Cabinet Kohen Avocats · Paris 16ᵉ
COSCO Ships and Hidden Intelligence Equipment: What France Can Lawfully Do in Its Ports and Waters

Maître Hassan KOHEN intervient en urgence, du commissariat à la cour d'assises. Première analyse stratégique : 80 € TTC, réponse personnelle sous 24 heures.

100 % confidentiel · Secret professionnel · Sans engagement

Article généré par une intelligence artificielle, selon un processus conçu et contrôlé par le cabinet

Source : Cour de cassation – Base Open Data « Judilibre » & « Légifrance ».

Barreau de Paris Garde à vue, instruction, assises Fiche CNB avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

COSCO Ships and Hidden Intelligence Equipment: What France Can Lawfully Do in Its Ports and Waters

Parler à un avocat 06 89 11 34 45

Reuters reported on 1 September 2026 that two senior United States officials allege that China’s state-owned shipping group COSCO has used concealed equipment aboard commercial vessels to collect information about military communications near the coasts of the United States, Europe and Asia. The report describes an allegation, not a judicial finding: the officials were not identified, the material was not independently verified, and the report does not establish that a particular COSCO ship has broken French law. Yet the story raises an immediate question for shipowners, cargo interests, port operators and public authorities. If a vessel enters a French port, or passes through French territorial waters, what can France lawfully inspect, seize, restrict or prosecute? The answer turns on the location of the conduct, the vessel’s flag, the purpose and capability of the equipment, the identity of the person controlling it, and the quality of the evidence. French law can reach conduct that has a territorial component, classified information, an intrusion into an automated data system, or a deliberate intelligence relationship damaging fundamental national interests. It does not, however, convert a press allegation into proof, erase the law of the sea, or make a foreign commercial ship an open evidential container. The practical issue is how to move from a politically serious signal to a lawful, reviewable sequence of maritime security, judicial investigation and international cooperation.

I. What the COSCO allegations mean under French and maritime law

A. Does a commercial ship carrying hidden sensors commit an offence in France?

The first legal mistake would be to treat “concealed equipment” as the name of an offence. French criminal law does not punish a device merely because it is hidden, installed on a ship owned by a Chinese state-owned group, or capable of collecting communications. It asks what the device did, who used it, what information was collected, where the relevant act occurred, and whether the statutory elements and mental element are established. A ship carrying a passive receiver, a navigation sensor, a communications diagnostic tool or a device designed to access protected systems may present very different legal cases.

The territorial starting point is Article 113-2 of the French Criminal Code. Its opening rule is exact: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République.” It adds that an offence is deemed committed in France when one of its constituent acts takes place there. That rule matters even when the ship is foreign-flagged. A transmission received, a system accessed, a file copied, or an instruction issued from a French port may create a territorial connection. The connection must still be proved and matched to a defined offence; the presence of hardware is not enough.

Article 113-3 of the Criminal Code deals with offences committed aboard French-flagged ships, or against such ships or persons aboard them, wherever they are. It states: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises à bord des navires battant un pavillon français”. This is not a general jurisdictional shortcut for a COSCO vessel. A foreign flag does not create immunity from every French investigation in a French port, but neither does a French port erase the flag State’s interests or the jurisdictional limits that apply while a ship is at sea.

The most politically sensitive possibility would be an intelligence offence. Article 411-5 of the Criminal Code punishes the act of “entretenir des intelligences avec une puissance étrangère” when it is capable of harming the fundamental interests of the nation. The text requires more than contact with a foreign company or a state-owned business. Investigators would need to identify a relationship, the foreign power or foreign-controlled organisation, the conduct that constitutes the relationship, and its capacity to harm a protected national interest. A commercial group’s public ownership may be relevant evidence, but it cannot replace proof of the relationship and its harmful quality.

Article 411-6 is more specific where information has been delivered or made accessible. It refers to “renseignements, procédés, objets, documents, données informatisées ou fichiers” whose exploitation, disclosure or collection is capable of harming the fundamental interests of the nation, and provides a fifteen-year criminal penalty in the provision quoted by the Code. The legal question is not whether military communications are commercially interesting. It is whether the material falls within the statutory protection and whether the act of making it accessible to a foreign power, foreign organisation or its agents is established.

