China’s Ministry of Justice has called the European Union’s investigation into JD.com’s proposed acquisition of German retailer CECONOMY an improper exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and has told Chinese entities not to implement or assist with the inquiry. The intervention landed while JD.com was offering remedies to Brussels and while the European Commission was moving toward a provisional 23 October 2026 decision. The public filing did not disclose the content of those remedies. The result is a live collision between an EU market-access investigation and a Chinese rule designed to restrict cooperation with foreign regulators.
The story is not only about a Chinese takeover of the group behind MediaMarkt and Saturn. It is an evidence problem for every business that sits between the two systems: a French supplier with invoices and pricing data, a French subsidiary holding group records, a bank with financing documents, a cloud provider with logs, or a French adviser asked to collect material for Brussels. The same record can be commercially sensitive in France, located in China, controlled by a parent company, and relevant to an EU administrative investigation.
That does not mean that every French company must hand over its entire archive, nor that a Chinese instruction automatically neutralises a Commission request. The Foreign Subsidies Regulation is directly applicable EU law, while French rules protect trade secrets, legal correspondence and certain information requested for foreign proceedings. The practical answer is a controlled evidence map, a precise confidentiality strategy and an early decision about which authority has a lawful claim to which document.
I. What does China’s blocking order mean for the EU JD.com–CECONOMY investigation?
A. Why is Brussels examining the acquisition under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation?
On 17 April 2026, the Commission received notification of the proposed concentration through JINGDONG HOLDING GERMANY GmbH, controlled by JD.com, Inc. The target, CECONOMY AG, operates the MediaMarkt and Saturn consumer-electronics businesses across Europe. The transaction is commonly reported at roughly 2.5 billion dollars, or about 2.2 billion euros depending on the exchange rate and the valuation used. It is a commercial acquisition, but its regulatory path is no longer a routine merger review.
On 28 May 2026, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation in case FS.100253 under Article 10(3)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560. The Official Journal summary notice for JD.COM / CECONOMY records that the opening followed a preliminary review in which the Commission found “sufficient indications” that at least one party had received a foreign subsidy capable of distorting the internal market. The wording is important. An opening decision is not a final finding that JD.com received unlawful aid, and it does not decide that the transaction must be prohibited.
The Commission’s public materials identify concerns about possible preferential financing, tax incentives and grants, as well as the way financial resources might have supported JD Group’s logistics and technology. The legal question is not whether every Chinese state contribution is forbidden. A foreign financial contribution becomes relevant under the FSR when it qualifies as a foreign subsidy and creates, or may create, a distortion in the EU internal market. The Commission must examine the contribution, the alleged distortion and any positive effects before selecting a remedy.
The Commission’s 28 May press release states that the investigation concerns JD.com’s proposed acquisition and that the preliminary concerns do not prejudge the outcome. That safeguard matters for businesses and for the public record. A press article, a statement of objections or a request for documents is not a judgment of fraud. A company responding to the inquiry should therefore avoid language that concedes a subsidy, a distortion or an obligation that the Commission has not yet established.
The next development was procedural but commercially significant. On 20 August, Reuters reported that JD.com had offered remedies to the Commission in the FSR investigation. The public regulatory filing did not specify their terms. Other reporting placed the provisional decision date on 23 October. A remedies filing can indicate an effort to preserve the transaction, but it does not reveal whether Brussels will accept commitments, impose redressive measures or prohibit the concentration. Until the Commission adopts a final decision, the investigation remains an assessment under the FSR rather than a completed enforcement finding.
The Regulation nevertheless gives the Commission a wide evidentiary toolkit. Its official consolidated text of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 allows information requests during the preliminary and in-depth stages. Article 13(2) concerns the undertaking under investigation; Article 13(3) allows the Commission to seek information from other undertakings or associations, with due regard to proportionality. The request can therefore reach an entity that is not JD.com and is not CECONOMY if that entity possesses material relevant to the Commission’s assessment.
The scope is also wider than a single head-office file. The Commission may ask for information about financing, guarantees, tax treatment, grants, corporate relationships, technology, logistics, contracts and the commercial effect of a proposed remedy. It can use inspections within the Union and, subject to the conditions of the Regulation and the cooperation available in the third country, outside the Union. A French business that supplies products, provides logistics, maintains software, finances a group company or holds data for a related entity may therefore receive a request even though the transaction is German and Chinese at its centre.
