Eurojust’s 31 August 2026 press release gives a new cross-border criminal case an unusually concrete evidential dimension. Romanian authorities searched 16 premises on 24 August, arrested seven suspected members of a network that moved drugs from Spain through Europe, and reported four intercepted shipments valued at approximately EUR 25 million. The release also says that Romanian authorities worked with their French counterparts through Eurojust to obtain messages from the encrypted SkyECC service that “can now be used in subsequent legal proceedings”. That sentence is the legal flashpoint. It does not identify the European Investigation Order, the domestic authorisation, the technical collection method, the forensic export, the translation protocol or the file in which each message will be relied upon. It says that the material is available for proceedings; it does not say that attribution, authenticity, integrity, relevance or fair-trial compliance has already been established. French prosecutors at the Paris national prosecution office for organised crime and at the Perpignan public prosecution office will therefore have to build a bridge between a Romanian operation, French judicial cooperation and an individual defendant. This analysis explains how that bridge can be documented, which French and European rules may govern it, and how a defence can test a SkyECC record before it becomes the decisive narrative in a drug-trafficking or criminal-association case.
I. Why can SkyECC messages now enter a French-led cross-border case?
A. What did the Eurojust operation actually establish?
The starting point is the public record, and the public record is narrower than the headlines that an arrest operation can generate. The Eurojust press release of 31 August 2026 reports judicial cooperation during an investigation into a network that allegedly provided transport services to other criminal groups. It records the operational result: 114 kilograms of cocaine, 228 kilograms of cannabis and 1,300 kilograms of hashish were intercepted across four shipments, with an estimated market value of EUR 25 million. It identifies Romanian, French, German, Italian and Spanish authorities, and names the Public Prosecution Office Perpignan and the Paris national prosecution office for organised crime among the French participants.
Eurojust describes the network as a “crime as a service” structure. It says that the group had operated since September 2023, used trucks with hidden compartments, created legal companies as fronts and tried to keep links to its leaders out of criminal case files when drivers were arrested. Those facts, if later proved in a particular case, may support several lines of investigation: the underlying drug offences, participation in a structured enterprise, the financial route of the profits and the role of an individual who supplied transport, storage, money or communications. They do not, without more, prove that every person whose identifier appears in a SkyECC extraction participated in every shipment.
The evidence paragraph is equally precise and equally limited. Eurojust says that Romanian authorities worked with French counterparts through the agency “to obtain the messages that can now be used in subsequent legal proceedings”. It does not say that the messages were intercepted during the 24 August searches. It does not say whether the messages were already in the possession of French authorities, whether the relevant data were supplied from a French investigation, whether Romania executed a request for evidence, whether the cooperation took place through a joint investigation team, or whether another mutual-assistance instrument was used. It does not publish the identity of the user accounts, the time window, the data fields, the forensic hash, or the chain by which a message travelled from the source system into a French file.
That distinction protects both the prosecution and the defence from a false shortcut. A press release can establish a reliable news fact: Eurojust says encrypted SkyECC messages were obtained through cooperation involving French authorities and are intended for later proceedings. It cannot establish the evidential facts that a trial court must decide: that a particular accused controlled a particular device, that a particular message was complete and unaltered, that a translation captures its meaning, that the message concerns the charged shipment, or that the acquisition and disclosure rules were respected. The public statement is a trigger for legal work, not a substitute for the judicial record.
The likely offences explain why the French organised-crime framework matters. Article 222-37 of the French Criminal Code punishes the unlawful transport, possession, offering, transfer, acquisition or use of narcotics with ten years’ imprisonment and a EUR 7.5 million fine. In an international logistics network, the prosecution may also examine Article 450-1 of the Criminal Code, which defines criminal association by reference to a group or agreement formed to prepare, through material acts, a crime or an offence carrying at least five years’ imprisonment. The procedural consequences are important: Article 706-73 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly includes drug-trafficking crimes and offences under Articles 222-34 to 222-40 within the organised-crime regime. None of these provisions converts a communication into proof of participation. They define the legal frame in which the communication must be assessed.
