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CJEU Grixta Opinion: Can Libya Recover Allegedly Stolen Assets in Malta Under Rome II?

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Avocat au Barreau de Paris

CJEU Grixta Opinion: Can Libya Recover Allegedly Stolen Assets in Malta Under Rome II?

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On 3 September 2026, Advocate General Richard de la Tour delivered an opinion in Case C-345/25, Grixta, a Malta reference that places state-led asset recovery inside one of European private international law’s most consequential border zones. The dispute concerns a claim by the State of Libya seeking to recover assets of a deceased former public official, identified in the anonymised proceedings as BC, that are present in Malta and connected with Maltese companies. The parties include CK, acting as agent for CD, Capital Resources Limited, the Libyan State Litigation Department and BC’s unknown heirs.

The official case record does not turn the allegations into established facts, and an Advocate General’s opinion is not the judgment of the Court. The immediate legal question is narrower and more powerful: does a claim brought by a State under anti-corruption legislation fall within “civil and commercial matters” for Article 1 of the Rome II Regulation? If it does, the Court must also clarify how the tort/delict rule in Article 4 interacts with the unjust-enrichment rule in Article 10. If it does not, the claim may sit outside Rome II as an administrative or sovereign-authority matter.

That classification affects more than the Maltese proceedings. It may determine which law governs ownership, restitution, limitation, valuation and defences; how evidence is collected; whether a judgment can travel to France; and whether a French court may preserve assets before enforcement. The French procedural lens is particularly useful because France separates applicable law, recognition of foreign judgments, provisional attachment and immunity of foreign States. The Grixta opinion therefore deserves attention from banks, fiduciaries, corporate directors, heirs and asset-recovery teams.

I. What does Grixta ask about Libya’s asset recovery in Malta?

A. Why does a State claim have to pass the “civil and commercial matters” gateway?

Rome II does not begin by asking whether a claimant is a private person, a company or a government. Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 applies, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. It expressly excludes revenue, customs and administrative matters, together with State liability for acts or omissions in the exercise of State authority, described in the text as acta iure imperii. The complete instrument is available in the official Rome II Regulation.

The wording creates a gateway, not a merits test. A court must first identify the legal relationship and the event from which the alleged obligation arises. It then asks whether that relationship is governed by ordinary rules that could apply between private parties, or whether the State is relying on powers unavailable to a private claimant. The label attached to the domestic statute is relevant, but it is not conclusive. Nor is the fact that the requested remedy is monetary. A public authority may claim money in a private-law action; a private-looking claim may still be inseparable from the exercise of sovereign powers.

Grixta sits at the intersection of several signals. Libya invokes anti-corruption rules and seeks the recovery of assets linked to a deceased former official. The assets are located in Malta and the proceedings involve companies and heirs. The State’s claim may be presented as the enforcement of a public policy against illicit enrichment, but the requested relief may resemble restitution, recovery of property or compensation. The Court must decide which feature legally characterises the obligation. A State cannot obtain the benefit of Rome II merely by calling its action civil, and a defendant cannot defeat Rome II merely by pointing to the claimant’s public status.

Three analytical models illustrate the problem. Under the first, Libya is exercising a public enforcement power: it imposes a public-law liability, issues an administrative order or seeks a penalty that a private person could never obtain. That model points towards the administrative or iure imperii exclusion. Under the second, Libya appears before a court as the person claiming restitution of value or property, alleges that the defendants were unjustly enriched, and seeks an order under ordinary judicial rules. That model points towards a civil or commercial matter. Under the third, the proceeding is hybrid: public legislation supplies the factual and legal background, while the pleaded obligation is a private-law claim against companies, holders or heirs. The classification would then focus on the source and nature of the obligation placed before the court.

The Court of Justice has developed this distinction under the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. Those instruments concern jurisdiction and recognition rather than the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, so their answers cannot simply be copied into Rome II. They nevertheless provide the EU vocabulary for separating ordinary legal relationships from exceptional public powers.

In Lechouritou and Others, Case C-292/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:102, the Court examined a damages action brought against Germany for acts committed by its armed forces during wartime. The decisive point was not that the claim sought compensation or was brought before a civil court. The alleged loss arose from conduct in which the defendant State had acted through sovereign military powers. The Court treated the nature of the originating act as controlling. The official judgment is available through EUR-Lex, Case C-292/05.

