On 3 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a judgment that every company operating anywhere near Russian capital should read line by line. In the Lithuanian case concerning electricity supplier Inter Rao Lietuva, the Court held that funds cannot be frozen under the EU Russia sanctions regime on the sole ground that a company is indirectly linked, through its ownership chain, to a Russian state-controlled group or to a listed person. An asset freeze requires objective, solid evidence of a real sanctions nexus, disclosed reasons capable of supporting judicial review, and respect for the right to effective judicial protection. The ruling follows a reference from a Lithuanian court after the Lithuanian authority froze the company’s funds because its 51% shareholder, Finnish company RAO Nordic Oy, is wholly owned by Russian group PJSC Inter RAO, whose chief executive Boris Kovalchuk is an EU-listed person. The Court said that chain alone is not enough.
This analysis explains what happened, why the Court drew the line where it did, and what any non-listed company facing a freeze in France or elsewhere in the EU should do next. The angle is practical: how to challenge a freeze, which evidence the authority must produce, which procedural guarantees apply, and how French enforcement through the Directorate General of the Treasury fits into the EU framework. The judgment does not weaken sanctions. It makes them legally sustainable by forcing authorities to prove the link they allege. For compliance teams, banks, counterparties and lawyers, that distinction changes daily work immediately.
The facts reported on 3 September 2026 are straightforward. Inter Rao Lietuva, an electricity trading and supply company active in Lithuania, is 51% owned by RAO Nordic Oy of Finland, itself wholly owned by PJSC Inter RAO, a Russian electricity group controlled by the Russian state. After the listing of Inter RAO chief executive Boris Kovalchuk as a person subject to EU restrictive measures, the Lithuanian authority treated Inter Rao Lietuva as falling within the scope of the asset freeze under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and froze funds. The company challenged the freeze before the Lithuanian courts, which referred questions to the Court of Justice. The case is registered as Request for a preliminary ruling C-147/25 Inter Rao Lietuva, lodged 17 February 2025. The Court ruled on 3 September 2026 that the regime alone, without concrete evidence, cannot support the freeze, and that the affected company must be given reasons and access to judicial review satisfying Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
I. The CJEU said no to guilt by ownership chain: what Brussels and Vilnius got wrong
The first part of the judgment answers the question general counsel keep asking since 2022: does a Russian shareholder somewhere up the chain automatically contaminate every downstream company? The Court answers no. Ownership is a clue, not a freeze order. The authority must establish, with objective material, that the specific entity concerned falls within a freezing criterion laid down by the Regulation, and the judge must be able to verify that assessment.
A. Why an indirect link to PJSC Inter RAO and a listed CEO cannot freeze Inter Rao Lietuva alone
EU sanctions against Russia rest on a two-level legal basis that matters for every challenge. At the political level, the Council adopts a Common Foreign and Security Policy decision under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union. At the implementing level, the Council adopts a regulation under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is directly applicable in every Member State. Regulation 269/2014 freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons and entities, and prohibits making funds available to them. National authorities, banks and operators apply it, but they cannot invent new listing criteria. Only the Council lists, and only the criteria stated in the acts count.
In the Lithuanian file, the authority reasoned by cascade: PJSC Inter RAO is controlled by the Russian state, its CEO Boris Kovalchuk is listed, RAO Nordic Oy is its subsidiary, Inter Rao Lietuva is 51% owned by RAO Nordic Oy, therefore Inter Rao Lietuva is caught. The Court rejected that cascade as a legal basis for a freeze. A shareholding percentage, even a majority, and a group relationship, even with a state-controlled parent, do not by themselves prove ownership or control by the listed person within the meaning of the Regulation, nor do they prove that the funds belong to a listed person or that making funds available would benefit one. The authority must point to concrete factors: voting rights actually exercised, power to appoint management, decisive influence over commercial policy, commingling of funds, instructions from the listed person, circumvention schemes, or equivalent objective material. The judgment insists on an individual assessment of the entity whose funds are frozen, not a presumption derived from the reputation of the group or from the political context alone.
