The Court of Justice of the European Union has delivered a same-day ruling that will matter well beyond Romania’s public-sector pay disputes. In Case C-606/24, XY and Others v Ministerul Finanţelor, ECLI:EU:C:2026:686, the Fourth Chamber accepted, in principle, a Romanian mechanism requiring certain lower courts to send a new point of domestic law to the High Court of Cassation and Justice before deciding the case. The mechanism was adopted by OUG No 62/2024 after employees brought a claim for salary differences. The judgment is not a licence for a supreme court to command the outcome of ordinary litigation. Its permission is conditional: the statutory route must be defined in advance, the referring court must retain power to decide the dispute, and every national court must remain able to send questions of EU law to Luxembourg before or after the domestic referral. That distinction is the real news. For companies, employees, public authorities and litigants facing a cross-border EU-law issue, C-606/24 supplies a practical test for identifying when a domestic consistency procedure protects legal certainty and when it starts to obstruct the preliminary-ruling system.
I. Can Romania require lower courts to refer a new legal point to its supreme court?
A. What did the CJEU decide in Ministerul Finanţelor?
The case began with a Romanian salary dispute, not with an institutional challenge brought by a judge or a bar association. On 20 November 2023, the applicants brought proceedings against the Romanian Ministry of Finance. They sought recalculation and payment of salary-related differences on the basis that they should receive the remuneration applicable to comparable public posts paid from public funds. While that litigation was pending, Romania adopted Emergency Ordinance No 62/2024, known as OUG No 62/2024, which entered into force on 14 June 2024.
The ordinance used an existing procedural idea and changed its legal force. Under Article 519 of the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, a panel ruling at last instance could, subject to admissibility conditions, ask the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție, or High Court of Cassation and Justice, for a preliminary decision on a new point of law. The national court had to explain why the point was necessary to decide the case and why it had not already been resolved. OUG No 62/2024 made that route mandatory in defined categories of proceedings concerning, in essence, the remuneration of staff paid from public funds and certain social-security benefits. It also provided a mechanism for suspending similar disputes while the supreme court dealt with a point of law.
The referring Romanian court was concerned about what this change could do to adjudication. Its question asked whether judicial independence under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, prevented national legislation from requiring panels in the specified salary cases to ask the supreme court for a preliminary ruling on every new point of law. The concern was not abstract. The referring court identified the possibility that a central court could become the effective decision-maker, that proceedings could be delayed, that parties could be treated differently depending on whether a similar point had already reached Bucharest, and that the measure could have been driven by concern about the national budget rather than by judicial reasons.
The CJEU did not answer by asking whether Romania was allowed to organise its courts in a particular style. The organisation of national justice systems remains primarily a Member State responsibility. The question was whether the chosen system complied with the EU obligations that attach to every national body capable of ruling on questions in the fields covered by EU law. Article 19(1) TEU is the anchor. Its second subparagraph says that “Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” The Court has repeatedly treated that obligation as a requirement concerning the independence, impartiality and lawful establishment of the courts that may apply EU law.
In C-606/24, the Court first separated the Charter analysis from the Article 19 analysis. The referring court had not shown that the salary dispute itself concerned the interpretation or application of an EU rule implemented at national level. Article 51(1) of the Charter therefore meant that Article 47 was not directly applicable to that dispute as such. Article 51 provides that the Charter addresses Member States “when they are implementing EU law.” The Court nevertheless used the guarantees associated with Article 47 to interpret the effective judicial-protection obligation in Article 19(1) TEU. That is an important drafting point for future litigation: Article 47 cannot be invoked as a free-standing answer to every domestic procedural problem, but its judicial guarantees remain relevant when the Court applies Article 19 to courts within the EU-law judicial field.
The Court then assessed the Romanian procedure as a system of legal certainty. It noted that conflicting case-law is a risk inherent in any judicial system, and that Member States may choose different methods to reduce that risk and promote equal treatment. The mandatory character of the referral did not, by itself, establish an interference with the deciding panel’s independence. The Court looked instead at the legal architecture: objective admissibility conditions, a point of law that had not previously been dealt with, a necessary connection with the pending dispute, and a distinction between abstract interpretation by the supreme court and application of the interpreted rule by the referring court.
Paragraph 72 of the judgment expresses that division of labour in precise terms: “The former courts retain exclusive jurisdiction to apply the law and to resolve the dispute before them, whereas the latter rules on the abstract interpretation of the rule of law which is the subject of the preliminary question raised by the court concerned.” In context, “the former courts” means the courts that refer the point and “the latter” means the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The supreme court can settle the meaning of a new legal provision within the domestic procedure; it cannot take over the merits, weigh the evidence, or decide which party wins the salary claim.