That precedent does not mean every claim by a State is outside civil cooperation. In Sunico and Others, Case C-49/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:545, the United Kingdom tax authority claimed damages from persons allegedly involved in a VAT-fraud conspiracy. The Court held that the claim fell within civil and commercial matters because the authority relied on tort law and had to use ordinary legal channels against defendants who were not themselves subject to the relevant VAT liability. The Court emphasised that the authority did not have, in that relationship, exceptional powers compared with a private party. The official Sunico judgment is a useful warning against treating a public claimant as an automatic jurisdictional or conflict-of-laws exclusion.

Rina, Case C-641/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:349, concerned private-law ship classification and certification bodies acting upon delegation from Panama. The Court held that delegation from a State did not by itself establish an exercise of public powers. The decisive question remained whether the activities actually used powers falling outside ordinary private-law relationships. The ruling, available at EUR-Lex, Case C-641/18, arose under Brussels I, not Rome II. Its value for Grixta is therefore analogical: a State connection, an international obligation or a public-interest objective cannot replace a concrete examination of the powers used.

In Grixta, the referring court’s questions are framed around whether the notion of “civil and commercial matters” in Article 1 of Rome II covers Libya’s recovery claim. The official referral document identifies the parties, the Maltese origin of the reference and the questions sent to Luxembourg. It does not resolve them. The opinion dated 3 September 2026 is recorded in the official InfoCuria case record as Case C-345/25, Grixta, ECLI:EU:C:2026:694.

The practical question for counsel is therefore not “Is Libya a State?” It is “What obligation is Libya asking the Maltese court to enforce, against whom, and by what legal mechanism?” Counsel should identify whether the pleaded right is ownership, restitution, damages, unjust enrichment, recovery under a public statute, or a combination that must be separated. They should identify whether the defendants are alleged to have exercised public powers or merely received, controlled or transferred assets. They should also distinguish the public purpose of the claim from the legal nature of the relationship with each defendant.

The same discipline protects defendants. A State may rely on official records, investigations or legislation without every act used to prove the claim becoming an act of sovereign authority for Rome II purposes. Evidence obtained through public channels does not automatically determine the classification of the underlying obligation. Conversely, a claim that seeks a unilateral penalty, a tax recovery or the execution of an administrative decision should not be repackaged as unjust enrichment merely because money is requested. The court will need the pleadings, the statutory scheme and the remedy actually sought.

Because Grixta is an opinion, its immediate effect is interpretive rather than executory. It does not itself establish that any account, company or heir holds misappropriated property. It does not order a freeze, transfer or confiscation. Its importance lies in the framework it offers the Court before the eventual judgment: where a State uses a civil court to pursue value located in another Member State, the boundary between public enforcement and private recovery must be drawn before the applicable law can be selected.

B. How do Rome II’s tort and unjust-enrichment rules map onto a State-recovery claim?

If the CJEU places the claim within Rome II, the next issue is not simply whether Maltese law applies. Rome II contains different connecting rules for different non-contractual obligations. Article 4 generally directs a tort or delict claim to the law of the country where the damage occurs, subject to common habitual residence and a manifestly closer connection. Article 10 addresses unjust enrichment through a staged analysis: a closely connected pre-existing relationship comes first; if no law can be selected there, common habitual residence and then the country of enrichment are considered, subject to a manifestly closer connection.

That distinction matters in a recovery action involving a State, a deceased person, corporate vehicles and assets held in another country. A tort theory may describe an unlawful act in Libya, financial damage to the Libyan State, transfers through companies and the continuing location of value in Malta. An unjust-enrichment theory may focus on the enrichment of a company, heir or account holder, the alleged impoverishment of Libya and the absence of a legal basis for retaining the benefit. The two theories may use the same transactions but generate different arguments about the relevant connecting factor.

Article 4 is not a simple “place of the bad act” rule. It normally looks to the country in which the direct damage occurs, not merely the place where preparation, instructions or indirect consequences occurred. In an asset-recovery dispute, counsel must define the loss with precision. Is the immediate damage a reduction in the State’s treasury? Is it the loss of a particular asset? Is it the deprivation of a beneficial ownership interest? Is the injury located where the funds were removed, where the claimant is established, or where the asset is now held? The answer cannot be assumed from the location of a bank account.

Article 4(3) adds a safety valve where all the circumstances show a manifestly closer connection with another country. A pre-existing relationship, such as a contract closely connected with the alleged tort, may be relevant. In Grixta, any relationship between the State, the deceased official, the companies and the alleged transfers could matter. The court will need to avoid using the flexible connection as a substitute for the primary analysis. A closer connection must be demonstrated by the factual architecture of the dispute.