Article 411-7 addresses the earlier stage of gathering or assembling information with a view to delivering it to a foreign power, foreign organisation or its agents. It uses the same central categories of information and the same reference to harm to fundamental national interests. For a shipborne collection theory, prosecutors would have to prove more than technical capability. They would need evidence about the collection itself, its intended recipient or purpose, and the link between the information and the protected national interest. A receiver switched on during a voyage and an organised collection mission are not interchangeable factual hypotheses.

That distinction protects both national security and legal accuracy. The public allegation describes equipment allegedly concealed on commercial ships and information allegedly gathered near military communications systems. It does not by itself establish that any crew member knew the equipment’s purpose, that the ship’s operator authorised the collection, that the equipment captured protected content rather than signals metadata, or that the information was transmitted to a foreign service. Each question can change the applicable offence, the competent authority and the necessary procedural safeguards.

A second possible route concerns the equipment rather than the intelligence relationship. Article 226-3 of the Criminal Code regulates the manufacture, import, possession, display, offer, rental or sale of certain technical devices capable of intercepting correspondence or locating people, subject to the statutory categories and authorisation framework. It is not a universal ban on radio receivers, antenna systems, satellite communications equipment or maritime sensors. An authority would need to identify the device, its technical function and the legal category into which it falls. Customs classification, technical expertise and the procurement trail would therefore be important before a criminal allegation is framed.

A device that interacts with a computer network raises a different issue. Article 323-1 of the Criminal Code begins: “Le fait d’accéder ou de se maintenir, frauduleusement, dans tout ou partie d’un système de traitement automatisé de données est puni de trois ans d’emprisonnement et de 100 000 € d’amende.” A radio receiver collecting an unencrypted emission is not automatically an intrusion into an automated data-processing system. If equipment was used to enter a port network, a defence network, a shipboard system belonging to another operator, or an account without authorisation, the analysis changes. Investigators would then need logs, credentials, malware or configuration evidence, network traces and expert testimony, not only photographs of an antenna.

Classified information produces another threshold. Article 413-9 of the Criminal Code provides that protected material includes information and data concerning national defence that has been classified to restrict its dissemination or access. The statutory definition refers to items that “ont fait l’objet de mesures de classification destinées à restreindre leur diffusion ou leur accès”. A foreign ship’s collection may be strategically hostile without the collected material being formally classified. Conversely, an act may involve a classified file even if the physical file was not on the ship. Those are separate propositions and should not be collapsed into a label such as “espionage”.

Article 413-10 applies to a person who, because of a state, professional or assigned function, holds a process, object, document, information, network, computerised data or file that is a defence secret, and who destroys, diverts, removes, reproduces, gives access to an unauthorised person or discloses it. The status of the person who held the secret is therefore central. It would be legally unsafe to apply that provision simply because a foreign commercial ship allegedly collected information adjacent to a French military installation. Prosecutors would need to identify classified material and a person within the statutory position of custody or responsibility.

The case law illustrates why the evidence trail matters. In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 13 November 2014, no. 13-87.943, the court examined the disclosure and reproduction of classified technical information. The reasoning recorded the practical rule that “il appartient à la personne tenue à la confidentialité de prendre les précautions nécessaires”. The case is not a ruling on COSCO or maritime collection. Its value here is methodological: when classified information is involved, the court looks at the person’s obligations, the safeguards used, the recipients and the actual handling of the information. Urgency, commercial convenience or a technical need does not answer those questions.

In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 11 May 2005, no. 05-81.157, the court addressed the treatment of a document claimed to be covered by the defence secret in an investigation. The decision shows why the classification status, markings, origin, seizure history and procedural custody of the document can become contested issues. For a shipboard investigation, an electronic copy, a removable storage device, a sensor configuration and a server record may each require a separate account of acquisition and preservation. The label “classified” should be tested against the legal status of the item and the route by which it entered the case.

Corporate responsibility also requires precision. Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code provides that legal persons can be criminally responsible for offences committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives. The existence of a corporate owner, a state shareholder or a group structure does not prove that the legal person committed an offence. The prosecution still needs an offence, an act on behalf of the company, a relevant organ or representative, and the required mental element where the offence requires it. Crew members, technical contractors, the ship’s manager, the beneficial owner and the parent group should not be treated as one legal person without evidence.

The safe conclusion is therefore narrow but significant. France can investigate concealed collection equipment when facts connect it to a French territory, a French network, classified material, an offence involving fundamental national interests, or a specific device offence. It can preserve evidence and seek cooperation before the facts are fully known. It cannot treat an allegation, foreign state ownership or a suspicious antenna as a completed criminal offence.

