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Strait of Hormuz Strike: Can French Shipowners Invoke Force Majeure After the Larak Island Attack?

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Maître Hassan KOHEN
Avocat au Barreau de Paris

Strait of Hormuz Strike: Can French Shipowners Invoke Force Majeure After the Larak Island Attack?

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The 30 August 2026 strike on Iranian rocket launchers near Larak Island has turned a familiar maritime risk into an immediate contract question for French shipowners, charterers, cargo interests and insurers: can a vessel that does not enter the Strait of Hormuz, or that arrives far outside its agreed window, rely on force majeure under French law?

The factual trigger is serious but legally precise. The Associated Press reported that United States forces struck Iranian launchers after observing Revolutionary Guard forces preparing rockets and sea mines, while commercial traffic remained at reduced levels and a projectile had struck a tanker north of Khasab. The AP account of the Larak Island attack does not establish that every voyage is legally impossible. It does establish an event, a concrete safety concern and a rapidly changing route assessment. The International Maritime Organization had already warned that “safe passage cannot be considered to exist” without credible security assurances.

For a French-law contract, the answer will depend on the date and wording of the contract, the vessel’s actual voyage, the availability of an alternative route, the decision taken by the master and the evidence preserved at the time. A war-risk label or a dramatic headline is not enough. The decisive issue is whether this particular event prevented this particular contractual obligation, despite appropriate measures. That distinction determines whether a shipowner obtains a temporary suspension, avoids damages, renegotiates performance, or faces a claim for delay, demurrage or non-delivery.

I. Can the Larak Island attack qualify as force majeure under French law?

A. What must a French court prove under Article 1218?

The starting point is the contract itself. A French-law maritime contract remains governed by its negotiated allocation of voyage risk. Article 1103 of the Civil Code states: “Les contrats légalement formés tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faits.” In English, a lawfully formed contract binds the parties as their law. A charterparty, booking note, bill of lading, service agreement or sale contract may therefore contain the first answer: a war-risk clause, an unsafe-port clause, a liberty-to-deviate clause, a sanctions clause, a route substitution clause or a notice mechanism may define the parties’ rights more specifically than the default rule.

The parties must also operate the contract in good faith. Article 1104 provides: “Les contrats doivent être négociés, formés et exécutés de bonne foi.” That is not a general licence to rewrite a bargain after an alarming news report. It does, however, require transparent communication, coherent route decisions, honest disclosure of information and cooperation with contractual safety and notice procedures. A party that silently lets a laycan expire and invokes force majeure only after a claim arrives will face a much weaker evidential position than a party that notified the risk, proposed a route and kept a contemporaneous record.

Article 1218 supplies the statutory test. Its first paragraph reads: “Il y a force majeure en matière contractuelle lorsqu’un événement échappant au contrôle du débiteur, qui ne pouvait être raisonnablement prévu lors de la conclusion du contrat et dont les effets ne peuvent être évités par des mesures appropriées, empêche l’exécution de son obligation par le débiteur.” Four questions follow from that text.

First, what is the event? The event should be formulated at the level of precision that the evidence can support. “The Iran conflict” is too broad. “The 30 August 2026 strike on launchers preparing rockets and sea mines near Larak Island, combined with the resulting security instructions and loss of a credible safe passage for the nominated vessel” is more legally useful. The AP report describes the military action and the reported preparations. The IMO statement on the Strait records the maritime safety assessment that risks were known, significant and beyond mitigation in the circumstances then described. Those are different kinds of proof: one fixes the triggering incident; the other helps prove its operational consequence.

Second, was the event outside the debtor’s control? A private shipowner does not control a military strike, the deployment of sea mines, an attack on a commercial tanker or the withdrawal of credible security assurances. That element may be straightforward. It is not the same as saying that every commercial consequence is outside the shipowner’s control. The owner still controls route planning, technical readiness, communication with the charterer, the decision to seek an alternative port and the preservation of evidence. The control analysis therefore separates the external danger from the operator’s response to it.

