A judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 1 September 2026 has put a precise question back at the centre of criminal appeals across Europe: can an appeal court turn an acquittal into a conviction when the decisive witness is not heard again? In Brunell and McArdle v. the Netherlands, applications nos. 30395/20 and 31220/20, the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 after Dutch appeal judges relied on a witness whose credibility had been expressly doubted at first instance. The judgment concerns the Netherlands, but its practical signal is wider. French criminal appeals also combine broad appellate powers, written evidence, live testimony and strict limits on the Court of Cassation’s review. The decisive issue is not whether an appeal court may ever convict after an acquittal. It may, within the limits of the appeal and the applicable procedure. The issue is whether it can make a fresh credibility finding against an accused without giving the defence a real opportunity to test the witness whose account carries the conviction. This analysis explains what the Strasbourg ruling changes, how the French rules map onto it, and what counsel should put on the record immediately when a case turns on one absent or unexamined witness.
I. Can an appeal court overturn an acquittal on a decisive witness?
A. What Brunell and McArdle decided on 1 September 2026
The case arose from a death in Amsterdam in February 2009. Kenneth Brunell and Barry McArdle, both Irish nationals, were prosecuted in the Netherlands after the body of a man was found there. A witness identified in the Strasbourg materials as X connected the two men with the flat in Rotterdam where the victim’s body was handled. According to the factual account examined by the European Court, X said that the men helped clean the flat, dispose of the body and travel towards France before taking a ferry to England. Those cross-border details matter because they show how a criminal case can be assembled from several jurisdictions while the decisive account still depends on one person’s credibility.
On 15 May 2017, the Regional Court found both men guilty of disposing of a body and sentenced each to two years’ imprisonment. It did not convict them of manslaughter. The court considered that X’s statements were not reliable enough to establish the more serious charge. That was not a technical acquittal detached from the evidence. It was a factual assessment directed at the central witness and at the difference between placing the accused in a location and proving what they did there.
On 17 May 2018, the Court of Appeal took a different view. It convicted both men of manslaughter as well as disposing of a body and imposed thirteen-year sentences. The appeal court relied on X’s account even though it did not hear him again. The Dutch Supreme Court upheld that result on 28 January 2020. The applicants then complained in Strasbourg that the conviction had been reached without the direct examination needed to resolve the credibility issue.
The European Court’s judgment press release describes the problem in functional terms. The objective phone, travel and DNA evidence placed the applicants in or around the relevant house, but it did not reconstruct the events or establish the respective roles of the men. Their guilt for manslaughter therefore depended on the reliability of X. Because the first-instance court had already expressed doubts about that reliability, the appeal court’s decision was not simply a different legal classification of undisputed facts. It was a new factual conclusion about a witness who had not been heard in the appeal proceedings.
The Strasbourg Chamber unanimously found a violation of Article 6 § 1. It considered that the appeal court needed to make a direct assessment of X if it was going to reverse the first-instance conclusion and treat his testimony as decisive. The Court did not award damages because none had been claimed; it held that the finding of a violation was sufficient just satisfaction. It also indicated that reopening the domestic proceedings would be the most appropriate form of redress. The judgment is a Chamber judgment and, on the date of publication, is not yet final: the parties have the three-month period provided by the Convention to seek referral to the Grand Chamber.
That procedural status should be reported accurately. The judgment binds the respondent State once final and its execution is supervised through the Convention system. It does not itself quash a French conviction, reopen a French appeal or create an automatic remedy for every case involving an absent witness. It is nevertheless an important same-day authority for lawyers dealing with a European criminal file, because it identifies the point at which appellate fact-finding becomes inseparable from the fairness of the hearing.
The headline is therefore narrower than “Europe bans convictions on appeal”. The Court did not announce such a ban. It addressed a particular combination: an acquittal on the serious charge, a first-instance finding that the key witness was unreliable, an appeal conviction based on that witness, and the absence of a renewed hearing capable of allowing the appeal judges to observe and test the witness directly. Remove one of those features and the Article 6 analysis may change. Keep them together and the risk of a violation becomes immediate.