Article 10 is more structured than a broad appeal to “where the money is.” If the unjust-enrichment obligation concerns a relationship existing between the parties, such as a contract or a tort closely connected with the enrichment, the law governing that relationship is considered first. This could make the characterization of an underlying tort decisive. If no relationship supplies the answer, the parties’ common habitual residence and then the place where enrichment occurred become relevant. The result can still be displaced by a manifestly closer connection.

French law provides a useful substantive comparison, without displacing Rome II’s choice-of-law rules. Article 1303 of the Civil Code provides that a person who benefits from unjustified enrichment at another’s expense owes an indemnity equal to the lesser of the enrichment and the impoverishment, subject to the situations identified by the text. Its central sentence begins: “En dehors des cas de gestion d’affaires et de paiement de l’indu, celui qui bénéficie d’un enrichissement injustifié au détriment d’autrui doit, à celui qui s’en trouve appauvri, une indemnité égale à la moindre des deux valeurs de l’enrichissement et de l’appauvrissement.” The current provision is published by Légifrance, Article 1303 of the Civil Code.

Article 1303-1 gives the French test for the absence of justification: “L’enrichissement est injustifié lorsqu’il ne procède ni de l’accomplissement d’une obligation par l’appauvri ni de son intention libérale.” The wording helps show why the legal basis of a transfer matters. A payment may be morally controversial but legally justified by a contract, a statute, a settlement or another obligation. The official text is at Légifrance, Article 1303-1.

Article 1303-3 makes the action subsidiary in French law. It states: “L’appauvri n’a pas d’action sur ce fondement lorsqu’une autre action lui est ouverte ou se heurte à un obstacle de droit, tel que la prescription.” That rule is not the answer to the Rome II classification question, but it illustrates the litigation consequence of choosing an enrichment label. A claimant may need to prove why a tort, contract, ownership or statutory recovery route is unavailable before relying on unjust enrichment under French substantive law. See Légifrance, Article 1303-3.

Valuation can also diverge from the public narrative of “stolen assets.” Under Article 1303-4, French law assesses the impoverishment at the date of expenditure and the enrichment as it remains at the date of the claim, with the relevant amounts evaluated at the date of judgment and a special rule for bad faith. The official text is available at Légifrance, Article 1303-4. A claimant tracing a portfolio, property company or bank balance must therefore preserve valuation evidence, not only evidence of the original transfer.

A tort theory may instead resemble the general French rules in Articles 1240 and 1241 of the Civil Code. Article 1240 states: “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer.” It is published at Légifrance, Article 1240. Article 1241 adds: “Chacun est responsable du dommage qu’il a causé non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa négligence ou par son imprudence.” See Légifrance, Article 1241. These provisions are not automatically applicable to Grixta; the applicable-law analysis must come first. They show, however, the difference between proving a wrongful act and proving enrichment without legal justification.

The line between the two heads of liability can become decisive when the claim is directed at a person who did not commit the original corruption or diversion. A company may be accused of receiving funds without being accused of participating in the underlying offence. An heir may hold property because of succession law rather than a personal act. A bank may have carried out payments under instructions without acquiring the final benefit. Tort, unjust enrichment, succession, company law and property law may each describe a different part of the same factual chain. The legal characterization must respect those distinctions rather than treating every recipient as a tortfeasor.

Rome II also separates applicable law from procedure. The Regulation does not govern evidence and procedure as such, while the law selected under its provisions can govern substantive questions such as the existence and extent of an obligation, the consequences of breach, assessment of damage and the extinction of an obligation, subject to the instrument’s limits. A Maltese court may therefore apply one country’s substantive law while using Maltese procedural rules. If the law selected is Libyan law, the absence of EU membership does not alone prevent its application: Rome II is designed to designate the law specified by its rules, whether or not that law belongs to a Member State.

This is why the Grixta opinion matters to practitioners long before a final recovery order. The classification determines the legal research plan. Counsel must obtain the relevant Libyan provisions, their authentic language and reliable translations; map the corporate and succession relationships; establish where the alleged enrichment took place; analyse the direct damage; and test whether another legal relationship is manifestly closer. A court cannot make that choice safely from a press description or a generic allegation that assets were corruptly acquired.

