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Washington vs. The Hague: US Sanctions on the ICC President and What France Must Still Do When an ICC Warrant Lands in Paris

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Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Washington vs. The Hague: US Sanctions on the ICC President and What France Must Still Do When an ICC Warrant Lands in Paris

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On 31 August 2026, Reuters reported that President Donald Trump’s administration is weighing new sanctions on the International Criminal Court that could target the entire institution, a step the agency described with unusual bluntness: « President Donald Trump’s administration is weighing new sanctions on the International Criminal Court that could target the entire institution, five sources told Reuters on Monday, in a dramatic escalation that would make it harder for the war crimes tribunal to operate. » Less than two weeks earlier, Washington had placed the Court’s own president, Judge Tomoko Akane, on its sanctions list. In The Hague, meanwhile, the confirmation-of-charges hearing in the case against former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte opened its first week, with the accused appearing by video link. For anyone living, banking, travelling or litigating in France, the collision raises a blunt question: can American sanctions stop French cooperation with the Court, and what happens to you if an ICC file reaches French soil? The short answer is that Washington can make life materially harder for the Court’s staff, its vendors and its banks, but it cannot release France from its duty to cooperate. France implemented the Rome Statute in its Code of Criminal Procedure more than twenty years ago, and that domestic machinery keeps running regardless of who sits on a United States sanctions list. This analysis maps both halves of the problem: how the American sanctions machine against the Court actually works, and what Paris must still do when an ICC arrest warrant lands in France.

I. Can Washington sanction the world’s criminal court and freeze it out of the dollar system

A. Who Washington has already sanctioned and under which orders since February 2025

The legal engine is Executive Order 14203, signed on 6 February 2025 and titled « Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court ». The order declares that the Court’s actions against the United States and its ally Israel constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, and it authorises the blocking of property and the imposition of visa restrictions on designated Court officials and their immediate family members. The full text was published by the White House at Executive Order 14203 imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court and in the Federal Register at Federal Register notice of Executive Order 14203. The administration’s stated posture was set out in programme language that has been repeated ever since: « The United States will take whatever actions we deem necessary to protect our troops, our sovereignty, and our allies from the ICC’s illegitimate actions. » That sentence matters because it announces open-ended escalation, and the eighteen months that followed delivered exactly that.

The first designation came within days. On 13 February 2025, the then Prosecutor, Karim Khan, was added to the sanctions list, a move without precedent against the sitting prosecutor of an international court supported by 125 States Parties. Four months later, in June 2025, Washington designated four sitting ICC judges: Solomy Balungi Bossa, Luz del Carmen Ibanez Carranza, Reine Alapini-Gansou and Beti Hohler. On 20 August 2025 came the round that directly hit France: Judges Kimberly Prost of Canada and Nicolas Guillou of France, together with Deputy Prosecutors Nazhat Shameem Khan and Mame Mandiaye Niang, were designated. Paris reacted the way it reacts when one of its own judges is targeted by a foreign power: the Foreign Ministry summoned the United States ambassador, an episode widely reported by Reuters and the French press, and publicly restated its support for the Court. Then, on 18 August 2026, Washington crossed the last symbolic line and sanctioned the Court’s president herself, Judge Tomoko Akane, alongside the Court as reporting described further designations of senior staff. The designations are published in the Treasury sanctions machinery at OFAC sanctions lists and recent actions, and each round has combined asset freezes, family-member visa bans and a documented chilling effect on staff recruitment.

The Reuters exclusive of 31 August 2026 is the logical endpoint of this sequence. Citing five sources, the agency reported that the administration could sanction the entire Court as an institution, a step no United States government has taken against any international tribunal. The Court itself publicly condemned each round of designations, statements published at the International Criminal Court, and the United Nations human rights office publicly backed the Court, warning that sanctions against judges and prosecutors for doing their jobs strike at judicial independence itself. Two features make this escalation genuinely new. First, the target set has moved from the Prosecutor’s office to the bench and now to the presidency and potentially the institution, which means the sanctions no longer punish one investigation but penalise the judicial function as such. Second, the timing coincides with live proceedings that Washington opposes: the Afghanistan file, the Palestine file, and the Duterte confirmation hearing that opened in The Hague in the first days of September 2026. International media reporting in August 2026 described the Court losing about a fifth of its staff since the sanctions began, as vendors cut contracts and recruitment froze. An institution losing a fifth of its personnel while its judges cannot use international banks is not an institution under criticism; it is an institution under siege.

