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EU Sanctions Reform: Can France and Germany Replace the Veto Without Rewriting the Treaties?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

EU Sanctions Reform: Can France and Germany Replace the Veto Without Rewriting the Treaties?

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On 1 September 2026, eleven European Union governments, including France and Germany, called for an end to “obstructive” vetoes in the Union’s foreign policy. Their letter to High Representative Kaja Kallas has turned a long-running institutional debate into a live sanctions question: can the EU respond quickly when one capital refuses to renew, expand, or coordinate a restrictive-measures regime? The answer is more limited than the political headline suggests. The discussion is taking place around the informal foreign affairs ministers’ Gymnich meeting in Wicklow on 1–2 September, as confirmed by the Council’s official meeting calendar, but no treaty provision has been switched on by a press report or a ministerial letter. The current proposal is reported by Euronews, while Le Monde describes the parallel French-German plan to strengthen coordination around the High Representative. For a French bank, exporter, insurer, listed person, or foreign business with assets in France, the practical issue is not whether unanimity is politically unpopular. It is which legal act exists today, who adopted it, which authority can authorise a payment, and which court can review it.

I. Can the EU change sanctions voting without changing the treaties?

A. What the eleven-state proposal actually changes

The first distinction is between political coordination and a binding EU measure. The eleven governments identified in the current reporting are Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. They are asking the High Representative and the other governments to use the Treaties more effectively, to rely more often on constructive abstention, to avoid linking unrelated questions, and to explore qualified-majority voting in areas where the Treaties already provide a route. That is a serious political signal. It is not a Council decision adopting a new sanctions regime, and it does not change the voting rule for an existing regime overnight.

The relevant legal starting point is Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union. It allows the Council to define the Union’s approach to a particular geographical or thematic matter within the common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures. An Article 29 decision is the foreign-policy layer. A bank freeze, export restriction, prohibition on making funds available, or other economic measure normally requires a second layer under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The division matters because a political commitment made at a meeting is not the same instrument as the regulation that a French compliance officer must apply.

Article 31(1) TEU states the baseline rule in terms that leave little room for an informal shortcut: Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The provision concerns Chapter 2 of Title V, the CFSP chapter. The complete text is available in the official Article 31 TEU text on EUR-Lex. A government that votes against a CFSP decision normally prevents that decision from being adopted. A government that abstains, however, may make a formal declaration of constructive abstention. It then does not have to apply the decision itself, while accepting that the decision binds the Union and undertaking not to obstruct the action of the other Member States. That is an existing treaty tool, but it requires a state to accept a political and legal compromise; it does not convert unanimity into a majority vote.

The letter’s language about “obstructive” vetoes also has a legal dimension. The duty of sincere cooperation cannot simply erase the express voting rule in Article 31. It may support an argument for good-faith consultation and a refusal to attach an unrelated demand to a sanctions file, but it cannot authorize the Council presidency, the Commission, or the High Representative to declare that a required unanimous decision has passed. The Council’s own explanation of sanctions says that sanctions decisions and regulations are adopted unanimously and operate within EU jurisdiction. The same page lists the consequences that may follow: arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes, trade restrictions, financial restrictions, and diplomatic measures. Each consequence must be tied to the instrument actually published in the Official Journal.

The proposal therefore changes the political starting point. It makes the next legal questions visible: whether a matter can be characterized as an implementing decision, whether an existing CFSP decision can be used as the foundation for a qualified-majority act, whether constructive abstention is acceptable, and whether the European Council could activate the specific passerelle in Article 31(3). It does not itself answer those questions. For businesses and individuals, that distinction prevents a dangerous mistake: treating a coalition letter as if it had already amended an annex, extended a designation, or permitted a transaction.

