On 1 September 2026, the Registry of the International Court of Justice reported that Vanuatu had filed an application against France concerning sovereignty over Umaenupne, known as Matthew Island, and Umaeneg/Leka, known as Hunter Island, as well as the drawing of a single maritime boundary between the exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of Vanuatu and France in relation to New Caledonia. The Court’s Press Release No. 2026/22 records a dispute with a strikingly narrow geographic focus but potentially wide consequences for maritime rights.
The immediate legal question is not whether the ICJ has already opened a case. It has not. Vanuatu relied on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, a procedure designed for an application where the respondent State’s consent is still missing. The application was transmitted to France, but it was not entered in the General List and no procedural step can be taken unless and until Paris accepts the Court’s jurisdiction. The Registry’s release quotes the decisive safeguard: “nor any action be taken in the proceedings, unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the Court’s jurisdiction”.
That makes this a live cross-border legal story rather than a judgment about title. France can refuse, remain silent, or consent on carefully drafted terms. If it consents, the dispute would move into a second phase involving territorial title, the legal status of the two features, and maritime delimitation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. French constitutional rules, New Caledonia’s institutional status and the domestic regulation of French maritime spaces would then become part of the practical risk analysis. The central answer for international clients is therefore clear: Vanuatu has created legal and diplomatic pressure, but it has not yet compelled France to litigate.
I. Can France refuse the ICJ’s jurisdiction over Matthew and Hunter?
A. What Vanuatu’s ICJ application actually does under Rule 38(5)
International litigation between States rests on consent. The ICJ is not a general court with automatic authority over every sovereign dispute. Its jurisdiction may arise from a special agreement, a jurisdiction clause in a treaty, a declaration accepting the optional clause, or a later act by which the respondent accepts the Court’s jurisdiction for the case. The Court’s own explanation of the basis of jurisdiction reflects that consent-based architecture.
Article 38(5) of the Rules of Court is the procedural bridge used when the applicant wants to file first and invite the respondent to consent afterwards. Vanuatu’s move is therefore legally intelligible but deliberately incomplete. The Registry can transmit the application to France. Transmission gives the respondent the document, identifies the proposed dispute and creates the setting in which France can decide whether to accept. Transmission does not itself create jurisdiction. It also does not allow the applicant to turn a unilateral filing into an international judgment by force of presentation.
The wording matters. The Court’s 1 September release states that Vanuatu “seeks to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court”. It then says that the application has been transmitted to France and that “no action will be taken in the proceedings unless and until France consents to the Court’s jurisdiction in the case”. Those are not media qualifications. They describe the legal status of the matter as recorded by the Registry. There is no merits phase, no timetable for written pleadings and no judicial determination of sovereignty at this point.
France consequently has a real jurisdictional choice. It can decline the invitation expressly. It can also take no step that amounts to consent. An application under Article 38(5) cannot be treated as an ordinary summons requiring France to defend itself simply because Vanuatu has filed a document in The Hague. The release does not state a response deadline, and its wording does not say that silence will open the case. Until consent exists, the application remains outside the General List.
The practical effect should not be underestimated. A State may use a non-jurisdictional filing to establish its public legal position, focus diplomatic attention and put the opposing State’s response under a microscope. That is an analytical inference from the mechanism, not a finding of the Court: an application that cannot yet proceed can still shape negotiations, official maps, parliamentary debate and the way third States describe the dispute. For Vanuatu, the filing turns a long-running sovereignty and maritime issue into a formal question addressed to the French Republic. For France, every public answer must be measured against the possibility of future consent, negotiation or litigation.
It is also important to separate three issues that headlines can merge. First, Vanuatu has filed an application. Second, France has received it. Third, France has not, on the material publicly recorded by the ICJ, consented to jurisdiction. The first two facts do not imply the third. The Court has not ordered provisional measures, frozen a maritime activity, required France to change its conduct or recognized a Vanuatu title. Current administration and enforcement arrangements therefore do not change merely because the application was filed.