B. What American sanctions do in practice to judges, staff, banks and vendors

A United States designation under Executive Order 14203 has three layers, and each layer bites differently. The first layer is the asset freeze. Any property or interest in property of a designated person that is within United States jurisdiction is blocked, and no person under United States jurisdiction may deal in it. In practice this reaches dollar-denominated accounts anywhere in the world, because dollar clearing runs through New York, and it reaches any transaction with a United States nexus, including software licences, cloud hosting, legal databases, travel bookings and academic publishing contracts routed through American companies. A sanctioned judge keeps her salary from her home State in many cases, but she loses practical access to the plumbing of international life: credit cards issued by global networks, dollar transfers, and even payment of school fees through correspondent banks. The second layer is the visa ban. Designated officials and their immediate family members become ineligible for United States visas, which in a profession built on conferences, UN meetings in New York and cooperation missions is a career sanction as much as a travel sanction. The third layer is the least visible and the most powerful: secondary pressure through over-compliance. Banks, insurers, airlines, universities and even email providers that have no legal duty under the order cut ties voluntarily because the cost of a United States enforcement action dwarfs the revenue from one client. The American sanctions practice literature calls this de-risking, and the ICC sanctions have produced a textbook case: staff departures, a hiring freeze, vendors demanding cash or refusing contracts, and at least one reported instance of investigative steps being paused while sanctions-proof working arrangements were secured, as described by journalists covering the Afghanistan file.

None of this, however, touches the legal validity of the Court’s acts, and the distinction decides everything for a client in France. Sanctions do not quash arrest warrants, do not close cases and do not release detainees. The Duterte confirmation hearing opened on schedule because the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authority flows from the Rome Statute, a treaty ratified by 125 States, and not from any American licence. A sanctioned judge is still a judge; her orders still bind States Parties; and a State Party that refuses to execute them breaches its own treaty obligations. The sanctions bite the Court’s logistics, not its jurisdiction. That is precisely why the French analysis must start from the opposite end: not what Washington forbids, but what Paris owes. France owes the Court arrest and surrender, evidence, witness protection and enforcement cooperation under a statute that Washington cannot repeal, and French officials who deal with ICC files apply the French Code of Criminal Procedure, whose cooperation title is examined in the second part of this analysis through the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions on cooperation with the International Criminal Court. For completeness, the general architecture of French criminal procedure is accessible through the Code of Criminal Procedure on Legifrance, and the definitions of the gravest crimes that the Court prosecutes have their French domestic mirror in the French Criminal Code on Legifrance.

There is a final practical point on the American side that French counsel must internalise. United States sanctions compliance is enforced criminally and civilly with extraterritorial energy, and American authorities treat evasion structures, front payments and disguised dollar routing as standalone offences. Any strategy that consists of quietly routing around the sanctions through opaque channels exposes the client and the lawyer to United States criminal liability without advancing the ICC file by one page. The correct posture, developed in the second part, is the exact opposite: full visibility, full reliance on binding European and French protective law, and formal authorisations where the regulations provide for them. A Paris lawyer never advises a client to dodge American sanctions; she advises the client to invoke the European and French rules that make compliance with those sanctions unlawful on French territory.

II. An ICC file lands in Paris and Washington objects: what France must do anyway

A. What France owes The Hague when an ICC arrest warrant reaches French soil

France is not a bystander to the Rome Statute system; it is one of its architects and earliest parties. France signed the Statute in 1998, ratified it in 2000, and gave it domestic procedural teeth through the cooperation statute of 26 February 2002, codified in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The governing treaty rule is Article 86 of the Rome Statute, under which States Parties accept a general obligation to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigations and prosecutions, implemented through Article 89 on arrest and surrender and clarified by Article 102, which defines surrender to the Court as a vertical act distinct from extradition between States. The official text of the Statute is published by the Court at the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Because France is a State Party, an ICC request for arrest and surrender is not a diplomatic favour; it is a binding demand that French authorities must execute through French judicial procedure, and no foreign sanctions list can suspend that duty.