The CJEU also declined to decide whether OUG No 62/2024 was compatible with the Romanian Constitution. Under Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU interprets EU law; the national court interprets its own law. The judgment expressly recalled that “the Court has no jurisdiction to interpret national law, that being exclusively for the national court.” That allocation matters when a party argues that a domestic referral statute is unconstitutional, ultra vires, or inconsistent with a national separation-of-powers rule. The national court must conduct that inquiry under national law while also preserving the EU-law limits identified by Luxembourg.
The immediate answer was therefore carefully qualified. Article 19(1) TEU, read with Article 47 of the Charter, does not in principle preclude legislation that requires a national court, in a specified matter and on a new point of law, to refer the point to a supreme court or await the result of another referral. The CJEU’s operative answer is a permission with conditions, not a general approval of mandatory vertical review. The conditions become decisive whenever the domestic process touches an EU-law question.
B. Why did the Court accept a mandatory domestic referral?
The judgment is best understood as a distinction between hierarchy and subordination. A supreme court may have a legitimate role in harmonising national case-law without becoming a superior political authority over every trial judge. The CJEU’s institutional question was whether OUG No 62/2024 left the lower court with a genuine adjudicative task. It found, on the material before it, that the domestic law appeared to define the powers of the two levels in advance. The High Court of Cassation and Justice gave an abstract answer to a legal question; the original panel remained responsible for applying that answer to the facts and deciding the dispute.
That reasoning connects with the Court’s earlier case-law. In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, judgment of 27 February 2018, the Grand Chamber held that Article 19(1) TEU applies to national bodies that may rule on questions concerning EU law. The dispute involved a reduction in the remuneration of judges at Portugal’s Court of Auditors. The decision did not turn every budget measure into a judicial-independence violation. It required the national system to provide effective protection through courts whose independence is secured. C-606/24 develops the same institutional discipline in a different setting: the issue is not a pay cut imposed on judges, but a procedural obligation imposed on panels hearing public-pay disputes.
In Hann-Invest and Others, Joined Cases C-554/21, C-622/21 and C-727/21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:594, judgment of 11 July 2024, the Grand Chamber examined judicial organisation and the involvement of court management in the allocation or handling of decisions. The Court linked the requirement of a tribunal established by law to rules that prevent the judicial system from being left to executive discretion. C-606/24 follows that method: the question is whether the intervention of the Romanian supreme court is determined by law, by objective criteria, and by a defined legal function, rather than by an ad hoc instruction that can steer a politically sensitive case.
The “previously established by law” guarantee is not a technical label. Article 47 of the Charter entitles everyone to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by “an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.” A litigant may therefore ask at least four questions about a domestic referral system. Was the competent body identified before the dispute? Are the referral triggers sufficiently clear? Can the parties make submissions before the higher court answers? Does the original court retain power to decide the evidence and the result? The answers help separate a lawful consistency mechanism from an arrangement that reallocates adjudication to an institution not assigned the task by law.
Speed was also part of the CJEU’s assessment. The Romanian mechanism gave the High Court of Cassation and Justice 60 days to rule on the preliminary legal point, while the ordinary Article 520(12) route in the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure allowed a longer period of three months. The existence of a stay is not automatically incompatible with a reasonable-time requirement. A short, defined stay can prevent hundreds of courts from reaching contradictory conclusions and forcing parties through years of appeals. A stay with no clear trigger, no reasoned admissibility decision, no participation rights and no practical end point would raise a different problem.
The French comparison is useful precisely because it is not identical. Article L441-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation allows a French court to request an advisory opinion from the Cour de cassation when a new serious legal question arises in numerous disputes. The current provision is available in civil, criminal and other judicial matters under its statutory conditions, but it is an advisory-opinion route, not a general compulsory transfer of every new point in a specified class of cases. The text is available on Légifrance, Article L441-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation. A French lawyer comparing the systems should not describe the French mechanism as a domestic equivalent of OUG No 62/2024. Its discretionary character and its relationship with the deciding court are materially different.
French procedural law also reflects the distinction between review of legality and decision on the merits. Article 604 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the cassation appeal as seeking to have the decision censured for non-conformity with legal rules. That function is different from deciding the facts in the first instance. The comparison reinforces the point made by the CJEU: a higher court may control the legal framework while the trial court retains the task of resolving the dispute within that framework.
