On 1 September 2026, Vanuatu took its decades-old dispute with France over the Matthew and Hunter Islands to the threshold of the International Court of Justice. Reuters reported that the application has been transmitted to Paris, but that the Court has not accepted the dispute as an ordinary contentious case: the step now depends on France’s consent. The Court’s procedural message is decisive. No merits hearing, timetable or provisional-measures debate begins merely because one State has sent an application.
The two volcanic outcrops, known in Vanuatu as Umaenupne and Leka or Umaeneg, lie in the South Pacific between Vanuatu and New Caledonia. Their small size does not make the dispute legally small. Sovereignty over land affects the maritime spaces that may be claimed from it, while an unresolved boundary complicates fishing, scientific research, surveillance and seabed interests. France says the islands are French and linked to New Caledonia; Vanuatu says they belong to Tafea and that decolonisation is incomplete.
This is therefore a jurisdiction story before it is a sovereignty story. The immediate question is not which flag would prevail on the evidence, but whether Vanuatu can make France litigate. The answer under the public procedural record is no: France may choose whether to convert the transmission into a case. That choice does not erase Vanuatu’s claim. It determines whether the claim moves into pleadings, or remains a diplomatic and maritime dispute requiring another route.
I. Can Vanuatu put the Matthew and Hunter Islands before the ICJ without France’s consent?
A. What did Vanuatu actually trigger at The Hague?
The International Court of Justice is not a world tribunal with automatic jurisdiction over every dispute between members of the United Nations. Its contentious jurisdiction rests on State consent. The Court’s own explanation states that “The jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings is based on the consent of the States”. That principle appears in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, especially Article 36, which recognises cases referred by the parties, matters placed before the Court by treaties, and compulsory jurisdiction only where the relevant States have accepted the same obligation.
Vanuatu’s move is best understood through Article 38(5) of the Court’s Rules. That provision allows an applicant State to file an application while proposing to rely on consent that the respondent has not yet given. The official text of the Rules of Court provides, in the relevant passage, that the application “shall not however be entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings” until the respondent consents. This is not a defective filing. It is a recognised procedural invitation. It is also a built-in brake: transmission to France is not registration of a case against France.
The practical consequences are immediate. The Registrar can transmit Vanuatu’s application to the French Government. France can examine the legal grounds, the requested relief and the historical and maritime record. Until France gives the necessary consent, the Court does not move to written pleadings, a jurisdictional hearing or a determination of sovereignty. The public formula reported on 1 September is therefore a status notice, not a ruling on the merits and not a declaration that Vanuatu’s claim is legally baseless.
Article 38(5) also explains why the wording of the application matters. A respondent that later consents may define the scope of its acceptance. France could accept the Court’s jurisdiction for a particular dispute, for a defined set of claims, or through a special agreement negotiated with Vanuatu. It could also refuse. There is no procedural device in this route that turns a refusal into consent. The distinction between a unilateral political announcement and a mutual jurisdictional act will matter more than the headline announcing that the dispute has reached The Hague.
The Court’s French precedents show how this mechanism operates. In Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), the Congo relied on consent yet to be given. France later consented by letter, and the matter entered the General List. The Court records that the consent was what converted the application into a case. In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), France also accepted jurisdiction after an application, but the case illustrates the other half of the rule: consent may be confined to the dispute and claims identified in the application.
Those precedents are particularly relevant because they involve France rather than an abstract respondent. They do not establish that Paris will consent to Vanuatu. They demonstrate that the French Government has previously used the forum prorogatum route when it considered a case legally and diplomatically manageable. They also warn Vanuatu that a later French acceptance could be narrower than the political narrative surrounding the islands. A State may invite the Court to address sovereignty, maritime delimitation, historic title and alleged international wrongs in one sentence; a respondent may accept only a smaller question, or no question at all.
There is another limit. Only States may appear in contentious proceedings. The Court would not be deciding a private claim by island communities, a company or a fishing association. Vanuatu would be the applicant State, and France would be the respondent State. Local communities, New Caledonian institutions and regional organisations could influence the evidence and diplomacy, but they would not replace the required State-to-State consent. This is why the constitutional and political setting in New Caledonia may be highly relevant evidence without itself creating ICJ jurisdiction.