The FSR also creates material consequences for a careless response. Article 17 allows fines or periodic penalty payments for incomplete, incorrect or misleading information and for failures during inspections. Article 26 applies the same enforcement architecture to concentrations and allows a fine that can reach 1 per cent of aggregate turnover for incorrect or misleading notification information, and up to 10 per cent in specified concentration infringements. The precise provision depends on the conduct and the stage of the case. A French company should not treat a request as an informal questionnaire merely because the communication arrives by email.
B. Can a Chinese blocking order stop the Commission from demanding evidence?
China’s position changes the compliance risk but does not erase the EU proceeding. On 20 August, China’s Ministry of Justice said that the EU’s investigation constituted improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, complained that the request reached information located in China, and directed organisations and individuals not to comply with or assist the measure. The account was carried by Xinhua and was also reported by Reuters and other international outlets. Beijing presented its position as an application of rules adopted in April 2026 to counter foreign measures regarded as violating international law or harming China’s sovereignty, security, development interests or the rights of Chinese citizens and organisations.
Brussels starts from a different jurisdictional proposition. The FSR regulates access to the EU internal market, not only the place where the subsidising government or the parent company is located. A concentration involving a European target can trigger EU review even if the financing records, tax documents or decision-makers are outside the Union. The Commission’s case is not a criminal prosecution of China. It is an administrative market-access inquiry addressed to undertakings connected with a concentration subject to EU rules.
That distinction does not make a document request self-executing in China. The Commission cannot assume that a Chinese public body, a Chinese bank or a Chinese parent will physically deliver material simply because the request is written in the language of an EU regulation. Enforcement may instead depend on the undertaking’s EU presence, its assets, its future access to the single market, the accuracy of its voluntary cooperation, the use of available facts and diplomatic or judicial channels. A blocking order can make a complete response impossible while leaving the undertaking exposed if it gives no explanation, destroys records or submits an unreliable substitute.
French entities sit in the middle of that tension. A French subsidiary may be a separate legal person, yet its directors may control documents generated by the group. A French supplier may hold its own contracts but not the parent’s internal financing records. A French bank may possess customer due-diligence documents, loan files and payment records but have no authority to disclose another entity’s confidential commercial strategy. The first question is therefore not “EU law or Chinese law?” It is “which entity controls which record, where is it held, what legal order addressed the request, and what harm follows from disclosure?”
French trade-secret law does not provide a universal veto against EU regulatory requests. Article L.151-7 of the French Commercial Code expressly states that trade-secret protection is not opposable when disclosure is required or authorised by EU law, an international treaty or national law in the exercise of investigative, supervisory, authorisation or sanction powers. The official Article L.151-7 text uses the words “Le secret des affaires n’est pas opposable lorsque l’obtention, l’utilisation ou la divulgation du secret est requise ou autorisée par le droit de l’Union européenne”. That does not mean that the Commission may demand anything without limits. It means that secrecy must be handled through relevance, necessity, proportionality and confidentiality procedures rather than asserted as an absolute answer.
The French 1968 blocking statute requires the same caution in the opposite direction. Article 1 bis concerns documents and information sought to constitute evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings. Its official wording begins: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux et des lois et règlements en vigueur, il est interdit”. The reservation is not decorative. It requires the lawyer and the company to examine whether EU law, a treaty, the addressee’s status and the nature of the request displace or qualify the prohibition. The text should not be used as a reflex to refuse a Commission request, but neither should a company ignore it when a foreign authority or a foreign litigant asks for French business records.
There is a second practical point. A Commission request is not the same as a Chinese request, a US subpoena or a private discovery demand. The legal basis, the recipient, the purpose, the deadline and the sanction for non-response must be read from the document itself. An informal request from a transaction adviser may be answered differently from a formal Article 13 decision. A request directed to JD.com may not bind a French supplier. A demand for a non-confidential summary may require a different process from a demand for a complete confidential file.
For French businesses, the safest conclusion is narrow: the Chinese instruction creates a genuine conflict-of-laws risk, but it is not permission to stop preserving evidence, and it is not proof that every record may be withheld from Brussels. The company needs a defensible explanation for every record not produced, a controlled record of every document produced, and a route for resolving the conflict before the deadline expires.
