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BNP Paribas’s Sudan Appeal: Why Swiss Law Could Reframe Cross-Border Bank Liability in France

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Avocat au Barreau de Paris

BNP Paribas’s Sudan Appeal: Why Swiss Law Could Reframe Cross-Border Bank Liability in France

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BNP Paribas’s Sudan litigation has moved into a legally unusual phase. In a statement dated 30 August 2026, the French banking group said that its appeal will be decided under Swiss law and argued that the trial court misread that law, made legal errors and overlooked evidence that the transactions were authorised under Swiss and European rules. The underlying U.S. jury verdict, reported by the Associated Press in October 2025, awarded almost $20.5 million to three U.S. citizens who said they were displaced by violence in Sudan. The appeal is not a French proceeding and a French court would not simply retry the American case. The practical question for a French claimant, bank, investor or creditor is different: if a U.S. judgment eventually has to produce effects against assets or activity in France, what will French procedure examine? This analysis separates the U.S. appeal, Swiss governing law, French recognition, evidence, sanctions compliance and limitation. It also explains why an earlier regulatory settlement cannot, by itself, prove civil causation in the Sudan case.

I. What does the BNP Paribas Sudan appeal under Swiss law actually decide?

A. Why is a U.S. case against a French bank governed by Swiss law?

The immediate news is an appellate dispute, not a new French judgment. BNP Paribas’s own 30 August statement says that the appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit will be decided under Swiss law. The bank’s position is that the trial court “fundamentally misconstrued” Swiss law, committed legal errors and sidelined evidence showing that the financial transactions were authorised under Swiss and European law. That is an argument advanced by a party. It is not yet a holding by the appellate court, and it does not mean that a Swiss court has taken over the case.

Governing law and forum are different questions. A U.S. court may hear a dispute because the parties, conduct, victims, banking channels or applicable jurisdictional rules connect it to the United States while applying another legal system to substantive liability. Swiss law may therefore govern the legal test for assistance, fault, causation, authorisation or damages even though the pleadings, evidence and appeal remain in a U.S. court. The appellate judges may decide whether the trial judge selected and applied the correct Swiss rules. They may also decide whether the evidence supports the verdict under the governing standard of review. None of those steps converts the appeal into an action before a French court.

The public stakes are high because the case joins three narratives that are often wrongly collapsed into one. The first is the alleged role of banking services in the movement of money connected with Sudanese state or commercial actors. The second is the civil-liability question: whether a bank’s conduct legally caused a compensable injury to particular claimants. The third is the separate history of sanctions compliance. In 2014, BNP Paribas pleaded guilty in the United States to sanctions-related offences and agreed to penalties and forfeiture exceeding $8.8 billion, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. That historic criminal resolution is relevant background, but it is not an automatic finding that every later civil claimant has proved a Swiss-law cause of action.

The distinction matters for international reporting and for litigation strategy. A compliance failure can show that a financial institution faced warnings, controls or restrictions. It does not alone establish that a particular payment caused a particular injury, that a bank legally assisted an underlying wrong, or that the claimed damages are recoverable under the chosen law. The claimant still has to connect the alleged conduct to the pleaded damage. The bank, in turn, may rely on authorisations, regulatory guidance, the institutional role of each intermediary, the absence of a legally sufficient causal chain and the limits of the duties that applied at the relevant time.

Timing is another essential filter. A dispute about transactions carried out years ago cannot be resolved by importing today’s French compliance duties without a conflicts analysis. Counsel must identify the law governing each relevant transaction, the law governing the alleged wrong, the law governing the relationship between the parties and the law governing any later enforcement step. Current French and European anti-money-laundering obligations may illuminate what a regulated institution is expected to do today. They do not automatically rewrite the legal duties applicable when the historic conduct occurred. That temporal discipline is particularly important when a news report uses modern terms such as “sanctions evasion” to describe conduct that a court must assess under a specified historical legal framework.