Nor does membership of the United Nations or participation in the law of the sea convention automatically solve the jurisdiction question. Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute includes disputes specially provided for in treaties, but the parties must identify an applicable jurisdictional clause. Article 36(2) concerns optional declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction and operates only in the relationship created by matching declarations, including their reservations. A dispute labelled “territorial” or “maritime” does not bypass that analysis.
The public report does not disclose the full Vanuatu application or every jurisdictional instrument on which it relies. It would be unsafe to predict whether Vanuatu seeks a declaration on sovereignty, a maritime boundary, or both, and whether it invokes a treaty clause in addition to Article 38(5). The safe conclusion is narrower: the Court has transmitted a claim whose next procedural step depends on France. Until Paris consents, Vanuatu has achieved international notice and diplomatic pressure, not a judicially enforceable merits process.
B. Why is a dispute over two rocks also a maritime-boundary case?
France and Vanuatu have not presented the matter as a simple cartographic disagreement. In a French Foreign Ministry account of talks with Vanuatu, France reiterated its sovereignty position over the islands while the two governments continued discussing the wider relationship. Vanuatu’s own maritime-boundaries office describes its objective as securing recognition of Vanuatu sovereignty and a permanent maritime boundary with New Caledonia. The diplomatic record therefore connects the title claim to the unresolved maritime line, even though neither source decides the legal merits.
The French parliamentary record makes the legal stakes unusually clear. In its response to written Question No. 11997, published on 10 February 2026, the Government described the dispute as dating from Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, said it blocks the maritime boundary with New Caledonia, and identified uncertainty affecting fishing and scientific research. The same response says France supports an equidistance-based approach under the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. That official record is useful because it confirms that Paris treats the island title and the maritime boundary as connected, while still insisting that no cession or renunciation of sovereignty was discussed in the exchanges then described.
France is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The French Parliament authorised ratification in Law No. 95-1311 of 21 December 1995, whose sole article authorises ratification of the Convention signed at Montego Bay. The Convention was then published for France by Decree No. 96-774 of 30 August 1996; the decree records that the Convention entered into force for France on 11 May 1996. These instruments do not decide ownership of Matthew or Hunter, but they place the future boundary work inside a treaty framework that both governments must account for.
Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention address delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. Article 74(1) requires delimitation by agreement “in order to achieve an equitable solution”. If agreement is not reached within a reasonable period, Article 74(2) points to the procedures in Part XV. Pending agreement, Article 74(3) requires the parties to make every effort to enter practical provisional arrangements and not to jeopardise or hamper the final agreement. Article 83 uses materially parallel language for the continental shelf. The official United Nations texts of Article 74 and Article 83 are the controlling reference points for that analysis.
The status of each formation can also affect the size and geometry of the maritime claim. Article 121 of the Convention distinguishes an island above water at high tide from a rock unable to sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own. The official text says that such rocks “shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. Whether Matthew and Hunter satisfy the relevant legal tests would require evidence, not an assumption drawn from the description “uninhabited”. Uninhabited does not automatically mean legally insignificant; nor does a State’s assertion that a formation is an island guarantee full effect in a delimitation between coasts.
An eventual tribunal would therefore have to separate several questions. First, which State has title to the land? Second, what historical instruments, administrative acts, maps, displays of authority and local connections bear on that title? Third, if one or both formations generate maritime zones, how should those zones be delimited against Vanuatu’s islands and New Caledonia? Fourth, should the formations receive full, partial or no effect in the boundary line? A sovereignty finding and a delimitation line are related, but they are not the same legal exercise.
The historical record may be contested in precisely the way that makes jurisdictional consent sensitive. Vanuatu’s case is linked to the legacy of the former Anglo-French condominium and to claims of customary and cultural connection. France points to its administration and its treatment of the islands as part of New Caledonia. A merits tribunal would not simply compare two modern maps. It could have to assess colonial-era arrangements, the conduct of the former administering powers, post-independence conduct, public protests, effective administration and the legal relevance of local populations. The current news report is not enough to resolve any of those questions.