II. What must French businesses do when the EU requests China-linked records?
A. How should a French company map evidence, secrets and legal duties?
The first move should be an evidence map rather than a bulk export. Identify the addressee of the Commission request, the legal provision cited, the response deadline, the requested categories, the relevant period, the custodians and the possible sanctions. Then separate records held in France from records held elsewhere, records owned by the French entity from records merely accessible to it, and records created for the transaction from ordinary business material. This classification is the foundation for both a complete response and a credible objection.
A useful map has at least five columns: document or data category, controlling entity, physical location, legal sensitivity and proposed response. “Physical location” is not the same as “control”. A French cloud account may contain data controlled by a Chinese parent. A Chinese server may contain French customer information. A bank may have a copy of a contract but not the right to certify the parent’s tax position. Those distinctions should be recorded before anyone begins searching keywords or forwarding attachments.
The next step is to mark information that may qualify as a trade secret. Article L.151-1 of the Commercial Code protects information meeting three conditions: it is not generally known or easily accessible, it has actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and its lawful holder takes reasonable steps to keep it secret. The official Article L.151-1 text describes protected information as “Est protégée au titre du secret des affaires toute information répondant aux critères suivants”. Pricing formulas, supplier discounts, logistics capacity, algorithms, internal forecasts and financing terms may fit the definition, but a label saying “confidential” is not enough. The company must be able to show the commercial value and the protective measures.
Article L.151-4 addresses unlawful acquisition without the consent of the lawful holder, including unauthorised access, copying or conduct contrary to commercial usage. The official Article L.151-4 version should be read alongside the actual custody arrangement. Producing a record to a competent regulator under a valid legal power is not the same as allowing a competitor to obtain it. The response should distinguish regulatory disclosure from commercial disclosure, state the purpose of the production, and request confidentiality treatment where the procedural rules allow it.
Contracts matter as well. Article 1103 of the Civil Code provides that “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits”; the official provision is available through Légifrance’s Article 1103 page. Article 1104 adds that “Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi”, as recorded in Article 1104 of the Civil Code. An NDA, supply agreement, financing covenant or data-processing contract cannot automatically defeat a mandatory regulatory power, but it may determine who must notify whom, who bears the cost of production, how confidential material is handled and whether disclosure must be limited.
French civil procedure offers useful analogies for disciplined evidence handling, although it is not a substitute for the FSR process. Article 138 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows a party seeking to rely on a document held by a third party to ask the judge to order production. The official Article 138 text says that the party “peut demander au juge saisi de l’affaire d’ordonner … la production de l’acte ou de la pièce”. The point is procedural control: the request goes through the competent judge, with a defined dispute and a defined document, rather than an unbounded demand to a third party.
Before litigation, Article 145 of the same Code permits an evidentiary measure when there is a legitimate reason to preserve or establish facts on which the outcome of a dispute may depend. The current Article 145 page on Légifrance begins: “S’il existe un motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir avant tout procès la preuve de faits”. For a French company in the JD.com context, this can support preservation and carefully framed French proceedings, but it does not authorise a company to disregard a formal Commission decision. It is a domestic procedural route, not a private override of EU regulatory authority.
Confidentiality should be prepared as a package. Article R.153-3 of the Commercial Code requires, subject to inadmissibility, a confidential complete version, a non-confidential version or summary, and a statement explaining why the information is secret. The official Article R.153-3 text is a useful drafting model even where the receiving authority applies its own FSR procedure. The company should create a redaction log, identify each withheld passage, explain the specific harm from disclosure and provide the maximum usable factual information without exposing the protected core.
French Supreme Court decisions reinforce the need for a proportionality analysis. In its Commercial Chamber decision of 5 June 2024, no. 23-10.954, the Cour de cassation stated that “le droit à la preuve peut justifier la production d’éléments couverts par le secret des affaires”. The official decision, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2024:CO00328, continues by requiring an indispensable production and a strictly proportionate interference. The case does not decide the JD.com investigation, but it supplies a valuable French test: relevance alone is not a reason to disclose every sensitive page.
In a decision of 20 March 2024, no. 22-22.398, the Commercial Chamber explained that the procedure under Article R.153-1 exists to protect trade secrets during an Article 145 measure. The official decision, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2024:CO00146, describes that procedure as having “pour seul objet d’éviter” that production during the investigation measure harms the secret. The lesson is operational: a confidentiality mechanism protects the material while the judge decides what may be released; it is not a licence to ignore the evidentiary process.