II. What would Grixta change for assets, banks and French proceedings?

A. Why does classification control applicable law, jurisdictional strategy and evidence?

For a bank or corporate holder, the difference between a tort and unjust enrichment is not academic. It may change the elements that must be proved, the identity of the proper defendant, the role of good faith, the treatment of a change in asset value, the availability of a limitation defence and the way the claimant connects an asset to the alleged conduct. It may also change which experts are needed. A public-law expert may explain Libyan anti-corruption powers; a private-international-law expert may address Rome II; a valuation expert may trace the value through companies, shares, loans or property.

The first evidence layer is legal provenance. The file should contain the statute invoked by Libya, the official version in force at the relevant dates, the authority competent to bring the claim, any decision authorising the litigation, and the relief requested. If the claim relies on a provision that permits the State to recover property directly, that power must be separated from the private-law consequences of a court judgment. If the claim relies on ownership, the documents showing the State’s title must be distinguished from documents showing an unlawful transfer. If the claim relies on unjust enrichment, the file must identify both sides of the enrichment and impoverishment.

The second layer is the transactional chain. Preserve account statements, payment instructions, loan agreements, share registers, corporate minutes, beneficial-owner declarations, property deeds, trust or nominee documents, invoices, tax records, correspondence and records of every onward transfer. The original format and metadata matter. A court evaluating a cross-border claim will ask when each document was created, who controlled the account, whether consideration was paid, whether the recipient had notice, and whether the asset was exchanged for another form of value.

The third layer is the relationship map. The deceased person’s status, the companies’ incorporation and management, the heirs’ legal position, the State’s alleged loss and the location of each asset should be plotted separately. A corporate shareholder is not necessarily the company. An heir is not necessarily the estate administrator. A company holding an account is not necessarily the beneficial owner. A bank executing a payment is not necessarily enriched. These distinctions influence both the Rome II connecting factors and the procedural right to sue or be sued.

French law illustrates why the forum cannot be ignored even when Maltese proceedings are central. Article 3 of the Civil Code provides: “Les lois de police et de sûreté obligent tous ceux qui habitent le territoire.” It also states that French law governs French immovables, including those owned by foreigners, and addresses the status and capacity of French nationals abroad. The official provision is available at Légifrance, Article 3 of the Civil Code. For a French asset, a foreign recovery theory may encounter mandatory French rules even when the main claim is governed by another law.

Article 6 of the Civil Code adds: “On ne peut déroger, par des conventions particulières, aux lois qui intéressent l’ordre public et les bonnes moeurs.” The official text of Article 6 is a domestic expression of public policy. In a cross-border dispute, it should not be used as a vague invitation to reject foreign law. The relevant question is whether applying the designated law or recognising the resulting decision would cross a sufficiently fundamental French public-policy boundary. The burden is different from asking which law is closest to the facts.

Jurisdictional strategy must be kept separate from Rome II. Article 42 of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that territorial jurisdiction ordinarily follows the defendant’s domicile and, where there are several defendants, gives the claimant a choice among their domiciles. The official text is at Légifrance, Article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 46 permits a claimant, in matters of tort, to sue either where the harmful event occurred or where the damage was suffered; see Légifrance, Article 46. These domestic rules are starting points for a French forum analysis, not a substitute for any applicable European or international jurisdiction instrument.

The question is especially sensitive where the claimant wants to preserve French assets while the merits are litigated in Malta or Libya. A French bank may receive a request to block an account. A shareholder may face a claim over securities. A property company may be asked not to sell. A French court may need to determine whether it has power to grant interim relief, whether the claimant has shown a credible right, whether the risk of dissipation is real and whether immunity or another mandatory rule intervenes. None of those questions is answered solely by the publication of the Grixta opinion.

For that reason, the best response to a cross-border notice is a controlled legal hold. The recipient should preserve the relevant assets and documents, identify the authority and legal instrument relied upon, avoid a transfer that could frustrate a lawful measure, and obtain advice before making a voluntary admission. A bank should not turn an unverified allegation into an irreversible account closure. A holder should not move the asset to a new jurisdiction merely to make service or enforcement harder. The aim is to maintain the status quo while the legal basis is tested.

Where French substantive law is ultimately selected, the Civil Code provisions on tort and unjust enrichment provide concrete questions. Under Article 1240, what act caused the loss and who committed it? Under Article 1241, is negligence or imprudence alleged? Under Articles 1303 and 1303-1, what enrichment exists, what impoverishment corresponds to it, and why is the enrichment unjustified? Under Article 1303-3, is another action available or is the restitution claim barred by prescription or another legal obstacle? Under Article 1303-4, what value remains at the date of the claim and at the date of judgment? If another law is selected, the same questions must be translated into that law rather than silently answered with French concepts.

