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Venezuela’s U.S. Oil Deal: Can French Investors Still Rely on the France–Venezuela Investment Treaty?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Venezuela’s U.S. Oil Deal: Can French Investors Still Rely on the France–Venezuela Investment Treaty?

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The legal question behind the dramatic oil announcement is not simply who controls the next barrel. On 28 August 2026, Donald Trump said that the United States had secured majority control of more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven reserves. Caracas described an “historic agreement” involving 17 strategic fields, more than $100 billion in investment and more than $209 billion in tax revenue. Public reporting also refers to a new private joint venture, a possible 55% share of effective production and concessions lasting a century. The published details remain incomplete, and the legality of the concessions has not been formally established. Le Monde’s account of the announcement records both the scale of the claims and the continuing uncertainty around the legal instruments.

That uncertainty matters for a French company, fund or industrial partner considering a Venezuelan oil participation. France and Venezuela have a bilateral investment treaty, published by Decree No. 2004-380 of 23 April 2004. It protects qualifying investments, including interests in natural-resource concessions, but it does not turn a press statement into an enforceable title, remove sanctions risk or guarantee that an arbitral award can be collected. The treaty must be read alongside French contract law, EU restrictive measures, U.S. licensing conditions and the rules governing State immunity.

The answer is therefore conditional. A French investor may have a serious treaty position if it owns or controls a qualifying Venezuelan investment and a Venezuelan measure substantially deprives that investment of its value. The position is much weaker for a contractor with only an unpaid invoice, an unawarded project or a claim against Washington rather than Caracas. The decisive work is to identify the protected asset, the State measure, the correct respondent, the forum and the assets against which any eventual award could be enforced.

I. What protection does the France–Venezuela treaty actually give a French investor?

A. Does a French oil stake qualify as a protected investment?

The first question is classification, not compensation. Article 1 of the treaty uses a broad, asset-based definition of investment. It covers property, rights and interests of every kind. The list includes shares and other forms of participation, “même minoritaires ou indirectes”, meaning that a minority or indirect interest is not excluded merely because the French investor does not hold the operating company directly. It also covers claims with economic value, intellectual-property rights, know-how and concessions granted by law or contract.

For the oil project, the most important treaty language is the reference to “les concessions accordées par la loi ou en vertu d’un contrat”, including concessions for prospecting, extracting or exploiting natural resources. That wording is potentially relevant to an oil field, a production-sharing entitlement, a participation in a concessionaire, an infrastructure right attached to extraction, or a contractual right to receive production or revenues. It does not mean that every commercial relationship connected with oil is automatically an investment. A one-off sale of equipment, a short consultancy engagement or a contingent bid may remain an ordinary commercial transaction unless the facts demonstrate an asset, duration, contribution and economic exposure protected by the treaty.

Article 1 also requires the assets to be, or to have been, invested in accordance with the law of the State where the investment is made. A French investor therefore needs evidence of the Venezuelan legal basis for the concession, licence, joint venture, equity issue, financing or transfer. A political announcement by the United States, an interim Venezuelan authority or a State-owned company does not prove that the relevant concession was lawfully granted. The French law authorising approval of the treaty and the published treaty text must be read with the Venezuelan hydrocarbons legislation and the specific project instruments.

Nationality and corporate structure are equally important. The treaty defines a French “company” as a legal person constituted in France in accordance with French law, or a legal person effectively controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of a contracting party or by companies satisfying the treaty’s territorial and legal criteria. That language may assist a French group investing through a holding company. It does not eliminate disputes about control, timing, corporate nationality, restructuring and abuse of rights. A claimant should map the chain from the French parent to the Venezuelan asset, identify every intermediate entity, record the ownership percentages and preserve corporate documents as they existed before any threatened State measure.

A French investor should also distinguish four possible assets:

  • an equity participation in a Venezuelan company holding an oil concession;
  • a concession or licence held directly by a French company;
  • a long-term contractual right to production, revenues, repayment or dividends; and
  • physical assets, technology, intellectual property or infrastructure deployed in Venezuela.