Two constitutional provisions also shape the French setting. Article 55 of the Constitution gives duly ratified or approved treaties, subject to reciprocity, authority above statutes. Article 88-1 of the Constitution states that the Republic participates in the European Union constituted by States that have chosen to exercise certain competences in common under the TEU and TFEU. Those provisions do not replace Article 267 TFEU or the CJEU’s case-law, but they are part of the domestic legal context in which a French court must give effect to EU obligations.
The Cour de cassation’s own information and decisions show why a domestic court cannot treat a Luxembourg reference as an administrative courtesy. In Criminal Chamber, 7 April 2011, appeal no. 10-15.656, the Court addressed the Article 267 obligation of a court ruling at last instance and recognised the established-answer exception: a national final court does not have to ask a question that has already received a materially identical answer. In Civil Chamber, 18 November 2015, appeal no. 14-26.482, it held that a Court of Appeal had not exceeded its powers by referring a question to the CJEU and treated the immediate appeal against the stay and reference as inadmissible. These are precise French illustrations of the autonomy that Article 267 gives to the court seised of the dispute.
The French Cour de cassation’s official QPC procedure page is also relevant to litigators managing parallel questions. A party may want a constitutional review of a French provision and a preliminary ruling on EU law. The two routes have different sources, objects and procedural consequences. The CJEU’s decision in Melki and Abdeli, discussed below, prevents a national priority mechanism from removing the national court’s ability to refer an EU-law question when that question is necessary to decide the case. The practical issue is sequencing, not a choice between constitutional identity and EU effectiveness.
For international businesses, the commercial effect is concrete. A group operating through France and Romania may face a domestic decision on pay, procurement, tax, social security, sanctions or market access while the same EU-law provision is being interpreted elsewhere. C-606/24 suggests that a central consistency route can be useful if it supplies a prompt and reasoned domestic answer. It does not allow a Member State to create a procedural funnel that delays or neutralises a reference to the CJEU. Counsel should therefore map both tracks from the first pleading: the domestic question sent to the supreme court and the EU question that only Luxembourg can answer.
II. What does the ruling mean for EU law and French litigation?
A. How does Article 267 TFEU limit a national supreme-court mechanism?
Article 267 TFEU is the controlling safeguard. It gives the CJEU jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Treaties and on the validity and interpretation of acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies. A national court may refer a question when an answer is necessary to give judgment. A court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law must refer when such a question is raised, subject to the case-law exceptions. The Treaty language is direct: a final court “shall bring the matter before the Court.” A domestic supreme court cannot turn that Treaty relationship into an optional consultation with itself.
C-606/24 makes the boundary explicit. The Romanian referral may delay the national case so that the High Court of Cassation and Justice can answer a new point of Romanian law. It must not prevent a national court from sending a question about EU law to the CJEU. The lower court can refer before the case reaches the domestic supreme court, and it can refer after the domestic answer if an EU-law issue remains. The national mechanism must also preserve the court’s discretion to choose the procedural stage at which the Luxembourg reference is made.
The Court’s earlier ruling in Melki and Abdeli, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, judgment of 22 June 2010, supplies the French constitutional-procedure analogy. The case arose from a French priority constitutional question mechanism. The CJEU held that Article 267 precluded national rules that required a court to decide the constitutional question first in circumstances that prevented it from referring EU-law questions, either before the priority review or after the constitutional court’s ruling. The principle is functional: a national procedural priority cannot deprive the national judge of the role assigned by EU law.
In Elchinov, C-173/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581, judgment of 5 October 2010, the Court confirmed that a lower national court must remain able to apply EU law as interpreted by the CJEU, even where national procedural law ordinarily binds it to a higher court’s legal ruling. C-606/24 uses that logic in its paragraph 79. After receiving a preliminary decision from the Romanian supreme court, the lower court cannot be bound by that domestic ruling if, in light of the CJEU’s interpretation under Article 267, the ruling is inconsistent with EU law. The domestic hierarchy remains real, but it is not the final authority on the meaning or validity of EU law.
The same limit applies to the domestic supreme court itself. The CJEU stated that OUG No 62/2024 must be interpreted so that the High Court of Cassation and Justice can stay the proceedings before it and refer its own EU-law question to Luxembourg. That conclusion follows from the principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with EU law, subject to the prohibition on a contra legem interpretation. The official judgment cites KUBERA, C-144/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:881, judgment of 15 October 2024, for the requirement that national courts use recognised interpretative methods to give EU provisions full effect. A domestic rule cannot be read as silently closing the only EU-law exit from a mandatory national referral.