For a French reader, the most useful way to understand the appeal is as a choice-of-law and evidence contest with a human-rights dimension, not as a declaration that French banks are liable whenever they once processed funds connected to a foreign crisis. The appeal may clarify how the U.S. court understands Swiss doctrines and whether the verdict survives. A future French proceeding would ask a narrower, different set of questions: whether the foreign decision can receive effect in France, whether the procedural safeguards were respected, whether the award conflicts with international public policy and what assets or documents can lawfully be reached.

The practical file should therefore be assembled in layers. The first layer is the complete U.S. record: complaint, amended pleadings, jury instructions, verdict form, trial judgment, notices of appeal and all orders that define what remains enforceable. The second is the Swiss-law material relied upon by both sides, with a clear distinction between statutory text, judicial decisions, expert opinions and argument. The third is the transaction evidence, organised by date, entity, account, instruction, intermediary and regulatory authorisation. The fourth is the French enforcement file, which will have its own requirements for service, finality, translation and identification of assets. Treating those layers as interchangeable creates avoidable weaknesses.

BNP Paribas’s statement also illustrates why a live appeal should be described carefully. The bank says its forthcoming filings will answer the plaintiffs’ arguments and present the case to the Second Circuit. That means the legal and factual record remains contested. The existence of a jury verdict is newsworthy; it is not the same as an irrevocable judgment available for immediate execution in every country. A French strategy built before the U.S. appeal is resolved must preserve alternatives and avoid representing the trial result as a final French-recognised debt.

B. What would French courts test before recognizing the U.S. judgment?

The starting point is Article 509 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. Its text states: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” In English, a foreign judgment is not self-executing in France merely because it exists. Its effect depends on the legal route and the conditions applicable to the particular decision. Recognition and enforcement are related but should be analysed separately: one concerns the judgment’s ability to produce legal effects, while the other concerns coercive measures against identified assets.

The leading French framework is Cass. 1re civ., 20 February 2007, no. 05-14.082, commonly known as the Cornelissen decision. The Court of Cassation stated that, outside an international convention, the French judge must ensure three conditions. The decision’s concise formulation refers to “trois conditions” for exequatur; those conditions are indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court founded on a connection between the dispute and that court, conformity with French international public policy in substance and procedure, and the absence of fraud against the law. The judge is not invited to conduct a fresh trial on the merits simply because the losing party dislikes the foreign court’s assessment.

That framework would give the BNP Paribas case a disciplined French afterlife. The judge would first examine the foreign court’s indirect jurisdiction from the French perspective. The fact that the defendant is a French company may be important, but it is not a complete answer. The court would look at the dispute’s links to the United States, the parties, the alleged conduct and the judgment sought to be enforced. The analysis is not a mechanical nationality test. It asks whether the foreign forum had a sufficiently legitimate connection for the judgment to be received in France.

The second question is international public policy. This does not permit a French court to replace every foreign rule with its preferred domestic rule. It is a limited safeguard for fundamental principles, including procedural fairness and certain core substantive protections. Swiss law governing the American dispute would not, by itself, make a future French exequatur application impossible. Nor would a difference between Swiss and French civil-liability doctrine automatically amount to an international-public-policy violation. The issue would be the effect of the particular judgment, its procedure and its award in the circumstances presented.

The third condition is fraud. A party seeking recognition must present the foreign proceeding and the judgment honestly. Material concealment, manipulation of jurisdiction or an attempt to obtain abroad what could not lawfully be obtained through the proper route may create a serious problem. Fraud is not established simply because the proceedings were hard-fought or because the foreign court accepted one party’s evidence. It requires a concrete analysis of how the judgment was procured and what effect is sought in France.

The Court of Cassation has applied the same three-part logic to foreign banking litigation. In Cass. 1re civ., 30 January 2013, no. 11-10.588, the Gazprombank decision, the court reiterated the exequatur conditions in a dispute involving foreign judgments and a bank. The point for the Sudan appeal is structural: the French judge does not reopen the American jury’s weighing of the evidence as if the exequatur application were a second appeal. The applicant must prove the judgment’s qualifying features and the respondent may challenge jurisdiction, procedure, fraud or public policy within that framework.