Each asset presents a different jurisdictional and valuation question. The treaty protects investment income as well as the investment itself. That is useful where an investor can prove a protected right to dividends, royalties or proceeds, but it does not transform anticipated future profits into a vested right. The investor must show the legal source of the entitlement, the conditions attached to it and the extent to which the challenged measure affected it.

The temporal question is unusually important because the treaty was signed in 2001 and entered into force on 15 April 2004. Article 12 says that the agreement remains in force after its initial term unless either party denounces it through diplomatic channels with one year’s notice. The official treaty text states that investments made while the agreement was in force continue to benefit from its protection for an additional 15 years after the agreement’s expiry. A current UNCTAD treaty record lists the France–Venezuela BIT as in force. At the same time, the France Diplomatie country page describes the agreement by reference to 2019 and warns that Venezuela’s withdrawal from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID, raises dispute-resolution questions. That apparent difference in presentation is a reason to verify the treaty’s termination and notice history before signing, not a reason to assume that the protection has disappeared.

The practical test is documentary. Before committing capital, the French investor should obtain the signed concession, its amendments, the governmental approvals, proof of capital contribution, bank records, board resolutions, beneficial-ownership files, environmental and operating authorisations, and any correspondence in which Venezuela recognises the investor’s rights. The file should show what existed before the 28 August announcement and what changed afterwards. It should also separate the investment from the political narrative: “American control” is a description of a reported commercial and political arrangement, not a finding that a French investor’s treaty-protected asset has already been taken.

B. Does nationalization or regulatory rupture trigger compensation?

Article 3 of the treaty requires each State to give a fair and equitable treatment to the other State’s investments and to ensure that the exercise of the recognised right is not hindered “ni en droit ni en fait”, in law or in fact. It also promises full protection and security. Article 4 adds national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment for investment and related activities, subject to an express exclusion for tax questions and to the treaty’s limitation concerning free-trade areas, customs unions and common markets.

Article 5 is the core protection against expropriation. Venezuela may not take measures of expropriation, nationalisation or equivalent effect that directly or indirectly deprive a French investor of its investment unless the measure serves a public purpose, is non-discriminatory and is not contrary to a specific undertaking. If expropriation occurs, the treaty requires “prompte et adéquate” compensation. The amount is to equal the real value of the investment, assessed by reference to the normal economic situation before the threat of expropriation became publicly known. The compensation must be effectively realisable, paid without delay, freely transferable and interest-bearing until payment.

That text creates a possible route for a French investor whose existing concession, shares or contractual production right is cancelled, transferred or rendered economically useless by a Venezuelan measure. It does not create a claim merely because the investor dislikes a new American majority, a lower valuation or a change in the political direction of the oil sector. The claimant must establish a substantial deprivation, a protected asset and conduct attributable to Venezuela. A measure taken solely by the United States would raise a different claim against a different State and would not automatically engage the France–Venezuela treaty.

The distinction between direct and indirect expropriation is central. Direct expropriation is the clearest case: title to a concession, shares or equipment is formally taken. Indirect expropriation is more fact-sensitive. The State may leave the title on paper while removing control, access, production, revenues or the economic use of the investment. Courts and tribunals usually examine the intensity and duration of the deprivation, the investor’s reasonable expectations, the character of the measure, its economic impact and whether the State was exercising a non-discriminatory regulatory power for a legitimate public purpose. The treaty’s wording is broad, but a claimant still has to prove the facts rather than rely on the label “nationalisation”.

The reported 100-year concessions and proposed joint venture raise several scenarios. If Venezuelan authorities lawfully invite a new operator into undeveloped fields while leaving a French company’s existing concession intact, there may be no expropriation of the French investment. If an old concession is terminated and its production, infrastructure or revenues are transferred to the new vehicle without compensation, the analysis changes. If a French company has only negotiated a future entry and has not committed capital or acquired an enforceable right, the treaty claim may fail at the investment or causation stage. If an existing joint venture is diluted through a State-mandated transfer, the valuation must address both the legal interest and the counterfactual value that would have existed without the measure.

The treaty’s protection against loss in war, revolution, national emergency or revolt also matters. Article 5(2) requires treatment no less favourable than that given to Venezuelan nationals or the most-favoured nation where investments suffer losses from those events. This is not a promise that Venezuela will reimburse every wartime loss. It is a comparative-treatment obligation. Evidence of how Venezuelan and third-country investors were treated may therefore be as important as evidence of the French investor’s own loss.

