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Hamas Crypto Seizure: Can a U.S. Court Order Reach a French Custodian?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Hamas Crypto Seizure: Can a U.S. Court Order Reach a French Custodian?

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On 1 September 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced that court-authorized seizures had taken more than $560,000 in cryptocurrency allegedly destined for Hamas’s Al Qassam Brigades. The FBI also took control of fundraising domains, servers and communications infrastructure, while investigators collected information about thousands of people who contacted the organisation online. The Associated Press reported the same operation and described the seizures as part of a continuing investigation, not as final convictions against every person whose details appear in the files.

The immediate question for an international business is not whether a blockchain address can be seen from Paris. It is whether a United States warrant can, by itself, freeze an account held by a French custodian. The answer is no: a United States order does not automatically become a French judicial seizure or an EU restrictive measure. It can nevertheless trigger urgent duties under EU sanctions law, French anti-money-laundering rules and domestic criminal procedure. It can also create a fast route for evidence-sharing, asset preservation and a lawful request for restraint.

This analysis follows the legal path from the American announcement to a French platform, bank, donor, beneficiary or third-party owner. It separates an EU asset freeze from a criminal seizure, identifies the records that should be preserved, and explains the remedies available when a legitimate account is caught in a cross-border investigation. The legal position described below is assessed as at 1 September 2026.

I. Can a U.S. Hamas crypto seizure freeze a French wallet?

A. What the FBI seizure actually establishes for an international audience

The public announcement is significant because it combines three forms of leverage: control over digital infrastructure, control over identified crypto-assets and collection of intelligence about potential donors. The United States Department of Justice release dated 1 September 2026 calls the measures “court-authorized seizures”. It lists cryptocurrency seizure warrants dated 25 March 2025, 25 June 2025 and 10 October 2025, together with later affidavits dated 29 July 2026 and 18 August 2026. According to the release, investigators traced rotating donation addresses connected to the Al Qassam Brigades, seized approximately $560,000 in cryptocurrency and used the captured infrastructure to intercept donations.

The Associated Press report adds an important procedural qualification. The FBI affidavits describe allegations and investigative material. They do not convert every person who contacted a fundraising channel into a convicted terrorist financier. A French lawyer assessing a client’s exposure must therefore distinguish at least four categories: a listed organisation or person; a wallet controlled by that person; a platform that merely processed an incoming transfer; and a person who made a donation or attempted to make one without knowing the legal status or destination of the recipient. The evidential and procedural questions differ for each category.

“Seizure”, “freeze” and “forfeiture” are not interchangeable. A seizure is a procedural restraint over property for an investigation or later confiscation. A freeze is a prohibition on changing, using or making funds available, usually because a sanctions or administrative measure applies. Forfeiture is the later determination that the property is legally confiscated. The United States may use a warrant and its own forfeiture process against an asset within its jurisdiction, against an American intermediary, or against a custodian subject to its court’s authority. That does not automatically transfer title, compel a French exchange to obey every foreign instruction, or establish that a French account holder committed an offence.

Location also needs careful analysis. A blockchain address has no ordinary bank branch. The relevant connecting factors may be the location of a custodian, the residence or nationality of a client, the server or domain registrar, the place where a conversion took place, the location of a bank account receiving fiat proceeds, or the place where a person acted. A self-hosted address may be visible on a public ledger but may not be controlled by a regulated intermediary. A custodial account, by contrast, creates a records trail and a legal relationship that can be reached through the custodian’s jurisdiction.

For a French custodian, the American announcement should therefore be treated as a high-value risk signal and a possible request for judicial cooperation, not as a self-executing French order. The platform should obtain the actual warrant, affidavit, case identifier, wallet addresses, transaction hashes and identity information rather than relying on a press headline. It should record when it received each item, who assessed it and which account or transaction was matched. That record matters if the platform later has to explain why it restrained a transaction, filed a report or refused a transfer.

The decisive question is whether an independent French or EU legal hook has been activated. That hook may be an EU listing, a French national freeze, a French judicial order, a request from a competent authority or an evidence-preservation obligation arising from the platform’s own anti-money-laundering controls. A foreign warrant can supply facts for that assessment. It cannot replace the French or EU decision required to impose a French measure on a person or an account that has no direct United States nexus.