Third, could the precise event reasonably have been foreseen when the contract was concluded? A contract signed after repeated attacks, formal navigation warnings or a previous route suspension creates a difficult foreseeability question. The relevant risk is not whether a regional conflict existed in the abstract. It is whether the particular military escalation, mine threat, route restriction or security failure could reasonably have been anticipated at the time of contracting. A contract signed months before the reported strike will present a different case from a fixture concluded after the parties had expressly priced or allocated the same Hormuz risk. A clause that expressly assumes war risk may also affect whether the debtor can rely on the statutory defence, because the contractual allocation may show that the party accepted the risk.

Fourth, did the effects prevent performance, or merely make it slower, more expensive or less profitable? Article 1218 is concerned with prevention of the debtor’s obligation. The owner must identify the obligation that could not be performed: passage through a nominated route, arrival during a fixed delivery window, loading at a named port, delivery within a contractual transit time, or performance without exposing the vessel and crew to a prohibited level of danger. A longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, an available transshipment solution or additional bunkering may weaken a claim that delivery was impossible, even if those measures cause substantial cost. Conversely, if the only available route exposes the vessel to a documented and unmitigable threat, an alternative that is legally or physically unavailable may not defeat force majeure.

French courts have repeatedly insisted that the effect must be assessed against the obligation of the party invoking the defence. The third civil chamber’s decisions of 30 June 2022, including pourvoi no. 21-20.190, are a useful warning against treating force majeure as a free-standing answer to every disruption. The Cour de cassation explained, in the context of commercial leases and the pandemic measures, that a creditor who had not received the contractual counter-performance could not use force majeure to suspend its own obligation on that basis. The factual setting is different, but the reasoning matters: the court examines who was prevented from doing what, rather than applying the label to the entire economic relationship.

The same discipline applies to the master’s safety decision. The IMO’s warning is powerful evidence of a maritime safety context, but it is not a French civil judgment declaring every voyage impossible. The owner should connect it to the vessel: flag, cargo, draft, navigation window, security plan, crew risk, route instructions, port notices, naval advisories, insurance restrictions and the specific contractual deadline. The stronger the link between the incident and the performance failure, the more credible the Article 1218 case.

The legal consequence also depends on duration. Article 1218 expressly provides that a temporary impediment suspends performance unless the resulting delay justifies termination; a definitive impediment produces termination by operation of law under the statutory conditions. A short closure may suspend a voyage, while an open-ended prohibition that defeats the commercial purpose of a fixed delivery may justify termination. Neither result automatically awards damages. The contract, the parties’ notices and the proof of mitigation still determine the financial consequences.

B. Is a dangerous or expensive route different from a legally impossible route?

The most important distinction after the Larak Island attack is between force majeure and hardship. Article 1195 of the Civil Code addresses an unforeseen change that makes performance excessively onerous for a party that did not assume the risk. It begins: “Si un changement de circonstances imprévisible lors de la conclusion du contrat rend l’exécution excessivement onéreuse…” The party may request renegotiation, but the same provision says that it continues to perform during the renegotiation. Hardship is therefore a route toward contractual adjustment; force majeure is a defence based on prevention.

For example, a vessel may still be able to reach the destination by taking a longer route, but fuel, crew, security and delay costs may multiply. That fact may support a contractual war-risk adjustment or an Article 1195 discussion. It does not automatically prove Article 1218 force majeure. Conversely, a master may be unable to enter the Strait because a credible authority has withdrawn safe-passage assurances, the route is under attack or mines cannot be avoided. A route can then be practically and legally unavailable even if another theoretical route exists on a map. The analysis must be based on measures that were genuinely available within the contractual window, not on an abstract possibility identified after the event.

The contract may provide a more precise mechanism. A safe-port clause can permit refusal of an unsafe port without terminating the entire contract. A liberty clause can permit deviation, but the owner must follow its limits and act consistently with the voyage purpose. A war-risk clause may allocate additional premiums, escort costs, deviation rights, cancellation rights or delay. A sanctions clause may address prohibited counterparties or cargo. A force-majeure clause may contain its own definition, notice period and list of events. The clause must be read with the governing law and any applicable carriage convention; a broad label cannot erase mandatory rules or the agreed liability regime.

