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CJEU Jautiva Ruling: Can France Publish a Minority Shareholder’s Personal Data for Sanctions Checks?

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Source : Cour de cassation – Base Open Data « Judilibre » & « Légifrance ».

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Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

CJEU Jautiva Ruling: Can France Publish a Minority Shareholder’s Personal Data for Sanctions Checks?

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A new Court of Justice ruling has put a sharp question in front of every European company register: can a state place the personal and financial details of every shareholder online, including people with a small minority holding, so that the public can screen them for sanctions, money laundering or terrorism-financing risks? In Case C-798/24, Jautiva, judgment of 3 September 2026, the Court answered that European Union law does not require that blanket disclosure and that unrestricted online access may be incompatible with the GDPR and the Charter where less intrusive safeguards are available.

The judgment came from Latvia, not France. It does not itself annul a French statute, order the French register to erase a shareholder’s name, or prevent French authorities and regulated professionals from carrying out sanctions screening. Its importance is practical and cross-border. It supplies a fresh proportionality test for any system that turns a company register into a searchable database of natural persons, and it arrives while France is operating a more targeted regime for beneficial-owner information. A French company, an investor, a compliance team and a foreign requester therefore need to distinguish three different questions: what must be filed, who may obtain it, and whether the proposed disclosure is wider than the legal objective requires.

I. What the Jautiva judgment changes for shareholder and sanctions data

A. Why C-798/24 is not a general ban on company transparency

The facts explain both the reach and the limits of the ruling. Seventeen minority shareholders of a Latvian public limited liability company challenged legislation requiring information about shareholders to be made available to the public. The information included names, identity numbers or dates of birth, identity-document details, contact addresses, email addresses, the class and nominal value of shares, and the votes attached to those shares. The data could be viewed online and downloaded in bulk by an unidentified user. The national court referred questions to Luxembourg because the legislature relied on several objectives at once: business transparency, prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, prevention of proliferation financing, and implementation of national, international and EU sanctions.

The first answer concerns company-law harmonisation. Article 14(d) of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 does not, on the Court’s reading, require disclosure of information about every shareholder of a public limited liability company. The Court’s official summary states: “EU law does not require the disclosure” of information relating to all shareholders, including minority shareholders. That is not the same as saying that shareholders can never be identified, that every corporate filing must be confidential, or that a member state cannot impose transparency obligations under national law. It means that the particular EU company-law provision cannot be used as an automatic legal basis for universal publication of all shareholder data.

That distinction matters in France. The French company register has a public-information function. Article L. 123-1 of the French Commercial Code establishes the register of commerce and companies and connects its entries, acts and filed documents with public knowledge under the conditions laid down by law. The national registry architecture also includes the register of companies and their beneficial owners held through the one-stop system. Article L. 123-50 of the Commercial Code identifies the National Business Register and the National Institute of Industrial Property as part of that architecture. Those provisions do not convert every piece of personal information held by a company into an unrestricted internet publication.

A second distinction is between a shareholder and a beneficial owner. A shareholder may have voting or economic rights without meeting the legal test for beneficial ownership. A beneficial owner is identified by the control he or she ultimately exercises over a company or entity. The French beneficial-owner declaration is therefore designed to identify control, not to create a complete public list of every person who owns a few shares. Article L. 225-1 of the Commercial Code, which describes the société anonyme as a company whose capital is divided into shares and limits the associates’ losses to their contributions, illustrates why a shareholding relationship and a control relationship cannot simply be treated as interchangeable legal categories.

The Court’s second answer is based on fundamental rights. Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protect private life and personal data. They are not absolute, but a restriction must have a legal basis, respect the essence of the right and satisfy proportionality. The GDPR supplies the operational framework: Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 require a lawful, purpose-linked and proportionate processing operation. Jautiva applies that framework to a register that exposes both identity and a person’s investment profile.

The decision is especially important because the Court did not reduce the analysis to the abstract existence of a public interest. The fact that transparency, anti-money-laundering work or sanctions enforcement is legitimate does not end the inquiry. The state must still show that the precise dataset, audience, access method and retention model are appropriate and necessary. A public interest can justify controlled access without justifying an open database, bulk downloads and anonymous searches.

This is consistent with the Court’s earlier Grand Chamber judgment in Joined Cases C-37/20 and C-601/20, WM and Sovim SA v Luxembourg Business Registers, ECLI:EU:C:2022:912, available in the official EUR-Lex judgment. That case concerned public access to beneficial-owner information. It was not a ruling on ordinary minority shareholders, and it should not be cited as if it resolved every registry question. Its value here is methodological: public access to personal data must be tested against the precise purpose and against safeguards that prevent indiscriminate use.