French jurisdiction also cannot be assumed from the word “international”. In the Criminal Chamber’s judgment of 12 April 2022, no. 22-80.632, concerning the Sky ECC investigation, the Court examined a concrete French nexus: servers hosted in France, French resellers, French users, conduct identified in France and financial conversions in France. The decision records the reasoning that foreign facts may be indivisible from French facts where les faits commis à l’étranger sont indivisibles de ceux commis en France
, meaning that the foreign conduct cannot be understood separately from conduct on French territory. The lesson for the new operation is evidential specificity. Prosecutors should identify the French act, person, server, shipment, financial movement or investigative measure that connects the foreign conduct to the French proceedings. A generic reference to SkyECC’s worldwide use is not a jurisdictional pleading.
The distinction from existing coverage is also material. The firm has already addressed the broader regulatory shift around cross-border cloud evidence and EU e-Evidence; that background remains useful, but it is not this story. The present operation supplies a different entry point: a named current investigation, a precise multinational action day, French prosecutorial participation and encrypted messages that investigators say are ready for later cases. The legal question is not whether encrypted evidence exists in the abstract. It is what a French prosecutor must show before this particular evidence can carry an accusation.
B. Which French legal channel brings Romanian-acquired data before a French court?
The first document to request is the cooperation instrument itself. France and Romania are both European Union Member States. Unless a special provision applies, Article 694-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that criminal judicial-assistance requests between France and other EU Member States use European Investigation Orders. The statutory wording is direct: les demandes d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale entre la France et les autres Etats membres de l’Union européenne se font par l’intermédiaire des décisions d’enquête européenne
. This does not prove that the Eurojust operation used an EIO. It tells counsel where to look first and prevents the file from being described with the wrong legal label.
Article 694-16 defines a European Investigation Order as a judicial decision by the issuing State asking the executing State to conduct investigations or communicate evidence already in its possession. That second category is central to encrypted-platform cases. The receiving authority may not be asked to break the encryption again; it may be asked to transmit a dataset already held by a competent authority. The difference affects which act must be examined. A transmission order is not automatically the same thing as the original capture, infiltration, decryption or selection operation that produced the data.
French law imposes a necessity and proportionality discipline on an EIO issued by French authorities. Under Article 694-20, the issuing authority may act when the order is necessary for establishing, prosecuting or judging an offence, or enforcing a sentence, and is proportionate in light of the rights of the suspect, accused or convicted person. In practical terms, a request for a complete platform export deserves a more exact explanation than a request for a defined account, period, participant group and evidential purpose. The greater the breadth of the data, the more important the explanation becomes.
The form of the request is not administrative decoration. Article 694-21 requires a signed and certified form containing, among other matters, the issuing authority, the object and reasons, information about the persons concerned, the offence and applicable criminal provisions, the requested investigative measures and the evidence to be obtained. The statute expressly requires une description de la ou des mesures d’enquête demandées et des preuves à obtenir
. A defence request should therefore seek the complete EIO and not only a cover letter from Eurojust. It should identify whether the file contains the original form, a supplemental EIO, an execution certificate, a response from the executing authority and a schedule of the records transmitted.
Transmission must also leave an audit trail. Article 694-23 requires direct transmission by a means that leaves a written trace and establishes authenticity. The relevant record may include encrypted transfer logs, receipt confirmations, sealed media, a forensic export, a hash or a certificate from the executing authority. The point is not to demand a technologically fashionable document in every case. The point is to know which document proves that the exhibit in a French file is the same exhibit that the executing authority transmitted.
If the measure was executed in another Member State and later challenged there, Article 694-24 sets a specific consequence: a successful challenge abroad does not by itself nullify the evidence sent to France, but the material cannot be the sole foundation of a conviction. The article also states that a delay in executing an EIO does not itself create a nullity. That is not a licence to ignore a foreign ruling. It means that the French court must ask how the challenge affects reliability, fairness, corroboration and the ability to use the material, rather than applying an automatic all-or-nothing formula.
The European framework is illuminated by the Grand Chamber judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-670/22, M.N. (EncroChat), delivered on 30 April 2024. The case concerned German proceedings, data collected in France and European Investigation Orders for transmission. The Court held that an EIO for evidence already in the executing State’s possession need not necessarily be issued by a judge if a public prosecutor is competent to order transmission in a purely domestic case. It also held that the EIO must satisfy the issuing State’s own conditions for transmission, while the issuing authority does not re-run every substantive condition governing the original gathering in the executing State.
That does not make a SkyECC transfer self-proving. The Court expressly preserved subsequent judicial review of fundamental rights. Its operative rule is particularly important for a high-volume encrypted dataset: national criminal courts are required to disregard information and evidence if that person is not in a position to comment effectively
and the material is likely to have a preponderant influence on the findings of fact. The French file must therefore disclose enough of the route, selection and technical history for the accused to comment effectively. If Eurojust coordinated the cooperation but did not issue the judicial act, the file must say who did, under which instrument and for which evidence.