When the other contracting party fails to cooperate, the Civil Code offers distinct tools. Article 1219 states that one party may refuse to perform an obligation that is due if the other party does not perform its own and the breach is sufficiently serious. Article 1220 permits suspension when it is manifest that the other party will not perform at the due date and the consequences will be sufficiently serious; the text adds: “Cette suspension doit être notifiée dans les meilleurs délais.” These provisions concern non-performance by the counterparty, not an automatic response to an external attack. They should not be confused with a unilateral decision to stop a voyage merely because a route became commercially unattractive.

The general catalogue of remedies appears in Article 1217: refusal or suspension, specific performance, price reduction, termination and damages, subject to compatibility. Article 1221 limits specific performance where performance is impossible or manifestly disproportionate. Article 1231-1 states: “Le débiteur est condamné, s’il y a lieu, au paiement de dommages et intérêts soit à raison de l’inexécution de l’obligation, soit à raison du retard dans l’exécution, s’il ne justifie pas que l’exécution a été empêchée par la force majeure.” In practical terms, a shipowner needs a causation file that explains why the event prevented the obligation and why the chosen response was proportionate.

The Cour de cassation’s commercial chamber gave a further reminder in Com., 18 January 2023, no. 21-16.812. The published decision applies Articles 1217, 1227 and 1229 to judicial termination and restitution when the contractual performance has not been delivered. The court held that termination and restitution can follow even where the dispute is not framed as a fault-based claim. For a Hormuz dispute, that means a party should not focus only on escaping damages. It must also anticipate the consequences for advance freight, deposits, unused slots, cargo possession, demurrage and any benefits already exchanged.

The payment question must be handled separately. A party may be unable to deliver cargo because the route is unsafe while remaining technically able to make a payment. A force-majeure notice should identify each obligation rather than say that “the contract is suspended” in general terms. Freight, hire, demurrage, bunker adjustment, security costs and cargo release may have different contractual triggers. A court will be more receptive to a narrow, evidence-based request to suspend a defined voyage obligation than to a blanket refusal to pay every amount arising under the relationship.

II. What should French shipowners and cargo interests do after a Hormuz closure?

A. What evidence should be sent to preserve force-majeure rights?

The first notice should be sent before the missed deadline, addressed exactly as the contract requires and expressly tied to the identified voyage. It should state the relevant contractual provision, the date and time of the triggering event, the obligation affected, the anticipated period of delay, the safety information relied upon, the measures considered and the relief requested. A notice that simply forwards a newspaper article is weaker than one that attaches a route assessment signed by the master, a security advisory and a proposed mitigation plan.

The burden of proof is not theoretical. Article 1353 of the Civil Code says: “Celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.” It adds that the person claiming to be released must justify the payment or event that extinguished the obligation. The shipowner invoking Article 1218 should therefore build the file as though a court, arbitral tribunal, insurer and commercial counterparty will read it months later, without the context of the breaking news.

The most useful record separates five questions: what happened, when it happened, what obligation was due, what alternative measures were available and what loss followed. A contemporaneous evidence pack should normally include the following items:

  • the charterparty, booking note, bill of lading, sale contract, incorporated terms, agreed route, laycan, delivery window, safe-port language, war-risk clause, sanctions clause and notice clause;
  • the master’s risk assessment, company security-management record, voyage plan, AIS history, port and naval advisories, communications with the French maritime authorities and records showing why a proposed passage was or was not credible;
  • dated copies of the AP report, the IMO warning, the relevant UKMTO or coalition notices, the French Register of Shipping crisis information and any insurer or P&I circular used in the route decision;
  • emails and messages exchanged with the charterer, shipper, consignee, terminal, broker, bank and insurer, including proposed deviations, refusals, extensions and requests for instructions;
  • the financial trail: additional fuel, security, crew, port, storage, transshipment and survey costs, along with invoices, quotations, cancelled bookings, demurrage calculations and cargo-condition reports.