B. Why the flag, the sea zone and the port change the answer

The same equipment has a different legal setting depending on where the ship is. A vessel in a French port is in a zone where port-security rules and French administrative and judicial powers are concrete. A vessel transiting French territorial waters is subject to the law of the sea and the rules of innocent passage. A vessel on the high seas remains primarily within the jurisdiction of its flag State, subject to the limited exceptions recognised by international law. The first operational question is therefore not “Is COSCO Chinese?” but “Where was the act, and what authority is acting?”

The official United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states in Article 17 that “ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea”. Article 19 qualifies that right. It identifies as potentially prejudicial to the coastal State’s defence or security “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State”. If a vessel is actually collecting intelligence in French territorial waters with that harmful purpose, the passage may no longer be innocent. That does not automatically create a right to board every vessel carrying a receiver. It creates a legal basis for the coastal State to assess the conduct, require compliance with applicable rules and take proportionate measures consistent with the Convention.

The law of the sea distinguishes passage from entry into internal waters and a port call. A ship that is continuously and expeditiously traversing territorial waters is not in the same position as a ship that has requested a berth, taken on cargo, used port services or entered a security perimeter. In a port, the coastal State can condition access under domestic port-security legislation and can use inspections or administrative measures that would not be available in the same form against a vessel merely passing offshore.

French transport law gives the administration practical tools. Article L5241-4-5 of the French Transport Code permits refusal of port access to a vessel presenting a high risk to maritime safety, maritime security or the environment in cases fixed by regulation. Article L5241-5 allows departure to be prohibited or postponed after a visit where the vessel cannot safely sail, and addresses failures to report required information or maintain safe access for inspection. These provisions are not a conviction. They are administrative safety and compliance powers, and the decision must fit the statutory risk and procedure.

Article L5241-6 of the Transport Code allows the operation of a vessel or a connected operation presenting a manifest risk to passengers, crew, other vessels or the environment to be limited or prohibited after a conformity study or visit. It also allows an emergency stop where the risk is manifest and imminent. The wording is important. A concealed intelligence device may produce a security concern, but authorities should identify the risk, the legal basis and the necessary measure rather than use a safety power as an unbounded criminal search authority.

Port security has its own rule. Article L5332-8 of the Transport Code provides that, for security reasons, the administration may prohibit or restrict access and movement of vessels in port-security limits and may order their expulsion. This can be a decisive response where officials cannot safely allow a vessel to berth while the equipment, crew access or communications environment is assessed. It does not determine criminal guilt. The decision may be urgent, but it remains vulnerable to challenge if the stated security ground is disconnected from the evidence or if the measure is disproportionate.

The implementing security framework also matters. Article R5332-15 of the Transport Code requires port and maritime-security actors to implement measures addressing unauthorised access, prohibited objects and unauthorised access to information and communication systems under their responsibility. In practice, that supports controlled boarding, identity checks, access logs, segregation of technical spaces and preservation of relevant system records. It does not turn a routine inspection into an automatic forensic search of every private cabin or device.

On the high seas, the starting point is different. The flag State generally exercises jurisdiction over its ship, and the right of visit is not a general anti-intelligence power. A French patrol cannot rely on a newspaper report alone to board a foreign-flagged commercial ship far from French waters. It would need a recognised international-law basis, consent, a relevant treaty power, a flag-State request, or facts falling within a limited exception. A politically urgent allegation may justify diplomatic notification, intelligence cooperation and a request for clarification. It does not itself supply the legal power to conduct a search.

Even within the territorial sea, the treatment of a suspected intelligence act must be calibrated. Article 19 of the Convention uses the language of conduct prejudicial to the coastal State’s defence or security. The coastal State may protect itself, but it must also respect the Convention’s navigation framework. A ship’s passage, its communications, its equipment and the alleged collection activity need to be distinguished. The state should identify the particular act that makes passage non-innocent, the factual basis for that conclusion and the measure that follows.

This is why the port is legally important. Once a vessel seeks access to French infrastructure, authorities can impose security conditions, delay departure, refuse access, expel the vessel, notify the flag State and preserve evidence within defined powers. If the evidence points to a French criminal offence, prosecutors can use judicial procedure. If the facts remain a national-security concern without a prosecutable offence, intelligence and administrative channels may remain the proper route. Those channels can operate in parallel, but their legal standards should not be mixed.