B. Why direct assessment matters under Article 6
Credibility is not merely a fact written into a transcript. A judge deciding whether a person is reliable may need to assess hesitation, precision, memory, consistency under questioning, the effect of prior statements and the witness’s ability to distinguish personal observation from reconstruction. A transcript can preserve words, but it does not always preserve the evidential event. That is why the Strasbourg case law treats the direct assessment of a witness as especially important when an appellate court is the first court to convict after the trial court has acquitted.
The rule is not a formal demand that every witness appear twice in every European criminal case. Appellate courts regularly decide legal issues, assess documentary evidence and deal with witnesses who are unavailable for genuine reasons. A prior recording, a properly tested deposition, a forensic record or independent corroboration may reduce the need for a second live hearing. The question is whether the appellate court is making the decisive credibility assessment itself, and whether the defence has had a fair and practical chance to challenge the evidence that supports the conviction.
Three distinctions are essential. First, there is a difference between a witness who supplies background and a witness whose account is the bridge between circumstantial facts and criminal responsibility. If the independent evidence already proves the elements and the witness merely fills in peripheral detail, the absence of a second hearing may be less serious. If the witness supplies the only explanation for intent, participation, causation or the identity of the principal offender, the credibility issue moves to the centre of the trial.
Second, there is a difference between reviewing a first-instance credibility assessment and replacing it. An appeal court can examine whether the trial court reasoned adequately, overlooked material evidence or applied the wrong legal test. But where the trial court heard the witness and acquitted because it did not find the account sufficiently reliable, an appeal court that convicts on the same account is making a fresh factual choice. The more the decision turns on how the witness should be believed, the stronger the argument that the appeal judges must hear the witness or use a procedure that preserves an equivalent level of adversarial testing.
Third, there is a difference between an accused who asks for a witness to be heard and an accused who remains silent. A defence request identifies the issue and gives the domestic court an opportunity to cure it. It does not guarantee that the request will succeed, but a refusal must be reasoned and compatible with the practical requirements of a fair hearing. Counsel should never assume that a general reference to the written file preserves the point. The record should explain why the witness matters, what disputed proposition the witness proves, why the first-instance reasoning makes the testimony decisive, and what alternative safeguards would be inadequate.
There is also a remedy distinction. The European Court does not act as a fourth-instance court that recalculates the facts. It asks whether the proceedings as a whole were fair. A domestic court may still be able to convict on appeal after a first-instance acquittal where it hears the relevant witness, gives the defence a meaningful opportunity to question the evidence, explains the change in assessment and relies on a body of proof that does not stand or fall with an untested account. Conversely, the existence of some corroborative material does not automatically cure the defect if that material only places the accused near the scene and the decisive witness supplies the missing criminal narrative.
This is the practical message for international cases: build an evidence map rather than a source list. For each proposition in the indictment, identify whether it is proved by a document, a digital trace, an expert opinion, an admission, a witness or a combination. Mark the proposition for which X-type evidence is indispensable. Then ask whether an appeal court would be assessing reliability for the first time. That analysis is more useful than simply saying that the witness was “important”. It shows whether the witness is legally decisive.
The judgment also has a transnational dimension. The Netherlands can have to reopen its proceedings even though the evidence, travel routes and potential witnesses extend into Ireland, France and the United Kingdom. A French lawyer assisting a client abroad should therefore treat the Strasbourg analysis as a procedural issue with operational consequences: preserve the first-instance reasons, request the hearing in the domestic language and through the available cross-border channels, secure certified translations, and identify the domestic remedy before the appeal judgment becomes final. The international nature of the evidence does not dilute the hearing obligation; it makes planning for the hearing more important.