French maritime-authority crisis information is useful for the operational context, but it should not replace vessel-specific proof. Nor should an IMO warning be treated as a substitute for the company’s own safety-management assessment. The IMO’s official English statement places ultimate responsibility for voyage planning and realistic risk assessment on the master and company. That principle strengthens a properly documented refusal to expose seafarers to an unmitigable danger; it also makes an unexplained route decision harder to defend.

Notice strategy matters as much as the volume of documents. The party should reserve its rights while avoiding an overstatement that can later be used against it. It can say that the attack, the mine risk and the absence of credible security assurances have prevented or are expected to prevent the specified voyage obligation, while reserving the position pending updated official information. It should state whether the impediment is temporary, request cooperation on a revised route or delivery point, and identify any contractual deadline that must be extended. If the contract requires notice within a particular number of hours, that deadline should be treated as a separate urgent obligation.

The response should also preserve the distinction between mitigation and waiver. Exploring a diversion does not necessarily waive force majeure; it may prove that appropriate measures were considered. Accepting a revised route or delivery date may, however, amend the contract if the communication is framed as a final agreement. Written reservations should identify whether a proposal is made without prejudice, whether it changes laytime or demurrage, and whether additional security and fuel costs are allocated. Silence can create an argument about acceptance, reliance or good faith.

Insurance notifications must run in parallel. Force majeure answers a contractual liability question; it does not by itself create cover. Hull and machinery, war-risk, protection and indemnity, cargo, delay-in-start-up and business-interruption policies may apply different definitions, exclusions, deductibles, notice requirements and consent procedures. A deviation ordered without insurer approval can create a second dispute even if the owner ultimately proves that the original route was unsafe. The broker and underwriters should receive the same factual chronology, with policy references and a request for written instructions, while privileged legal analysis is kept separate where appropriate.

Sanctions create another independent track. The Council of the European Union’s 8 June 2026 measure on freedom of navigation in the Strait records listings relating to conduct that threatens navigation and describes asset freezes and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to listed persons and entities. It links to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1226. A French company must check the current EU list, cargo, banks, agents, owners, charterers, beneficial owners and payments before treating a route change as a purely safety-driven decision. A prohibited payment or service may be impossible for sanctions reasons, but sanctions compliance and Article 1218 remain separate legal analyses. One cannot be used as a shortcut to prove the other.

The most defensible notice is therefore operational, contractual and regulatory at the same time. It states what the ship can safely do, what it cannot do, why the event was not reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, which alternatives were unavailable or insufficient, what temporary solution is proposed and which sums are reserved. That format gives the counterparty a chance to cooperate and gives the later decision-maker a clear causal chain.

B. Who bears delay, loss and payment risk—shipowner, charterer, cargo owner or insurer?

There is no single “Hormuz liability.” The same incident can produce different results under the owner–charterer relationship, the carrier–cargo interest relationship, the sale contract, the terminal contract, the financing documents and the insurance policies. The relevant question is not who suffered the largest loss, but which contractual obligation was prevented and who assumed the corresponding risk.

For the sanctions side of the same regional crisis, readers can compare our earlier analysis of Iran sanctions exposure for French shipowners, insurers and crypto firms. That article addresses a different question: a sanctions prohibition is not the same as unsafe navigation or physical prevention under Article 1218.

For the shipowner, the first issue is the vessel’s safe navigation and the scope of the voyage order. If the nominated route is objectively unsafe, the owner may have a strong basis to refuse that passage or seek instructions, especially where a safe-port or war-risk clause supports the decision. But the owner should still examine whether the ship can reach the contractual destination by a reasonable deviation, whether the contract authorises it, who pays the extra cost and whether the deviation changes the cargo delivery obligation. A refusal that protects the crew may be justified; a refusal to investigate any practical alternative may be attacked as a failure to mitigate.

For the charterer, the core questions often concern hire, freight, laytime, demurrage, cancellation and the duty to nominate a safe port or lawful cargo. The charterer may argue that the owner had a contractual liberty to deviate or that a delay clause governs. The owner may argue that a route instruction became unsafe or unlawful and that performance was prevented. The answer turns on the wording, the timing of the instruction and the evidence available when the decision was taken. A later reduction in market value does not retrospectively make a voyage impossible.

