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CCJ Refuses to Pause Guyana’s U.S. Extradition Case: What Happens Before September 3?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

CCJ Refuses to Pause Guyana’s U.S. Extradition Case: What Happens Before September 3?

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The Guyana extradition case involving opposition leader Azruddin Mohamed and his father, Nazar Mohamed, has reached a decisive procedural checkpoint. On September 1, 2026, the Caribbean Court of Justice refused their attempt to keep the Magistrates’ Court proceedings on hold while they sought further relief. The immediate consequence is practical: the committal case is due to resume on September 3. The United States is seeking the pair’s extradition on an 11-count indictment alleging conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. Those allegations remain allegations; the current decision is not a finding of guilt and it is not an order delivering either man to the United States.

The legal question now attracting international attention is narrower and more useful than the headline “extradition approved.” What does the disappearance of an interim stay actually change? The CCJ’s July decision dealt with the validity of Guyana’s Authority to Proceed and lifted the earlier stay. The September development removes another procedural brake. It does not replace the committal hearing, decide every evidentiary objection, or settle the final question of surrender. For lawyers advising a person wanted across borders, that distinction is central. A stay protects time; its refusal restores the ordinary sequence of hearings. French and European practice offers a useful comparison because a request from the United States would still pass through treaty controls, document checks, judicial scrutiny and rights-based objections before any executive decision on surrender.

This analysis separates the two stages. First, it explains what the CCJ development means before the September 3 hearing. Second, it sets out what a comparable U.S. request would trigger in France, including the documents, deadlines, detention safeguards and arguments that should be preserved from the first appearance.

I. What does the CCJ’s refusal to pause Guyana’s U.S. extradition case change before September 3?

A. Can the magistrate resume the case immediately after the stay is refused?

Yes, in the procedural sense reported by the parties and the local court calendar. The latest report from Guyana states that the CCJ dismissed the Mohameds’ application for a stay of the extradition proceedings before the Magistrates’ Court. The same report identifies September 3 as the date on which the hearings resume. The Caribbean Court of Justice had already published a media release on the July appeal. It records that the United States’ request was received on October 28, 2025; that an Authority to Proceed was issued two days later; that the applicants challenged that administrative step; and that the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal concerning the validity of the ATP.

The July release uses language that matters for the next hearing: an Authority to Proceed is described as a “preliminary administrative step in the extradition process.” The Court also stated that challenges to the ATP may be filed before the committal stage but, save in exceptional circumstances, should ordinarily be heard after that stage. The point is not that a person loses the right to challenge an unlawful process. The point is sequencing. A challenge directed at the ministerial gateway should not automatically suspend the judicial examination of whether the statutory conditions for committal are met.

That sequencing explains why a refusal to stay is not equivalent to an extradition order. A stay is a temporary order that prevents the lower court from taking specified steps while an appeal or application is considered. Once the stay is refused or lifted, the lower court regains authority to conduct the hearing that was already pending. It must still apply the applicable Guyanese statute, examine the request, hear the defence and reach the decision assigned to it by the extradition framework. The foreign requesting state does not obtain a right to take the person merely because the stay has disappeared.

The word “committal” is equally important. In a common-law extradition system, committal is the judicial stage at which the court decides whether the requesting state has supplied the material required to send the case forward. It is not the trial on the American indictment. The magistrate does not become a Florida trial judge, and a defence that attacks the credibility of every witness or seeks a final ruling on American criminal liability may be premature at that stage. The defence can nevertheless challenge the legal identity of the person, the sufficiency and authenticity of the request, the extraditable character of the alleged conduct, the operation of the treaty or statute, abuse of process, and any applicable human-rights protection.

The September 3 hearing should therefore be read as the reopening of a decision-making track, not as the last day on which surrender will occur. The practical effect is that adjournments, evidentiary directions and submissions can proceed unless another competent court grants fresh relief. Counsel will need to identify which arguments concern the ATP, which concern committal, and which would only become relevant if a later authority considers the actual surrender decision. Mixing those categories can produce an attractive political argument but a weak procedural record.

