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Belgian Data Retention Law: What C-661/24 Means for French Telecom Operators and Criminal Investigations

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Belgian Data Retention Law: What C-661/24 Means for French Telecom Operators and Criminal Investigations

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On 3 September 2026, Advocate General Maciej Szpunar delivered an important Opinion in Case C-661/24, Académie Fiscale and Others. The dispute concerns Belgium’s 2022 rules requiring electronic-communications providers to collect and retain identification data and metadata, including traffic and location information. Five actions brought the legislation before the Belgian Constitutional Court, which referred questions to Luxembourg. The Opinion is not the final judgment, but its reasoning matters immediately to French operators, prosecutors, investigating judges and defence counsel handling evidence that crosses the Belgian-French border. The proposed test focuses not only on the statutory purpose of retention, but also on the technical architecture that prevents different data sets from being combined to reconstruct a person’s private life. That approach may affect how French retention rules are challenged, how provider systems are documented and how connection data is admitted in a criminal case. France already operates a detailed regime under the Code des postes et des communications électroniques and the Code de procédure pénale. C-661/24 does not automatically cancel that regime. It does, however, sharpen the questions that every cross-border case should ask: what data was retained, for how long, under which legal power, with what separation, and subject to what independent control?

I. What did the C-661/24 Opinion actually change?

A. Why did a Belgian data-retention dispute reach Luxembourg?

The case is a preliminary reference, not an appeal against a criminal conviction. The Belgian Constitutional Court is examining challenges to the Belgian law of 20 July 2022 on the collection and retention of identification data and metadata in electronic communications and on the supply of those data to public authorities. The official EUR-Lex case record for C-661/24 identifies the referring court, the parties and the questions sent to the Court of Justice. The applicants include the Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, the Académie Fiscale and organisations defending fundamental rights. The national proceedings were brought in five connected actions. The questions therefore arise from a constitutional review of a statute with general application, rather than from a single request for a subscriber’s details.

Belgium’s 2022 legislation was presented as a response to operational problems familiar across Europe: fraud, malicious use of networks and threats to network security. It governs categories of data generated by electronic communications even when the content of a message or call is not retained. Identification data can connect an account, number or technical identifier to a person. Traffic data can show when a communication occurred, its technical characteristics or its participants. Location data can reveal where a mobile device was used. The legal question is not whether those data are useful to investigators. They plainly can be. The question is whether the legislature has built sufficient limits around a power that can create an exceptionally detailed map of private life.

The referring questions also expose a second constitutional tension. If a national court concludes that parts of a retention statute conflict with EU law, may it keep those provisions temporarily in force to avoid legal uncertainty and preserve previously collected data? That issue is especially relevant to companies, investigators and litigants who fear that an immediate annulment could affect thousands of investigations. It is also relevant in France because national courts have repeatedly had to distinguish between the power to retain data, the power to preserve data quickly once an investigation has begun, and the power to access and use data already held by a provider.

The legal framework at EU level is Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 15 permits Member States to restrict certain confidentiality and data-protection rights for recognised public-interest purposes, including criminal-law objectives, but it does not remove the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Those requirements are not satisfied merely because a measure has been enacted by Parliament or because investigators can point to useful results. The interference must remain legally framed, limited and reviewable.

That is why the status of the document must be stated precisely. The 3 September 2026 document is an Opinion of the Advocate General, delivered after the hearing and before the judges’ deliberations. The Court’s own press release says that the Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice. The judges may follow it, refine it or take a different route. The Belgian Constitutional Court must then resolve the national litigation in the light of the eventual judgment. A headline saying that the CJEU has already struck down Belgium’s law would therefore be wrong. The accurate headline is more useful: the Opinion proposes a demanding method for testing retention laws, and it gives operators and litigants an early warning about the points the final judgment may decide.

B. Why does technical separation change the proportionality analysis?

The most consequential part of the Opinion is its treatment of the system behind the statute. The Advocate General recalls that retaining traffic and location data interferes with privacy and data protection. The interference can be lawful only where it has a legal basis, is strictly necessary and complies with proportionality. The weight of the interference must be assessed against the importance of the public objective. That is familiar language in EU fundamental-rights litigation. The new emphasis is the proposition that the seriousness of the interference may depend on what the provider’s technical arrangements allow authorities, or the provider itself, to do with the data over the retention period.

In the proposed analysis, even a general and indiscriminate retention regime might be compatible with EU law in limited circumstances if the system guarantees a genuinely watertight separation between categories of data and prevents their combination throughout the entire retention period. The point is not that separation transforms sensitive data into harmless data. It is that a rule preventing the reconstruction of a person’s movements, contacts and habits can reduce the practical intensity of the interference. The protection must be real, technical and durable. A policy document saying that data should not be combined would not answer the question if the database, access rights or provider workflow make combination easy.