Four questions should be answered before the messages are described as “French evidence”. Was the evidence collected or merely transmitted in France? Was the relevant act carried out by a French judge, prosecutor, police service, Romanian authority or a joint team? Was the data already in the possession of a competent authority when the request was made? And which court or authority can hear a challenge to the original collection and the later transmission? The answers determine whether the controlling provisions are the EIO chapter, a bilateral or multilateral assistance instrument, joint-investigation rules, domestic French capture provisions, or a combination of them.
II. How can the defence test authenticity, integrity and fairness?
A. What must prosecutors prove about the message and its chain of custody?
French criminal procedure does not demand one universal technology certificate for every electronic record. It demands a reasoned assessment of the evidence that reaches the debate. Article 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that, outside statutory exceptions, offences may be established by any mode of proof and that the judge decides according to intimate conviction. The same article limits the decision to evidence brought during the hearing and discussed contradictorily. The operative balance can be captured in the short statutory phrase les infractions peuvent être établies par tout mode de preuve
: broad admissibility does not remove the requirement of an adversarial discussion.
For a SkyECC exhibit, “authenticity” has several layers. The first is account attribution. An identifier, nickname or device number is not automatically a person. Prosecutors may rely on a combination of subscriber or reseller records, device configuration, geolocation, travel, financial movements, photographs, contacts, language, references to private events and corroborating witness evidence. The stronger the independent links, the less the case depends on an inference from the content of the messages themselves. The fact that users employed anonymous or pseudonymous identities makes the attribution record a central exhibit, not a footnote.
The second layer is message integrity. Counsel should ask for the raw or native export, not only a translated transcript or a selected screenshot. The record should show message identifiers, dates and time zones, sender and recipient fields, attachments, deletion markers, system-generated metadata and any gaps in the relevant period. If the extraction was filtered by account, keyword, date, language or suspected shipment, the file should explain who applied the filter, when it was applied, what was excluded and whether the original dataset remains available. A prosecutor may use a focused selection, but the defence must be able to understand the selection bias created by it.
The third layer is the chain of custody. The evidence schedule should identify the source authority, the person who received the data, each transfer medium, each conversion or decryption step, each checksum or other integrity control, the storage location and the person who produced the exhibit for the French proceeding. A cross-border chain does not have to be physically continuous in one country. It does have to be intelligible. The court should be able to move from the source record to the exhibit and then to the translation without an unexplained technical or administrative gap.
Supplementary French records may be requested under Article 60-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits the prosecutor or judicial police, under the statutory conditions, to require information from a person, public or private body or administration, including information from a computer system. The provision allows delivery in digital form and protects certain lawyer-related situations by requiring consent for persons covered by Articles 56-1 to 56-5. It is not a magic route to obtain a foreign platform’s entire server. It is a possible domestic route for corroborative data: a French carrier record, a company’s logistics file, a bank document, a device record or a service provider’s information that links the SkyECC account to a real-world act.
Decryption and technical processing require a separate analysis. Article 230-3 provides, subject to national-defence secrecy obligations, that technical results are accompanied by useful indications for understanding and exploitation and by an attestation certifying the sincerity of the transmitted results. The phrase is precise: les résultats sont accompagnés des indications techniques utiles à la compréhension et à leur exploitation
. The defence should not, however, argue that the presence of a cryptographic label automatically triggers every domestic decryption formality. The exact operation must first be identified.
In the Criminal Chamber’s judgment of 10 May 2023, no. 22-84.475, involving an EncroChat procedure, the Court recorded that the data, when captured and exploited under Articles 706-102-1 and 706-102-5, were not encrypted and concluded that the provisions governing the clearing of encrypted data had not been applied. The decision uses the words les données … n’étaient pas chiffrées
. The practical lesson is classification: was the operation a capture of already readable data, a decryption or “mise au clair” operation, a foreign forensic recovery, a transmission of a completed dataset, or several distinct acts? The answer controls which technical documents can be demanded.