For the cargo owner and buyer, the sale contract may have a separate delivery term and a different risk-transfer mechanism. Incoterms, documentary conditions and the governing law can determine whether a delay is a seller’s problem, a buyer’s risk after shipment or a dispute over documents rather than physical delivery. A cargo interest should not assume that a carrier’s force-majeure notice automatically suspends its own payment obligation to the seller. It should map the chain: sale, carriage, insurance, financing and any resale commitment. Each contract may require a separate notice and evidence pack.

For the insurer, the question is policy coverage, not whether a French court would excuse contractual delay. A war-risk policy may respond to physical loss or damage; a cargo policy may respond to a covered peril; a P&I policy may have exclusions or special procedures; a delay claim may require a specific endorsement. The owner should avoid promising that insurance will reimburse route costs until coverage is confirmed. It should also preserve survey evidence and avoid prejudice to recovery rights against the party responsible for a physical attack or unsafe instruction.

Banks and payment providers occupy a separate position. The EU measure described by the Council includes asset-freeze consequences for listed persons and entities. U.S. sanctions, export controls, correspondent-bank restrictions and contractual compliance representations may add another layer. A bank’s refusal to process a payment can become a compliance issue, a contractual impossibility issue or a banking-services dispute depending on the facts. A French company should not tell a counterparty that a payment is blocked by “the war” without identifying the actual rule, listed party, licence question or bank decision involved.

The remedies must then be matched to the performance failure. A temporary obstruction may suspend the affected voyage obligation. A permanent obstruction may terminate the contract under Article 1218. A serious counterparty breach may engage Articles 1219 or 1220. A claim for termination and restitution may rely on the architecture confirmed in Com., 18 January 2023, no. 21-16.812. Damages under Article 1231-1 require the debtor to show that force majeure prevented performance; they do not turn every war-related market loss into a compensable amount.

The phrase “force majeure” should therefore be narrowed to the obligation and period actually affected. A shipowner may be excused from entering the Strait on 30 August while remaining obliged to safeguard cargo, notify the charterer, preserve the vessel, seek a lawful alternative and account for advances. A cargo buyer may obtain a delivery extension while remaining responsible for an unrelated payment that was not prevented. An insurer may cover physical damage while rejecting commercial delay. A sanctions clause may prohibit a payment while leaving the voyage contract otherwise intact. Precision prevents a safety defence from becoming an overbroad refusal and helps the parties settle the part of the dispute that the evidence can resolve.

The forum and procedure should be checked immediately. A French court, an arbitral tribunal, a foreign court, a maritime court or a contractual expert may have jurisdiction. The contract may require London arbitration, Paris arbitration, a specific commercial court or an urgent application for evidence preservation. The governing law of the charterparty may differ from the law of the sale or insurance policy. Before issuing a notice that admits a breach, waives a clause or accepts a revised route, the company should obtain a coordinated review of the contract, applicable sanctions, insurance conditions and evidence. The deadline may be measured in hours, but the legal consequences can last for years.

Conclusion

The Larak Island attack is a credible trigger for urgent force-majeure analysis, not an automatic exemption for every French maritime contract. Under Article 1218, a French court will ask whether the event was outside the debtor’s control, could not reasonably have been foreseen when the contract was made, could not be avoided by appropriate measures and actually prevented the identified obligation. The IMO’s warning and the reported military action strengthen the factual case for a vessel-specific safety decision; they do not eliminate the need to prove causation, notice and mitigation.

French shipowners and cargo interests should act on two tracks. They should send a precise reservation and force-majeure notice before the contractual deadline, while separately notifying insurers, brokers, banks and compliance teams. They should preserve the voyage plan, official warnings, route alternatives, master’s assessment, contract clauses, communications and quantified loss. The strongest claim will be the narrowest one: this obligation, on this voyage, during this period, could not safely or lawfully be performed despite the measures that were genuinely available.

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