The distinction is especially important because the applicants’ earlier case focused on alleged actual or apparent bias connected with public statements by government officials. The CCJ’s official July release states that the appeal was unanimously dismissed, while the separate reasons differed on the timing of an ATP challenge and on the assessment of apparent bias. The Court found that the alleged bias did not invalidate the ATP in the circumstances before it. That finding does not prevent a different objection based on a concrete defect in the request, a failure to satisfy the statutory committal test, or a later event that affects the fairness of the proceedings.

For an international reader, the immediate lesson is simple: a regional final court can clear the procedural road without deciding the foreign indictment. The next court remains responsible for the next procedural question. That is also why the earlier analysis of the Guyana Court of Appeal stay remains relevant but cannot answer the new question. It addressed the earlier freeze; it did not replace the hearings now scheduled to resume.

A person following the case should also distinguish three dates: the date the United States transmitted its request, the date Guyana issued its Authority to Proceed, and the dates of the committal hearings. Each date can affect limitation arguments, treaty compliance, detention, disclosure and the way an objection is presented. The end of a stay does not erase the procedural history created while the case was suspended. It makes that history more urgent because the lower court can now decide what evidence and submissions it will receive next.

The legal posture can be represented as a chain:

  1. the United States sends an extradition request;
  2. the Guyanese executive issues an Authority to Proceed;
  3. the requested persons challenge that gateway decision;
  4. the appellate stay is granted, then lifted or refused;
  5. the Magistrates’ Court resumes the committal stage; and
  6. only after the statutory sequence is completed can the question of surrender move to its next decision-maker.

That chain also explains the news value of the September development. The opposition status of one requested person gives the dispute an obvious political dimension, while the cross-border allegations give it a law-enforcement dimension. The legal work begins by refusing to let either dimension swallow the procedural one. The CCJ has removed a pause; it has not converted an extradition request into a conviction, nor has it allowed the United States to bypass the Guyanese court.

B. Which defence arguments remain after the interim stay disappears?

The defence still has to work on the merits of the committal question, but “merits” here must be used carefully. The objective is not necessarily to prove innocence in the manner required at a criminal trial. The objective is to show why the request cannot lawfully proceed, why a particular count does not satisfy the applicable extradition test, why the documents do not establish the necessary connection to the person, or why the court should refuse or control the process for a reason recognised by law.

The first line is document integrity. A foreign indictment may be widely reported, but the court must work from the authenticated material transmitted through the legally prescribed channel. The defence should compare the charging instrument, arrest warrant, affidavits, exhibits and translations. Names, dates, corporate entities, transactions and alleged conduct must align. A mismatch that looks minor in a press report can become material when the court asks whether the person identified in the request is the person before it, whether the conduct is described with enough precision, or whether the requested person can understand the case to be answered.

The second line is the extraditable character of each count. The United States allegations reported in the present case include conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. A court may need to examine the statutory elements, the conduct alleged rather than the label attached to it, and whether the applicable Guyanese rule treats the conduct as an offence for which surrender may be ordered. “Fraud” and “money laundering” are not magic words. The legal test depends on the treaty and statute in force, the facts identified in the request, and the relationship between the conduct and the person sought.

The third line is the distinction between political controversy and a legally operative political exception. A requested person may be a politician and may allege that government statements have contaminated the process. That does not automatically make the underlying request a political offence or a request made for a political purpose. The defence has to identify the legal test, the evidence supporting it and the stage at which the court is competent to apply it. The CCJ’s July release is a warning against relying on status alone: the Court rejected the ATP challenge on the facts presented, while preserving the need for judicial independence and cautioning public officials about comments on pending proceedings.

The fourth line is abuse of process. If the defence says that a request is being used for an improper purpose, it should build a chronology rather than rely on rhetoric. Relevant material may include the timing of the indictment, sanctions, public statements, parallel investigations, communications between agencies, changes in the requested person’s political role, and any inconsistent explanation for the prosecution. The question is not whether the case is politically embarrassing. The question is whether the court’s process is being used in a way that makes committal legally or constitutionally unacceptable.