There is also a useful French privacy analogy. In its civil judgment of 18 October 2017, no. 16-19.740, the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation held that publication of adoption-related filiation could infringe private life even though the underlying civil-status record had been consultable by the author. The official Légifrance decision shows why “available in a record” and “lawfully republished to an unlimited audience” are not identical propositions. Jautiva applies a comparable distinction to shareholder data, while using EU law as the controlling framework in the case before it.

For a French company, the immediate conclusion is therefore measured. Jautiva does not erase the obligation to declare a beneficial owner, does not cancel the powers of the French clerk or the tax and judicial authorities, and does not make sanctions due diligence optional. It does make an overbroad publication policy vulnerable if it treats all shareholders as though they were controlling persons, publishes identifiers without a defined audience, or offers bulk access without a verifiable reason.

B. Why unrestricted online and bulk access fails the sanctions test

The most newsworthy part of Jautiva is its treatment of the sanctions argument. The Latvian court expressly asked whether disclosure was necessary to implement national, international and European Union restrictive measures. The Court accepted that sanctions enforcement is a recognised public interest. It nevertheless found that unrestricted access to all shareholder data did not appear necessary or proportionate for that purpose. Its proposed direction is precise rather than absolute: “less prejudicial means are available,” including access for people able to demonstrate a legitimate interest and, for sanctions work, focusing disclosure on data relating to people who are actually included on sanctions lists.

That reasoning changes the compliance conversation. Sanctions screening is not a blank cheque to collect or publish every natural person connected to a company. A screening system has to identify the legal purpose, the relevant population and the minimum data needed for a reliable match. If a bank needs to determine whether a beneficial owner is a designated person, it may need identity data and control information. That does not automatically show why the email address, personal home address, identity-document issue date, share nominal value and voting history of every minority shareholder should be downloadable by an anonymous internet user.

The Court also focused on the data’s combined effect. A name alone may be relatively limited. A name linked to an identification number, an address, the value of shares and the sectors or undertakings in which the person invests can reveal wealth and economic behaviour. Jautiva describes the resulting interference as serious because the data may be accessed by an unlimited audience, retained, copied and disseminated for reasons unrelated to the public objective. The risk is not confined to a mistaken sanctions hit. It includes identity theft, targeted fraud, harassment, pressure on investors and commercial intelligence unrelated to anti-money-laundering controls.

Bulk downloading is a separate risk multiplier. An online page that requires a verified request for one company is not equivalent to an export function that allows a user to collect thousands of records. The latter changes the scale, speed and persistence of the processing. It also makes it harder for the registry to determine who is looking, why the data are being used and whether a later use remains within the original purpose. Jautiva treats the absence of safeguards around internet access and bulk download as central to the proportionality assessment, not as a minor technical defect.

French compliance teams should not misread this as permission to stop screening. Article L. 561-46 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires companies and covered entities to declare beneficial-owner information and gives broad access, within their missions, to judicial authorities, the French financial-intelligence unit, customs, tax officers, authorised judicial police officers, supervisory authorities, the French Anti-Corruption Agency, Treasury agents implementing European restrictive measures, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and other listed authorities. The same provision grants covered anti-money-laundering professionals access to the information in the context of at least one vigilance measure. Jautiva does not remove those targeted statutory channels.

The practical difference is between an authorised user with a defined vigilance or enforcement purpose and an unidentified person browsing a public database. The former has a legal role, a documented purpose and professional duties. The latter may have no connection to the company, no reason to process the information and no duty to prevent onward dissemination. Any French or European system that ignores this difference will face a stronger challenge after Jautiva.

The same-day C-147/25 Inter Rao Lietuva judgment, which addressed EU restrictive measures and a state-owned company, should also be kept separate. It concerns a different legal question and a different factual setting. A sanctions measure can be unlawful for one reason while a registry disclosure can be disproportionate for another. The two judgments can be read together only at the level of method: a sanctions objective requires a legally grounded, evidence-based measure, not a presumption that every connected person or every item of personal data must be exposed.

For a foreign investor or journalist, the message is equally important. The fact that a French company has a cross-border business, foreign shareholders or possible exposure to a sanctions list does not guarantee a right to obtain the full personal details of all shareholders. The request must identify the person’s role, the company connection, the actual inquiry and the legal purpose. A request based only on curiosity, a general desire to map wealth or a plan to upload the data to another database is precisely the kind of open-ended use that proportionality rules are intended to prevent.