II. What French authorities can do next — and what they cannot do

A. Inspection, seizure and evidence: the legal sequence for a French port

A defensible response would begin with immediate risk control, not an improvised criminal conclusion. The port authority can secure the relevant area, restrict access to technical spaces, ensure that the vessel does not depart before a lawful inspection is complete where the statutory conditions are met, and preserve CCTV, access logs, cargo records, crew lists, radio-frequency observations and communications with the ship’s operator. The objective is to prevent evidence destruction and reduce operational risk while the competent authority identifies the legal route.

The next step is a technical description. Investigators should record the manufacturer, serial number, power source, antenna configuration, frequency range, network interfaces, storage capacity, software version, remote-management settings, installation date and persons with access. They should distinguish a system designed to receive, one designed to decode, one designed to store, one designed to transmit, and one capable of entering another information system. An expert report should state what the device can do and what it actually did, separating testing from collection and collection from transmission.

That distinction matters for Article 226-3, Articles 323-1 and 323-2, and the national-security offences in Articles 411-5 to 411-7. A technically sophisticated device can support several hypotheses but does not prove any one of them. A hidden cable can indicate an attempt to bypass an access control, or it can be a maintenance modification. A storage drive can contain collected information, a software image, test data or unrelated files. A receiver can capture signals without deciphering content. Each conclusion requires a fact and a method.

If a criminal investigation is opened, the prosecution must also preserve the contestability of the evidence. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Hors les cas où la loi en dispose autrement, les infractions peuvent être établies par tout mode de preuve”. It immediately adds that the judge decides according to personal conviction and can rely only on evidence brought during the hearing and discussed contradictorily. This flexible proof rule does not authorise irregular collection. It means that photographs, expert reports, server records, testimony, customs documents and diplomatic material may all be relevant if lawfully obtained and capable of challenge.

For documentary and digital evidence, Article 60-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the prosecutor or judicial police officer, under its conditions, to require a person to hand over information useful to the investigation, including in digital form. A port operator may therefore receive a formal request for access logs, berth records, security video, network alerts, visitor badges or communications with the ship. A carrier or service provider may receive a request concerning billing, remote maintenance or equipment installation. The request must be tied to the investigation and the recipient should preserve the original data, metadata and retention context.

A search and seizure on a ship is more intrusive than a document request. The authority must identify the procedural setting, the magistrate or officer empowered to act, the offence under investigation, the place and objects targeted, and the conditions applicable to digital devices and privileged material. The ship’s master, crew and operator should ask for the legal basis and record the time, scope, persons present and items taken. Cooperation can be strategically wise, but it should be documented; a consent statement, refusal, reservation or technical impossibility can later affect the dispute over admissibility and reliability.

Where officials encounter material potentially covered by the defence secret, the procedure becomes more specialised. The Constitutional Council’s Decision no. 2011-192 QPC of 10 November 2011 records the role of the Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale and the rules governing classified material discovered during searches. The decision explains that a magistrate or judicial police officer who discovers classified material must avoid examining it as ordinary evidence, place it under the prescribed safeguards and transmit it through the commission’s process. The court’s description is a warning against treating a suspected military document as an ordinary attachment copied into an investigation file.

That procedural discipline is directly relevant to any claim that equipment captured military communications. Investigators must determine whether the captured material is classified under French law, whether it belongs to a French authority or another State, whether it is a communication or metadata, whether it was legally accessible, and whether the evidence can be disclosed to the defence and the court. An intelligence report may guide an investigation without being itself the final proof of the underlying act. The evidential route from a protected source to a usable judicial exhibit must be explained.

The 2014 classified-information decision cited above is especially useful for port operators and subcontractors. The court’s reasoning places weight on precautions, compartmentalisation and the recipient’s authorisation. A port, shipyard, telecommunications contractor or defence supplier that discovers a suspicious connection should not forward sensitive material through an ordinary email chain. It should preserve the initial record, restrict access, notify the competent security channel and document who handled the item. Uncontrolled disclosure can create a second legal problem while the first is being investigated.

Authorities should also separate administrative inspection from judicial seizure in their paperwork. A port-security inspection may establish a safety or access risk and support a departure delay. It does not automatically authorise a forensic copy of a crew member’s private phone. A judicial search may seize the phone under a different statutory basis, with different recording and chain-of-custody requirements. When an operation uses several powers, the file should identify when one phase ended and the next began. That clarity helps the court assess whether each item was obtained under the correct authority.