Procedural fairness may be decisive. In Cass. 1re civ., 12 March 2025, no. 23-16.855, the Court of Cassation explained that “La contrariété à l’ordre public international de procédure ne peut être admise que s’il est démontré que les intérêts d’une partie ont été objectivement compromis.” The exact application depends on the record, but the practical lesson is clear: service, notice, time to prepare, access to counsel, opportunity to submit evidence and ability to challenge the case should be documented. A party cannot rely on a vague complaint about foreign procedure. It must show an objective impairment of its defence.

That makes the appeal docket important for any later French application. The claimant would want a complete record demonstrating jurisdiction, notice and adversarial participation. BNP Paribas would want the record to show the opportunity it had to defend itself, while preserving any concrete procedural objections that were raised in time. If the U.S. judgment changes on appeal, the French analysis must follow the operative version, not an earlier media description. If the judgment is not final or not enforceable under the relevant U.S. rules, that status must be addressed before anyone presents it as a debt capable of execution in France.

Damages require a further check. In Cass. 1re civ., 1 December 2010, no. 09-13.303, Fountaine Pajot, the Court of Cassation held that “le principe d’une condamnation à des dommages-intérêts punitifs, n’est pas, en soi, contraire à l’ordre public.” It added that disproportion can change the assessment. The amount of a foreign award is therefore not automatically rejected because it has a punitive label, and it is not automatically accepted because it is described as compensation. The French court would need to understand the award’s legal character, the injury found, the reasoning for each head of damage and the relationship between compensatory and punitive components.

For a potential $20.5 million award, the file should distinguish personal injury, property loss, emotional harm, punitive damages, interest and costs. A headline figure cannot answer the exequatur question. The judgment’s reasoning, the verdict form and any appellate modification may matter more than the number alone. If a component is viewed as manifestly disproportionate under the Fountaine Pajot approach, the parties will argue about the proper consequence. That consequence should not be predicted without reading the operative foreign decision and the French court’s procedural posture.

Recognition also does not identify assets. A claimant who seeks payment in France must map the debtor’s French accounts, shares, receivables, real property or other attachable interests and choose the appropriate enforcement measure. A court’s willingness to recognise a foreign judgment is distinct from the technical conditions for a seizure. The French enforcement file must be precise about the debtor, the asset holder, the amount due, the enforceable title and any competing rights. The fact that a bank has a French headquarters does not mean every affiliate, branch, correspondent account or group company is automatically the debtor or the target.

French courts would also consider whether the requested effect exceeds what the U.S. judgment decided. An exequatur application cannot use a foreign decision as a springboard for a new claim against people or entities that were never parties, for losses that were not adjudicated or for obligations that the judgment did not impose. That party-and-scope discipline is especially important in a cross-border mass-claims environment. The French court’s task is to give the foreign judgment the effect that the applicable law permits, not to create a broader judgment in its place.

II. What should French banks and claimants prepare for a cross-border enforcement fight?

A. How do sanctions compliance, civil causation and evidence fit together?

The central analytical mistake would be to treat sanctions compliance as a substitute for civil causation. A claimant may rely on regulatory breaches, internal warnings or the history of a bank’s dealings to support a narrative of knowledge and assistance. A bank may answer that it complied with the law then applicable, relied on a governmental authorisation, processed a transaction through a limited role or lacked the legally necessary connection to the alleged harm. Each proposition can be evidentially relevant. None, standing alone, resolves the civil claim.

For a freestanding claim assessed under French law, Articles 1240 and 1241 of the Civil Code show the basic structure. Article 1240 provides: “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.” Article 1241 adds: “Chacun est responsable du dommage qu’il a causé non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence ou par son imprudence.” Those provisions are not a shortcut for determining the law governing the Sudan litigation. They are a useful map of the questions a French court would ask if a French-law delictual theory were actually before it: what fault or negligence occurred, what damage resulted and what causal link connects the two.

The burden of proof follows the pleaded obligation. Article 1353 of the Civil Code states: “Celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.” Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure similarly provides: “Il incombe à chaque partie de prouver conformément à la loi les faits nécessaires au succès de sa prétention.” In practical terms, a claimant needs more than a chronology showing that a bank processed payments during a period of violence. The record must explain why the identified conduct satisfies the applicable legal test and how it produced the identified loss. A defendant cannot simply invoke the word “authorised” and assume that every causal question disappears either.