French contract law supplies a second, separate layer. Article 1103 of the French Civil Code states, “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.” A valid concession or joint-venture agreement binds its parties according to its terms. Article 1104 of the French Civil Code adds, “Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi.” These provisions may assist in a contractual dispute, but they do not by themselves establish a treaty breach, override Venezuelan public law, or prevent a State from invoking a treaty defence.

Two contract doctrines are often misused in a sanctions-driven energy dispute. Article 1195 of the French Civil Code begins, “Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat”, and permits a party facing excessive hardship to seek renegotiation when it did not accept the risk. Article 1218 of the French Civil Code defines contractual force majeure by reference to an event outside the debtor’s control that could not reasonably have been foreseen and whose effects cannot be avoided by appropriate measures. Neither provision automatically excuses performance because Washington changes a licence or because Caracas changes an operator. The contract’s governing law, risk allocation, sanctions clauses, notice provisions, adaptation mechanism and dispute clause must be read first.

The compensation analysis must also exclude double recovery. A French claimant cannot necessarily recover the same economic loss through a treaty arbitration, a contractual arbitration, an insurance claim and a guarantee scheme. Article 9 of the treaty recognises subrogation where a contracting party or its emanation pays an investor under a non-commercial-risk guarantee or insurance contract. The insurer or guarantor may acquire the relevant rights, while the investor’s ability to pursue proceedings is preserved subject to the treaty wording. The project file should therefore identify every insurer, export-credit agency, lender and guarantor before a notice of dispute is sent.

II. Can a French investor turn the treaty into a real remedy after the U.S. deal?

A. Which dispute forum and French procedural route are available?

Article 8 contains the treaty’s investor–State mechanism. A dispute about Venezuela’s obligation concerning an investment under the agreement must first be addressed amicably. If it has not been resolved within six months from the time it was raised by either party, the French national or company may submit it either to the competent court of the State where the investment was made or to ICSID. The treaty says, “Cette option relève du choix du national ou de la société intéressé.” Once arbitration is chosen, the option becomes definitive. The tribunal decides whether Venezuela complied with the treaty and, if not, fixes compensation. The award is final and binding between the parties to the dispute.

The six-month period is not a procedural ornament. A claimant should issue a carefully drafted notice identifying the investor, the investment, the Venezuelan measures, the treaty provisions, the dates, the loss and the relief sought. A vague political complaint may not start the cooling-off period cleanly. The notice should also reserve treaty, contractual and domestic remedies without making an irreversible forum election accidentally. Corporate authority, service, translation and proof of receipt should be recorded.

The CIRDI reference creates a genuine complication. France Diplomatie records that Venezuela withdrew from ICSID in January 2012. That fact does not answer every jurisdictional question. The tribunal would need to examine the treaty consent, the Convention, the date and nationality of the investment, the date of the dispute, the effect of the withdrawal and any objection raised by Venezuela. A French investor considering a post-2012 project should not assume that the treaty’s reference to ICSID guarantees a new ICSID registration. It should obtain a current jurisdictional opinion before treating Article 8 as a reliable arbitration route.

The alternative is the competent Venezuelan court. That route may be commercially unattractive or operationally difficult, but it remains textually important. A claimant that chooses domestic proceedings may face local procedural rules, evidence restrictions, limitation rules, public-law defences and enforcement obstacles. The election-of-remedies wording must be examined before filing. A domestic action about a concession and a treaty arbitration about the same measure may not coexist freely if the treaty treats the choice as definitive.

The treaty is also distinct from the project contract. The contract may provide for arbitration seated in Paris, London, Singapore or another forum. A concession may contain a stabilisation clause, an arbitration agreement, a waiver of jurisdictional immunity or a law clause. A treaty claim asks whether Venezuela breached an international obligation owed to a protected investor. A contract claim asks whether a contractual party failed to perform. The same event may generate both claims, but the parties, causes of action, evidence and remedies are not identical. A French subcontractor may have a strong payment claim but no standing as an investor; a shareholder may have a treaty claim but no direct claim for every debt owed to the operating company.