The evidence must also address good faith and notice. A recipient who paid market value after reasonable checks may occupy a different legal position from a recipient who received assets without consideration and ignored repeated warnings. That distinction does not decide the Rome II gateway, but it may affect liability, restitution, valuation and defences. The record should show what the recipient knew, when it knew it, which documents were reviewed and whether the transaction had a plausible commercial explanation.

B. What would French courts test before recognising, freezing or enforcing a foreign recovery claim?

A foreign recovery claim has to cross several procedural bridges before it becomes an enforceable result in France. A claim filed in Malta is not a French title. An opinion from the CJEU is not a seizure order. A press report is not a designation. A foreign judgment may require recognition or exequatur before it can support enforcement against French assets, subject to any European or treaty regime that applies to the particular judgment.

Article 509 of the French Code of Civil Procedure states: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” The official provision is published at Légifrance, Article 509. The text is short but decisive: execution depends on the applicable legal route and the conditions imposed by that route. It does not grant automatic execution to every foreign order concerning assets located in France.

Outside an applicable convention or European regime, the leading French rule is the first civil chamber’s judgment of 20 February 2007, no. 05-14.082, known as Cornelissen. The official Cour de cassation decision states that, to grant exequatur, the French judge must verify the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court, conformity with French international public policy in substance and procedure, and absence of fraud. The judge does not normally reopen the merits simply because the foreign court applied a different law. That balance is important for a Libyan recovery judgment: recognition is a serious control, but it is not a second trial on every factual and legal issue.

The first condition is not satisfied by naming Malta or Libya in the pleadings. The foreign court must have a sufficiently characterised connection with the dispute under the French approach to international jurisdiction. In its judgment of 3 March 2021, first civil chamber, no. 19-19.471, the Cour de cassation explained that the judge must control the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court by examining whether, under French private international law, the dispute was sufficiently connected to the forum. The official decision no. 19-19.471 is directly relevant to a recovery claim that links Libya, Malta, corporate defendants, heirs and assets held in several countries.

The recognition analysis also tests procedure and fraud. Defendants may raise defective service, lack of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, an improper constitution of the parties, concealment of a material procedural fact or a decision obtained through a strategy designed to evade a mandatory rule. The claimant should preserve proof of service, translations, representation, finality, the power of the State authority to litigate and the authenticity of the judgment. If the case involved unknown heirs or a deceased person’s estate, the identity and representation of every person affected by enforcement will receive close attention.

Freezing and enforcement are not the same. The French Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures recognises that a creditor may use a protective measure to safeguard rights, but it also protects persons benefiting from immunity from execution. Article L111-1 states: “Tout créancier peut pratiquer une mesure conservatoire pour assurer la sauvegarde de ses droits. L’exécution forcée et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui bénéficient d’une immunité d’exécution.” The official text is available at Légifrance, Article L111-1.

Foreign-State property receives an additional safeguard. Article L111-1-1 provides: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” See Légifrance, Article L111-1-1. The provision matters in both directions. If the property genuinely belongs to Libya, a claimant or creditor cannot proceed as if it were an ordinary private asset. If the property belongs to a private Maltese company or an heir and is merely alleged to represent value owed to Libya, the State-property rule cannot be assumed without first proving ownership and the relevant immunity position.

Article L111-1-2 then limits when the judge may authorise a measure aimed at property belonging to a foreign State. The conditions include express consent, reservation or allocation of the property to satisfy the claim, or a judgment or arbitral award against the State combined with specific non-commercial use and a link to the entity against which proceedings were brought. The detailed official text is available at Légifrance, Article L111-1-2. A judgment against a company therefore does not automatically open the door to attach a diplomatic account, a public-service asset or property with no legally established link to the judgment debtor.

For private assets, Article L511-1 sets the ordinary logic of a French conservatory measure: a person whose claim appears founded in principle may seek authorisation if circumstances threaten recovery. The text provides that the measure can take the form of a conservatory attachment or a judicial security. The official provision is at Légifrance, Article L511-1. A claimant relying on Grixta’s subject matter would still need to connect the claimed right to the identified account, shares, receivable or property and establish a real risk of dissipation. The CJEU opinion cannot replace that evidentiary showing.