Evidence should be collected by transaction rather than by slogan. A useful schedule identifies the date and value of each payment, the legal entities involved, the account and intermediary, the stated purpose, the internal approval path, the sanctions or licence regime then in force, the information available to the bank and the alleged injury that the claimant links to that payment. The schedule should mark what is direct evidence, what is an inference and what remains disputed. It should also preserve the original file, metadata and translation history. This method allows the court to test causation instead of receiving a mass of documents that merely share the same geographic or political context.

French procedure gives the judge tools to control that evidentiary dispute. Article 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure says: “Le juge a le pouvoir d’ordonner d’office toutes les mesures d’instruction légalement admissibles.” Article 11 states that “Les parties sont tenues d’apporter leur concours aux mesures d’instruction,” while allowing orders concerning documents held by a party or a third party, subject to a legitimate impediment. These provisions do not create unlimited discovery. A request still needs a defined purpose, relevance and a procedure compatible with confidentiality and the rights of the person holding the material.

Before proceedings, Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be relevant where a legitimate reason exists to preserve or establish evidence on which a future dispute may depend. The article begins: “S’il existe un motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir avant tout procès la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution d’un litige”, an instruction measure that is legally admissible may be ordered. A well-designed application would identify the documents, the custodians, the time period and the risk of disappearance or alteration. A demand for every internal record relating to Sudan, every compliance file and every communication over decades would invite an objection that the request is a fishing expedition.

Banking secrecy, legal privilege, personal-data protection, trade secrets and third-party confidentiality can constitute legitimate impediments or require tailored safeguards. A French judge may need to consider redaction, a confidentiality ring, an expert review or a limited production order. The existence of a bank record does not make it automatically accessible to a claimant. Conversely, a confidentiality label does not automatically defeat a focused judicial order. The parties should explain the evidentiary value and the least intrusive way to protect competing rights.

The French anti-money-laundering framework adds another layer, but it must be placed in time. Article L. 561-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code addresses customer identification before entering a business relationship or carrying out certain transactions. Article L. 561-6 requires ongoing attention; it says that during the relationship “ces personnes exercent sur leurs clients, dans la limite de leurs obligations, une vigilance constante.” Article L. 561-10 provides additional vigilance in higher-risk situations, including politically exposed persons, high-risk products or transactions and high-risk jurisdictions, while Article L. 561-10-1 addresses enhanced vigilance where the risk is high. The current texts are linked through Article L. 561-5, Article L. 561-6, Article L. 561-10 and Article L. 561-10-1.

Record retention can make these duties practically significant. Article L. 561-12 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires the retention of specified documents for a defined period, including a five-year period in the circumstances described by the text. The official provision should be read in its current and historical versions before a party argues that a missing document proves anything. A document that no longer had to be retained is not the same as a document that was destroyed to conceal evidence. The difference is legally and factually important.

Suspicious-transaction reporting is also distinct from private-law liability. Article L. 561-15 describes the reporting obligation for sums or operations that a regulated person knows, suspects or has good reason to suspect are connected with an offence carrying a sufficient penalty, terrorism financing or other situations defined by the statute. The text of Article L. 561-15 is not a finding that a specific civil injury was caused. A report may be confidential and may reflect a legal threshold different from the threshold for damages. The claimant must still prove the elements of the civil theory, and the bank must explain what the reporting record does or does not establish.

That is why BNP Paribas’s assertion that transactions were authorised under Swiss and European law may matter without being conclusive. Authorisation can bear on the bank’s knowledge, the foreseeability of the alleged harm, the lawfulness of a specific transfer and the reasonableness of a compliance decision. It does not automatically establish that the transaction was harmless, and it does not automatically establish that the bank assisted the underlying harm. The judge must identify the governing law and test the evidence against that law.