If France later consents, the text of that consent will be as important as the application itself. The respondent may accept jurisdiction for the whole dispute, accept only specified questions, or accept only the claims framed in a particular version of the application. The Court would then have to determine what common consent exists before the merits could be addressed. This is why the first document to watch is not a merits memorial from Vanuatu but the precise instrument, if any, by which France responds.
B. Why France’s 2006 Djibouti precedent matters
France has already faced this procedural structure. In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Case No. 136, Djibouti filed an application relying on Article 38, paragraph 5. France later consented by a letter dated 25 July 2006. The ICJ’s case record describes that consent as “valid only for the purposes of the case” and limited to the dispute and claims formulated by Djibouti. The Court subsequently entered the case and delivered its Judgment on 4 June 2008; the procedural history and the judgment are available on the official ICJ case page and in the official Judgment of 4 June 2008.
That precedent does not mean that France must accept Vanuatu’s application. It shows something more precise: France may choose to consent ad hoc, and the limits of that consent can be negotiated through careful drafting. The Court did not treat the French letter as a generic submission to every possible claim between the two States. It examined the language of the letter alongside the application and identified the scope of the jurisdiction actually accepted.
The Djibouti case is especially useful because it rejects an easy assumption about Article 38(5). The procedure is not a hidden compulsory-jurisdiction clause. The applicant cannot decide alone that the respondent has accepted. Conversely, once the respondent sends a sufficiently clear act of consent, the respondent cannot necessarily rewrite the dispute later by attaching a narrower meaning than the instrument and application support. Consent is required, and its scope is interpreted as a legal instrument.
Applied to the Vanuatu filing, four broad outcomes are possible. France could reject jurisdiction and keep the dispute in diplomatic channels. France could provide a limited acceptance, for example by defining the questions, claims or procedural purposes covered by its consent. France could consent to the application as framed, leaving jurisdictional objections about the precise dispute for the Court. Or the two States could negotiate a separate agreement that submits a defined dispute to the ICJ. These are options in the architecture of the procedure, not predictions about the French government’s decision.
The wording of a French response would matter for at least three reasons. It would determine whether the case enters the General List. It would define whether the Court can examine sovereignty, maritime delimitation, or both. It would also influence the evidence and remedies that could become relevant. A response that accepts only a sovereignty question would not automatically authorize the Court to draw a maritime boundary. A response that accepts a boundary question would still require the Court to identify the legal coastlines, relevant maritime entitlements and applicable principles.
French constitutional law provides the domestic framework for any eventual political settlement, but it does not compel consent to the ICJ. Article 52 of the Constitution states: “Le Président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités.” That rule, set out in the official text of Article 52, concerns the negotiation and ratification of treaties. It does not convert the President’s treaty power into a unilateral acceptance of an international court’s jurisdiction in every dispute.
Article 53 adds a separate safeguard for a territorial settlement. Treaties or agreements involving a cession, exchange or addition of territory require authorization by statute, and the Constitution says: “Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n’est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.” The official Article 53 text is relevant if France and Vanuatu ever negotiate an instrument that legally changes territory. It is not a procedural bar that France must invoke before deciding whether to accept the Court’s jurisdiction, and an ICJ judgment would not be the same legal act as a treaty of cession.
Article 55 of the Constitution also has a limited but important role. It provides that regularly ratified or approved treaties, once published, have an authority superior to statutes, subject to reciprocity. The constitutional wording refers to “une autorité supérieure à celle des lois”; the official Article 55 text should be read together with the relevant treaty and with the way the French judge gives effect to it. Article 55 does not give the ICJ jurisdiction over France without consent, and it does not settle the international title to a disputed island.
The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision in Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 30 October 1998, nos 200286 and 200287, is a useful warning against collapsing international and domestic hierarchies. In that New Caledonia litigation, the Conseil d’État held that the treaty superiority recognized by Article 55 does not displace constitutional provisions in the domestic order. The decision’s reasoning is not a ruling on Matthew or Hunter, but it demonstrates why any future settlement would have to be tested on two planes: France’s international obligations and the constitutional conditions for implementing them at home.