The fifth line is human-rights protection. The defence should identify concrete risks in the requesting state: detention conditions, access to counsel, trial delay, ability to participate in proceedings, medical needs, family circumstances and any risk of treatment contrary to the applicable constitutional or treaty standard. General criticism of the United States criminal system is unlikely to answer a specific extradition test. A focused record tied to the actual defendant, the actual facility, the actual charges and the actual procedural stage is more useful. If assurances are offered, the defence should ask who gives them, what they cover, whether they are binding, how compliance could be monitored and what remedy exists if they are breached.

The sixth line is the division between an objection to committal and an objection to surrender. Some systems allow a judicial court to decide whether a person can be committed, followed by an executive or appellate decision on surrender. Other systems combine more of the review. The lawyer must know which argument belongs where. An objection that is legally powerful at the surrender stage can be rejected as premature at committal. Conversely, a document defect that must be raised immediately can be lost if the defence waits for a later executive decision.

The seventh line is preservation. The end of a stay creates a short operational window. Counsel should request the hearing record, identify all prior concessions, renew any objection that was expressly reserved, and make sure that a ruling on each material point is recorded. If the magistrate rules against the defence, the reasons and the exact procedural order may control the route to review. A broad complaint that “the case was political” is harder to appeal than a precise submission that the court failed to apply a specified statutory condition to a specified document.

Finally, the defence should plan for communication. The public hears “the CCJ refused a stay”; the client needs to know whether he must attend, whether bail remains in force, which documents will be argued, whether disclosure is complete, what the next hearing can decide and what it cannot decide. That explanation is not public relations. It is part of informed representation when a national court is processing a request from a foreign prosecutor and the requested person is also a public figure.

It is possible that further litigation will follow. The current report says the applicants sought special leave and interim orders, and that the stay application was dismissed. A later application will depend on the governing appellate rules, the reasons delivered, any new event and the effect of the Magistrates’ Court proceedings. The safe conclusion is therefore procedural: the defence must now argue within the committal timetable while preserving any appellate point that remains legally available.

II. What would a French court examine if a comparable U.S. extradition request were filed in France?

A. Which documents, detention safeguards and timelines come first?

France would not treat a foreign appellate court’s refusal to stay proceedings as an automatic authorisation to surrender. The starting point would be the applicable treaty and the French Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 696 states that, where an international convention provides a different rule, the convention governs; the Code also applies to matters not regulated by the convention. The official French text says: En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. In English, the statutory framework is a gap-filling and procedural framework, not a licence to ignore the bilateral instrument.

For a request from the United States, the bilateral treaty signed in Paris on April 23, 1996 and published in France by Decree No. 2002-117 of January 29, 2002 would be central, together with the later instrument applying the EU–United States extradition agreement. The Court of Cassation has addressed that hierarchy in Criminal Chamber, appeal No. 16-87.102, a United States extradition case in which the Court examined the bilateral treaty and the EU–United States instrument rather than treating unrelated convention provisions as controlling. The practical implication is that a French defence must map every submission against the treaty article, the Code provision and the human-rights rule that actually governs it.

The request’s content comes first. Article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a diplomatic request accompanied by a conviction or a procedural act sending the person before a criminal court, or an arrest warrant or equivalent judicial act identifying the conduct and its date. The requesting state must also provide the applicable legal provisions. The exact text includes: Les pièces ci-dessus mentionnées doivent être produites en original ou en copie certifiée conforme. That is not a technical footnote. The form, authentication, translation and chain of transmission can determine whether the court has a legally usable request.

Article 696-9 adds an administrative verification stage: after the documents are checked, the request is transmitted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, which sends it to the territorially competent prosecutor general after checking the regularity of the request. Counsel should obtain the version actually transmitted to the court, not rely only on a diplomatic summary or a press account. If the American indictment was amended, superseded or supplemented, the defence should identify which version formed the basis of the arrest and which version supports the extradition request.

The first hours after arrest are protected by specific rules. Article 696-10 provides, in exact terms: Toute personne appréhendée à la suite d’une demande d’extradition doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent. The same article requires information, in a language the person understands, about the existence and content of the request, access to a chosen or appointed lawyer, immediate communication with counsel, access to the file and the ability to consent or oppose extradition. The record must show that those notifications occurred; the statute attaches nullity to the failure to record the information it requires.