The distinction between domestic and EU questions should be stated with care. A Romanian court might ask the High Court of Cassation and Justice what a national salary statute means, whether an implementing regulation applies, or whether a domestic limitation rule is triggered. It might ask the CJEU whether an EU directive, regulation or Treaty provision has a particular meaning, whether a national measure is precluded, or whether an EU act is valid. The same dispute can contain both kinds of question. The proper response is not to label the entire case “domestic” because the claim is based on a Romanian statute. It is to separate the legal propositions and send each to the institution competent to answer it.
The Charter’s scope must also be pleaded precisely. Article 51(1) is available where the Member State is implementing EU law. A party should identify the EU instrument, provision or Treaty freedom that supplies the link. If that link cannot be shown, Article 47 may not directly govern the merits of a purely domestic dispute. Article 19(1) TEU can still impose structural requirements on a national court that may rule in fields covered by Union law, as C-606/24 explains. Poorly framed Charter pleadings can therefore distract from a stronger Article 19 and Article 267 argument.
Judicial independence is likewise not a claim that every judge must be free from every form of legal coordination. The CJEU accepted that consistent interpretation can protect equality and predictability. The objection becomes stronger when the higher court’s intervention is triggered by vague political criteria, when it can decide facts outside its lawful function, when parties cannot participate, when the stay is indefinite, or when the lower court cannot depart from a domestic answer that conflicts with EU law. The test is not whether the supreme court speaks. It is whether its intervention leaves effective judicial protection and the preliminary-ruling dialogue intact.
That is why legal certainty cannot be reduced to fiscal convenience. The Romanian referring court had raised the possibility that inconsistent case-law could affect the consolidated general budget and socio-economic stability. Such consequences may explain why a government wants rapid harmonisation. They do not, on their own, alter Article 267’s allocation of authority. A budgetary objective can justify designing an efficient procedure; it cannot authorise a procedure that makes EU-law referrals impossible or gives a domestic answer precedence over the CJEU’s binding interpretation.
For cross-border counsel, the result is a two-level escalation model. First, test whether the domestic point satisfies the national referral statute and ask the referring panel to make a clear record. Second, test whether the dispute also raises an EU-law question and preserve a separate Article 267 request. If the panel declines, record the reasons and the consequence for the result. If the panel refers only the domestic point, reassess the EU issue after the national answer. If the matter reaches a final national court, analyse the established-case-law and acte-clair exceptions carefully rather than assuming that the domestic referral has discharged the Treaty duty.
B. What should lawyers and litigants do in France?
A French proceeding affected by C-606/24 may not use the Romanian ordinance directly, but the judgment offers a litigation checklist. The first step is to identify the EU-law hook. Is the dispute governed by a regulation with direct effect, a directive implemented by French legislation, a Treaty freedom, an EU sanctions regime, a mutual-recognition instrument, or a procedural guarantee falling within the field of Union law? State the specific provision and explain why its interpretation is necessary to the result. A generic reference to “European law” is unlikely to demonstrate necessity.
The second step is to separate the questions. A French court may need to interpret the French rule that transposes an EU directive and also ask whether the directive permits the result. The first issue belongs to the French court; the second may require Luxembourg. If a party challenges the constitutional validity of the French transposition rule, a QPC may be relevant, but Melki and Abdeli means that the QPC sequence cannot suppress a necessary Article 267 reference. The pleading should show what the court can decide itself, what only the CJEU can decide, and why the order of questions does not deprive the parties of effective protection.
The third step is to address the final-instance duty. The Cour de cassation’s 7 April 2011 decision, appeal no. 10-15.656, is a useful reminder that the Article 267 duty is not mechanical where the CJEU has already answered a materially identical question. But the exception is narrower than a court’s assertion that the answer feels obvious. Counsel should compare the legal provision, factual setting, relevant time period and issue actually decided. If a sanctions regulation, extradition framework decision or cross-border enforcement rule has changed, an older ruling may not resolve the new question. The record should explain the difference in a way that another court can review.
The fourth step is to ask for a reasoned order. A court that grants or refuses a preliminary reference should identify the EU provision, the factual premise, the necessity of the answer and the relation between the question and the operative part sought. Under Article 455 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment must state the parties’ claims and grounds and set out the operative part; that domestic duty reinforces the need for an intelligible reference decision. A reasoned record protects both sides. It lets the opposing party challenge an irrelevant reference, and it lets the applicant show on appeal that a refusal ignored a serious EU-law uncertainty. The 18 November 2015 Cour de cassation decision, appeal no. 14-26.482, supports the principle that an appellate court can refer a question and stay the case within its judicial function.