That distinction also limits the reaction of a French bank. An alert saying that Libya seeks recovery of assets is not, without more, a statutory freeze. The bank should identify whether it has received a court order, an applicable restrictive measure, an instruction from a competent authority or a private demand from counsel. It should check the account holder, the beneficial owner, the asset, the transaction and any immunity claim. If it pauses an operation for risk management, it should record that this is an internal control decision rather than a declaration that the asset is legally confiscated.

Sanctions law is a separate track. A Rome II classification does not designate a person, and a civil recovery judgment does not automatically create an EU restrictive measure. Conversely, a sanctions listing does not decide who owns an asset or which law governs a restitution claim. A listed account, a frozen asset and an asset alleged to be the proceeds of corruption may overlap, but each status requires its own legal source, authority and challenge mechanism. Treating the three as interchangeable can expose a bank or holder to both under-compliance and an unjustified refusal to perform.

French courts will also examine the relief actually requested. Recognition of a money judgment is different from recognition of a declaration of ownership. A transfer order is different from a conservatory attachment. A request to compel a French company to disclose information is different from a request to seize its shares. The remedy may require a particular form of title, a particular defendant and a particular connection with France. An applicant should draft the French application around the precise asset and relief rather than importing the foreign judgment’s terminology unchanged.

For defendants, the most effective challenge is often structured rather than rhetorical. First, identify the legal nature of the foreign claim and whether the foreign court applied the correct jurisdictional gateway. Second, separate State property from private property and prove the ownership chain. Third, test service, representation, finality and fraud under the recognition rules. Fourth, challenge the link between the judgment and the asset targeted in France. Fifth, raise immunity, public policy and proportionality where the evidence supports them. A general denial that “the assets are legitimate” is weaker than a documented chain showing title, consideration, good faith and the absence of a link to the alleged diversion.

For claimants, the same logic produces a practical file. The application should attach the Grixta referral and the eventual CJEU judgment when available, but it should not present the opinion as a final holding. It should plead the legal characterization under the designated law, prove the relationship between the parties, show the asset’s location and ownership, establish the risk of dissipation, address immunity and identify the procedural route to recognition or interim relief. If a French court is asked to recognise a foreign judgment, the claimant should provide a reliable copy, proof of finality, proof of service, translations and evidence that the foreign forum had a sufficiently characterised connection.

The eventual CJEU judgment may settle the Rome II gateway and the ordering of Articles 4 and 10, but it will not erase the second-stage questions. Even if Grixta confirms that a State recovery action is civil and commercial, each French enforcement application will still depend on the judgment’s terms, the asset’s ownership, the identity of the debtor, the applicable recognition regime and any immunity from jurisdiction or execution. Even if the Court excludes a particular public-law claim from Rome II, ordinary French or Maltese private international law may still provide a route, subject to its own rules.

Conclusion

Grixta is a live test of whether European private international law can accommodate modern asset recovery without confusing public enforcement with private restitution. Libya’s status as a State is a starting fact, not the conclusion. The decisive questions are the nature of the obligation, the powers used, the relationship with each defendant and the remedy sought. If the claim enters Rome II, Article 4 may govern a tort or delict while Article 10 may govern unjust enrichment, and the choice between them will shape the connecting factors, evidence and valuation. If the claim remains outside Rome II, the forum must still apply the relevant national and international rules.

For assets that may reach France, the legal sequence is equally clear. Establish the claim and its applicable law; preserve the evidence; distinguish private assets from property of a foreign State; seek interim protection through the correct procedure; and obtain recognition before pursuing enforcement where a foreign judgment requires it. Article 509, Cornelissen, Article L111-1-1 and Article L511-1 each answer a different question. None turns a same-day opinion into an automatic freeze.

The prudent response for a bank, company, heir or fiduciary is to preserve the asset and the record while testing the legal basis. Do not move value, destroy documents or treat an allegation as a final finding. Do not assume that an official claimant can bypass ordinary civil procedure, and do not assume that a private company can defeat a properly established recovery claim by pointing only to its corporate form. The CJEU’s eventual judgment will matter, but the quality of the factual and procedural file will determine whether that judgment can be used effectively in Malta, France or another European forum.

Primary materials checked for this analysis include the InfoCuria record for the 3 September 2026 Grixta opinion, the official Maltese reference, the Rome II Regulation, the CJEU judgments in Lechouritou, Sunico and Rina, and the French texts and decisions linked above.

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