Detention is a separate issue from the lawfulness of the request. Under Article 696-11, if the prosecutor general does not leave the person at liberty, the person is presented to the first president of the court of appeal or a designated judicial magistrate. That judge may order extradition custody, but may also impose measures guaranteeing appearance, with a route of review before the investigating chamber. This means that a French case can contain two parallel files: the merits of surrender and the necessity/proportionality of custody. Counsel should not allow the procedural urgency of the first file to hide a release application in the second.

The next distinction is consent. If the person consents, Article 696-13 provides for prompt referral to the investigating chamber and an appearance within five working days from presentation to the prosecutor general. The chamber verifies identity and receives statements. The public nature of the hearing has statutory exceptions, and the person may be assisted by counsel and an interpreter. Article 696-14 then governs the formal recording of consent when the legal conditions are met. Consent is a legal choice with consequences; it should never be treated as a casual answer to an arresting officer.

If the person refuses, Article 696-15 requires the investigating chamber to be seized without delay. Its first sentence reads: Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure. The person appears within ten working days of presentation to the prosecutor general. The chamber gives a reasoned opinion, normally within one month of the appearance unless further information is ordered. Its opinion is unfavourable if the legal conditions are not met or if there is an obvious error. The appeal on that opinion is restricted to formal defects capable of depriving it of essential legal conditions.

That timetable changes the defence strategy. A French lawyer cannot wait for a future executive decision before reviewing the evidence. The chamber’s opinion is formed at the judicial stage, and the record must contain the objection, the response and the reasons. If the requesting state wants to address the hearing, Article 696-16 allows the chamber, by a non-appealable decision, to authorise the requesting state to intervene through an authorised person; even then, the requesting state does not become a party to the procedure.

A negative judicial opinion has a strong consequence. Under Article 696-17, if the investigating chamber rejects the request in a final opinion, extradition cannot be granted and the person is released if not held for another cause. If the opinion is favourable, the process moves to the executive stage described by Article 696-18: extradition is authorised by decree of the Prime Minister on the report of the Minister of Justice, subject to the available challenge before the Conseil d’État. The foreign request therefore passes through multiple gates. A stay refusal in another country cannot replace any of them.

There is also a continuing custody remedy. Article 696-19 allows an application for release to the investigating chamber at any time and sets decision periods, including a shorter period where the application follows quickly after extradition custody. This is the French equivalent of keeping the temporary restraint under review while the surrender case continues. A person may lose a stay and still retain a strong argument for liberty; those are separate procedural questions.

At the end of the process, the act of physical transfer has its own rule. Article 696-22 provides that, where the person is at liberty after the government decision is no longer open to challenge, the prosecutor general may order the search and arrest of the person for extradition custody, and that surrender must occur within seven days of arrest or the person is released automatically. This final deadline illustrates why an international defence must plan early. The most consequential filing may be made weeks or months before the final transfer date.

French courts also distinguish ordinary extradition from the European arrest warrant. That distinction is not academic. In Criminal Chamber, appeal No. 26-84.072, July 29, 2026, the Court of Cassation held that the hearing of a person sought under a European arrest warrant is limited to identity, observations about the procedure and consent or refusal to surrender. The Court described that formality as préliminaire à tout débat, preliminary to the debate, and required the counsellor’s report before the debate as well. The case concerns an EU surrender mechanism, not a U.S. extradition request, but it offers a current reminder: a procedural appearance can be a gateway hearing rather than the hearing on every substantive ground.

B. What should a cross-border defence file prove before surrender is decided?

The first question is whether the French court is applying the correct legal instrument. Article 696 says that the Code applies in the absence of a different international convention and to points the convention leaves unregulated. The France–United States treaty, its 2004/2010 implementing instrument and the EU–United States agreement must therefore be placed beside the Code. A defence file should contain a table identifying, for each issue, the treaty article, the Code provision, the Convention right and the requested remedy. That table prevents a court from receiving a broad argument with no precise legal home.