The French execution procedure is written in a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure on cooperation with the Court, consultable at the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions on cooperation with the International Criminal Court. Its logic mirrors the Statute’s vertical philosophy while preserving French judicial control. When the Court transmits a request, the French prosecutor refers the matter to the investigating chamber of the geographically competent court of appeal, the person sought is brought before the court, identity is verified, and the chamber rules on surrender after hearing the defence. The architecture deliberately excludes the classic extradition filters that apply between sovereigns. Double criminality in its bilateral form, the political-offence exception and the nationality bar, which structure extradition toward third States under Articles 696 to 696-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on extradition to foreign States, have no equivalent place in ICC surrender, because the requesting entity is a treaty court applying international definitions, not a foreign government seeking to enforce its own penal code. The general conditions of extradition law remain instructive background and are set out alongside at the Code of Criminal Procedure provisions on the conditions of extradition, but counsel must plead the correct track from the first hour: ICC surrender is faster, narrower and far less amenable to political defences than classic extradition.

Two deadlines dominate defence strategy and both are strict. An appeal lies against the surrender order within a short window running from notification, the fifteen-day appeal mechanism associated with Article 627-8 of the cooperation title, and the person sought must be released if the Court has not taken charge within the time limit associated with Article 627-10, the one-month take-charge rule. These are not indicative timeframes; they are release-generating guarantees, and experienced counsel calendars them alongside the underlying ICC deadlines in The Hague, including jurisdictional and admissibility challenges under Articles 17 to 19 of the Statute and interim-release applications under Article 60. The operational checklist in the first forty-eight hours is therefore fixed: obtain the underlying ICC warrant rather than relying on any Interpol diffusion summary, verify identity and nationality documents, file the appeal against any surrender order within the window, prepare the take-charge calendar, and instruct ICC-focused counsel in The Hague in parallel with the Paris team. Families should budget from the outset for two legal teams and for sworn translation of identity, medical and nationality documents into French and English. None of these steps involves any contact with the United States sanctions apparatus, because none requires it: the procedure runs from The Hague to Paris directly, and dollar clearing, American vendors and United States visas play no role in a handover between French police and Court officials at a Paris airport.

One recurrent confusion must be cleared for travellers and executives. An Interpol red notice is not an ICC arrest warrant, and neither is an arrest warrant. A red notice is a police-cooperation alert; it may lead to provisional arrest, but the surrender that follows still requires the underlying judicial act and the full chamber procedure. Conversely, an ICC arrest warrant can be executed in France even if no red notice was ever circulated, because the Statute’s cooperation channel runs State to Court. Counsel who treats a screen hit as the legal basis for detention, instead of demanding the warrant behind it, pleads the wrong case. And counsel who believes that American sanctions on the issuing judges invalidate the warrant pleads a case that no French chamber will entertain: French courts apply the Statute and the Code, not Executive Order 14203.

B. Caught between Washington and The Hague: how people, banks and NGOs in France handle the clash

The real collision zone is not the courtroom but the back office: the Paris bank that holds the account of a sanctioned person’s relative, the French NGO that pays ICC-linked investigators, the university that hosts a sanctioned judge for a conference, the airline that is asked to carry a surrendered person, the cloud provider that hosts defence evidence. Each of these actors faces two commands that point in opposite directions. Washington says: have nothing to do with these people. Brussels and Paris say: you must not obey that command, and you must keep cooperating with the Court. European and French law resolve the conflict explicitly, and in favour of non-compliance with the American sanctions, through two instruments every cross-border practitioner in Paris must know by heart.