The same principle applies to international evidence. A ship’s parent company may be located abroad, the technical vendor may be in a third country, and the data centre may be outside France. A French prosecutor may need mutual legal assistance, a European investigation mechanism, a flag-State request or a voluntary preservation commitment. The request should specify the data, date range, offence, safeguards and urgency. A broad request for “all intelligence” is less likely to produce reliable, usable evidence than a targeted request for a configuration file, a purchase order, a remote-login record or a transmission log.

For the shipowner, the immediate checklist is concrete. Preserve the voyage data recorder and relevant bridge logs. Freeze deletion of network, access-control and remote-maintenance records. Identify every person who installed, tested, configured or accessed the equipment. Isolate a suspected device without altering its state. Photograph connections before disassembly. Obtain a neutral technical assessment. Do not reset, wipe or casually power-cycle a system that may be evidence. Request a written account of any French restriction on departure, the legal ground for the restriction and the route for challenging it. Those steps protect the investigation and the operator’s ability to contest a later inference.

B. Intelligence, sanctions and corporate exposure: the threshold beyond suspicion

Not every security concern should be converted into a criminal prosecution. French intelligence law recognises a preventive function, but it also sets a legal framework. Article L811-3 of the Internal Security Code lists interests that specialised intelligence services may protect, including national independence, territorial integrity and national defence, as well as major foreign-policy interests and the prevention of foreign interference. That provision can support an intelligence assessment of a foreign-linked maritime collection pattern even where prosecutors cannot yet prove an offence.

Surveillance powers are not free-standing. Article L821-1 of the Internal Security Code provides that the implementation on national territory of the listed intelligence-gathering techniques is subject to prior authorisation by the Prime Minister after an opinion from the Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement. It also limits use to individually designated and authorised agents. A news report may be a trigger for assessment. It is not, by itself, the authorisation required for a particular interception, geolocation, access to connection data or other technique.

The practical separation is important. Port officials can manage access and safety. Police and customs can investigate offences within their powers. Intelligence services can assess foreign interference through the statutory authorisation process. Prosecutors can open a judicial investigation when facts and jurisdiction support one. The same ship may be relevant to all three tracks, but a document produced for one track should not be silently treated as if it were gathered under another track’s rules.

Sanctions create a further risk of overstatement. A United States allegation, designation or warning does not automatically freeze a COSCO vessel, a French bank account or a French company in the European Union. EU restrictive measures must be identified in an applicable Council regulation or decision, and their scope must be matched to the person, entity, goods, service, vessel or transaction. The current consolidated text of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, for example, contains Russia-related measures, but its existence does not make every China-linked maritime concern a Russia-sanctions case. The applicable instrument, annex, date and transaction must be checked separately.

French asset-freezing law follows the same logic. Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires persons within its scope to apply without delay the freezing and non-provision measures provided by the relevant chapter and applicable European instruments. That duty becomes operational when there is a measure to apply. A bank should not tell a customer that a freeze exists merely because the customer is connected to a state-owned shipping group or because a foreign official has made an allegation. Conversely, a bank should not release a transaction without checking whether the ship, owner, charterer, beneficial owner, cargo, insurer or service is actually covered by an applicable measure.

For compliance teams, the legal question is often not “Is this ship suspicious?” but “Which fact would bring this transaction within an identified prohibition?” The answer may involve ownership, control, a listed person, a restricted service, a sanctioned destination, an evasion arrangement or a specific item. The file should record the names and identifiers checked, the date and version of the relevant EU and French texts, the relationship between the vessel and the contracting parties, and the reason for releasing, holding or reporting the transaction. A foreign warning can elevate due diligence without becoming a legal designation.

Corporate liability follows the same evidence discipline. A legal person may face exposure if an organ or representative committed a defined offence on its behalf. The fact that COSCO is state-owned may be relevant to risk assessment, corporate governance, procurement and intelligence hypotheses. It is not a substitute for identifying who ordered the installation, who authorised the collection, who received the data and whether that conduct is attributable to the company. Crew members may have acted under orders, under a misunderstanding, or without access to the relevant system. Each possibility requires a different evidential response.

A ship operator that discovers unexplained equipment should therefore take two steps at once. It should protect the physical and digital evidence, and it should obtain legal advice before circulating technical information to a foreign parent, an insurer, a vendor or a public authority. The objective is not to obstruct an investigation. It is to prevent accidental destruction, unauthorised disclosure, contamination of the original evidence and inconsistent statements by different parts of the group. A written incident chronology can distinguish discovery from testing, testing from collection, and collection from transmission.