II. What would the same problem trigger in French criminal procedure?
A. How French appeal powers meet the hearing requirement
French law begins from a broad conception of criminal proof. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Hors les cas où la loi en dispose autrement, les infractions peuvent être établies par tout mode de preuve et le juge décide d’après son intime conviction.” The same provision adds that the judge may rely only on evidence brought before the debates and discussed contradictorily. The principle gives trial judges room to evaluate digital, documentary, scientific and testimonial proof. It does not make an untested decisive witness immune from Article 6 scrutiny.
The starting point for an appeal is its scope. Under Article 509, “L’affaire est dévolue à la cour d’appel dans les limites fixées par l’acte d’appel”. The appeal court does not receive an unlimited mandate to reconstruct the case. The notice of appeal, the identity of the appellant and the challenged heads of the judgment shape what can be examined. In a cross-border file, counsel should obtain the original appeal act, its translation and any later statement of the grounds before arguing the witness issue. A strong Article 6 submission can fail if it is disconnected from the precise questions devolved to the court.
For the correctional appeal, Article 512 provides that “Les règles édictées pour le tribunal correctionnel sont applicables devant la cour d’appel”, subject to the following provisions. Article 513 then sets out the appellate hearing: “L’appel est jugé à l’audience sur le rapport oral d’un conseiller ; le prévenu est interrogé.” It also states that defence witnesses are heard under the rules in Articles 435 to 457 and that the public prosecutor may object when they have already been heard by the tribunal. The court decides that procedural dispute before the merits. The accused or counsel has the last word.
That text is a powerful practical tool where the requested witness was not heard at first instance. The Criminal Chamber judgment of 6 November 2018, no. 17-81.420, applied Article 513 in a case where a regularly summoned witness had not been heard by the tribunal. The Court of Cassation held that the appeal court had misunderstood the meaning and scope of the provision when it refused the hearing without the required basis. The official decision records the formulation “devant la cour d’appel, les témoins sont entendus dans les règles prévues par les articles 435 à 457 du code de procédure pénale”. This is not identical to Brunell and McArdle: the French case concerned the statutory hearing of a defence witness, while Strasbourg concerned an appeal conviction built on a decisive witness whose credibility had driven the acquittal. The two authorities nevertheless point in the same direction: a procedural label cannot replace a concrete examination of the witness who matters.
The prosecution’s appeal also matters. Article 515 states: “La cour peut, sur l’appel du ministère public, soit confirmer le jugement, soit l’infirmer en tout ou en partie dans un sens favorable ou défavorable au prévenu.” It protects the accused from aggravation on an appeal brought only by the accused, the civil party or certain related parties. A conviction after an acquittal is therefore not excluded as a matter of French appellate power when the public prosecutor has appealed within the relevant scope. But the power to worsen the outcome is not a waiver of a fair hearing. The wider the change from acquittal to conviction, the more carefully the court must address the evidence, the defence request and the reasons for departing from the first-instance assessment.
French reasoning rules provide a second line of defence. Article 485 says: “Tout jugement doit contenir des motifs et un dispositif. Les motifs constituent la base de la décision.” An appellate judgment that changes a first-instance acquittal should identify the disputed evidence, explain why the earlier credibility concern is rejected and show how the remaining proof establishes each element of the offence. A conclusion that merely says the witness is now believed is vulnerable because it does not reveal the path from the first judgment to the new conviction.
The procedural response to a defect depends on its nature. Article 520 provides: “Si le jugement est annulé pour violation ou omission non réparée de formes prescrites par la loi à peine de nullité, la cour évoque et statue sur le fond.” That rule addresses what the appeal court does when a judgment is annulled for a procedural defect; it is not a universal instruction to reopen every credibility dispute. Counsel should connect the requested remedy to the specific violation: failure to hear a properly cited witness, refusal without material impossibility, inadequate reasons, or reliance on evidence that was not genuinely debated.