The maritime consequences explain the political urgency. A line on a chart controls which State may regulate fisheries, authorise marine scientific research, police activity and claim seabed resources in the relevant maritime space. It can also influence the routes of cables, environmental protection measures and security operations. The French Government’s own answer to Parliament identifies fishing and research uncertainty. That is why a refusal to litigate would not end the practical dispute: it would leave the parties managing overlapping assertions while their diplomats search for a boundary arrangement.
II. What legal and political choices now confront France?
A. Could France be compelled to accept the case or a boundary outcome?
On the present procedural posture, France cannot be compelled to accept Vanuatu’s Article 38(5) invitation. The ICJ’s explanation of contentious jurisdiction is direct: the Court can deal with a dispute only when the States concerned have recognised its jurisdiction. The rule does not give France a veto over international law in general. It gives France control over whether this particular application becomes a contentious case under a consent-not-yet-given procedure.
France has at least three legally different options. It can refuse consent and continue bilateral negotiations. It can consent to the application as framed, accepting that the Court will decide the pleaded dispute. Or it can negotiate a special agreement with Vanuatu that defines the questions, the applicable law, the evidence, the language and the requested relief. A fourth possibility is a consent limited to a preliminary or procedural issue. Each option has a different political price and a different level of litigation risk.
Consent would not mean that France accepts Vanuatu’s title. It would mean that France accepts an adjudicator’s authority to examine the dispute. Paris could still raise objections to jurisdiction, admissibility, the legal character of the dispute, the scope of the application, the relevance of particular evidence and the relief requested. Article 36(6) of the ICJ Statute expressly provides that a jurisdictional dispute is settled by the Court. A jurisdictional objection is therefore part of the litigation, not a way of avoiding litigation altogether.
Nor would a French consent necessarily cover every issue raised in diplomatic statements. The Court’s 2008 judgment in Djibouti v. France is a practical warning. France’s consent in that case was confined to the application and its claims. The Court treated the scope of consent as a question requiring careful reading of the two instruments. Applied here, an acceptance limited to maritime delimitation could leave sovereignty outside the case, while an acceptance of sovereignty alone might not produce a final boundary line.
If France ultimately agreed to a merits case and the Court issued a judgment, the international consequences would be serious. The judgment would bind the parties in that case under the Statute, and the parties would be expected to comply with it. But an ICJ judgment should not be confused with a French constitutional act of cession. The Court would determine the rights and obligations submitted to it under international law; it would not itself amend the French Constitution or mechanically rewrite every domestic register, map or administrative rule.
French constitutional law does, however, frame the Government’s room for manoeuvre. Article 52 of the Constitution provides that “Le Président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités.” Article 53 requires parliamentary authorisation for treaties or agreements involving, among other matters, the cession, exchange or addition of territory, and states: “Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n’est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.” The precise domestic route would depend on the legal instrument chosen and whether it actually effects a territorial transfer. Accepting ICJ jurisdiction is not, by itself, a transfer of Matthew or Hunter.
Article 54 adds a constitutional-review safeguard for an international undertaking containing a clause contrary to the Constitution. It does not require a speculative review of every diplomatic communication. If Paris negotiated a special agreement with binding territorial consequences, the agreement’s text and constitutional implications would need to be examined before ratification or approval. That is a separate question from whether the Foreign Ministry sends a consent letter under the Court’s Rules.
The hierarchy of norms also needs to be stated accurately. Article 55 of the Constitution gives duly ratified or approved treaties, once published, authority above statutes subject to reciprocity. In Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 30 October 1998, Sarran, Levacher et autres, nos. 200286 and 200287, the court stated that “la suprématie ainsi conférée aux engagements internationaux ne s’applique pas, dans l’ordre interne, aux dispositions de nature constitutionnelle”. That is a rule of the French domestic hierarchy. It is not a licence to assume that France can accept an international judgment and later disregard it internationally by invoking internal law.