A French port can also become a litigation site. A vessel may challenge a refusal of access, a departure delay, an expulsion order, a seizure, a customs decision, a criminal search or a measure affecting cargo. The operator should preserve the order, the notification, the inspection report, the identity of the authority, the time limits for challenge and the practical consequences for cargo and crew. The remedy depends on the measure. Administrative urgency does not mean there is no remedy; criminal secrecy does not mean the operator should wait until evidence and deadlines have disappeared.

The contrast with the United States allegation is important. The Reuters report may justify a diplomatic conversation, a port-security alert, a review of vessel-risk indicators and targeted intelligence collection. It does not identify a French suspect, a French act, a particular device or a judicially established harm. A French authority that acts should be able to answer four questions: what specific fact was observed; what legal power authorises the response; why is the measure necessary and proportionate; and what process allows the affected party to contest it? Those questions are not formalities. They are what separates a lawful security response from an evidentially fragile public accusation.

The best immediate model is a staged decision tree. First, secure the port and prevent unsafe or unauthorised access. Second, preserve data and identify the equipment without altering it. Third, determine whether the vessel is in port, internal waters, territorial waters or outside French jurisdiction. Fourth, notify the flag State and relevant national authorities. Fifth, select the administrative, intelligence or judicial channel that matches the evidence. Sixth, obtain technical and legal review before making a public statement. Seventh, reassess the vessel, operator, cargo and financial counterparties against the exact EU and French restrictions in force. Each stage creates a record that can be audited, challenged and shared with foreign partners.

France also has an interest in not weakening its own case through premature language. Calling the matter “Chinese espionage” before a device, operator, recipient and harm are established may cause diplomatic and commercial consequences that no later correction can fully reverse. The more accurate public formulation is that a reported allegation is being assessed under maritime-security, intelligence and criminal-law frameworks, with responsibility depending on evidence. That language is not soft. It preserves the ability to take urgent protective measures while keeping the final legal conclusion open until the facts are tested.

Conclusion

The COSCO allegation exposes a real legal fault line: modern commercial shipping can carry equipment with military, commercial and dual-use functions, while the authorities must work within separate regimes for port security, territorial waters, intelligence and criminal proof. France can restrict port access, delay or prohibit departure, order expulsion in the port-security area, preserve evidence, open a criminal investigation and use authorised intelligence techniques where the statutory conditions are met. It can prosecute only when the conduct fits a defined offence and the evidence establishes the required territorial, material and mental elements. It cannot board a foreign ship on the high seas solely because a news report is alarming, or treat foreign ownership as proof of a criminal order.

The legal assessment should therefore focus on the device’s actual operation, the information collected, the transmission path, the location of each act, the vessel’s flag and status, the authorisations used, the identity of the responsible persons and the treatment of the evidence. Articles 113-2, 411-5 to 411-7, 226-3, 323-1, 413-9 and 413-10 of the Criminal Code provide possible routes only when their conditions are met. Articles L5241-4-5, L5241-5, L5241-6 and L5332-8 of the Transport Code provide practical port tools, not a presumption of guilt. Articles L811-3 and L821-1 of the Internal Security Code frame the intelligence response. The decisions in no. 13-87.943, no. 05-81.157 and Decision no. 2011-192 QPC show why classification, custody, authorisation and contradiction must remain visible in the file.

For a vessel operator, port, bank, insurer or technical contractor confronted with a similar situation, the first questions are immediate: who has lawful custody of the device, what data must be preserved, has a French authority issued a written measure, which deadline applies, and which facts are alleged rather than established? A rapid review can protect both operational continuity and the integrity of a future defence. The related issue of sanctions and foreign designations should be checked separately against the exact European or French measure in force. For a useful comparison, see our analysis of the evidence required before a sanctions-evasion allegation affects a French-facing payment.

Reporting basis and legal texts: this analysis responds to the Reuters report of 1 September 2026 concerning allegations by two anonymous senior United States officials. Reuters did not independently verify the allegations, and no conclusion is drawn here about the conduct of a particular COSCO vessel. The legal references are linked to the official French, European and United Nations texts or decisions cited in the article. They should be checked against the applicable version, facts and procedural measure before action is taken.

📄 Circulaire officielle