An international dispute also does not make French evidence rules disappear. In its First Civil Chamber decision of 3 November 2016, no. 15-20.495, the Cour de cassation held that implementation in France of Article 145 measures is governed by French law and that “le secret des affaires et le secret professionnel ne constituent pas en eux-mêmes un obstacle”. The official decision also preserves the protection of correspondence between a lawyer and client. A French company must therefore identify privileged communications separately and must not assume that a foreign label of “legal privilege” will produce the same result in France.
The evidence map should end with a decision tree. If a record is irrelevant, record the reason and do not produce it. If it is relevant but commercially sensitive, prepare a confidentiality designation and a redacted version. If it is relevant and held by a third party, identify the lawful route to obtain it. If it is controlled in China and subject to a blocking instruction, preserve it, isolate it, seek advice on the competing duties and tell the Commission precisely what prevents production. Silence and deletion are much harder to defend than a documented conflict analysis.
B. What is the safest response when French and Chinese rules collide?
A formal response should be coordinated by one legal and compliance team with authority to speak for the relevant entity. The team should create a single chronology: receipt of the request, internal preservation notice, contact with the parent or supplier, Chinese instruction, French-law analysis, questions sent to the Commission, documents produced and documents withheld. This chronology will matter if the Commission later alleges delay or incompleteness, if a Chinese authority asks why a record moved, or if a French court must assess whether the company acted carefully.
The first written communication to the Commission should not be a blanket refusal. It should confirm preservation, identify the entity’s role, ask the Commission to confirm the scope and legal basis of the request, explain any translation or definition problem, and identify the categories affected by Chinese restrictions. The company can request a short extension, a narrower custodian list, a staged production, or permission to submit a non-confidential summary while a dispute over specific documents is resolved. The request should be concrete: “category X, held by entity Y in jurisdiction Z, affected by instrument Q, proposed alternative A.”
If a formal FSR request is unclear, ask whether it is made under Article 13(2) or 13(3), whether it is directed to the French company itself or to a group undertaking, and whether the Commission expects original documents, translations, data extracts or explanations. Those distinctions affect the duty to respond. An entity should not volunteer an expansive factual narrative that creates inconsistencies with the notified transaction, but it should also not provide a selective summary that omits a material qualification.
Confidentiality claims should be granular. Use document-level and passage-level descriptions, not one generic statement that an entire folder is secret. Explain why a price, financing term or algorithm has commercial value, who knows it, what protective steps exist, and what would happen if it reached a competitor. Where possible, provide a non-confidential version, a range, an indexed schedule or a summary. The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 sets detailed arrangements for proceedings under the FSR, including the handling of confidential information. The company should follow the Commission’s current instructions rather than invent a private format.
The French blocking statute should be escalated, not improvised. Article 1 of the 1968 law concerns certain economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information whose communication to foreign public authorities may harm French sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order. The official Article 1 text must be read with the treaties and laws reservation. Article 1 bis addresses evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings; the official Article 1 bis text is the relevant starting point for a foreign-litigation request.
When the statute applies, Article 2 does not tell the company to hide the request. It requires the persons covered by Articles 1 and 1 bis to notify the competent minister without delay when they receive a demand concerning such communications. The official provision states that those persons are “tenues d’informer sans délai le ministre compétent”; see Article 2 on Légifrance. The company should obtain advice on the correct channel and preserve proof of notification. It should not claim that Article 2 was satisfied merely by mentioning the Chinese order in an internal email.
There is also a penalty provision. Article 3 provides that an infringement of Articles 1 and 1 bis may be punished by six months’ imprisonment and an 18,000-euro fine, subject to more severe penalties provided by law. The official Article 3 text is short but should not be overlooked. At the same time, the company must avoid overstating the statute. The 1968 law is not a general answer to every EU request, and an EU regulatory power may qualify its operation. The right approach is to identify the exact request, the exact documents and the applicable conflict rule.
Article L.151-8 adds exceptions to trade-secret protection for freedom of expression, good-faith disclosure of unlawful conduct in the public interest and protection of a legitimate interest recognised by EU or national law. The official Article L.151-8 text should not be confused with the regulatory confidentiality regime. A Commission investigation is not a press publication, and a confidential submission is not a public disclosure. The company’s response should preserve both the regulator’s need to test the evidence and the owner’s need to limit dissemination.
A French lawyer reviewing the file should also separate corporate communications from protected lawyer-client correspondence. The 2016 Cour de cassation decision on Article 145 is especially useful here because it confirms that the protection of correspondence between a client and lawyer is a specific safeguard, rather than a broad immunity for every document passing through a legal department. Internal business emails, board presentations and ordinary compliance notes may be sensitive without being privileged. Misclassifying them can weaken both the confidentiality claim and the credibility of the response.