For companies, the decision is a reason to audit the data lifecycle. Ask what is filed, what appears in a search result, which fields are visible after authentication, whether downloads are logged, whether the requester’s identity is verified, how long records are retained, and which users may pass information to another country. If those controls do not match the public-interest objective, the risk is not merely theoretical. A person whose data are exposed can combine Jautiva with the GDPR, the Charter, French privacy law and the procedural remedies described below.

II. What a French company, investor or foreign requester should do now

A. Which French register data remain available and how to request access

Start with the correct register. The French RNE is not the same thing as the beneficial-owner information held under the anti-money-laundering provisions, and neither should be confused with a company’s internal register of movements in securities. A request that names the wrong register or asks for “all shareholder data” without identifying the legal category is likely to produce delay, refusal or an answer that cannot safely be used.

The French beneficial-owner declaration is governed principally by Article L. 561-46 of the Monetary and Financial Code. The company or relevant entity declares identification information, the beneficial owner’s personal domicile and the modalities of control exercised over the entity. The provision is not a public invitation to publish every data field to every requester. It creates differentiated access: the entity has access to the information it declared; a natural person can access information about entities for which that person has been declared beneficial owner; listed authorities have direct access for their missions; and regulated anti-money-laundering professionals have access in the context of vigilance obligations.

Other requesters fall under the controlled-access mechanism in Article L. 561-46-2. That provision addresses, among other categories, certain anti-money-laundering professionals and equivalent authorities outside the ordinary French access channel, as well as public-interest uses connected with European funds and public contracts. It requires the register holder or the competent clerk to assess whether the requester has a legitimate interest. It also includes restrictions on communicating the information to third parties and provisions concerning the history of consultations. The design is important after Jautiva because it replaces anonymous availability with a reasoned access route.

The register infrastructure matters when identifying the decision-maker. The RNE is held by the INPI and receives entries and filings through the one-stop formalities system under Article L. 123-50 of the Commercial Code. For beneficial-owner access, the request may be directed to the register holder or the competent clerk, depending on the legal route and the entity concerned. The requester should preserve the submission receipt, the identity of the recipient, the date of transmission and every supporting document. Those details become critical if the decision is late, incomplete or refused.

French regulations now give a working definition of legitimate interest. Article R. 561-58-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code links the assessment to the requester’s function or employment and, in the ordinary categories, to a connection with the company or entity. The point is not to demand a dramatic personal story. It is to show a real and legally relevant relationship: a proposed acquisition, an existing contractual relationship, a fraud or asset-tracing inquiry, a litigation file, a professional due-diligence task or another purpose that can be documented and connected to the company. A generic request to investigate wealthy shareholders is weaker than a request tied to a named transaction and a defined risk.

A current certificate from another EU central register may affect how the function or employment is checked, but it does not remove the need to respect the French rules governing the requested use. A requester should therefore attach the foreign certificate, identify its scope and explain why it covers the French entity and the particular purpose. A certificate is evidence, not a licence to republish the information to an unrestricted audience.

The application should be built as an evidence bundle. Include a reliable identity document for the applicant or an authorisation for the representative; the company’s legal name, registration number and registered office; the applicant’s professional role; the contract, draft contract, court document or transaction file establishing the connection; the precise information sought; the legal purpose; the planned recipients; and the safeguards that will prevent onward disclosure. If the requester is outside the European Union, include the proposed transfer mechanism and explain where the data will be stored and who will see it. Translations should be accurate, and the original documents should remain available for verification.

The processing timetable is set out in Article R. 561-58-2. The register holder or clerk normally decides within twelve working days. A requester who holds a valid access certificate receives the benefit of a seven-working-day examination period for another request. The first period may be extended in the event of a sudden high volume of applications, and additional documents may affect the timetable. Silence at the end of the applicable period is an implicit rejection. It is not a grant of access and should not be treated as permission to obtain or use the data by another route.

A successful access decision is not necessarily a one-off informal email. Under Article R. 561-58-3, a certificate of access based on recognised legitimate interest is valid for three years. The same provision lists refusal grounds, including missing information or documents, failure to prove legitimate interest, serious indications of a use unrelated to the requested purpose or anti-money-laundering objective, limits on recognition of an EU register determination, and incompatibility of a transfer to a third country with Chapter V of the GDPR. A refusal must be reasoned and must state the available routes and deadlines for appeal.