B. Why Article 31 TEU still protects the veto

Article 31(2) creates narrow exceptions to the baseline. The Council acts by qualified majority when it adopts a Union action or position on the basis of a European Council decision relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives; when it adopts an action or position on a proposal presented by the High Representative after a specific European Council request; when it adopts an implementing decision for an existing action or position; and when it appoints a special representative under Article 33 TEU. Those categories can be important in practice, particularly when the legal act merely implements a political decision already adopted. They do not amount to a general rule that every sanctions renewal, listing, or expansion can be pushed through by majority vote.

Even within an Article 31(2) category, the Treaty preserves an emergency brake. If a Council member declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote is not taken. The High Representative must seek an acceptable solution in close consultation with that Member State. If no solution is reached, the Council may by qualified majority ask the European Council to decide unanimously. The legal design is important: qualified majority may be available at the first stage, but a reasoned national objection can still force the dispute back toward unanimity.

Article 31(3) is the specific passerelle that the current debate keeps returning to. The Treaty says: The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2. The words “may unanimously” are the institutional paradox. The gateway out of the veto requires the governments, including a government that values the veto, to agree unanimously to use it. Article 31(4) then excludes decisions having military or defence implications. The result could be a carefully defined qualified-majority lane for particular civilian or diplomatic matters, but it would not be a blank cheque for all foreign-policy and security decisions.

The ordinary qualified-majority threshold is also sometimes described too simply. The Council explains that its double-majority rule requires both at least 55% of the Member States, currently 15 of 27, and states representing at least 65% of the EU population. Its official page confirms that unanimity remains applicable, among other fields, to the common foreign and security policy. The threshold is not a substitute for finding a treaty basis that permits a vote. Counting 15 governments cannot cure a legal requirement that the Council act unanimously.

There are less dramatic routes to faster action. A Council member may use constructive abstention. The High Representative may frame a document as an implementing decision where the Treaty and the existing action or position genuinely support that classification. Governments may agree in advance not to reopen settled elements of a sanctions regime. Member States may coordinate national implementation and authorisation practice. But each route has a boundary. Re-labelling a new political choice as “implementation” would invite an institutional challenge; it would also expose later measures to litigation by a listed person or affected company.

A Treaty amendment would be a different project. It could create a more general change in the voting architecture, but it would involve the Treaty revision procedures and national constitutional approval. The current French-German message is more cautious: it seeks to reorganize and coordinate the external action machinery without immediately reopening the Treaties. That may produce practical gains, but a legal adviser must still read the published CFSP decision and the Article 215 regulation, not infer a new rule from the political ambition behind them.

II. What would qualified-majority sanctions change for France?

A. Why Article 215 measures still need a legal chain

For a French operator, the most important legal sequence is usually: CFSP decision, economic or financial regulation, national authority, then the transaction or enforcement question. Article 215 TFEU provides that where a Chapter 2 Title V TEU decision interrupts or reduces economic and financial relations with a third country, the Council acts by qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative and the Commission. It can also adopt restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, groups, or non-State entities where the CFSP decision provides for them. The Treaty adds a short but crucial guarantee: The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal safeguards.

This explains why the political reform debate cannot be reduced to the slogan “sanctions by majority.” The CFSP decision remains the gateway. If the Council changes that gateway through an Article 31 exception or passerelle, the Article 215 economic instrument may be adopted under its own qualified-majority rule. If the CFSP decision has not been validly adopted, the Commission and the Council cannot use Article 215 as an independent replacement. Conversely, a valid CFSP decision does not tell a French bank to block a particular account unless the applicable regulation, decision, designation, or national measure creates that obligation.

The Conseil d’État judgment of 7 April 2023, no. 465879, gives a useful French illustration. In a dispute involving property connected with EU restrictive measures, the judgment identifies the Article 29 TEU decision and the Article 215 TFEU regulation as successive parts of the legal framework. It also records the operative rule that funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held, or controlled by listed persons are frozen and may not be made available. The decision does not turn a political assessment into a freeze; it examines the published EU instrument and the French implementing act.