That insistence is consistent with earlier sanctions case law. In Judgment of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council, C-376/10 P, the Court annulled measures against family members of Burmese leaders because the Council had applied a presumption of association without proving a real link to the regime. Being related to someone targeted is not a criterion unless the act says so and the facts support it. In Judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C-72/15, the Court confirmed that restrictive measures are subject to full judicial review of their legality, including proportionality, and that broad discretion in foreign policy does not exempt the Council and national authorities from stating and proving their case. The Inter Rao Lietuva ruling extends that logic to indirect corporate structures: the further the entity stands from the listed person, the harder the authority must work to evidence control or benefit, and a bare organisational chart never suffices.
The practical consequence is immediate for banks and counterparties. Many over-compliance freezes since 2022 were triggered by name-matching software flagging any counterparty with a Russian-sounding ultimate owner, followed by a precautionary block pending clarification. The judgment confirms that such a block, when imposed by a competent authority as a formal freeze, must be lifted or properly reasoned if the only material is the chart. For companies, the litigation point writes itself: demand the freezing decision, identify the exact listing criterion invoked, and require the authority to connect each element of the criterion to a dated document or verifiable fact concerning your company, not its parent. If the file contains only press articles about the group, a sanctions-list entry for another person, and a corporate registry extract showing share capital, the freeze is vulnerable under the 3 September 2026 reasoning.
B. How the Lithuanian reference reached Luxembourg and why the answer binds every EU authority
The Lithuanian court did what national judges are supposed to do when the validity or interpretation of an EU freeze is unclear: it referred the question to Luxembourg under Article 267 TFEU on the preliminary ruling procedure. That mechanism is the backbone of sanctions litigation. The national judge stays seised of the dispute, sends the interpretation question to the Court of Justice, then applies the answer to annul, uphold or adjust the national measure. The answer binds all Member States, not only Lithuania. When the Court says an indirect link alone cannot support a freeze under Regulation 269/2014, the French Directorate General of the Treasury, German, Dutch or Cypriot authorities, and every bank compliance desk applying the same Regulation must read their own files the same way.
The timeline underlines the point. The request was lodged on 17 February 2025 as Case C-147/25, and the Court ruled on 3 September 2026. During that period the funds stayed frozen in practice while the legal question matured. That delay is typical and painful: companies lose contracts, licences and banking relationships long before the judge rules. The judgment mitigates that structural disadvantage in two ways. First, it clarifies the substantive threshold so interim judges can apply it quickly in suspension proceedings. Second, it reinforces procedural rights from day one, including the duty to give reasons and the right to be heard in a manner compatible with effective judicial protection. A company that receives a one-line freeze notice referencing only the group context can now cite a same-day Luxembourg authority to obtain disclosure or suspension.
The binding effect also runs horizontally. Competitors, journalists and commentators sometimes present a July 2026 line of CJEU rulings favouring sanctioned individuals as a political softening. The legally accurate reading is narrower: the Court is stabilising the regime by striking down weakly reasoned files so that well-evidenced listings survive. That is exactly what happened in the Kadi saga, where the Court annulled listings for lack of disclosure while affirming the principle of targeted sanctions. In Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Kadi II, judgment of 18 July 2013, the Court required the authority to disclose the essence of the grounds, to hear the person concerned, and to subject the allegations to judicial review. Inter Rao Lietuva applies the same discipline to downstream non-listed companies: the context of war does not suspend the duty to give reasons or the intensity of review.
For French practice, the reference matters because challenges to implementing measures often pass through the administrative judge or the civil judge depending on the act, while the interpretation of the Regulation itself belongs to Luxembourg. Counsel should therefore frame submissions in two layers: breach of the EU substantive threshold as interpreted on 3 September 2026, and breach of national procedural guarantees in the enforcement of the freeze. That dual framing forces the authority to defend both the legal reading and the file, and it preserves a referral argument if the judge hesitates. Since the answer now exists, no new reference is needed on the core point; the task is to obtain its application to your facts without waiting eighteen months.
II. How to get unfrozen after 3 September 2026: evidence, procedure and the French enforcement path
The second part turns the judgment into a checklist. Winning on the principle is not the same as getting funds released this quarter. Authorities can re-reason a freeze, add evidence, or shift to another legal basis. Companies need a litigation and compliance strategy that converts the Luxembourg standard into disclosure, interim relief and a durable clean bill of health vis-a-vis banks.