The fifth step is to control delay. A Luxembourg reference is not a strategy for suspending a case without an end date. The party seeking it should define the question narrowly, provide the necessary factual assumptions, identify the urgent consequences and explain which domestic issues can continue. The party opposing it should distinguish a genuine EU-law uncertainty from a question whose answer is already clear, unnecessary or detached from the claim. Where assets may move, a licence may expire, an arrest warrant may be executed, or a business may lose access to a market, counsel should address interim relief under the applicable French and EU instruments rather than treating the reference as a substitute for protection.
The sixth step is to preserve the right to refer after a domestic advisory opinion or supreme-court answer. Article L441-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation can help a French court obtain guidance on a new serious national question. It does not answer the EU-law question and should not be presented as if the Cour de cassation were replacing the CJEU. If the advisory answer adopts an interpretation that creates an EU-law concern, the original court must still assess whether Article 267 requires a reference. The same logic applies to an answer from a foreign supreme court that is persuasive or binding under foreign procedural law but appears inconsistent with EU law.
Businesses should build this analysis into transaction and dispute planning. A compliance team facing EU sanctions can record the exact listed-entity provision, the domestic implementing act, the competent French court and the evidence needed to challenge a freeze. An employer with staff or payroll operations in several Member States can identify whether a pay claim turns on an EU equality or social-security rule in addition to domestic salary law. A company enforcing a judgment across borders can distinguish recognition mechanics from the EU instrument’s autonomous meaning. C-606/24 is especially relevant when a foreign procedural rule promises quick consistency: speed helps only if the route remains open to Luxembourg.
Individuals should make the same distinction at a smaller scale. A worker challenging a public-authority decision should obtain the domestic statute, any implementing measure, the date of the contested decision, and the EU provision said to be engaged. A person facing an EU arrest-warrant, asset-freeze or cross-border enforcement issue should preserve the underlying decision and the procedural deadlines in every jurisdiction. A lawyer can then decide whether to request a French advisory opinion, a CJEU reference, an urgent domestic measure, or a combination. The legal remedy depends on the exact question, not on the fact that another court somewhere in Europe has been asked to interpret a similar phrase.
There is also a communications lesson. The headline “Romania’s supreme court can overrule lower courts” would misstate C-606/24. The holding is narrower: Romania may require a preliminary domestic referral in defined circumstances when the supreme court gives an abstract answer and the lower court keeps the merits. The headline “the EU Court rejects national judicial hierarchy” would be equally wrong. The CJEU recognised the legitimate aim of consistent case-law and rejected a challenge to the mechanism in principle. The decisive qualification is that the domestic process must not prevent national courts from referring EU-law questions, must not remove their stage-by-stage discretion, and must allow the supreme court itself to refer onward.
For French advocates, the most useful pleading paragraph may be a short institutional map. Identify the French court’s power to decide the national rule; identify the CJEU’s power under Article 267; identify the national final-instance obligation if applicable; identify the Article 19(1) TEU requirement of effective protection; and identify the procedural safeguard sought, such as a stay limited to the necessary question, an interim measure, or a reasoned referral order. That map makes the application concrete and prevents the court from treating a serious EU-law issue as an abstract constitutional complaint.
Finally, counsel should verify the current text of every cited provision and the status of every proceeding. The legal regime for sanctions, extradition, public remuneration and judicial organisation can change quickly. The official Article 19 TEU text, Article 47 of the Charter, Article 51 of the Charter and Article 267 TFEU should be read with the operative judgment in C-606/24. Official sources do not remove the need for legal judgment; they make the judgment auditable and preserve the exact wording on which a procedural objection may turn.
Conclusion
C-606/24 is a procedural ruling with a constitutional consequence. The CJEU accepts that a Member State may require a national court to obtain a supreme-court answer on a new domestic point when the mechanism is defined by law, supports consistency and leaves the original court in charge of the merits. The ruling does not permit a national system to close the Article 267 route. Lower courts must remain able to refer EU-law questions before or after the domestic process; they cannot be forced to apply a domestic legal answer that conflicts with Luxembourg’s interpretation; and the national supreme court must itself be able to refer when EU law requires it.
For French and international litigants, the practical message is to draw the institutional boundary early. Use the French court for French law and facts, the Cour de cassation’s advisory machinery only within its statutory role, and the CJEU for the meaning and validity of EU law. A well-framed application will identify the EU provision, prove necessity, protect against delay and preserve the right to a later reference. That is how a domestic consistency mechanism can improve predictability without becoming a barrier to effective judicial protection.
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