B. Which EU and French rules can create a real freeze

The first legal layer is the EU terrorist-financing sanctions framework. Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 provides that, subject to its exceptions, “all funds, other financial assets and economic resources” belonging to a listed person, group or entity “shall be frozen” and that funds must not be made available to a listed person or entity. Its Article 2 also prohibits financial services for the benefit of a listed person, group or entity. The regulation is directly applicable in Member States, so a French bank or crypto-asset service provider cannot treat a confirmed EU listing as a voluntary policy choice.

The current EU framework must be checked rather than copied from an old sanctions spreadsheet. The Council’s Regulation (EU) 2026/456 of 26 February 2026 amended Regulation 2580/2001 and repealed earlier implementing measures. Hamas appears in the EU terrorism-sanctions architecture, while a separate, dedicated regime addresses people and entities that support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. That second regime is set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/386, whose consolidated version is current through 28 May 2026, and its list was amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1174.

The distinction is critical. A wallet address named in a United States affidavit is not automatically a person or entity listed by the EU. A platform must identify the legal owner, beneficial controller and transaction purpose, then compare those identifiers against the applicable EU and French measures. A transaction can still be suspicious or criminal without being an automatic sanctions match. Conversely, an account can be frozen because the owner or controller is listed even if the transaction itself looks ordinary. The compliance response should state which proposition is being applied.

France has its own national framework. Article L. 562-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code permits the ministers responsible for the economy and the interior to decide jointly, for six months renewable, to freeze funds and economic resources belonging to people or entities that commit, attempt, facilitate or finance terrorist acts, or participate in them. The statute’s definitions cover the volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, nature and destination of funds. That functional definition can capture a crypto balance or a claim against a custodian even though the ledger entry is intangible.

Article L. 562-4 of the same code requires the persons covered by the provision, including regulated financial and crypto-asset operators, to apply the freeze and the ban on making funds available without delay and to inform the economy minister. Article L. 562-5 prohibits directly or indirectly making funds or economic resources available for the benefit of a person whose funds are frozen. Article L. 562-6 prohibits knowingly and voluntarily taking part in activities designed to circumvent a freeze. These are the provisions that make “move the coins to another wallet until the paperwork arrives” an unsafe response once a French measure or a clear EU prohibition applies. The relevant statutory links are Article L. 562-4, Article L. 562-6 and Article L. 562-11.

The national freeze is not the same as a criminal seizure. The French Treasury explains that national measures are temporary administrative police measures and that an order can be challenged within two months of notification, with a contentious claim brought before the Administrative Court of Paris. Its Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad regime page also explains that the EU regulation applies across the Union, to Member State nationals outside the Union, and to legal persons established under Member State law. A client or platform should identify the precise source of the restraint: an EU regulation, a national order, a criminal investigation or a private risk decision.

The second legal layer is anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing supervision. Article L. 561-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, in its version effective from 5 August 2026, includes crypto-asset service providers authorised under MiCA among the persons subject to the relevant obligations. Article L. 561-2 should be read together with Article L. 561-10-2, which requires an enhanced examination of an especially complex or unusually large operation, or one lacking an apparent lawful economic purpose. The operator must seek information about the origin and destination of funds, the purpose of the operation and the identity of its beneficiary.

Article L. 561-15 requires a covered person to report sums or operations that it knows, suspects or has good reason to suspect are connected with terrorist financing. It does not require the platform to prove a completed offence before reporting. At the same time, the operator must not transform a suspicion report into a public accusation. The French Article L. 561-15 link should be paired with an internal record of the factual indicators, the source of the United States information, the blockchain analysis and the decision-maker’s reasoning.

For an individual, the criminal threshold is different from the platform’s reporting threshold. Article 421-2-2 of the French Penal Code defines terrorist financing as supplying, collecting or managing funds, assets or property, or giving advice for that purpose, with the intention that the resources be used, or knowing that they are intended to be used, for a terrorist act; the act need not ultimately occur. The current text is available at Article 421-2-2 of the French Penal Code.