The Belgian scheme, in the Advocate General’s assessment, presents the opposite features. It authorises a very broad set of traffic and location data without imposing arrangements that ensure genuine separation. Essential elements are also left to provider discretion. In some circumstances, providers may decide which data they consider necessary to retain and may extend the retention period. The Opinion treats that combination as a problem of clarity, precision and safeguards, not merely as a technical compliance detail. If the duration, categories and relationship between data sets are not fixed by law or effectively controlled, the resulting interference may exceed what is necessary even where the stated objectives are legitimate.

This is a significant refinement of the public debate. The legal question is not simply “bulk retention or no bulk retention”. It has at least four layers. First, what objective does the law pursue: national security, serious crime, fraud, network security or another purpose? Second, what exact data categories are held: civil identity, account data, IP address and port, traffic records, location data or message content? Third, what period and geographic or personal scope apply? Fourth, can the categories be combined, by whom, under what authorisation and with what audit trail? C-661/24 places the fourth question beside the first three.

The Opinion builds on the Court’s earlier electronic-communications case law, including the 6 October 2020 judgment in Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, commonly known as La Quadrature du Net, and the 30 April 2024 judgment in C-470/21, La Quadrature du Net II. Those references are identified in the footnotes to the official 3 September press release. The earlier decisions already require close attention to the purpose of retention, the seriousness of the threat and the controls surrounding access. C-661/24 proposes that data architecture can be part of the seriousness assessment itself.

For French operators, the comparison begins with Article L. 34-1 of the Code des postes et des communications électroniques. The current text, available on Légifrance, applies to personal-data processing in the provision of public electronic-communications services. It requires the erasure or anonymisation of communications data subject to defined exceptions. It also requires the retention of civil-identity information for specified purposes for up to five years after the end of a contract, certain subscription and payment information for up to one year after the contract or account ends, and technical data identifying the source of a connection or the terminal used for up to one year from the connection or use. A separate national-security mechanism concerns specified traffic and location data when a serious, current or foreseeable threat is established.

Article L. 34-1 does not authorise retention of message content. It limits the retained material to user identification, technical characteristics of communications and terminal location, and requires safeguards against uses outside the statutory purposes. The distinction is central. A retention dispute about metadata is not automatically an interception dispute, and an interception dispute is not automatically resolved by showing that the operator lawfully stored some connection records. The legal basis and safeguards must be matched to the data actually requested.

French rules also describe the categories more concretely. Article R. 10-12 of the same Code defines traffic and location data by reference to information made available through electronic-communications processes and capable of being recorded by the operator during communications it transmits. Article R. 10-13 lists, among other items, an IP address and associated port, user and terminal identifiers, the originating telephone number, communication characteristics, date, time and duration, supplementary services and the technical information identifying recipients. Those provisions are available in the official Article R. 10-12 text and the Légifrance section containing Article R. 10-13.

The practical lesson is not that French law is identical to Belgian law. It is that any future EU judgment will be read against national technical and procedural choices. A French provider with Belgian activity, a Belgian provider responding to a French investigation, and a French court assessing evidence supplied from Belgium may all need to show how the data were segregated, retained and accessed. The more a case depends on combining location, traffic and identity data, the more important the system-level evidence becomes.

II. What should French telecom operators, investigators and defence lawyers do now?

A. How does the French retention and requisition framework work?

The first operational distinction is between retention and access. Retention is the provider’s obligation to keep defined information for a defined period. Access is the public authority’s later request for some of that information in a specific case. Rapid preservation is a further step: the authority seeks to prevent the destruction of data already held while an investigation identifies the relevant material. Treating those three steps as one power creates avoidable errors. C-661/24 is concerned primarily with the statutory retention architecture, but its logic makes the legality of later access impossible to assess without knowing what was retained and how.

In a French flagrance inquiry, Article 60-1 of the Code de procédure pénale allows the prosecutor or the relevant police authority to requisition information from a person, public or private body or administration that may hold information relevant to the investigation. The article expressly makes computer or nominative-processing data subject to Article 60-1-2. The current version also provides a sanction for failure to respond and limits the use of material obtained in breach of the statutory press-protection rule. The full text is on Légifrance, Article 60-1. A general power to requisition information is therefore not a free-standing power to obtain every category of connection data.

Article 60-1-2 supplies the sharper boundary. It states, on pain of nullity, that requisitions for technical data identifying the source of a connection, data concerning terminals, or traffic and location data are possible only when the needs of the procedure require them and in the cases listed by the article. Those cases include a crime or an offence punishable by at least three years’ imprisonment; an offence punishable by at least one year committed through an electronic-communications network when the sole purpose is to identify its author; a request concerning the victim’s terminal; and certain missing-person procedures. The official Article 60-1-2 text records both the nullity language and the statutory categories.