The second question is dual criminality and threshold. Article 696-3 states that extraditable conduct includes crimes under the requesting state’s law and certain offences meeting a two-year maximum threshold, while also providing that the conduct must be punishable under French law by a criminal or correctional penalty. The French court looks at the facts described in the request, not merely the foreign label. The defence should prepare a count-by-count comparison: the conduct alleged, the date, the place, the foreign elements, the closest French qualification and the statutory penalty. If a count depends on a theory that has no French equivalent, the argument should be explained with precision rather than asserted as “no dual criminality.”

The third question is whether a refusal ground is established. Article 696-4 begins with the exact words L’extradition n’est pas accordée : and then lists statutory exclusions. They include French nationality at the relevant time, a political offence or a request made for a political purpose, conduct committed in France, final proceedings in France for the same facts, prescription, a penalty or security measure contrary to French public order, a requesting tribunal that does not ensure fundamental procedural and defence guarantees, and a military offence. Each ground has its own factual burden. Nationality, for example, is assessed at the time of the offence; a political-purpose objection requires more than the fact that the requested person is an opposition politician.

The fourth question is the quality of the foreign material. Article 696-8 requires a judicial act or conviction, precise identification of the conduct and its date, certified originals or copies, and the applicable foreign law. The file should preserve every version received by French authorities, every translation and every correction. Counsel should note whether the arrest warrant is still in force, whether the indictment has been superseded, whether an American grand-jury document is being used for a purpose the treaty permits, and whether the facts in the diplomatic request match the facts argued in court. If the United States later changes the charges, that change should be analysed under the treaty’s specialty and modification provisions rather than left to an assumption that “the same case” continues.

The fifth question is notice and representation. The 48-hour rule in Article 696-10 is only one part of the protection. The requested person must understand the request in a language they understand, must have access to counsel, and must be able to consult the file. The official rule also informs the person that they may consent or oppose extradition and may waive specialty, with legal consequences explained. A defence file should record the language used, the time of notification, when counsel saw the file, whether an interpreter was present, and whether the client was advised about the difference between consent, opposition and a later challenge to the government decree.

The sixth question is liberty pending the hearing. If the person is placed under extradition custody, Article 696-11 provides the framework for custody or alternative measures. Article 696-19 permits release applications during the process. The file should contain residence, identity, family, employment, medical and financial material showing why appearance can be guaranteed. It should also answer the prosecution’s likely concerns: risk of flight, access to travel documents, ties to France and other countries, previous compliance and any ability to interfere with evidence. A well-supported release application can coexist with a firm objection to extradition; it does not concede the request.

The seventh question is the requesting state’s assurances. The French court may need to assess trial rights, prison conditions, access to counsel, medical treatment, the possibility of conviction in absentia, specialty, maximum penalty and the treatment of any sentence. The file should request specific assurances where the treaty or constitutional case law makes them relevant, then test their wording. An assurance that the prosecution “will respect the law” may be less useful than a commitment identifying the facility, the court, the right to counsel, the procedural remedy and the authority responsible for compliance. If the risk is personal, evidence should be personal: medical records, previous detention reports, family circumstances or documented threats.

The eighth question is the effect of parallel proceedings. Article 696-7 addresses the situation in which the requested person is prosecuted or has been convicted in France for a different offence: transfer may be delayed until the French prosecution ends or the sentence is served, subject to the rule’s terms and the possibility of a temporary transfer. A lawyer should search for French proceedings, foreign proceedings and prior final judgments before the first substantive hearing. The same conduct may appear under different labels in two jurisdictions. A final French judgment, prescription or a pending prosecution can change the surrender analysis, but only if the facts and legal identity are mapped accurately.

The ninth question is EU nationality. The United States is a third state from the perspective of the European Union, but a person arrested in France may be a national of another EU Member State. The Court of Cassation’s appeal No. 22-80.120, October 11, 2022, concerned a request from a non-EU state for an EU citizen who was a national of another Member State. The Court required the investigating chamber to ensure that the person’s state of nationality had been sufficiently placed in a position to decide whether to prosecute and issue a European arrest warrant. The Court also stated, in a short formulation that should guide the record, l’insuffisance ou la contradiction des motifs équivaut à leur absence: insufficient or contradictory reasons are equivalent to an absence of reasons. This is not an automatic bar to every U.S. request. It is a reminder to check nationality and to put the cross-border consequence before the court rather than assuming the executive will handle it informally.