French administrative law also shows why the treaty record must be documented. In Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 9 July 2010, No. 317747, the court recalled the rule pacta sunt servanda and said that a treaty in force “doit être exécuté par elles de bonne foi”. The decision concerns reciprocity under Article 55, not the Matthew and Hunter dispute. Its relevance is methodological: a French court will identify the international instrument, check its conditions of application and examine the evidence rather than treating a political assertion as a self-executing boundary.
In Conseil d’État, 8 July 2002, No. 239366, the court distinguished the matters it may review when an international commitment is published from questions it cannot decide as a domestic court about the validity or merits of the international commitment itself. The decision is useful here because the eventual French litigation map will not be one single challenge before one single judge. Constitutional authorisation, publication, administrative implementation and international consent raise different questions before different institutions.
Finally, Conseil d’État, 10 November 2021, No. 456139, concerning the constitutional framework for New Caledonia’s self-determination consultations, illustrates the care with which French law treats constitutional arrangements for the territory. The court held that the relevant Nouméa Agreement provisions had constitutional value and examined the statutory consultation timetable. That decision does not rule on Matthew or Hunter. It does show why a future territorial settlement cannot be reduced to a technical maritime chart: New Caledonia’s constitutional status and the participation of interested populations may become part of the domestic legal architecture of any settlement.
Accordingly, France’s strongest immediate legal position is not simply “the islands are French”. It is that Vanuatu has not yet established a forum in which France must litigate, while France retains the ability to choose a negotiated, adjudicative or mixed path. Its strongest long-term position would require preserving the evidentiary record, maintaining a coherent maritime policy and ensuring that any consent or agreement is drafted with the constitutional consequences in view.
B. What would an ICJ refusal mean for fishing, research and maritime security?
A French refusal under Article 38(5) would stop this particular ICJ proceeding, but it would not settle the title question or remove the practical need to manage the waters. The parties would still have the diplomatic record, the UNCLOS framework and their competing positions. Vanuatu could seek a different procedure if a valid treaty basis exists, propose arbitration or conciliation, or return to a negotiated package. France could propose a boundary arrangement without submitting sovereignty to a judgment, although the legal and political value of such a package would depend on its terms.
The law of the sea is designed to keep an unresolved boundary from becoming a licence for unilateral escalation. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) call for practical provisional arrangements and require the parties not to jeopardise or hamper the final agreement. That language is not a final answer on title. It is a conduct rule for the interim. A responsible interim arrangement could address fishing licences, scientific permits, environmental monitoring, emergency response, notification of naval or coastguard activity and the treatment of new installations without prejudicing either State’s claim.
The alternative-procedure analysis is more technical than the phrase “take the case to arbitration” suggests. Article 287 of UNCLOS concerns choices of procedure; Part XV contains both non-binding means and binding procedures. Article 298 allows a State to exclude certain categories from binding procedures, including disputes concerning sea-boundary delimitation under Articles 15, 74 and 83, and disputes involving historic bays or titles. It also recognises a conciliation route in defined circumstances. Article 298 expressly addresses disputes that necessarily involve an unsettled dispute over sovereignty or other rights in insular territory. The official UNCLOS Part XV text must therefore be read with the parties’ actual declarations and with the precise legal character of Vanuatu’s claim.
That qualification matters. A tribunal empowered to interpret and apply UNCLOS may not automatically have authority to decide a stand-alone question of sovereignty over land. Conversely, a maritime-boundary claim may require a tribunal to consider title as an incidental issue without awarding the land itself. The jurisdictional instrument, the pleadings and the requested relief will determine the difference. Public reporting on 1 September is not enough to say that Vanuatu has secured an alternative forum, or that France has blocked every international legal route.
If a case eventually proceeds, the evidence will likely be more operational than rhetorical. Vanuatu would be expected to assemble historical and colonial instruments, maps, administrative communications, protests, displays of authority, traditional and community evidence, and the conduct of France and Vanuatu after independence. France would need to preserve the 1965 arrangements it invokes, its administrative and meteorological presence, official maps, public notices, maritime deposits, patrol records and its communications with Vanuatu and the United Nations. Neither side can safely rely on a single ceremony, flag-raising or press statement as the entire title case.