A. What EU judges now require from authorities: solid evidence, stated reasons and real judicial review
The core evidential rule after Inter Rao Lietuva is that the burden of proving the sanctions nexus lies on the authority, and the standard is objective material capable of judicial verification. That rule was already visible in earlier judgments and the new ruling consolidates it for indirect-ownership cases. In Judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support and Procurement Kala Naft, C-348/12 P, the Court placed the burden on the Council to prove the grounds for listing and refused to shift that burden to the targeted company by demanding that it prove a negative. In Judgment of 16 April 2015, Council v Bank Saderat Iran, C-200/13 P, the Court annulled a listing where the evidence did not support the stated reason. The message is constant: allegations must be matched to proof, and proof must be in the file submitted to the judge, not in press briefings.
Concretely, a defensible freeze file after 3 September 2026 must contain dated, company-specific material. Examples that meet the threshold include board minutes showing instructions from the listed person, bank statements proving fund flows to or from the listed person, contracts priced off-market to channel value to the listed person, shareholder agreements conferring veto or appointment rights on the listed person, verified corporate filings showing majority voting control actually exercisable, or documented circumvention behaviour after the listing date. Examples that do not meet the threshold include a bare group chart, a news article about the parent, the mere fact that the parent is state-controlled, the nationality of managers, or the historical origin of capital without a current control analysis. The Lithuanian file failed because it essentially offered the second category while freezing on the strength of the first category’s vocabulary.
The second requirement is the statement of reasons. Under Kadi II and Article 47 of the Charter, the person or entity affected must receive the essential grounds for the measure, in time to challenge it, with enough detail to understand what is alleged and what to rebut. A reference to the Regulation plus the name of a listed relative or executive is not a statement of reasons. The authority must say which freezing criterion applies to your entity, which facts satisfy each limb of that criterion, and which documents support each fact. Where genuine security or confidentiality interests prevent full disclosure, the authority must still provide the essence and make the full material available to the judge under appropriate procedural safeguards. Inter Rao Lietuva reinforces that logic for non-listed companies: the further you stand from the list, the more precise the reasons must be, because the inference is weaker and the risk of error higher.
The third requirement is effective judicial protection itself. Article 47 guarantees an effective remedy before a tribunal, a fair hearing, and a fully reasoned judicial decision. In sanctions matters that means the judge must be able to examine the facts, assess the evidence, verify proportionality, and annul or order release if the file is thin. Proportionality deserves emphasis: even where some link exists, the freeze must not go beyond what is necessary. A blanket freeze of all operating accounts of a company employing staff and supplying energy, based on a minority indirect influence that could have been addressed by targeted restrictions or authorisations, will face hard questions. Counsel should systematically plead unlawfulness, breach of the duty to state reasons, manifest error of assessment, and disproportionality as four distinct pleas, so that the judge can grant relief on any of them without reaching the others.
Evidence gathering by the company should mirror that structure. Commission an independent corporate and financial memo mapping voting rights, board composition, veto rights, financing lines, dividend flows and management instructions over the last three years. Collect registry extracts, audited accounts, loan agreements, compliance policies, and correspondence showing autonomous commercial decision-making. Document the harm: payroll at risk, supply contracts jeopardised, energy customers affected, banking exclusion. File a reasoned administrative request for disclosure and release before or alongside the court action, because judges reward claimants who gave the authority a chance to correct a thin file. Each exhibit should be numbered, dated and tied to a plea, so the judge can verify without reconstructing your group from scratch.
B. How to challenge a freeze enforced in France: Treasury, judges and banks after the new standard
In France, EU asset freezes are directly applicable but operationally enforced through the national machinery, in particular the Directorate General of the Treasury, which publishes and implements freezing measures, and through reporting and compliance obligations of banks and financial institutions. The French framework is codified in the Monetary and Financial Code, whose provisions on restrictive measures and asset freezes structure the domestic effects of EU regulations; the official text is available on the French official legal database at Legifrance, Code monetaire et financier, with the sanctions and freezing sections applicable to measures taken in implementation of EU acts. A company frozen in France typically learns of the measure through its bank, which blocks accounts and transactions by reference to a Treasury notice or an EU listing implemented nationally. The first 72 hours decide the trajectory: identify the exact decision, secure the written grounds, and stop the file from hardening around an unchallenged presumption.