Once a valid certificate exists, Article R. 561-58-4 allows the register holder or clerk to verify the requester’s identity without repeating the function or employment assessment for each access. That convenience comes with continuing responsibility. Under Article R. 561-58-6, access may be revoked when the conditions are no longer met. A requester who changes employer, loses the company connection or changes the purpose should not continue using the certificate as if nothing had changed.

The same rules help an international legal team advise its client. The first question is not “Can we find the name online?” It is “What is our lawful role in this request?” The second is not “Can we download the record?” It is “What minimum field set answers the defined question?” The third is not “Can we send the result to a partner abroad?” It is “Does the recipient and the transfer mechanism satisfy data-protection rules?” Those questions track the logic of Jautiva and make the request easier to defend if reviewed by a clerk, regulator or judge.

B. How to challenge excessive disclosure, a refusal or a defective filing

A person affected by a disclosure should preserve evidence before asking for a correction. Save the exact URL, the search terms, the date and time, screenshots, downloaded files, the visible fields, the absence or presence of an authentication barrier, and any indication that bulk export was possible. Identify whether the data concern an ordinary shareholder, a beneficial owner, a director or another person. The legal argument changes with that classification. A Jautiva-based challenge should not silently treat a minority shareholder as a beneficial owner, or a beneficial owner as though no statutory access regime existed.

If the underlying French filing is wrong or incomplete, the first route is correction through the company and the registry process. Article R. 561-55 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires an update within thirty days of an event that makes a correction or completion necessary, subject to the specific rule for collective investment funds. The person challenging the entry should assemble the documents showing the change in control, identity, address or control modality and ask for a written record of the request. A publication dispute can remain unresolved if the source filing is never corrected.

The clerk also has a verification role. Article L. 561-47 provides for checking the completeness, conformity and supporting documents of beneficial-owner information. If the declarant fails to file or regularise after a formal notice within the statutory period, the clerk may take the measures provided by law, including striking the registration. That enforcement mechanism protects the integrity of the register, but it does not answer the separate question whether every correctly filed field may be released to every person. Accuracy and proportionality are two different control points.

The second route challenges the scope or conditions of access. A person whose information is made available without a legitimate-interest filter can rely on the reasoning of Jautiva: the national court must ask whether the dataset and audience are necessary, whether targeted access would work, and whether the system prevents anonymous bulk extraction. The claim should identify the exact processing operation rather than ask for an abstract declaration that company transparency is unlawful. Useful requests may include suspending a public endpoint, limiting a field, disabling bulk download, recording access, correcting a match or preventing onward disclosure while the dispute is examined.

French private-life law supplies a national foundation. Article 9 of the Civil Code protects respect for private life and allows a judge to order measures, including in urgent proceedings, to prevent or stop an infringement. The Cour de cassation judgment no. 16-19.740 discussed above is useful when explaining why a source’s accessibility does not automatically authorise publication for a new audience and a new purpose. The argument should remain fact-specific: public corporate information is not always private, but personal identifiers and an aggregated wealth profile can trigger a stronger privacy analysis.

Recent French case law also shows that proportionality is a two-sided exercise. In its Social Chamber judgment of 14 February 2024, no. 22-23.073, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2024:SO00187, the Cour de cassation accepted the use of personal data from video surveillance after the lower court had carefully balanced the employee’s privacy against the employer’s legitimate interest in protecting its property and had found the evidence necessary and proportionate. The official Légifrance decision supports the same discipline for registry access: a defined purpose and a demonstrably necessary dataset can justify controlled processing, while a wider collection or audience needs its own justification.

Where the harm is imminent or the disturbance is manifestly unlawful, the interim judge may be available. Article 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the president of the judicial court, or the judge handling the case, to order interim or protective measures even where there is a serious dispute, particularly to prevent imminent damage or stop a manifestly unlawful disturbance. The applicant should show urgency, the data actually exposed, the concrete risk, the requested technical or legal measure, and why a narrower measure will protect the person while preserving legitimate access for authorities and regulated professionals.

A refusal of access requires a different file. Start with the written decision and check which of the statutory grounds was used. If documents were missing, submit the absent item and explain why it cures the defect. If legitimate interest was rejected, tie the request to a specific company connection and explain the exact fields needed. If the refusal relies on suspected misuse, address the proposed recipients, storage, retention and onward-transfer controls. If it concerns a third country, provide the Chapter V GDPR analysis rather than simply stating that the recipient is a lawyer or a public body.