The French Court of Cassation has also drawn important boundaries. In its decision of 1 June 2016, no. 15-83.059, it censured an appeal court that rejected the hearing of a victim cited as a witness, where no particular difficulty made the hearing materially impossible. The court could not treat the fact that other evidence existed as a reason to avoid the statutory question at that stage. By contrast, in Criminal Chamber decision of 18 May 2010, no. 09-83.156, the Court accepted a fair-trial analysis where an anonymous witness’s statements were excluded and the appeal court relied only on audiovisual material that had been submitted to adversarial discussion. These decisions show the real test: not whether the word “witness” appears in the file, but whether the evidence used for conviction was sufficiently tested in the procedure actually followed.
Finally, the appeal is not the same as cassation. Article 591 says that final judgments may be quashed only for violation of the law when they comply with the prescribed forms. Article 593 adds that criminal decisions are null when they lack reasons or contain reasons insufficient to allow the Court of Cassation to exercise its control. A cassation argument should therefore translate the Strasbourg concern into a legal defect: failure to apply Article 513, inadequate reasons under Article 593, breach of the adversarial principle, or a mismatch between the appeal court’s factual finding and the evidence legally available to it.
B. What counsel should do when the evidence turns on credibility
The first step is to freeze the procedural timeline. Obtain the first-instance judgment, the appeal act, the summonses, the minutes or audio-visual record of the hearings, the prosecution’s written or oral submissions, and the appellate judgment. In an international matter, obtain the authenticated version and a working translation. Identify exactly when the witness was heard, by whom, under what status, with what opportunity for questions, and whether the accused or counsel asked for a renewed hearing. A later complaint will be judged against the record, not against a general assertion that the witness was important.
The second step is to preserve the first-instance finding. Quote the passage where the trial court rejected or qualified the witness’s reliability. Do not reduce it to “the court did not believe him”. It may have identified contradictions, a motive to shift blame, an inability to see the relevant event, changes between statements, a deal with investigators, a language problem or a conflict with objective evidence. The appellate court must confront the actual reason for the acquittal. A focused comparison between the two judgments is often more persuasive than a long narrative of the whole case.
The third step is to make the hearing request granular. State the witness’s full identity and location if safe and lawful, the disputed facts, the questions that must be put, the reason the testimony is decisive, and the proposed method of examination. If the witness is in another country, address travel, a European judicial cooperation request, videoconference, interpretation, protective measures and the timetable. A request that says only “the defence seeks the witness to be heard” invites a short refusal. A request that shows why the appeal court cannot fairly resolve the case from the papers gives the court a decision it must answer.
The fourth step is to anticipate material impossibility arguments. A witness may be dead, medically unable to travel, exposed to a credible threat, outside the court’s practical reach or genuinely unavailable despite documented efforts. The response is not to pretend that attendance is always possible. It is to ask whether a recorded prior examination, a judicial videoconference, written questions with judicial control, an authenticated deposition or exclusion of the decisive portions can preserve fairness. The 2010 French decision linked above illustrates the importance of what the court does with untested statements: excluding them or relying on a recording actually debated by the parties produces a different analysis from silently treating a contested statement as decisive.
The fifth step is to separate presence evidence from responsibility evidence. Phone records, border crossings, DNA, hotel data and vehicle movements may show that an accused was near a place or travelled with another person. They may not prove who inflicted fatal harm, who gave an order, who knew the plan, or who acted with the necessary intent. In Brunell and McArdle, the Strasbourg concern arose precisely because the objective material did not answer the role question without X. A French appeal submission should create a table or a clearly structured argument showing which element is covered by which item, where the chain depends on testimony, and whether the first-instance court rejected that chain for a stated reason.
The sixth step is to challenge the appellate reasoning without asking the Court of Cassation to become a third fact-finder. The point is not that the appellate judges preferred one witness to another. The point is that they could not fairly make the decisive preference without the procedural safeguards required by Article 6 and the applicable French provisions. Article 593 is useful when the appellate judgment does not explain why the first-instance doubts were wrong, why the requested hearing was refused, or why circumstantial evidence independently proves the missing element. Article 591 is relevant when the court has violated a legal rule governing the hearing, the scope of the appeal or the adversarial debate.