The Cour de cassation applied that principle in its 7 September 2021 decision, appeal no. 19-87.367. It held that the relevant knowledge can be established without proving an intention to finance a specific terrorist act and without proving that the act occurred. That case concerned payments to the Islamic State, not the present Hamas investigation, so it is not a ruling on the American affidavits. Its value is the legal test: the destination, the knowledge and the purpose of the funding must be proved from the evidence; a media report or a blockchain label is not enough by itself.

EU anti-money-laundering law reinforces the same separation between risk analysis and criminal conviction. The consolidated Directive (EU) 2015/849 requires enhanced measures in higher-risk situations and now addresses crypto-asset transfers to or from self-hosted addresses. The Directive (EU) 2018/1673 defines property broadly as assets “including electronic or digital” and treats terrorism as a category of criminal activity. The wording matters for a French case file: the account history, the wallet attribution and the digital records are part of the proof, but they must still be connected to a person and to the required mental element.

MiCA adds an operational layer but does not create a foreign-warrant enforcement mechanism. Article 59 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 restricts the provision of crypto-asset services in the Union to authorised providers or specified regulated financial entities. Article 60(7) asks an applicant to describe internal controls for national anti-money-laundering law, its risk-assessment framework for money-laundering and terrorist-financing risks, and its client-asset segregation procedures. Article 75 requires a custodian to segregate client holdings from its own holdings. These rules make accurate account mapping and preservation of custody records essential when an American warrant names a wallet that may be omnibus-held by a European platform.

II. What must a French custodian do when the U.S. order crosses the border?

A. How to preserve evidence and trigger lawful cooperation

The first response should be a controlled preservation decision. A French platform should place the identified account, wallet and transaction range under a legal hold, preserving the status that existed at the moment of notice. That normally includes the customer file, beneficial-owner information, onboarding and enhanced-review records, deposits and withdrawals, transaction hashes, wallet addresses, internal ledger entries, conversion records, IP and device data held lawfully, support messages, risk alerts, sanctions-screening results, communications with banks and any earlier suspicious-transaction analysis. The platform should preserve both machine-readable exports and a human-readable chronology, with time zone and hash information where available.

Preservation is not the same as indiscriminate blocking. The operator should identify the exact asset and the exact legal reason for a restraint. If the United States affidavit names a wallet that is held through an omnibus address, the custodian must map the internal sub-ledger without assuming that all clients sharing the address are implicated. If a transfer merely passed through a wallet, the record should distinguish sender, intermediary, beneficiary and ultimate controller. If the customer is a French association or a humanitarian organisation, the platform should preserve its constitutional documents, grant terms, beneficiary information and purpose evidence as well as the transaction data.

A written decision matrix helps prevent two opposite errors: releasing property that a lawful French or EU measure has frozen, or treating an untested foreign allegation as a final finding of guilt. The matrix should ask:

  • Is there a confirmed EU or French designation, and does it identify the customer, the beneficial owner, an entity under control, or only a related person?
  • Is there a French administrative freeze, a French judicial seizure order, or only a United States warrant and affidavit?
  • Does the platform hold the asset, control the private key, operate a fiat account, or merely provide information?
  • Is the proposed action a temporary hold, a refusal to execute, a report to an authority, a transfer to an authorised custodian, or a confiscation request?
  • Which third-party rights could be affected, and which records prove that the third party was separated from the alleged fundraising activity?

The reporting channel must also be chosen carefully. A French operator that sees indicators connected with terrorist financing should assess a report under Article L. 561-15 and document the facts supporting it. It should not tell the customer that a suspicious-transaction report has been filed, and it should not warn a person that authorities may seek a seizure if doing so would compromise the investigation. The platform can still communicate a neutral service message about a technical or legal hold, subject to its obligations and the advice of counsel. The purpose is to preserve the investigation while keeping the customer communication accurate.

If a French national freeze is adopted, the scope is broader than one blockchain transaction. Article L. 562-4 covers persons in France and regulated persons conducting operations in France, including relevant cross-border activity. Article L. 562-10 makes the measure opposable to a third party who claims a right over the funds or resources, even when that right predates the measure. Article L. 562-11 allows a request for authorised release of part of the frozen funds where the statutory conditions are satisfied. A custodian should therefore preserve evidence of ownership and priority rather than assuming that the freeze ends every third-party claim.