The appeal notice matters. Under Article R. 561-58-3, the refusal must state the routes and time limits for appeal. An applicant should not assume that an informal rejection by email starts or preserves every procedural deadline. Obtain the formal decision, identify the competent reviewing authority or court, and record the date of receipt. If the decision is silent after the applicable period, treat the silence as the implicit rejection specified by Article R. 561-58-2 and calculate the next procedural step from the applicable notification and appeal rules.

Businesses should prepare for the opposite dispute as well: a competitor or third party obtains legitimate access and then republishes the information. The certificate and the original request define the purpose of access; they do not necessarily authorise publication to the internet. A company should identify the recipient, preserve the consultation history where available, send a targeted preservation or cessation request and assess data-protection, unfair-competition, confidentiality and privacy claims. The fact that data came from a public or semi-public register may affect the merits, but it does not immunise a later processing operation from its own purpose and proportionality analysis.

International transfer creates an additional fault line. A foreign requester may have a strong commercial or litigation reason to know who controls a French entity, yet the answer may not be sent if the proposed disclosure to a third country fails the GDPR’s transfer requirements. This is not a nationality test. It is a destination, safeguards and access-risk test. A request should specify the country, the recipient, the hosting location, the onward recipients, the retention period and the mechanism relied upon. The more sensitive the data, the less convincing a vague assurance becomes.

The sanctions context needs discipline in both directions. A person should not argue that Jautiva blocks a lawful targeted check of a designated person. Conversely, an authority or private requester should not infer from the existence of sanctions regimes that all shareholders are presumptively relevant. The appropriate method is to define the designation, identify the control chain, compare reliable identifiers, document false-positive analysis and disclose only what the legal task requires. If the concern is a name match, the remedy is a better match process, not an indiscriminate catalogue of unrelated investors.

A French court assessing a challenge will likely examine the interaction of the EU judgment, the GDPR, the Charter, the national access provisions and the evidence about the actual platform. The official CJEU notice emphasises that the Court of Justice does not decide the national dispute itself: the referring court must apply the interpretation, and the ruling binds other national courts facing a similar issue. That procedural point should appear in any urgent application. It avoids overstating Jautiva as an automatic order against France while still showing why a French measure that reproduces the same unrestricted, bulk-access design deserves close scrutiny.

Finally, companies should run a register governance review rather than waiting for litigation. Map every field from declaration to public interface, separate ordinary shareholder data from beneficial-owner data, document each access category, test whether anonymous export is possible, review third-country transfers, and retain a way to reconstruct who received what. The review should include the legal basis, the purpose, the retention period, the correction route and the incident response. Jautiva turns those points into evidence that can either defend a carefully designed system or expose a system that uses the word “transparency” to avoid proportionality analysis.

Conclusion

Jautiva is a warning against confusing corporate transparency with unlimited personal-data publication. The Court’s judgment of 3 September 2026, Case C-798/24, does not abolish French beneficial-owner declarations or prevent a bank, regulator, police service or sanctions authority from obtaining the information needed for a defined legal mission. It does reject the shortcut of exposing the personal and financial details of every shareholder, including minority shareholders, to any unidentified user merely because the legislature invokes transparency, anti-money-laundering or sanctions enforcement.

For a French matter, the safest analysis follows five questions. First, which register and which legal category are involved? Second, is the person an ordinary shareholder, a declared beneficial owner, a director or an authorised representative? Third, does the requester have a statutory access right or must a legitimate interest be demonstrated? Fourth, are the fields, audience and download method limited to what the purpose requires? Fifth, does any onward disclosure or transfer outside the European Union satisfy the GDPR and the conditions of the access decision?

A company should correct a defective filing promptly, keep proof of every correction request and audit its public interfaces. A requester should submit a focused evidence bundle rather than a curiosity-driven demand. An affected person should preserve the disclosure, identify the audience and seek a proportionate remedy, using the French privacy and interim-relief routes where urgency justifies them. In each case, the key evidence is concrete: the fields exposed, the access barrier, the download function, the stated purpose, the actual recipient and the safeguards.

The international consequence is clear. A French company register is part of a European data and sanctions ecosystem, but that ecosystem is not built on an assumption of permanent, anonymous and unlimited visibility. After Jautiva, lawful transparency should be targeted, explainable and technically controlled. A court, regulator or registry holder should be able to show why the information is needed, why the audience is appropriate and why a narrower route would not achieve the same result. If it cannot, the dispute is no longer about whether corporate information matters; it is about whether the chosen disclosure is proportionate.

Analysis current as of 3 September 2026. This article is general information and does not replace a review of the company’s filings, the requester’s role, the applicable sanctions regime or the procedural deadlines in an individual case.

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