That sequence has two practical consequences. First, a new voting method would potentially shorten the time needed to adopt or renew the political decision, but it would not remove the need for an identifiable regulation, annex, effective date, and scope of application. Second, a bank that receives a politically sensitive instruction cannot safely rely on a press release alone. Its compliance file must identify the EU regulation or decision, the listed person or entity, ownership and control links, the prohibited conduct, any derogation, and the competent authority empowered to authorize a release or payment.

French law gives the administration an implementation role without making the administration the source of every EU sanction. The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs coordinates restrictive measures, while the Treasury is central to financial restrictions and authorisations. An EU regulation may apply directly, but a French authority can still have to receive a request for a derogation, supervise a release, communicate with a financial institution, or apply national penalties for non-compliance. The precise instrument matters more than the label “EU sanctions.”

The same reasoning applies to a designation challenge. A person listed in an EU annex may argue that the statement of reasons is insufficient, that the wrong entity was identified, that ownership or control was inferred without evidence, that the Council relied on material it did not disclose, or that the measure is disproportionate. A company whose payment is refused may have a different claim: it may challenge the bank’s contractual response, seek an authorisation, contest the interpretation of a derogation, or ask an administrative court to review a national implementing decision. These routes are related, but they are not interchangeable.

B. What French banks, exporters and listed persons can challenge now

The EU Treaties do not leave a listed person without a judicial route. Article 275 TFEU limits the Court of Justice’s general jurisdiction over CFSP provisions, but it expressly preserves jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive-measures decisions against natural or legal persons under Article 263(4). The official Article 275 TFEU text describes that exception as reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons. The claimant must identify the contested act, show standing, and respect the procedural deadline. The official Article 263 TFEU text sets the framework for an action for annulment and provides the two-month period tied to publication, notification, or knowledge of the measure.

French case law shows why a challenge should begin with the exact effect of the measure. In the Bank Sepah litigation, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation, 29 April 2022, nos. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, dealt with an Iranian bank, UN resolutions, EU regulations, a French judgment for payment, and the consequences of a period of asset freezing. The decision’s procedural history identifies the earlier European measures and the later delisting. The linked Cour de cassation decision in no. 18-18.542 states the holding that a freeze imposed because of the entity’s activities was not, by itself, a case of force majeure that suspended statutory interest. For a creditor, a freeze may make lawful payment impossible for a period; it does not automatically erase the debt or rewrite the judgment.

In a separate Libyan-assets line of authority, the Cour de cassation, 7 September 2022, no. 19-25.108, held that enforcement on frozen funds required prior authorization from the competent Treasury authority under the applicable EU regulation. The related Cour de cassation, 3 November 2021, no. 19-21.964, records the definition of freezing as action preventing movement, transfer, use, or access that would permit the funds to be used. These decisions are useful for a French creditor or bank because a judgment, an attachment, and an authorization request are separate events.

The most recent example in this group is the Cour de cassation, 2nd Civil Chamber, 5 February 2026, no. 23-15.936. The judgment explains that an administrative authorization from the Treasury must precede authorization by the enforcement judge when the assets are subject to the relevant freeze. The original French text states: aucune mesure de saisie-attribution … ne peut être autorisée ou validée par le juge de l’exécution without the required prior authorization. In English, a creditor cannot ask the enforcement judge to validate an attribution seizure over frozen funds and then repair the omission later. The order of authorizations is part of the legal protection created by the EU regime.

The freeze is also not the same as confiscation or transfer of ownership. In the Cour de cassation, 2nd Civil Chamber, 29 June 2023, no. 19-23.674, the court reproduced the European interpretation that frozen assets remain the property of the persons or entities concerned until a distinct transfer mechanism operates. The judgment uses the phrase la mesure de gel n’a pas, à elle seule, d’incidence sur la propriété des avoirs faisant l’objet de cette mesure. A bank may block use of an account without becoming owner of the balance; a creditor may be prevented from enforcing without losing the underlying claim; and a political decision cannot be described as confiscation unless the applicable legal instrument creates that result.