The United Nations record already shows why maritime deposits must be handled carefully. France has stated in the UN law-of-the-sea materials that it exercises full sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter and regards them as part of New Caledonia; Vanuatu has made its own claims. A deposit of coordinates or a maritime-zone notification may evidence a State’s position, but it does not by itself adjudicate title against the other State. The distinction between a unilateral claim, a legally effective agreement and a judicial determination is central for anyone operating in the area.
For fishers and research operators, the immediate risk is not only arrest or confiscation. It is the uncertainty created by relying on the wrong authority, an outdated chart or an uncoordinated permit. Operators should verify which State issued the authorisation, preserve the applicable coordinates and conditions, identify the notification channel for the other administration and avoid conduct that could be presented as a deliberate challenge to sovereignty. Environmental or scientific work should carry a clear non-prejudice clause where possible. The goal is to avoid turning a private operation into evidence in the State dispute.
For businesses financing marine activity, the dispute creates a documentary risk. Insurance, lending and project contracts should identify the assumed maritime authority, allocate the consequences of a permit being contested and address interruption caused by diplomatic or security measures. A contract cannot decide sovereignty between France and Vanuatu, but it can determine who bears the cost when a project is delayed, a vessel is diverted or a research authorisation is challenged. Companies should also distinguish French domestic authorisation from international acceptance of the boundary line.
The security dimension is equally real. The islands are remote, but their position affects surveillance and maritime presence between Vanuatu and New Caledonia. Unannounced patrols, scientific missions or resource surveys can generate incidents even where neither State intends to create a new claim. A provisional arrangement should therefore address prior notice, safety at sea, liaison contacts and the treatment of enforcement actions. Those measures would not concede sovereignty. Properly drafted, they would reduce the chance that a small territorial dispute becomes a wider bilateral crisis.
France’s domestic law reinforces the need for institutional discipline. Article 52 places treaty negotiation and ratification in the constitutional hands of the President, while Article 53 reserves parliamentary authorisation for specified agreements and imposes a special rule for territorial cession, exchange or addition. Article 55 governs the domestic authority of published treaties. The decision whether to consent to the ICJ, negotiate a special agreement or conclude a territorial settlement should be documented as the legally distinct decision it is.
There is also a communications duty. France should state whether it rejects jurisdiction, accepts it in principle, proposes a special agreement, or supports another peaceful procedure. Vanuatu should identify whether its international move seeks a binding judgment, a boundary process, a declaration of legal principle or leverage for negotiation. Ambiguity may create news momentum, but it increases the chance that fishermen, investors and local communities misunderstand what has actually changed. The public should not be told that the ICJ has “taken” the islands, because it has not.
The most likely near-term outcome is therefore procedural and diplomatic rather than judicial. The application puts pressure on Paris after bilateral talks failed to close the gap. France must decide whether the value of an authoritative ruling outweighs the risk of litigating a sovereignty record that could affect its wider Pacific position. Vanuatu must decide whether an Article 38(5) invitation, a UNCLOS procedure, conciliation or renewed negotiation offers the best route to a result. Every option remains open, but none produces an automatic change of flag today.
Conclusion
Vanuatu has moved the Matthew and Hunter dispute into the ICJ’s diplomatic orbit, not yet into a contested case. Article 38(5) of the Rules means that the application can be sent to France while remaining outside the General List until France consents. That is the central answer to the headline question: Paris cannot be forced to litigate through this consent-not-yet-given route.
The legal stakes remain substantial. The dispute combines sovereignty, the status of insular formations, maritime delimitation, fisheries, research and New Caledonia’s constitutional environment. France’s refusal would end this particular ICJ path, not the underlying dispute. Consent, a special agreement, a UNCLOS procedure or a practical interim arrangement could still follow. Until then, operators and public authorities should treat the waters as legally contested, preserve their documents and avoid confusing a political claim, a treaty-based process and a judicial ruling.
This analysis reflects the public procedural and legal materials available on 1 September 2026. It does not determine title to either island or replace advice on a specific permit, vessel, investment or diplomatic filing.