For a criminal seizure, the French procedural route is different. Article 706-141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure places special seizures within the regime designed to secure a possible confiscation. Article 706-154 expressly addresses money credited to accounts opened with institutions authorised to hold deposit, payment or crypto-asset accounts. The current provision allows a judicial investigator, with authorisation from the prosecutor or investigating judge, to seize such a sum and requires the liberty-and-custody judge or investigating judge to decide within ten days whether the seizure is maintained or lifted. The full text is available at Article 706-154; the general special-seizure framework is set out in Article 706-141.

The Cour de cassation’s recent decisions show why the procedural file matters. In its 15 February 2023 decision, appeal no. 22-81.326, the criminal chamber upheld a seizure of bitcoins where the investigation connected the assets to encrypted communications, a criminal transaction and the legal presumption of illicit origin. The decision does not say that every crypto balance is illicit. It confirms that a court may assess the asset’s alleged origin, the surrounding data and its confiscability, while the owner must be able to contest the factual basis.

In its 24 September 2025 decision, appeal no. 24-81.705, the same chamber required an appellate decision on a third-party challenge to identify the procedural documents made available to the third party and the documents on which the seizure reasoning actually rests. This rule is directly relevant when a French custodian, account holder or beneficial owner receives only a foreign press statement instead of the evidence underlying the restraint. The challenge should ask for the precise documents, not merely a general summary of the investigation.

When a foreign authority wants evidence held in France, the request should travel through a recognised cooperation channel. An American warrant cannot simply be relabelled as an EU instrument. The United States and France may use applicable mutual legal-assistance arrangements and the competent judicial authorities. If relevant evidence is held in another EU Member State, an European Investigation Order may be available between Member States. Article 1 of Directive 2014/41/EU describes an EIO as “a judicial decision which has been issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member State” to obtain one or more specific investigative measures in another Member State. It is not a shortcut for a non-EU state to command a French platform.

The CJEU’s Grand Chamber judgment in Case C-670/22, M.N. (EncroChat), EU:C:2024:372, 30 April 2024, is a useful warning about digital evidence. The case concerned encrypted communications and the conditions for using evidence transferred through EIOs. It confirms the importance of identifying the legal measure used to obtain information, the authority that issued it and the safeguards that permit an affected person to challenge the intrusion. A French platform assisting an international investigation should retain the request, validation, scope, return and chain-of-custody documents together with the raw records.

For evidence outside France, the same logic applies. The platform should not silently export a customer’s entire history because a foreign investigator asked informally. It should identify the requesting authority, confirm the legal channel, define the date range and data categories, preserve the original, produce a verified copy and log every disclosure. That process protects the investigation, the platform and the person whose data is transferred. It also allows a French court to determine whether the evidence was lawfully obtained and whether it can support a seizure or charge.

B. How a holder or good-faith third party can challenge the block

A person whose wallet or fiat account is blocked should first establish which measure caused the block. There are three common possibilities: a sanctions freeze against a listed person or controlled entity; a French national administrative freeze; or a criminal seizure in an investigation. A private compliance hold may exist alongside one of these measures, but it is not the same thing. The request to the platform should ask for the legal basis, the date of effect, the assets concerned, the authority involved, the review process and the documents that can lawfully be disclosed.

The holder should preserve evidence before making a substantive explanation. Relevant material includes identity documents, proof of beneficial ownership, the source of funds, wallet-control evidence, exchange and bank statements, invoices, employment or donation records, association statutes, grant agreements, sanctions-screening results and all communications with the platform. A transaction history should be reconstructed from the ledger and the chain rather than from a screenshot. The key issue is not simply whether a wallet touched an address named in an affidavit. It is who controlled the wallet, who gave the instruction, where the funds came from, where they were intended to go and what the holder knew at the relevant time.

That distinction is particularly important for a person who donated, attempted to donate or was contacted by a fundraising channel. Article 421-2-2 requires a connection between the provision, collection or management of funds and the required intention or knowledge concerning terrorist use. The decision in appeal no. 19-87.367 explains the seriousness of that test, but it does not eliminate the need for proof in an individual case. Contact with a website, a Telegram group or a wallet address is an investigative lead. It is not by itself the final finding that the person knowingly financed a terrorist enterprise.