The same architecture continues in a preliminary inquiry. Article 77-1-1 allows the prosecutor, or an investigator acting with the required authorisation, to requisition information relevant to the investigation, again subject to Article 60-1-2 where the request concerns computer data or a nominative processing system. The article also regulates certain general instructions and requires the permitted requisitions to be linked to the offences identified by the prosecutor. The current version is available through Article 77-1-1 on Légifrance. The reference to 60-1-2 matters: an investigator cannot avoid the data-specific safeguards by placing an expansive request under a general evidential provision.

During a judicial investigation, Article 99-3 gives the investigating judge, or an authorised judicial police officer, power to require documents relevant to the investigation, including documents from an information system or nominative data processing, subject to Article 60-1-2. The statute also contains specific protections where the request concerns an attorney’s data. The relevant Article 99-3 version should be read with the applicable temporal version of the Code rather than quoted from an outdated procedural manual.

Lawyer-related data receive a further safeguard. Article 60-1-1 provides that, subject to Article 60-1-2, connection data emitted by an attorney and linked to the use of an electronic-communications network or service cannot be requisitioned under Article 60-1 without a reasoned order of the judge of liberties and detention, seized for that purpose by the prosecutor. The Article 60-1-1 text is therefore relevant whenever a French investigation seeks to identify contacts, movements or traffic associated with a lawyer’s professional line. The issue is not limited to the content of privileged correspondence. Metadata can disclose the existence and pattern of defence communications, which is why the legislature created a distinct route.

Interception must remain separate from retention and access to stored metadata. Article 100 of the Code de procédure pénale concerns the interception, recording and transcription of communications sent through electronic communications. In criminal matters and correctional matters carrying at least three years’ imprisonment, the investigating judge may order interception when the needs of the investigation require it. The article provides additional protection for a line depending on a lawyer’s office or home, subject to defined exceptions and a reasoned order of the judge of liberties and detention. The official Article 100 text shows why a court should not treat a provider’s traffic records as though they were intercepted conversations, or treat an interception order as a substitute for the legal basis required for historical connection data.

French case law has already required a close EU-law review of these powers. In its 12 July 2022 judgment, Criminal Division, appeal no. 21-83.710, the Cour de cassation applied the primacy of EU law to connection data. It rejected the use of general and undifferentiated preventive retention for ordinary criminal-law purposes where the EU conditions were not met, while recognising the distinct analysis required for a serious and current national-security threat. It also required the court examining access to test necessity and the seriousness of the criminality rather than assuming that the existence of a statutory retention rule resolved the issue.

On 25 October 2022, Criminal Division, appeal no. 21-87.397, the Cour de cassation addressed the judge’s control over access to data regularly retained by telecom operators. Its published decision requires the case file to show effective control by the investigating judge and compliance with the authorised duration and scope. A general commission rogatory does not prove that every later request to an operator was authorised. This is the French procedural translation of a principle that C-661/24 makes more visible at the retention-system level: limits must be concrete enough to control what can actually be done with the data.

On 28 May 2024, Criminal Division, appeal no. 23-85.848, the Cour de cassation examined rapid preservation and access. The decision held that requisitions made under the applicable French procedure can amount to rapid-preservation measures, but still require the conditions drawn from Article 60-1-2, including the procedural need, the statutory threshold and the seriousness of the criminality. The judge must also examine the necessity of the contested measure. The decision is particularly useful in a cross-border file because it prevents an authority from presenting “preservation” as a technical formality that escapes the substantive EU safeguards.

These decisions do not decide the Belgian reference. They do show how a French court is likely to approach a C-661/24 argument: identify the data category, identify the retention or access power, check the seriousness and statutory threshold, verify independent or judicial control, and examine the duration and scope actually used. The court should then ask whether the evidence produced reflects a legally permitted process or only the provider’s ability to produce a technically available record.

B. How should a cross-border party challenge or preserve the evidence?

For an operator, the immediate task is evidence of governance. A compliance file should identify each retained category, the statutory purpose, the start and end of the retention period, the systems in which the category is stored, the persons or authorities who can access it, and the technical controls preventing unapproved combination. A cross-border provider should be able to explain which national rule governs the activity that generated the record and which rule governed the later disclosure. If the answer is “the data were available in the platform”, that is a technical description, not a legal justification.

The Opinion’s emphasis on separation also changes the questions an investigator should ask before requesting data. The request should define the person, account, device, number, geographic scope, date range and category of data needed. It should state why the requested combination is necessary rather than simply useful. If an investigator needs an IP address to identify a source, that is a different request from a month of location records to map a person’s movements. If traffic and location records are to be combined, the authorisation should make that step visible and explain why a narrower request would not achieve the investigative purpose.