The tenth question is the scope of review. French extradition review is not a trial of the requesting state’s entire criminal case. The court examines the legal conditions, the request, the applicable convention, the existence of an obvious error where the Code uses that standard, and the fundamental rights engaged by surrender. That limited role does not make the hearing superficial. It makes selection important. Counsel should identify the points that the court can decide from the extradition file and separate them from arguments that belong before the American trial court. The defence’s credibility improves when it acknowledges that distinction while explaining why a threshold defect prevents surrender.

The eleventh question is the public and political setting. A person may be a parliamentarian, business figure, activist or government opponent. Public prominence can increase the risk of political statements, media pressure or online threats, but it is not itself a refusal ground. The file should focus on facts that bear on the statutory test: who made the statements, when, in what capacity, how they reached the decision-maker, whether they influenced the request, whether judicial independence can be maintained and what concrete safeguard is available. The CCJ’s treatment of alleged bias in the Mohamed litigation shows why the argument has to be tied to the decision under challenge and the remedy sought.

The final question is what happens after a favourable judicial opinion. Article 696-17 makes a final negative opinion decisive against extradition. A favourable opinion does not put the person on a plane. Article 696-18 moves the matter to the executive decree, and that decree has its own administrative-law challenge. If a decree is challenged, counsel must calculate the time limit from notification and identify whether the complaint concerns jurisdiction, procedure, treaty conditions, reasons, fundamental rights or a failure to consider a material circumstance. The later seven-day surrender rule in Article 696-22 means that a successful challenge cannot be improvised after arrest for transfer.

There is a useful operational checklist for any person who learns that a U.S. extradition request may be circulating:

  1. obtain the arrest warrant, indictment, diplomatic request and every annex;
  2. confirm the exact name, nationality and identity information used;
  3. build a chronology of the alleged conduct, request, arrest and notifications;
  4. compare each foreign count with the closest French offence and penalty;
  5. check prescription, prior French proceedings, final judgments and specialty;
  6. collect evidence on detention, medical needs, family circumstances and trial guarantees;
  7. record every deadline for appearance, release, judicial opinion and decree challenge; and
  8. decide separately what must be argued before the investigating chamber, the Conseil d’État and the requesting state’s trial court.

The checklist is deliberately procedural. It does not promise that a French court will refuse an extradition request. It ensures that a viable objection is not lost because the defence began with the political headline instead of the request, the treaty and the record. That is the principal comparison with Guyana. The CCJ’s refusal to maintain a stay makes the next hearing urgent, but urgency does not change the burden of identifying the legal gate that remains open.

It also explains why a French lawyer’s role is valuable in an international case even when France is not the requested state. French counsel can help coordinate the European dimension, preserve evidence about a future arrest in France, analyse the treaty relationship, distinguish an Interpol alert from a judicial arrest warrant, and prepare a rights-based file before a person is detained. None of that replaces counsel in Guyana or the United States. It prevents the defence from treating three different jurisdictions as if they were one court.

Conclusion

The September 1 CCJ development has one immediate legal effect: the Guyanese Magistrates’ Court is no longer blocked by the interim stay sought by Nazar and Azruddin Mohamed, and the committal proceedings are scheduled to resume on September 3. The July CCJ judgment already rejected the challenge to the Authority to Proceed and lifted the earlier stay. Neither development is a conviction, a final surrender order or a decision on every objection to the United States indictment.

For the defence, the next task is disciplined sequencing. Preserve the objection to bias if it remains legally available, but also attack the request through its documents, dates, offences, evidentiary foundation, treaty conditions, human-rights safeguards and procedural record. For a comparable request in France, the bilateral France–United States treaty would operate with the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Articles 696, 696-3, 696-4, 696-8, 696-10, 696-11 and 696-15 would frame the first review. The investigating chamber’s role is real but limited; a favourable judicial opinion is not the same thing as physical surrender.

The durable lesson is that an interim stay buys time but does not decide the case. When it disappears, the lawyer must know which argument belongs in the next hearing, which must be preserved for appeal and which belongs before the requesting state’s trial court. That is how a politically charged extradition story becomes an intelligible legal process.

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