The same separation appears in Conseil d’État, Assemblée, 11 April 2012, no. 322326. The Court explained that a treaty stipulation can be directly relied upon by individuals when, having regard to the parties’ intention, the treaty’s general scheme, its content and its terms, it does not exclusively govern relations between States and “ne requiert l’intervention d’aucun acte complémentaire”. The principle helps assess domestic litigation after a maritime rule is adopted; it does not remove the State-consent requirement at the ICJ.
There is a final New Caledonia caution. Article 77 of the Constitution creates a special institutional framework for the territory, including rules concerning the conditions and time limits under which its population may be called upon to decide on accession to full sovereignty. The official Article 77 text is therefore relevant to the constitutional setting, but it does not mean that a maritime sovereignty application by Vanuatu automatically triggers a self-determination vote or changes New Caledonia’s status. The dispute and the constitutional pathway for New Caledonia’s future are legally distinct questions.
II. What the maritime dispute means for New Caledonia and French law
A. How UNCLOS frames sovereignty, islands and the maritime boundary
The legal merits, if the case ever opens, would not be decided by geography alone. The Court would have to distinguish sovereignty over the land features from the maritime entitlements that those features may generate. The two questions are connected, but they are not identical. A State may argue about title to an island, the island’s status under the law of the sea, the treatment of a low-tide elevation, and the effect of the feature on a boundary with different legal consequences at each stage.
France incorporated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea into its legal order through Law No. 95-1311 of 21 December 1995, which authorized ratification, and Decree No. 96-774 of 30 August 1996, which published the Convention and its annexes. The French publication matters because the Convention is not merely a diplomatic reference in this context. It is part of the body of treaty law that French authorities and courts must apply within their respective competences, subject to the Constitution and the Convention’s own terms.
Article 2 of UNCLOS supplies the basic distinction for the territorial sea. It provides that “the sovereignty of a coastal State extends” to the adjacent territorial sea, exercised under the Convention and other international law. That is different from an exclusive economic zone. Under Articles 56 and 77, an EEZ and continental shelf give the coastal State defined sovereign rights and jurisdiction for resources and other matters; they are not a simple extension of territorial sovereignty over all waters and activities. The Convention’s French publication on Légifrance is the official French source for these provisions, while the United Nations English text of UNCLOS provides the wording used for an international audience.
Article 121 is likely to be central if the material facts support a dispute about the legal character of Matthew and Hunter. The island regime begins with a naturally formed area of land above water at high tide. An island can generate a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an EEZ and a continental shelf. Paragraph 3 creates the familiar limitation for rocks that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own”: such rocks have no EEZ or continental shelf. That rule does not itself decide which State owns the feature. It becomes relevant after the Court has identified the feature and assessed the evidence needed for the applicable legal classification.
The size of a feature is therefore not an automatic answer. A small island may still have legal significance, while a feature’s ability to generate a full maritime entitlement can be contested. The Court would have to examine the physical and historical evidence, the parties’ positions, the relevant coastlines and the way an entitlement interacts with the opposing coast. Public commentary that jumps directly from the name of an island to a fixed 200-nautical-mile zone risks skipping the legal questions that determine whether such a zone exists and how it should be delimited.
Articles 74 and 83 govern the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf respectively. Their common language directs States to negotiate on the basis of international law with a view to reaching an equitable solution. The English Convention text uses the phrase “with a view to arriving at an equitable solution”. In a pending dispute, that phrase is not a magic formula producing an instant median line. It frames a process in which the Court would identify relevant maritime entitlements, select an appropriate method, consider relevant circumstances and test the result for disproportionality.