The same caution appears in the Criminal Chamber’s judgment of 5 March 2024, no. 23-84.626. In a case involving data capture and state technical means, the Court held that no decryption had occurred on the findings before it and rejected the argument that an attestation was necessarily required on that basis. That judgment does not establish that secrecy defeats every challenge. It shows instead that the defence must connect the requested technical document to the operation actually performed. If French authorities captured readable data, the 230-1 to 230-5 framework may not apply in the same way as it would to data that had to be decrypted; if a foreign authority performed a separate conversion, its method and legal record must still be disclosed sufficiently for effective challenge.
Where French investigators themselves deployed a technical device, Article 706-102-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure describes a device used, without the person’s consent, to access, record, preserve and transmit computer data in the circumstances governed by the organised-crime provisions. The statutory text refers to data “as they are stored”, displayed or entered and transmitted by a system. A French authorisation, its scope, its duration, the targeted systems and the magistrate’s control then become part of the integrity and legality review. Eurojust’s release does not say that this French procedure was used in the current Romanian operation. It is therefore a conditional question, not an assumed fact.
A prosecutor’s strongest presentation would separate three evidential bundles. The first would contain the foreign or joint-operation source record and the authority’s certification. The second would contain the French cooperation instrument, the transmission log and every translation. The third would contain independent corroboration tying the account and the message to a shipment, payment, vehicle, company or meeting. That separation allows a judge to test each proposition. It also avoids treating the fact that a message was received through Eurojust as proof that its speaker, meaning and criminal context have been established.
B. Which remedies can challenge an unlawful or unusable cross-border record?
The defence should begin with a targeted disclosure request, not a slogan about “mass surveillance”. The request should identify the account or accounts relied upon, the relevant dates, the EIO or other cooperation instrument, the domestic authorisation, the foreign execution record, the original data, the technical report, the translation, the selection method and the corroborating material. It should explain why each item is necessary to test attribution, integrity or fairness. A court is more likely to order a useful supplement when the request identifies the missing link between a legal condition and a disputed exhibit.
If an EIO was executed in France, Article 694-41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the starting point for a French remedy. It allows interested persons to bring the same challenge, nullity request or other appeal that would have been available if the measure had been executed in a national proceeding. The provision states that ces recours peuvent, dans les mêmes conditions et selon les mêmes modalités, être formés contre ces mesures
. It also draws a boundary: the underlying reasons for the EIO itself are challenged in the issuing State, not by repackaging them as a French execution complaint.
This boundary makes the procedural map essential. If France executed a measure, the defence can challenge the French execution under Article 694-41 and the rules applicable to the equivalent domestic act. If Romania executed the measure, a challenge to Romanian execution may belong before Romanian authorities, while the French court must still assess whether the material can fairly be used in France. If the message dataset was already held by France and then transmitted to Romania, the issuing-State conditions and the French source procedure may be split between separate remedies. If the evidence came through a joint investigation team, counsel must identify the team agreement and the domestic acts through which the material entered the French file. One label, “Eurojust cooperation”, is not enough to choose the remedy.
For an information opened in France, Article 171 provides that a nullity exists when non-compliance with a substantial procedural formality causes prejudice to the interests of the affected party. Its central sentence is Il y a nullité lorsque la méconnaissance d’une formalité substantielle … a porté atteinte aux intérêts de la partie qu’elle concerne
. That requires more than identifying a procedural irregularity. The defence should explain the prejudice: inability to verify the original, inability to contest the account attribution, inability to test the selection, inability to challenge the scope of the technical operation, or inability to understand the translation that supplies the accusation’s meaning.
Article 173 requires a party or assisted witness who considers that a nullity occurred to seize the investigation chamber by a reasoned request, with the procedural filing formalities set out in the provision. The reasoned nature of the request matters in a SkyECC case. A motion should identify the act, the legal rule, the affected person, the evidence derived from it and the precise relief sought. It should distinguish a challenge to the original capture, a challenge to a decryption or technical report, a challenge to an EIO execution measure, a disclosure request and a fair-trial objection. Combining all of them under “the messages are unreliable” makes the application easier to reject.
Time limits can be decisive. Article 173-1 generally requires a person under investigation to raise nullity grounds concerning earlier acts within six months of the relevant notification or interrogation, subject to the statutory exception for matters that could not have been known. An encrypted dataset disclosed late, a newly produced technical annex or a transcript added after the ordinary period may change the analysis of knowledge and admissibility. Counsel should record the date on which each document became accessible, rather than treating the date of the investigation as the date on which the defence knew its full content.
