify the law in force on the date of the relevant procedural act. A legal basis that exists today may be renumbered or altered before a complaint, indictment or request is decided. That is one reason a current French legal assessment must cite the text’s version date rather than rely on an undated summary.

B. How French extradition review would test a Ukrainian request

If Ukraine requested Torden’s surrender from France, the first route would ordinarily be extradition to a non-EU requesting State, not a European Arrest Warrant. The fact that France and Finland are both EU Member States does not turn Ukraine’s request into an internal EU surrender procedure. French authorities would examine the applicable treaty and the domestic rules in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The request would have to identify the person, the acts, the legal basis and the judicial instrument with enough precision for the defence and the courts to understand what is being sought.

The framework begins with Article 696-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It identifies the offences capable of giving rise to extradition and requires, among other matters, that the conduct be punishable under French law. The essential idea is dual criminality, not identical wording. France does not need to reproduce the Ukrainian charge word for word, but it must be able to map the factual conduct to a French criminal offence. Alleged war crimes involving protected soldiers would require a careful comparison with Articles 461-1 to 461-31 and with any ordinary offences included in the request.

The refusal grounds then carry the human-rights analysis. Under Article 696-4, “L’extradition n’est pas accordée” in the cases listed by the statute. One ground concerns a penalty or security measure contrary to French public order; another applies where the requested person would be tried by a tribunal not ensuring “les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”. Prison conditions, access to counsel, court independence, martial-law derogations and the effective ability to challenge detention can therefore become decisive, but they must be proved and assessed in the individual case.

The recent case law shows why France would not apply a mechanical Ukraine rule. In Criminal Chamber decision no. 23-82.220 of 7 November 2023, the Court of Cassation rejected the prosecutor’s appeal against an unfavourable extradition opinion in a Ukrainian case. The arguments included Ukraine’s wartime derogations and the effect of changes to its criminal procedure on a fair trial and defence rights. The decision is a warning that assurances must be examined in context; it is not a proposition that every request from Ukraine must be refused.

Conversely, Criminal Chamber decision no. 25-86.478 of 10 February 2026 concerned another Ukrainian extradition request and rejected the challenge to a favourable opinion. The case involved arguments under Articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention and questions about Ukraine’s wartime legal framework. The result confirms the case-by-case character of the review. A later request, a different charge, a different detention facility or more precise assurances can change the analysis. French courts must decide the file before them, not issue a general geopolitical judgment.

The detention inquiry is not limited to general statements. In Criminal Chamber decision no. 20-82.296 of 16 March 2021, concerning a request from Russia, the Court held that the lower court had wrongly placed the burden of proving the applicable foreign law on the applicant, while also finding that the foreign authorities’ solemn assurances meant the decision did not incur censure on that point. The decision illustrates two simultaneous rules: the French court must do its legal work, and a concrete assurance can matter if it is sufficiently clear and credible. A promise on paper is not automatically enough, but neither is a general allegation enough to displace it.

The anticipated sentence is a separate issue. In Criminal Chamber decision no. 24-85.773 of 6 May 2025, the Court explained that Article 3 of the European Convention can require refusal where the person faces a real risk of a manifestly disproportionate sentence, a concept subject to an “interprétation stricte”. The court must consider the nature and seriousness of the facts and the conditions in which the foreign court would sentence the person. Torden’s Finnish sentence cannot be transplanted into a French extradition calculation, and a life sentence abroad is not automatically prohibited. The request would require a concrete analysis of the offence, the statutory penalty and the safeguards around sentencing.

The procedural timetable gives the defence an immediate role. If the requested person does not consent, Article 696-15 provides that the investigating chamber is “saisie, sans délai”. The person appears within ten working days, may be assisted by counsel and an interpreter, and the court gives a reasoned opinion. The text requires an “avis motivé” and provides for an opinion within one month unless further information is ordered. The defence must use that short window to challenge identity, double criminality, the completeness of the request, the factual description, detention assurances and trial guarantees.

The distinction between a judicial opinion and the final executive decision is also essential. Under Article 696-17, when a final reasoned opinion rejects the request, “l’extradition ne peut être accordée”. Where that provision does not apply, Article 696-18 provides that extradition is “autorisée par décret du Premier ministre” on the report of the Minister of Justice, with a one-month time limit for an application for judicial review. A person therefore needs to know which stage has been reached before deciding whether to litigate, seek guarantees, or prepare for transfer.