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) also reflect the interim duty applicable while a final agreement is absent: States should make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and should not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. That does not mean that Vanuatu’s filing creates a provisional boundary or automatically suspends French maritime regulation. It means that conduct during a live dispute may be assessed against the obligation to preserve the possibility of an eventual settlement. Whether a particular fishing, survey, construction or enforcement act raises that issue would depend on evidence and the applicable rule.
French domestic legislation mirrors this treaty structure. Article 1 of Ordonnance No. 2016-1687 of 8 December 2016 defines the French maritime spaces of sovereignty or jurisdiction by reference to UNCLOS. The provision covers historical bays, internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the continental shelf. It is significant for this dispute because France’s domestic vocabulary does not operate in isolation from the international law of the sea; the French text itself sends the reader back to Montego Bay.
Article 12 of the same ordonnance describes French sovereign rights in the EEZ over the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources and related economic activities. The official Article 12 text also refers to French authority over artificial islands, installations, marine scientific research and the protection of the marine environment. Article 15 addresses the continental shelf and the exclusive sovereign rights exercised over the seabed and subsoil for natural resources; it is available in the official Article 15 text. These provisions explain the economic stakes of a boundary without turning an EEZ into territorial ownership.
The question of New Caledonia is therefore not decorative. A single boundary between the Vanuatu and French maritime spaces could affect the legal geography used for fisheries management, seabed resources, environmental measures, scientific surveys, cable routes and offshore installations. The application itself does not announce the result of any of those issues. It identifies the requested dispute. The legal work, if jurisdiction is accepted, would consist in converting competing positions into a map supported by coordinates, coastal facts, legal entitlements and a method that can be defended under UNCLOS.
France would also have to keep the land-title question separate from the boundary question. The Court could, in principle, be asked to decide who has sovereignty over the features and then to address how any resulting entitlements affect the maritime line. But it is not safe to assume that every feature must receive the same weight in delimitation, or that a sovereignty ruling automatically produces Vanuatu’s preferred boundary. International maritime delimitation is an adjudicative exercise with its own principles, and the Court would need to state how each conclusion follows from the evidence.
B. What Paris and New Caledonia should watch next
The first operational marker is France’s response. If Paris refuses jurisdiction, the ICJ procedure should not be confused with a pending merits case. If Paris consents, the instrument must be read word for word, including any reservation about the subject matter, claims or procedural purpose. The Djibouti precedent shows why that drafting exercise is not clerical. A consent letter can open the door to the General List while still defining the room in which the Court may act.
The second marker is the evidence exchanged outside the press cycle. A territorial dispute can involve historical instruments, colonial-era administrative records, charts, acts of peaceful administration, diplomatic correspondence, fisheries practice, navigational records and technical coordinates. The ICJ would not decide title by counting headlines or by choosing the map that looks most convenient. The parties would need to explain how the evidence bears on sovereignty, how the features are classified and how those conclusions affect the maritime boundary.
The third marker is the domestic implementation of maritime powers. The French ordonnance is not a guarantee that every restriction imposed in a maritime space will survive challenge. Nor does the Vanuatu application invalidate French rules automatically. The legal question for a vessel owner, fisher, energy developer, survey contractor or environmental body remains concrete: which authority adopted the measure, what maritime space does it concern, what statutory power supports it, and does the measure comply with UNCLOS and applicable local rules?
A French administrative decision involving New Caledonian waters illustrates the point. In CAA de Paris, 1st chamber, 10 January 2023, no. 21PA04622, the court treated Articles 17 and 24 of UNCLOS as directly effective in the dispute before it and annulled provisions that imposed a prior-authorization regime on foreign ships in New Caledonian waters. The case did not decide Vanuatu’s sovereignty claim. Its value is narrower and practical: French maritime regulation must be tested against the Convention, and a measure affecting navigation can be challenged through the French administrative court system.
The method used by the Conseil d’État in CE, Assemblée, 11 April 2012, no. 322326, remains relevant to that domestic assessment. A treaty clause is not automatically directly invocable by every private party. The judge considers whether the clause is addressed exclusively to States and whether it requires another implementing act before it can produce effects for individuals. The 2023 Paris ruling shows how that analysis can operate in the maritime context, but it should not be stretched into a general rule that every UNCLOS provision creates a private cause of action.