Criminal exposure reinforces the need for a documented analysis. In Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, 29 November 2023, no. 22-85.867, the court considered the offence of evading obligations arising from an asset freeze and of obstructing its implementation under the French Monetary and Financial Code. The judgment discusses the need to identify the obligations created by the freeze and the conduct that constitutes an obstacle. Opening a foreign account is not a safe compliance strategy if it is used to conceal or move frozen assets. At the same time, a bank or prosecutor must connect the alleged conduct to the precise legal obligations in force at the relevant date.

A French or international client can use the following working sequence when a new EU sanctions decision is announced:

  1. Identify the instrument. Save the Council decision, the Article 215 regulation, the annex, the Official Journal reference, the publication date, and every amendment. Do not rely on a news alert, a ministerial speech, or a bank’s first email.
  2. Map the legal subject. Check the exact spelling, aliases, registration number, date of birth where relevant, ownership, control, beneficial owner, subsidiaries, branches, and intermediary banks. A similar name is not proof of identity, but an apparently separate company may be covered by ownership or control rules.
  3. Freeze the facts, not just the account. Preserve payment instructions, invoices, contracts, shipping records, corporate registers, correspondence, and the compliance decision. Do not transfer funds, substitute a new account, or alter ownership records while the scope is unresolved.
  4. Separate a derogation from a dispute. A derogation request asks the competent authority to authorize a defined transaction under an exception. A listing challenge argues that the measure is unlawful or does not apply. A bank complaint may address a third issue: whether the bank had contractual or regulatory grounds to refuse the transaction.
  5. Calculate the court clock. A direct action before the EU courts, a French administrative claim, an enforcement challenge, and a contractual claim may have different deadlines. The date of publication, notification, knowledge, refusal, or service can be decisive.
  6. Keep the EU and United States regimes separate. A U.S. designation may affect a dollar payment or a correspondent bank without being an EU designation. A political disagreement between Washington and Brussels does not itself determine the French legal answer.

The voting reform could accelerate decisions and reduce the ability of one government to hold an entire package hostage. It could also create more litigation about whether a particular measure was properly classified, whether the passerelle was lawfully used, whether a vital national-policy objection was handled, and whether the implementing regulation stayed within the scope of the underlying CFSP act. Article 215’s safeguards and the judicial review route under Article 275 remain in the legal architecture. Faster adoption does not mean weaker evidence, no reasons, no proportionality review, or no remedy.

For a French bank or exporter, the immediate compliance answer is therefore conservative but precise: continue applying the measure that is legally in force; identify any transitional provision; ask the competent authority a targeted question; and preserve the basis for the decision. For a listed person, the immediate answer is different: obtain the complete designation file, test identity and ownership, assess reasons and proportionality, request any necessary authorisation without admitting the listing is valid, and protect the deadline for a European judicial challenge. For a creditor, the French decisions above show that attachment and payment are not the same stage. For all three, the new political debate is a reason to update the legal map, not a reason to treat headlines as operative law.

Conclusion

France and Germany have helped put qualified-majority foreign-policy voting back at the centre of the EU agenda, alongside nine other governments. The legal position on 2 September 2026 is narrower than the political demand: CFSP decisions remain governed by unanimity unless a specific Article 31 exception applies; Article 31(3) passerelle use would itself require a unanimous European Council decision; military and defence implications remain excluded from the relevant routes; and an Article 215 regulation still requires a valid CFSP foundation and a joint High Representative–Commission proposal.

If reform succeeds, sanctions could be adopted, renewed, or implemented more quickly in defined fields. The change would not extinguish the distinction between a Council decision and a regulation, remove Treasury authorisations, transfer frozen property, or close the door to judicial review. A French bank, exporter, creditor, or listed person should start with the published legal act, the effective date, the precise designation, the available derogation, and the remedy clock. That document-led method remains the safest way to respond while the political coalition tests the limits of the Treaties.

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