For a French bank or payment institution, the review should include customer confidentiality, anti-money-laundering duties, sanctions screening and group information barriers. The JD.com matter is not itself an asset-freezing designation, and a Commission FSR request is not a sanctions notice. A bank should therefore avoid treating the investigation as proof that a customer is prohibited. It should answer the precise regulatory question, preserve records, maintain its ordinary compliance controls and document why unrelated customer data were excluded.
For a French supplier, the key risk is over-disclosure. A supplier may have received price lists, volume forecasts, rebates or logistics instructions from a group company. It should identify whether the request seeks evidence about a foreign financial contribution or about competitive effects in the EU market. The supplier can offer its own contracts, invoices, delivery data and explanations while objecting to material belonging to another company or material that reveals unrelated customers. A narrow, verified production is more useful than a disorganised archive.
For a French subsidiary of a Chinese group, the risk is under-disclosure combined with false certainty. The subsidiary should ask the parent to identify which records are controlled in China and which are generated locally. If the parent says that Chinese law forbids cooperation, obtain that position in writing and preserve the underlying request or instruction. Then communicate the conflict to Brussels with enough detail for the Commission to decide whether to narrow the request, accept a summary, use other evidence or adopt a procedural measure. Do not translate a legal disagreement into a statement that the documents do not exist.
The following practical matrix captures the first response:
| French business role | Immediate duty | Common error |
|---|---|---|
| French subsidiary or branch | Map control, custody and group instructions; preserve all potentially relevant records. | Assuming that separate legal personality eliminates every duty to explain group-held evidence. |
| Supplier or logistics provider | Produce its own relevant contracts and transaction data in a controlled format. | Forwarding unrelated customer material or the parent’s confidential strategy without a legal basis. |
| Bank or financial intermediary | Separate FSR-relevant financing records from unrelated customer and AML files. | Treating an investigation as a sanctions designation or freezing an account without a proper basis. |
| French adviser or lawyer | Protect correspondence, establish the client’s instructions and coordinate the confidentiality schedule. | Calling every internal document privileged or sending records before the client resolves the conflict. |
Finally, prepare for the possibility that the Commission uses facts available if the requested information remains incomplete. That outcome can be less favourable than a carefully explained partial production. The company should therefore explain what was searched, which custodians were unavailable, why a category could not be produced, what alternative evidence is offered and when a further answer may be possible. If the Commission adopts a final decision imposing a fine, commitments or redressive measures, the undertaking should assess the EU judicial review route and the time limit from the decision itself. A French commercial court is not a substitute for the General Court’s review of an EU Commission decision.
The case also has a forward-looking transaction lesson. Any business buying or financing a company with material exposure to China should include an evidence-access protocol in its due diligence. Ask where foreign financial contribution records are stored, who controls them, whether local blocking rules exist, which group entities can certify them, and whether the buyer can produce a reliable non-confidential record to the Commission. The question is no longer only whether a subsidy exists. It is whether the transaction can be investigated with evidence that a regulator can lawfully receive and a company can responsibly provide.
Conclusion
The JD.com–CECONOMY dispute is a test of regulatory reach, but its immediate pressure point is documentary cooperation. Brussels is examining a transaction that touches the EU internal market and has the FSR tools to request information from the investigated undertaking and from other relevant businesses. Beijing says that the investigation reaches too far and has instructed Chinese entities not to assist. A French company cannot solve that collision with a slogan about sovereignty, confidentiality or EU primacy.
The defensible response is more precise: preserve first; identify the entity that controls each record; classify trade secrets, privileged correspondence and ordinary business evidence; read the Commission’s legal basis and deadline; disclose relevant material in a controlled and confidential form; and explain every genuine obstacle. French Articles 1 and 1 bis of the 1968 blocking law may create a serious issue for particular documents, but Articles 1, 2 and 3 require a documented analysis and timely escalation. French trade-secret rules protect value without turning every sensitive file into an absolute shield.
For French suppliers, banks, subsidiaries and advisers, the practical deadline is the deadline in the request, not the public 23 October date for the Commission’s provisional decision. A business that receives a China-linked evidence request should obtain the full instrument, stop informal forwarding, preserve the chain of custody and seek a coordinated answer before a missed deadline becomes a separate regulatory problem.