A defence lawyer should begin with classification, not with a general assertion that “phone data” are unlawful. The first question is whether the record is civil-identity data, account data, an IP address and port, traffic data, location data, subscriber information, content or an interception product. The second is whether the dispute concerns retention, rapid preservation, access, transmission or use at trial. The third is whether the challenged step was taken under Article 60-1, 77-1-1, 99-3, an interception provision or another instrument. Different statutory conditions and different nullity arguments may apply.

The next review is documentary. The file should show the precise request sent to the provider, the authority that approved it, the duration and scope authorised, the date on which preservation or access occurred, the data returned and the chain by which the material entered the case. A broad authorisation followed by an expansive provider export is vulnerable if the record does not show who selected the data and under what limits. The reasoning of appeal no. 21-87.397 makes the point particularly clearly: a judge’s theoretical power to control access is not the same as proof that the judge actually controlled the duration and perimeter of the access.

The serious-crime threshold must be tested on the facts, not by label. Article 60-1-2 uses statutory penalties and defined procedural situations, while EU law requires a proportionality analysis that takes account of the nature of the conduct, the harm, the circumstances, the penalty and the intensity of the interference. A case involving a serious offence can still involve an overbroad request. Conversely, a technically narrow request can still be unlawful if the authority lacked the required prior control. The two questions—gravity and procedural legality—should be kept separate.

Where the data were emitted by or reveal communications involving an attorney, Article 60-1-1 must be checked before the ordinary requisition rules. The request may require a reasoned order of the judge of liberties and detention. Article 100 may also become relevant if the authorities actually intercepted communications rather than seeking historical metadata. The privilege analysis should identify the professional line, the person protected, the type of data obtained and the specific statutory route used. A court should not allow a request for connection data to defeat the protections that would apply to an interception or to lawyer communications.

In a Belgian-French case, the party should also separate the law of the place where the provider stored the record from the law of the forum using it. The existence of a Belgian retention duty does not by itself answer whether a French investigating authority obtained the record through the correct channel. The existence of a French procedural request does not by itself prove that a Belgian provider was entitled to retain or disclose the relevant category for the relevant period. The case file should identify the cross-border instrument, the recipient authority, the provider’s response and any translation or integrity process. That separation makes it possible to argue precisely instead of collapsing every issue into “EU data protection”.

For evidence preservation, the safest course is lawful urgency. If a provider still holds a record that may disappear, an authority should use the applicable rapid-preservation procedure and identify the data and period with precision. A company receiving such a request should preserve the relevant material in a segregated, access-logged form while seeking clarification or challenging an overbroad demand through the proper channel. Preservation is not a licence to search the entire account. It is a step designed to keep a defined record available for a later decision on access.

For a pending French criminal case, C-661/24 should therefore be used as a structured argument rather than as a claim of automatic invalidity. Counsel can ask the court to examine whether the national retention rule fixed the categories and periods precisely; whether the provider could determine or extend them without sufficient safeguards; whether the technical architecture allowed the combination of datasets; whether the access authority was independent or judicially controlled; and whether the request was limited to what the investigation required. The answers may support exclusion, a request for further disclosure, a reference to the Court of Justice, or a narrower use of the evidence. The Opinion does not predetermine which remedy follows.

The timing point is equally important. The Advocate General proposes a legal solution; the judges have not yet delivered the final judgment. The Court’s press release explains that a preliminary ruling does not resolve the national dispute itself and that the national court applies the eventual ruling. It also states that the final judgment will be given later. A party should preserve the C-661/24 argument, monitor the judgment, and avoid presenting the Opinion as a final declaration that all Belgian or French retention rules are void. If the final judgment follows the proposed reasoning, technical records about separation, access logs and provider governance may become decisive evidence in later litigation.

For international media and businesses, the broader message is clear. Data retention compliance is no longer only a question of how many months a provider keeps a log. It is also a question of whether the provider’s architecture makes the retained categories capable of being recombined into an intimate profile. French courts already ask whether access was necessary, controlled and limited. C-661/24 may add a further layer: whether the system itself preserved the boundary that the statute promised.

Conclusion

Case C-661/24 is a live warning, not a final judgment. Advocate General Szpunar’s 3 September 2026 Opinion proposes that the legality of electronic-communications retention depends on more than the public-interest objective invoked by a Member State. The exact categories, periods, provider discretion, separation of datasets and safeguards against combined use all affect proportionality. For France, the relevant framework is already detailed: Articles L. 34-1, R. 10-12 and R. 10-13 of the communications code, Articles 60-1, 60-1-1, 60-1-2, 77-1-1 and 99-3 of the criminal-procedure code, and the French case law on effective judicial control. The immediate task is to preserve precise records of retention and access, challenge overbroad requests with the correct procedural objection, and distinguish metadata from intercepted content. A final CJEU judgment may change the analysis. Until then, neither “all retention is unlawful” nor “the statute makes the evidence safe” is a reliable cross-border position.

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