The first is the European Blocking Statute, Regulation 2271/96, whose consolidated text is published by the Publications Office at Council Regulation 2271/96 protecting against the effects of third-country legislation. Its central rule, Article 5, prohibits European operators from complying, directly or through subsidiaries or intermediaries, with the listed foreign laws, and its annex has historically covered the Cuban, Iranian and Libyan sanctions programmes. The mechanism is straightforward: within the Union, obeying the listed American prohibitions is itself a breach of Union law, and European operators must apply instead for a Commission authorisation where a genuine conflict arises. The regulation adds two further tools: foreign judgments giving effect to the listed sanctions are unenforceable in the Union, and European operators harmed by the application of those sanctions may recover damages, the so-called clawback. Whether the ICC sanctions are or will be listed in the annex is a live regulatory question that counsel must check on the day advice is given, because listing is a political act of the Council, but the architecture is the point: Europe built a shield precisely for moments when a third country weaponises its courts and currency against international institutions.

The second instrument is French and criminally backed. The so-called French blocking law, whose exact title repays quotation, the law of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information to foreign natural or legal persons, prohibits the transmission to foreign authorities of information whose communication would harm French sovereignty, security or essential economic interests, and it punishes violations with criminal penalties. The text is consultable through the official search at Law 68-678 of 26 July 1968 on Legifrance. In ICC-sanctions practice this means a French bank, company or research body that receives an American request for information about ICC-linked clients or transactions must not answer reflexively; it must route the request through the French official channel and, where the information falls within the statute, refuse direct transmission. Combined with the banking and monetary framework set out in the Monetary and Financial Code on Legifrance, which governs account-keeping, payment services and asset-freezing measures applicable in France, the message to compliance departments is clear: a United States designation is not a French freezing order, and only a French or European freezing measure authorises a French bank to freeze.

The practical playbook for a person or organisation caught in the middle follows from these instruments and has five steps. First, map exposure honestly: dollar accounts, United States vendors, planned travel through American airports, family members’ visas, cloud and software dependencies. Second, stop all voluntary over-compliance: do not close accounts, cancel contracts or dismiss staff merely because an American list names them, because such anticipatory obedience can itself breach European law and French employment protections. Third, seek formal cover where the regulations provide it, including authorisations from the Commission under the Blocking Statute’s procedure where a conflict is unavoidable. Fourth, document every decision in writing with counsel, because both American enforcers and European regulators judge files on paper. Fifth, for individuals named or affected, separate the tracks: ICC defence in The Hague, surrender litigation in the arrest State under provisions such as those on cooperation with the International Criminal Court, and sanctions counselling with a dedicated team that never mixes evasion with protection. Victims of unlawful compliance measures, such as an account closed solely on American-list grounds, preserve their remedies before the French civil courts under the general civil-liability framework codified in the Civil Code on Legifrance. The through-line is the one French international practice has applied for decades: France executes its treaty duties to international courts through its own judges, protects its operators against foreign prohibitions through its own blocking rules, and expects its lawyers to plead in Paris, not in Washington.

Conclusion

Washington has built the most aggressive sanctions campaign ever directed at an international court: a prosecutor designated, eight judges and deputies listed, a president sanctioned, and now, if the Reuters reporting of 31 August 2026 proves correct, the institution itself in the crosshairs. The operational damage is real, measured in departed staff, frozen dollar channels and vendors who no longer answer the phone. But the legal bottom line has not moved. The Court’s warrants remain valid, its hearings continue, and France’s duty to arrest and surrender on ICC request remains written in the Code of Criminal Procedure, executable by French judges on French soil without any American permission. For clients, the discipline is threefold and non-negotiable. Treat every ICC file as a two-forum case from day one, The Hague for jurisdiction and merits, Paris for the surrender procedure with its appeal and take-charge deadlines. Treat every American sanctions instruction received in France as suspect until tested against the European Blocking Statute and the French blocking law, and never volunteer compliance that European law forbids. And treat every border hit, every bank letter and every vendor termination as a paper trail to be built with counsel, because in cross-border cases the file that wins is the file that documents. International justice now moves through courtrooms, clearing systems and sanctions lists at the same time; the client who masters all three keeps her liberty, her accounts and her case.

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