The same caution applies to humanitarian or charitable funds. The EU framework contains exceptions and derogations, and the purpose and beneficiary of a payment can change the analysis. A label such as “humanitarian” does not automatically cure a sanctions problem, but the absence of a listed beneficiary does not automatically prove terrorist financing. The holder should present objective documents showing the governance of the organisation, the recipient screening, the payment chain, the purpose of the funds and any licence or authorisation relied upon. A platform should keep the decision neutral until a competent authority determines the legal consequence.

If the restraint is an EU listing or a French national freeze, the remedy and deadline must be calculated from the applicable act. The French Treasury’s national-freeze guidance states that an order may be challenged within two months of notification, through an administrative reconsideration request or a contentious claim before the Administrative Court of Paris. The affected person can also seek authorised access to part of the funds under the conditions explained by Article L. 562-11. A third party claiming ownership or another right should state that right expressly and support it with dated records.

If the restraint is a criminal seizure, the challenge must follow the criminal-procedure route and the relevant stage of the investigation. A request for restitution, an appeal against the seizure or an argument about access to the file may be available depending on the order and the applicant’s status. The 20 May 2026 Cour de cassation decision, appeal no. 25-86.539, arose from a case involving ransom paid in ETH and USDT and a dispute over restitution of seized crypto-assets. The chamber held that, after the statutory transfer of competence, the appeal against the restitution order had to be decided by the first president of the court of appeal or the designated judge. The case is a reminder that a restitution request can fail procedurally even before the merits are examined.

Access to the evidence is not a technical luxury. It permits the third party to test whether the address was correctly attributed, whether the transaction was complete or only attempted, whether the custodian’s internal account was identified correctly, and whether the seizure covers the right quantity. It also permits arguments about proportionality and segregation. The holding in appeal no. 24-81.705 should be used to request identification of the documents made available and the specific documents relied upon. A general assertion that the file exists is not the same as access to the material supporting the restraint.

Moving the property to another jurisdiction is not a safe substitute for a remedy. In its 29 November 2023 decision, appeal no. 22-85.867, the criminal chamber considered the offence of evading terrorist-asset-freeze measures. It held that opening a foreign bank account immediately after a freeze, with the aim of accessing the assets during a later freeze period, could characterise evasion and that the law did not require a separate concealment manoeuvre. The facts concerned bank accounts, not the present Hamas crypto operation, but the principle is a clear warning against using a foreign exchange, a mixer or a self-hosted wallet to defeat a known restraint.

A responsible response can be organised in five written files:

  • a source file containing the United States warrant, affidavit, case number, court, date, wallet list and transaction hashes;
  • a French and EU status file recording sanctions screening, listings, French orders, JORF publication and any request from the Treasury, Tracfin or a judicial authority;
  • an evidence file preserving the original ledger, blockchain data, KYC material, communications and disclosure log;
  • a rights file separating the customer’s property, the custodian’s property, third-party claims, humanitarian documentation and any restitution request;
  • a decision file explaining each hold, refusal, report, disclosure, release or escalation, with the responsible reviewer and the next review date.

That documentation also helps the custodian respond to an international journalist or regulator without overstating the case. The platform can say that it received a foreign allegation, preserved the relevant records and is awaiting or cooperating with the competent legal process. It should not announce that every donor is a terrorist financier, that every named wallet is owned by Hamas, or that a United States warrant has automatically frozen French property. Precision is not a weakness in a terrorism-financing file; it is what protects the integrity of the investigation and the rights of people who may have been swept into it.

Conclusion

The FBI’s seizure of more than $560,000 in crypto-assets allegedly destined for Hamas is a live cross-border enforcement signal, not a ready-made French seizure order. A French custodian must verify the underlying warrant and wallet attribution, preserve the account and transaction record, screen the relevant EU and French measures, assess its reporting duties and use a recognised cooperation channel for any disclosure or restraint. A confirmed EU listing or French freeze can require immediate action; a foreign press release alone cannot silently replace the French legal decision required to affect a French holder.

For a holder or good-faith third party, the route is equally concrete: identify the measure, protect the evidence, separate ownership from contact with an address, ask for the documents supporting the restraint and use the correct administrative or criminal remedy within time. The current French case law on terrorist financing, crypto seizures, third-party access and freeze evasion shows why the distinction between suspicion, seizure, freeze and forfeiture must remain visible at every stage.

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