Sanctions law must be kept separate again. Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code defines the persons and activities subject to French freezing measures, including relevant persons in France and certain French-headquartered persons acting abroad. The provision requires implementation without delay in the situations it covers; see the official text. Article L. 562-5 prohibits making funds or economic resources directly or indirectly available to persons covered by a freeze, as set out in the Code. A U.S. designation, a Swiss authorisation, a European Union measure and a French national freeze are not interchangeable labels. The applicable list, date, jurisdiction and measure must be identified.

Article L. 562-10 further addresses the effects of freezing measures on third parties and pre-existing rights, while Article L. 574-3 provides penalties for evading or obstructing certain obligations. Those provisions can shape a bank’s compliance file and the French court’s assessment of a transaction. They do not transform every foreign policy decision into a French freezing order, and they do not eliminate the need to prove civil causation. A claimant should plead the precise legal consequence sought; a bank should identify the exact measure on which it relies rather than referring generally to “sanctions compliance.”

The evidence questions may be especially difficult when documents are held in Switzerland, the United States or by a group company outside France. A French court may not have the same coercive reach as the court conducting the U.S. discovery. The parties should therefore coordinate requests, translations and confidentiality protections rather than assume that a foreign production order automatically answers the French evidentiary question. The safest presentation identifies what the document would prove, why the French judge can order or receive it and what safeguards protect the holder and third parties.

B. How should recognition, enforcement and limitation be organized?

A claimant preparing for a French enforcement strategy should begin with the judgment’s procedural identity. Is it a trial judgment or an appellate judgment? Has execution been stayed? Which defendants were actually named? What amount is due after interest and costs? Was notice served in a way that allowed the defendant to defend itself? Which findings are necessary to the operative order, and which are background reasoning? The answers determine the documents needed for an application and may change while the Second Circuit appeal is pending. A press release cannot replace the authenticated record.

The next step is a French recognition memo applying the Cornelissen framework. It should address indirect jurisdiction, international public policy in substance and procedure, and fraud in separate sections. It should not argue the whole U.S. case again unless a particular merits issue is genuinely relevant to public policy or the scope of the foreign decision. The memo should also identify any treaty, convention or special procedural instrument that changes the default analysis. Because the United States judgment described here is not an intra-European judgment, counsel should not assume that a European automatic-recognition route applies; the exact instrument and date must be verified before filing.

Procedural fairness deserves its own evidence bundle. It may include summonses, proof of service, counsel’s appearance, hearing dates, extensions, translations, disclosure orders and the defendant’s submissions. The 2025 Court of Cassation decision no. 23-16.855 is a reminder that a procedural public-policy challenge requires proof that the party’s interests were objectively compromised. A party that had notice, counsel and a meaningful opportunity to respond faces a different issue from a party that learned of the proceeding too late to prepare. The French court will examine the actual record, not just the label attached to the foreign procedure.

Damages should be audited line by line. The applicant should provide the judgment’s calculation, the evidence accepted for each head of loss, the interest methodology and the treatment of punitive or exemplary components. The respondent should identify any internal inconsistency, double recovery or disproportionate component without suggesting that every non-French damages concept is automatically contrary to French public policy. The Fountaine Pajot ruling, no. 09-13.303, gives the parties a framework for discussing punitive damages, but it cannot decide the BNP appeal before the foreign judgment and its reasoning are known.

Asset strategy must then be separated from recognition. The applicant should identify property owned by the judgment debtor, not merely property linked to a corporate group. It should check whether an account is held by the debtor, a branch, an affiliate, a correspondent or a third party. It should quantify the enforceable balance and anticipate competing creditors, security interests and exemptions. It should also consider whether an urgent protective measure is available and proportionate under French law. A recognition application and an attachment application may interact, but they are not the same pleading and should not be treated as one.

Limitation requires the same care. Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that personal and movable actions generally prescribe in five years from the day the holder knew, or should have known, the facts enabling the action; the official provision must be applied to the specific claim and transitional rules. That general rule does not answer every question about a foreign judgment, a judgment debt, a claim governed by Swiss law or an action against a different defendant. The limitation analysis should identify the legal basis, the starting event, any discovery rule, any acknowledgment and any applicable foreign period.