The recent cross-border remedy decision is the Criminal Chamber’s judgment of 14 April 2026, no. 25-86.595. The case concerned an individual prosecuted in the United Kingdom on the basis of French EncroChat material. The Court held that a comparable Article 694-41 route depends on showing that the applicant is an interested person, that the contested measures were executed in France under a European Investigation Order, and that relevant supporting documents are supplied. The decision illustrates the practical burden: the applicant had not produced French translations of the EIO requests or the transcripts connecting the incriminating exchanges to the relevant person and measures. The Court’s approach can be summarised by the requirement to show that les mesures contestées ont été exécutées sur le territoire national
. The applicant must build the documentary bridge before asking the court to examine the merits.
The decision does not mean that an accused must prove the entire prosecution case before obtaining a remedy. It means that an Article 694-41 application must be anchored to the statutory conditions. An accused should therefore preserve the foreign charge, the notice describing the SkyECC material, the EIO or assistance reference, any French execution document, the transcript and the translation. If those documents are withheld, the defence should say so explicitly and ask the court to order their production or a supplement of information. The missing document is then a procedural issue, not an invitation to speculate about what it might contain.
The European fair-trial rule adds a separate safeguard. In M.N. (EncroChat), the Court of Justice held that a national criminal court must disregard evidence where the accused cannot comment effectively on it and the evidence is likely to have a preponderant influence on the factual findings. This is stronger than the proposition that an irregularity automatically erases a file, but it is also more practical. If the prosecution relies heavily on a translated selection while withholding the account attribution method, the source export, the technical conversion and the context needed to interpret coded language, the defence can argue that it cannot comment effectively. The court must then decide whether disclosure, expert examination, broader corroboration or exclusion is required to preserve a fair trial.
Article 694-24’s “not the sole foundation” rule and M.N.’s effective-comment rule should be pleaded together where appropriate. The first addresses the consequences of a successful challenge in the executing State. The second addresses what a trial court must do when the evidence cannot be tested fairly in the issuing proceedings. Neither rule guarantees exclusion merely because the evidence came from abroad. Both rules prevent mutual recognition from becoming a presumption that a defendant has no meaningful way to inspect or answer the material.
Finally, the reasoning of the decision must be auditable. Article 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure declares a decision null when its reasons are absent or insufficient to allow the Court of Cassation to exercise its control and determine whether the law was respected. The statutory test refers to reasons that ne permettent pas à la Cour de cassation d’exercer son contrôle
. If a chamber of the investigation rejects a focused SkyECC challenge without addressing the EIO, the data route, the requested records, the technical classification or the specific prejudice, the defence should preserve that omission in the appeal record. A reasoned decision is part of the evidence system: it shows how the court moved from an international dataset to an individual factual finding.
For a person or company caught in the operation, the immediate checklist is therefore concrete: secure the complete notice of the evidence; identify the account and attribution material; obtain the original-language record and translation; map each authority and transfer; ask whether an EIO or another instrument was used; preserve the dates of disclosure; separate a nullity request from a fair-trial objection; and identify independent evidence capable of corroborating or contradicting the messages. The best challenge is rarely a general objection to encryption. It is a precise demonstration that one link in the chain is missing, untested, late, overbroad or impossible to discuss effectively.
Conclusion
The Eurojust operation is a strong current signal for French and European prosecutors: an organised drug-trafficking investigation now combines a Romanian action day, Spanish supply routes, French cooperation, four major seizures and SkyECC material intended for later proceedings. Its legal force will depend on the file that follows. The public release proves cooperation and an investigative direction; it does not prove the identity of a speaker, the meaning of a message or the legality of every step that produced the dataset.
French prosecutors should preserve the cooperation instrument, the source authority’s record, the transfer trail, the translation and the corroboration before presenting a message as the voice of an accused person. The French Code of Criminal Procedure offers broad modes of proof, but it also provides routes for nullity, for challenges to EIO execution and for review of prejudice. The Court of Justice’s EncroChat judgment adds a non-negotiable fairness standard: a person must be able to comment effectively on evidence that may decide the facts. The recent French EncroChat decision adds an operational lesson: a cross-border applicant must bring the documents that connect the person, the measure and the French execution.
For the defence, the objective is not to ask a court to distrust every encrypted message. It is to force the case onto verifiable propositions: who controlled the account, what exactly was collected, how it was preserved, what was translated, which legal instrument authorised the transfer, and whether the accused can answer the material with the same level of precision as the prosecution. That is the point at which an international crime-operation headline becomes a French procedural question capable of being tested in court.