A recent comparative reference is Conseil d’État, 10th–9th chambers reunited, 4 March 2026, no. 510858. That case concerned French Polynesia, not New Caledonia and not the Vanuatu application. The Conseil d’État held that, in waters where State and territorial-collectivity competences overlap, the authority competent to regulate depends on the purpose of the measure. It distinguished environmental or public-domain management from State powers over maritime navigation and safety. The decision cannot simply be transplanted to New Caledonia because the organic statutes are different, but it is a current indicator of how French courts analyse overlapping maritime competences.
For operators, the immediate legal discipline is restraint in both directions. The filing is not a French title deed, and it is not an order to cease operating under current permits. At the same time, an operator should not assume that a permit, chart, fishing authorization or survey clearance will remain insulated from a future boundary process. Documents should identify the legal basis, issuing authority, coordinates, duration, renewal conditions and any reliance on a disputed maritime position. That record can matter in a later administrative challenge, contract dispute, compensation claim or regulatory transition.
For New Caledonian institutions and local stakeholders, the issue has a constitutional and practical dimension. Article 77 of the Constitution and the organic framework preserve a distinct institutional path for New Caledonia. Article 55’s treaty rule, the UNCLOS provisions published by France and the division of domestic competences may all become relevant, but none of them alone answers whether Vanuatu owns Matthew or Hunter. The legal system requires those questions to be sequenced rather than bundled into a single political slogan.
For Paris, the risk is equally two-sided. A refusal may prevent an ICJ merits ruling but leave the diplomatic dispute active and the maritime position contested in international forums. Consent may provide a definitive judicial process but expose France to a complex record on title, island status and maritime delimitation. A limited consent can manage the scope, as the Djibouti case demonstrates, but an overly narrow or ambiguous response may generate a second dispute about what France accepted. The safest legal analysis is therefore not a prediction of political intent; it is a close reading of the possible jurisdictional instrument.
The international audience should also distinguish an ICJ application from the mechanisms used in criminal or sanctions news. There is no arrest warrant, extradition request, asset freeze or criminal summons here. The dispute is inter-State and territorial. Its immediate legal event is a request for consent under Rule 38(5). That difference changes the remedies, the timetable, the evidence and the role of French domestic courts. It also explains why a story about two small Pacific features can become important to shipping, resources and public international law without producing an immediate change on the water.
As of 4 September 2026, the correct procedural description is therefore “Vanuatu has filed an application transmitted to France, awaiting French consent”, not “the ICJ is hearing Vanuatu’s case”. The distinction is material for anyone preparing a press statement, regulatory filing, investment decision, map, insurance assessment or legal opinion. A document that treats jurisdiction as settled may overstate the legal position; a document that ignores the application may understate the diplomatic and evidential exposure.
Conclusion
Can Paris refuse jurisdiction over Matthew and Hunter? Yes. Under the mechanism invoked by Vanuatu, France’s consent is still required before the application can enter the General List or move forward. The ICJ’s 1 September 2026 release records transmission to France, not a merits hearing, a provisional measure or a ruling on sovereignty.
France’s Djibouti precedent shows that consent is possible and can be limited, but it does not create an obligation to accept this new dispute. If France consents, the case will require separate analysis of territorial title, the Article 121 status of the features, the EEZ and continental-shelf rules in Articles 74 and 83, and the constitutional and domestic framework applicable to New Caledonia. French law already ties the country’s maritime spaces to UNCLOS, and recent administrative decisions show that maritime measures can be reviewed against that Convention.
The immediate legal test is thus procedural precision. Watch the French response, read its scope, preserve the historical and technical record, and do not confuse a formal application with a judgment. That is the difference between a headline that travels quickly and an international legal position that can withstand scrutiny.
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