Two procedural provisions may affect the chronology. Article 2239 of the Civil Code addresses suspension after a judicial measure ordered before trial to preserve or establish evidence; Article 2241 states that a legal action, including an interim application in the circumstances covered by the text, interrupts limitation or forfeiture. The Article 2239 text and the Article 2241 text should be checked against the dates and the court seized. A document-preservation application is not a universal reset button, and an action in a court without jurisdiction may raise its own complications even where the statute addresses interruption.

The defendant’s preparation is symmetrical but not identical. It should preserve the full compliance and transaction record, identify which documents are subject to retention duties and legal privilege, and map every version of the foreign judgment. It should separate a jurisdiction objection from a merits defence and a public-policy objection from an argument about proportionality. It should also examine whether the claimant is trying to enforce against an entity that was not the judgment debtor. A clear matrix prevents the common error of presenting every objection as “the case is wrong” when French recognition procedure requires a more precise ground.

A bank should be ready to explain authorisation evidence in context. The relevant question is not merely whether a regulator or government once approved a transaction. It is whether that approval covered the particular conduct, parties, route, currency, date and purpose at issue, and what legal effect the approval had under the governing law. The same document may be relevant to knowledge but not causation, to authorisation but not damages, or to public policy but not jurisdiction. A careful submission states the limited proposition for which the document is offered.

A claimant should make the same distinctions when using adverse regulatory history. The 2014 BNP Paribas resolution described by the U.S. Department of Justice may support questions about institutional controls and historical awareness. It cannot substitute for proof that the transactions identified in the Sudan complaint caused the injuries claimed by the three plaintiffs. The claimant should connect each inference to a record item and explain the legal bridge under Swiss law, U.S. law or French law, depending on the issue. Courts are more likely to engage with a precise causal theory than with a general assertion that a large prior settlement proves all later allegations.

The appeal itself should be monitored as a legal event. An appellate ruling may affirm, reverse, remand, alter damages or clarify the governing Swiss-law analysis without resolving every enforcement question. A settlement may change the documents and obligations again. Any French filing should state the current procedural status, attach the operative decision and explain what remains conditional. It should avoid presenting an appeal brief, a jury verdict, a party statement and a final enforceable judgment as if they had identical legal force.

That discipline is also useful for the international audience following the case. Cross-border bank-liability disputes increasingly move between criminal settlements, sanctions regimes, civil juries, foreign-law arguments and enforcement courts. The French angle is not that France will decide whether the Sudan allegations are true in the abstract. The French angle is that a foreign judgment targeting a French banking group must pass through a structured gateway before it can produce coercive effects in France, and that gateway depends on jurisdiction, public policy, fraud, damages, evidence and assets.

Finally, parties should use a staged decision tree. First, verify the operative U.S. judgment and the appellate status. Second, identify the legal basis and governing law for each claim. Third, build the transaction-level evidence schedule. Fourth, test indirect jurisdiction and procedural fairness under French recognition rules. Fifth, audit damages and limitation. Sixth, map assets and choose any protective or enforcement measure. The sequence avoids spending resources on a seizure strategy before the judgment’s French status is understood, while preserving evidence before it disappears.

Conclusion

BNP Paribas’s Sudan appeal is important because it puts a French banking group, a U.S. jury verdict, Swiss governing law and the consequences of a foreign human-rights claim in one live procedural chain. The appeal will determine how the U.S. court treats the Swiss-law arguments and the trial record. A French court, if later asked to give the judgment effect in France, would apply a different test. Under Article 509 and the Court of Cassation’s exequatur case law, the focus would be indirect jurisdiction, international public policy and fraud, with procedural fairness and the proportionality of damages receiving close attention. French civil-liability, evidence, anti-money-laundering and freezing provisions may provide useful analytical and documentary context, but none can be used as a shortcut around the applicable choice of law or the proof of causation. Claimants should build a finality, service, damages and asset file. BNP Paribas should preserve the transaction record and define precisely what each authorisation and compliance document proves. Until the U.S. appeal is resolved, the responsible conclusion is conditional: the case may create a significant cross-border enforcement question, but it is not yet a French judgment and it is not a licence to collapse sanctions history into civil liability.

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