The OFAC position illustrates the need to keep forum questions separate. In FAQ 1267, updated on 27 August 2026, OFAC says that certain Venezuela general licences no longer require a U.S. choice-of-law clause in contracts with the Venezuelan government or specified blocked persons. The same guidance says that those licences still require dispute-resolution proceedings to occur in the United States, United Kingdom, France or Singapore. That is a U.S. licensing condition. It is not an amendment to Article 8 of the France–Venezuela treaty, does not decide whether a French investor has standing, and does not waive Venezuela’s immunity from jurisdiction or execution.

Paris may still matter in two different ways. It can be the place of a contractual arbitration if the parties validly choose it, and it can be an enforcement jurisdiction if the award or judgment satisfies French procedural requirements and attachable assets are found. Those are separate questions. A Paris seat does not automatically make a Venezuelan State entity subject to every French court, and a French enforcement application does not make every Venezuelan asset seizable.

The French Supreme Court’s case law shows why an award is not the same as payment. In First Civil Chamber, 28 March 2013, No. 11-10.450, the Court held that a State’s waiver of execution immunity must be “de manière expresse et spéciale”, expressly and specifically, identifying the property or category of property concerned. The decision concerned Argentina, not Venezuela, but its principle is directly relevant to drafting a concession, financing agreement or settlement. A general arbitration clause is not necessarily a specific waiver of immunity from enforcement.

The distinction is even sharper for central-bank or monetary-authority assets. In Second Civil Chamber, 11 January 2018, No. 16-10.661, the Court examined Article L. 153-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code and held that enforcement against protected central-bank assets requires an enforceable title, judicial authorisation and proof that the relevant assets belong to a patrimony allocated to a principally private activity. The case involved the Central Bank of Iraq and is not a ruling on Venezuelan oil revenue. Its procedural lesson remains practical: identify assets, their owner, their use and the immunity applicable to each asset before investing in an award strategy.

The enforcement file should distinguish Venezuela itself, Petróleos de Venezuela, a project company, a foreign joint venture and a central bank. Separate legal personality, State ownership, control, commercial use and the text of any waiver all matter. A claimant may win on liability and still face years of litigation over whether a bank account, cargo, receivable, shareholding or commercial property can be attached. Early asset mapping is therefore part of legal risk assessment, not an afterthought.

B. What should a French investor document before signing or challenging the project?

The first checklist is sanctions compliance. The French Treasury’s Venezuela sanctions page identifies asset freezes, sectoral and military embargoes, and an embargo on equipment for internal repression. It explains that the EU Venezuela regime applies in EU territory, to EU nationals, to entities established under Member State law and to economic activity carried out in the Union. It also states that an asset freeze carries a prohibition on making funds and economic resources available to designated persons. The EU Regulation 2017/2063 framework must be checked in its current form, together with later amendments and any applicable national measures.

For a French group, the analysis is not limited to the Venezuelan counterparty. Article L. 562-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code identifies persons who must apply measures “sans délai”, without delay, including French legal persons conducting activities abroad. Article L. 562-5 prohibits those persons from “mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement” funds or economic resources for persons whose assets are frozen. Article L. 562-6 prohibits a person from “participer, sciemment et volontairement” in activities intended to circumvent the measures. A French investor should screen the State, State-owned companies, directors, beneficial owners, banks, insurers, shipping providers, traders and every entity in the payment chain.

An OFAC general licence is not a French or EU safe harbour. It may authorise specified transactions for U.S. persons or transactions with a U.S. nexus, subject to detailed conditions. It does not remove an EU listing, authorise a French bank to release frozen funds, or validate a Venezuelan concession under Venezuelan law. Conversely, the absence of a U.S. choice-of-law requirement under a specified general licence does not prevent the parties from choosing French law if the clause is valid and operational. Governing law, sanctions permission, forum and enforceability must be documented as four separate decisions.

The second checklist is transaction architecture. The project should identify who owns the concession, who operates each field, who receives production, which entity signs with Venezuela, where revenues are paid, which currency is used, which bank processes the payment and whether a French entity holds the protected interest directly or through a chain. The French investor should resist a structure in which it supplies capital and technology but receives only an unsecured promise from an entity with no assets, no treaty nationality and no enforceable waiver.