Article 696-8 addresses the documents that must accompany the request. It requires, subject to the statutory exception for European Union requests, transmission through the diplomatic channel and a judgment, prosecutorial act or arrest warrant. The warrant must state the facts and their date with precision. The phrase “par voie diplomatique” is not decorative, and the requirement for “l’indication précise du fait” prevents a person from being surrendered on an accusation too vague to test. If the request does not permit a meaningful defence, the defect may affect the judicial opinion or the later decision.

The rule of specialty then limits the requesting State’s use of the transfer. Article 696-6 states that, subject to exceptions, the extradited person may be neither prosecuted nor convicted for an offence other than the one that motivated surrender and predates the transfer. The operative phrase is “ni poursuivie, ni condamnée pour une infraction autre que celle ayant motivé l’extradition”. A French court would therefore need to compare the acts in the request with the acts for which Ukraine intends to prosecute. Specialty protects the person after surrender; it does not remove the pre-surrender requirement for a fair and sufficiently precise request.

The Court of Cassation’s newest procedural guidance reinforces the need for an effective defence. In Criminal Chamber decision no. 25-88.114 of 27 May 2026, the Court held that a person detained abroad under a French arrest warrant could challenge the warrant’s legality, and that the investigating chamber had to rule within a period that could not exceed two months. It also distinguished the legality of the French warrant from the conditions of detention abroad. The ruling does not decide a Ukrainian extradition request, but it demonstrates the current French approach: cross-border detention creates procedural rights that must be made effective within a defined period.

The Conseil d’État reached a related procedural conclusion in decision no. 421762 of 19 October 2018. Its reasoning explains that extradition cannot be granted without the requested person having been able to exercise the defence, and that a definitive unfavourable opinion prevents the executive decree. The institutional sequence is therefore not an administrative shortcut around judicial rights. It is a chain in which the judicial chamber, the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister each have a defined role.

What should counsel do if a Torden-style file reaches France? First, secure the identity record: passport, aliases, biometric records, previous residence, sanctions notices and all variations of spelling. Second, obtain the complete extradition package, not only the arrest warrant quoted in the press. Third, test the factual mapping under Article 696-3 and identify the exact French offence alleged. Fourth, request specific information about the prison, medical access, lawyer access, trial forum, interpretation and any wartime derogations. Fifth, preserve all evidence that can support or undermine the allegations, while seeking protective measures for witnesses. Finally, decide whether the French universal-jurisdiction route is even available under Article 689-11 or whether the case remains an extradition matter.

That checklist is especially important because Finland’s refusal does not automatically bind France. A French court may consider the Finnish findings as information, but it must apply French law to the request and the evidence before it. Conditions in Ukrainian prisons may have changed; they may differ between institutions; assurances may be updated; and the charges may not be identical. On the other hand, French authorities should not treat the Finnish record as irrelevant. A reasoned judgment concerning detention and fair-trial risk is precisely the kind of material that should be examined when a later State receives a related request.

The strategic result is a controlled choice between two routes. If the statutory conditions for French prosecution of an international crime are met, the National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor may consider a domestic investigation. If another State seeks surrender, the extradition safeguards may take priority and may prevent a domestic prosecution until the procedural position is clarified. If neither route is legally ready, the answer is not an improvised transfer based on publicity. It is to obtain the missing documents, verify the person’s status and make the next decision on an auditable record.

Conclusion

Voislav Torden’s reduced sentence is news from Finland, not a French conviction. Its cross-border importance comes from the sequence: Ukraine sought surrender; Finland’s Supreme Court found legal barriers to that transfer; Finnish prosecutors pursued a domestic war-crimes case; and the appeal court has now narrowed the convictions and reduced the sentence. The case shows that a human-rights refusal can redirect accountability without erasing it.

For France, the practical lesson is precise. A person travelling toward Nice does not acquire French jurisdiction merely by appearing on a flight plan, and a Finnish refusal does not authorise automatic French prosecution. France must identify the statutory connecting link for Article 689-11, or conduct the ordinary extradition review under Articles 696-3 to 696-18. That review must test the request’s precision, dual criminality, detention conditions, fair-trial guarantees, penalty and defence rights. The result should be based on verified evidence and the law in force, not on the intensity of the news cycle.

📄 Circulaire officielle