The new CJEU standard reshapes that first phase. Write immediately to the bank and to the Treasury unit handling freezes, requesting the freezing decision, the precise EU criterion invoked, the company-specific evidence relied upon, and the procedure for authorisation or release for essential payments. Cite the 3 September 2026 Inter Rao Lietuva ruling and Case C-147/25, and invite the authority to confirm whether the freeze rests on anything beyond the group chart and the listing of another person. Many files move at this stage, because the authority prefers to narrow or lift a weak freeze rather than defend it before a judge armed with a same-week Luxembourg precedent. Parallel to that, prepare interim relief: where the freeze threatens payroll, tax payments, energy supply or perishable commercial obligations, ask the competent judge for suspension or for targeted authorisations to use frozen funds for essential expenditure, a mechanism expressly contemplated by the EU sanctions architecture and routinely granted when the underlying freeze is doubtful.
On the merits, the French judge will apply Regulation 269/2014 as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Plead the Inter Rao Lietuva threshold head-on: no freeze of a non-listed company on indirect linkage alone, requirement of objective and solid evidence assessed individually, duty to state company-specific reasons, and full judicial review including proportionality. Attach the corporate memo, the absence of flows to the listed person, the autonomy of management, and the disclosure requests left unanswered. If the authority attempts to re-base the freeze on a different theory, such as control through financing or circumvention after listing, require it to produce the new evidence and the new reasons in writing, then answer them exhibit by exhibit. Do not let the debate drift to geopolitics; keep it on the file. Judges annul freezes on files, not on foreign policy.
The banking layer requires separate attention because a formal release does not automatically restore relationships. Banks maintain their own risk appetite and often keep a client in enhanced monitoring after a freeze is lifted. Use the judgment proactively: send the release decision plus a concise legal memo explaining the new evidential standard, the individual assessment conducted, and the compliance upgrades adopted, including screening procedures, ownership transparency, and escalation paths for any future group change. Request written confirmation of account restoration and of the removal of any internal sanctions flag not required by law. Where a bank maintains a purely commercial refusal after the legal freeze ends, that decision must be distinguished from a legal obligation, with consequences for liability and for the duty to provide account services under French banking law. The goal is not only to unfreeze, but to rebuild a paper trail that prevents the next automated block from becoming a second freeze without reasons.
Two strategic warnings close this section. First, do not confuse this judgment with a general amnesty. Well-documented files showing real control by a listed person, real benefit flows, or post-listing circumvention will survive, and the Court expressly preserves the effectiveness of sanctions. Restructurings designed to paper over control without changing reality will aggravate exposure and credibility. Second, do not delay disclosure requests. Time limits for challenges run quickly, interim harm compounds, and the evidential advantage of a fresh same-week precedent fades as authorities learn to re-reason files. The companies that benefit most from 3 September 2026 will be those that file a precise, exhibit-backed challenge within days, forcing the authority to prove its case before a judge who now knows exactly what proof looks like.
Conclusion
The Court of Justice did not dismantle EU sanctions on 3 September 2026. It made them enforceable under the rule of law by refusing guilt by ownership chart. In Case C-147/25, an electricity company majority-held through a Finnish subsidiary of a Russian state-controlled group could not have its funds frozen merely because the group’s CEO is listed and the context is war. The authority must prove, with objective company-specific evidence, that the entity itself meets a freezing criterion, must state those reasons clearly enough to allow a challenge, and must accept full judicial verification including proportionality. That standard binds Lithuanian, French and all EU authorities applying the same Regulation, and it gives banks a reason to replace reflexive blocks with reasoned analysis.
For any non-listed company currently frozen or newly flagged because of an indirect Russian link, the method is now settled: demand the decision and the file, test every alleged fact against dated exhibits, plead the Inter Rao Lietuva threshold alongside Kadi disclosure rights and Tay Za, Kala Naft and Bank Saderat Iran on proof, seek interim authorisations to protect payroll and essential operations, and rebuild the banking record once released. Sanctions remain severe and legitimate, but severity no longer excuses thin files. After 3 September 2026, the authority that cannot show its evidence will not keep the freeze.