The third checklist is treaty eligibility. Preserve proof of French nationality or incorporation, control of the investment, the date of each contribution, the Venezuelan approval, the economic value invested and compliance with local law. Record any restructuring before a dispute arises. A last-minute insertion of a French holding company may generate an objection that the structure was created only to manufacture treaty jurisdiction. The treaty’s broad language on indirect participation is valuable, but it is not an invitation to ignore timing and substance.

The fourth checklist is change-of-law protection. A French-law contract should state which legal changes trigger renegotiation, suspension, termination or compensation. Article 1195 of the Civil Code may be relevant to hardship, while Article 1218 may be relevant to force majeure, but neither should be treated as a universal sanctions clause. The agreement should address licences, blocked payments, currency controls, export restrictions, refusal by a compliance bank, loss of access to personnel, changes in concession law and orders from more than one State. It should require prompt notice, mitigation, information-sharing and preservation of evidence.

The fifth checklist is valuation. If Venezuela later replaces an operator or cancels a concession, the investor must prove the value immediately before the threat became public, not simply present an optimistic long-term production forecast. The treaty’s Article 5 wording points to real value and a pre-threat economic baseline. A defensible valuation should separate sunk capital, book value, replacement cost, discounted cash flow, reserves, production rights, debt, taxes, sanctions-related interruption and the probability of renewal. It should also avoid double counting the value of the same right at company, shareholder and lender levels.

The sixth checklist is evidence preservation. Save the public announcement, the underlying concession versions, board minutes, government letters, licence applications, compliance advice, bank refusals, payment messages, production data, inspection reports, satellite or logistical records, and all notices affecting access or control. Use a reliable time-stamping process. Keep the English, French and Spanish versions of the instruments and identify which language prevails. A cross-border dispute can turn on a single amendment, a translated definition of “control” or a notice sent to the wrong entity.

The seventh checklist is the French regulatory perimeter. Article L. 151-3 of the French Monetary and Financial Code concerns prior authorisation for certain foreign investments in an activity in France; it begins, “Sont soumis à autorisation préalable du ministre chargé de l’économie les investissements étrangers dans une activité en France”. That is not a general approval requirement for a French company investing in Venezuela. It becomes relevant if the structure includes a foreign acquisition or control of a sensitive French activity. The distinction prevents an investor from applying the wrong French filing analysis to an outbound Venezuelan project.

Finally, the investor should decide what outcome it actually wants. If the project is viable, the priority may be a stronger concession, an escrow arrangement, a payment waterfall, a compliance representation and a specific immunity waiver. If the investment has already been deprived, the priority may be a standstill, evidence preservation, emergency relief, a treaty notice and an asset investigation. If the problem is an unpaid invoice, a contractual claim may be faster than an investment arbitration. If the project is blocked by a designation, the immediate issue may be a licence, a delisting request or a French Treasury clarification rather than compensation.

The existing French compliance analysis of the announced Venezuela oil project addresses the wider authority, sanctions, contracting and investment-risk picture. The treaty question is narrower and complementary: whether a particular French investment has a protected legal status, whether a Venezuelan measure has crossed the expropriation threshold, and whether the selected forum can deliver a remedy that can ultimately be enforced.

Conclusion

French investors can still have a credible legal shield in the Venezuela oil story, but the shield is neither automatic nor political. The France–Venezuela treaty remains potentially valuable because it covers direct and indirect participations, natural-resource concessions, fair and equitable treatment, full protection, national treatment, free transfers and compensation for qualifying expropriation. Article 12’s continuation language and current treaty-status data support a careful “yes” to the question whether the treaty can still matter. The uncertainty identified by France Diplomatie about Venezuela’s ICSID withdrawal means that forum advice must come before capital deployment or a notice of dispute.

The reported U.S. arrangement does not itself prove that a French investor has been expropriated. The investor must show a protected asset, a Venezuelan measure, substantial deprivation, causation and loss. It must then separate treaty liability from contract performance, U.S. licensing from French and EU sanctions, an arbitral award from recovery, and a waiver of jurisdiction from a waiver of execution immunity. Those distinctions will determine whether the headline becomes a viable claim or merely a costly political risk.

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