The seventh step is to put the objection on the record at the right time. Under Article 513, the court rules on objections to witnesses before the merits. Counsel should request a reasoned ruling, renew the objection if the witness evidence is later used, and preserve the final-word position. If the court denies an adjournment or an examination, identify the concrete prejudice: which factual proposition could not be tested, which first-instance finding is being reversed, and why the remaining evidence cannot cure the gap. The aim is to make the procedural history intelligible to a later reviewing court and, if needed, to Strasbourg.
The eighth step is to choose the domestic remedy before the deadline begins to run. If an appeal conviction is delivered, counsel must examine the time limit and admissibility of a cassation appeal, the effect of custody or sentence execution, and any request for a stay or other urgent protection available under domestic law. If the judgment comes from the Netherlands or another State, French counsel cannot substitute a French cassation application for the foreign remedy. The domestic legal route must first be used or assessed in the country of judgment. The Strasbourg judgment then helps define why the issue is Convention-relevant, but it does not replace the national procedural steps.
There is an important distinction between a criminal appeal and a jury or assize procedure. The French provisions quoted above, particularly Article 513, concern the correctional appeal framework. A case involving a crime may engage different statutory provisions, a different composition of the court and different rules on oral evidence. The constitutional and Convention principles still matter, but counsel must cite the provisions that actually govern the forum. Copying a correctional argument into an assize case without checking the procedural route can weaken an otherwise strong Article 6 point.
For an accused facing a cross-border prosecution, the practical question is often urgent: “Can the other State use a witness who was not heard again?” The answer cannot be given from the witness label alone. Ask whether the trial court acquitted because it doubted that witness, whether the appeal court convicted because it reversed that credibility conclusion, whether the defence sought an examination, whether the witness was genuinely unavailable, whether a reliable alternative safeguard existed, and whether independent evidence proves the disputed elements. Those questions turn a headline into a reviewable legal analysis.
For prosecutors and appellate judges, the same checklist works in reverse. If the appeal seeks a conviction after an acquittal, identify the evidence that does not depend on the witness, explain why the trial court’s concern is legally or factually mistaken, hear the witness when credibility is decisive, and give reasons that address the defence’s request. If the witness cannot be heard, state the reason, define the alternative safeguard, and explain why the evidence remaining after that safeguard is sufficient. A carefully reasoned decision is not merely defensive drafting; it makes the judgment more durable across borders and under later Convention review.
The answer to the article’s title can now be stated precisely. France can convict on appeal after an acquittal when the appeal is properly brought, the court acts within its devolved jurisdiction, the applicable statutory hearing rules are respected, and the proceedings as a whole remain fair. France should not treat the power to reconsider the case as a licence to reverse a credibility-based acquittal on a decisive witness whom the appeal court never hears, particularly after the defence has made a specific and timely request. In that situation, the problem is not simply evidential weight. It is the method by which the conviction was reached.
Conclusion
Brunell and McArdle v. the Netherlands is a sharp warning against confusing appellate authority with appellate immediacy. The European Court did not abolish convictions after acquittal. It required the procedure to match the factual task: if an appeal court is the first court to rely on a disputed witness as the decisive bridge to guilt, the defence must have a genuine opportunity to test that witness or the court must use safeguards that preserve an equivalent level of fairness. French law already contains the tools to conduct that analysis: the limits of devolution, the correctional appeal hearing rules, the protection against unreasoned decisions and the legal control exercised by the Court of Cassation. In every international criminal file, the decisive work is therefore concrete: map the evidence, preserve the first-instance reasoning, request the right hearing, document any impossibility and translate the objection into the remedy that remains available before the judgment becomes final.